[Cite as State v. Bowen, 2020-Ohio-24.]
COURT OF APPEALS
HOLMES COUNTY, OHIO
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
STATE OF OHIO JUDGES:
Hon. William B. Hoffman, P.J
Plaintiff-Appellee Hon. John W. Wise, J.
Hon. Patricia A. Delaney, J.
-vs-
Case No. 19CA0007
ROBERT C. BOWEN
Defendant-Appellant O P I N IO N
CHARACTER OF PROCEEDINGS: Appeal from the Holmes County Court of
Common Pleas, Case No. 18CR0058
JUDGMENT: Affirmed
DATE OF JUDGMENT ENTRY: January 6, 2020
APPEARANCES:
For Plaintiff-Appellee For Defendant-Appellant
ROBERT K. HENDRIX ERIC J. ALLEN
Assistant Prosecuting Attorney The Law Office of Eric J. Allen, Ltd.
Holmes County, Ohio 4200 Regent, Suite 200
164 E. Jackson Street Columbus, Ohio 43219
Millersburg, Ohio 44654
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 2
Hoffman, P.J.
{¶1} Defendant-appellant Robert C. Bowen appeals his convictions and
sentence entered by the Holmes County Court of Common Pleas, on one count of rape
and four counts of sexual battery, following a jury trial. Plaintiff-appellee is the state of
Ohio.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE AND FACTS
{¶2} On June 4, 2018, the Holmes County Grand Jury indicted Appellant on one
count of rape, in violation of R.C. 2907.02(A)(2) and (B), a felony of the first degree; and
four counts of sexual battery, in violation of R.C. 2907.03(A)(5) and (B), felonies of the
third degree. The charges arose from incidents involving Appellant’s adopted daughter
(“the Child”). Appellant appeared before the trial court for arraignment on June 12, 2018,
and entered pleas of not guilty to all of the charges.
{¶3} The matter proceeded to jury trial on January 28, 2019. The following
evidence was adduced at trial.
{¶4} Mary Bowen testified she and Appellant were married on July 4, 2011.
Although they were still legally married at the time of the trial, Bowen indicated they had
been separated for over a year. Bowen and Appellant became foster parents to the Child
in September, 2012, and the child’s sister in November, 2012. Bowen and Appellant
adopted both children on March 24, 2014. Bowen conceded the Child and her sister had
behavioral problems.
{¶5} Bowen explained the Child and her sister were homeschooled after the
Child’s sister called in a bomb threat to her elementary school. Bowen worked six days
a week, usually from 7:30 a.m. to 5:30 or 6:00 p.m., but worked close enough to their
home to check on the children during her lunch hour.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 3
{¶6} In June, 2016, when the Child was 15 years old, she disclosed to Bowen
Appellant had touched her inappropriately. Bowen explained the Child had snuck out of
the house around midnight one evening to meet a 19 or 20 year old young man, and did
not return until 3:30 a.m. Bowen confronted the Child, telling her the young man would
get in trouble if she (Bowen) called the police. The Child responded Bowen should call
the police about Appellant as he had touched her. Bowen questioned Appellant, who
denied any wrongdoing. The Child later told Bowen she was lying. The Child returned
to public school in September, 2017.
{¶7} In January, 2018, after the Child’s sister set a number of fires, Children’s
Services became involved with the family. The Child’s sister told Children’s Services
Appellant had been abusing her and the Child. When Children’s Services questioned the
Child regarding her sister’s disclosure, the Child denied any abuse by Appellant.
{¶8} Bowen recalled the Child attended her prom the weekend of April 21, 2018.
When the Child was at school the following Monday, the Child disclosed Appellant had
been abusing her. Bowen was instructed to bring the Child to Children’s Services and
thereafter learned about the Child’s disclosure. Bowen was contacted by Victim’s
Assistance and was informed Appellant had confessed.
{¶9} The Child testified, when she was 15 years old, Appellant entered her
bedroom and touched her breasts over her clothing. Appellant instructed her not to tell
her mother. The Child recalled it was the summer and she was sick. The Child detailed
another incident which occurred when she was still 15. She noted she was being
homeschooled at the time and needed help with algebra. The Child proceeded to
Appellant’s bedroom which was located in the basement of the home. Appellant began
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 4
to help her with her math, but then pushed her onto his bed and removed her clothes.
Appellant vaginally penetrated her. Appellant told the Child not to tell anyone or he would
not be her father anymore. Appellant also threatened to do the same to the Child’s sister
if the Child told anyone. After the incident, the Child hurriedly put on her clothes and
returned upstairs to finish her schoolwork. The Child testified Appellant had sexual
intercourse with her at least five times. Shortly before the Child turned 16, she disclosed
the abuse to Bowen. The Child admitted she later told Bowen she had made “the whole
thing up”. Tr. at 128.
{¶10} The Child testified, in January, 2018, she spoke with a detective and a social
worker after the Child’s sister had set a few fires in their home. The detective and the
social worker questioned the Child about Appellant, but she did not disclose the abuse at
that time. The Child disclosed the abuse to her boyfriend and a friend the night of her
prom, April 21, 2018. The following Monday, the Child met with Ms. Gilson, the school
liaison, and told the woman what Appellant had done to her. Ms. Gilson informed the
Child she was required to contact the authorities. When the Child returned home from
school, Bowen met her at the bus and told her Children’s Services needed to speak with
her. The Child met with Jacqueline Shaw and disclosed the abuse.
{¶11} Sergeant James Henry, a detective with the Holmes County Sheriff’s Office,
testified he interviewed Appellant on May 10, 2018. The interview was recorded and the
recording was played for the jury. During the interview, Appellant confessed to having a
sexual relationship with the Child. Det. Henry acknowledged the Child, during an
interview on January 9, 2018, initially denied any sexual contact with Appellant. The
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 5
detective explained it is not unusual for the victim of sexual abuse to initially not disclose
the abuse occurred, but subsequently, after counseling, is able to do so.
{¶12} Appellant testified on his own behalf. He explained he was contacted by
Det. Lay of the Millersburg Police Department, who requested Appellant come to the
station to speak with him. Appellant phoned Det. Lay and the two spoke on the telephone
for an hour. During the conversation, the detective set up a computerized voice stress
analyzer (“CVSA”). Several weeks later, in February, 2018, Appellant was interviewed
by Det. Lay. Appellant and the detective spoke for two hours, including the time
conducting the CVSA. Appellant did not hear from the detective again.
{¶13} On April 24, 2018, the Tuesday following the Child’s prom, Appellant
received a message he needed to call Job and Family Services. He was instructed to
contact Det. Henry. When Appellant initially sat down with Det. Henry, he assumed he
was being questioned about the situation with the Child’s sister. Appellant was shocked
by the allegations. Appellant denied confessing to Det. Henry and denied abusing the
Child.
{¶14} After hearing all the evidence and deliberating, the jury found Appellant
guilty of all five counts contained in the Indictment. The trial court sentenced Appellant
to an aggregated term of incarceration of ten years.
{¶15} It is from these convictions and sentence Appellant appeals, raising the
following assignments of error:
I. THE STATE OF OHIO FAILED TO PRODUCE SUFFICENT [SIC]
EVIDENCE TO CONVICT THE APPELLANT OF THE COUNTS IN THE
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 6
INDICTMENT IN VIOLATION OF HIS RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS UNDER
THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MADE APPLICABLE TO ALL STATE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS BY THE FOURTHEENTH [SIC]
AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
II. THE CONVICTIONS IN THIS MATTER ARE NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE VIOLATIVE OF THE
APPELLANT’S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED BY THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
III. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN IMPOSING
A PUNITIVE DISCOVER SANCTION THAT WAS NOT THE LEAST
RESTRICTIVE AND WAS VIOLATIVE OF HIS DUE PROCESS RIGHTS
UNDER THE FIFTH AMENDMENT MADE APPLICABLE TO ALL STATE
CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS BY THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT TO
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION.
IV. THE TRIAL COURT COMMITTED ERROR BY ALLOWING
DISCUSSION OF A CVSA TEST AND VIOLATED APPELLANT’S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS GUARANTEED TO HIM UNDER THE FIFTH
AMENDMENT TO THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION MADE APPLICABLE
TO STATE CRIMINAL PROSECUTIONS BY THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 7
I
{¶16} In his first assignment of error, Appellant contends his convictions were not
based upon sufficient evidence and the trial court erred in denying his Crim. R 29 motion
for acquittal.
{¶17} Criminal Rule 29(A) provides a court must order the entry of a judgment of
acquittal on a charged offense if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction on the
offense. Crim. R. 29(A). However, “a court shall not order an entry of judgment of acquittal
if the evidence is such that reasonable minds can reach different conclusions as to
whether each material element of a crime has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”
State v. Bridgeman, 55 Ohio St.2d 261, 381 N.E.2d 184 (1978), syllabus. Thus, a motion
for acquittal tests the sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Tatum, 3d Dist. Seneca No. 13-
10-18, 2011-Ohio-3005, 2011 WL 2448972, ¶ 43, citing State v. Miley, 114 Ohio App.3d
738, 742, 684 N.E.2d 102 (4th Dist. 1996).
{¶18} When an appellate court reviews a record for sufficiency, the relevant
inquiry is whether, after viewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution,
any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Monroe, 105 Ohio St.3d 384, 2005-Ohio-2282, 827
N.E.2d 285, ¶ 47. Sufficiency is a test of adequacy. State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d
380, 386, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997). Accordingly, the question of whether the offered
evidence is sufficient to sustain a verdict is a question of law. State v. Perkins, 3d Dist.
Hancock No. 5-13-01, 2014-Ohio-752, 2014 WL 855870, ¶ 30, citing Thompkins at 386,
678 N.E.2d 541.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 8
{¶19} Appellant was convicted of one count of rape, in violation of R.C.
2907.02(A)(2) and (B), which provides:
(A)(2) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another when
the offender purposely compels the other person to submit by force or threat
of force.
(B) Whoever violates this section is guilty of rape, a felony of the first
degree. * * *
{¶20} Appellant also was convicted of four counts of sexual battery, in violation of
R.C. 2907.03(A)(5), which provides:
(A) No person shall engage in sexual conduct with another, not the
spouse of the offender, when any of the following apply: * * *
(5) The offender is the other person's natural or adoptive parent, or
a stepparent, or guardian, custodian, or person in loco parentis of the other
person.
{¶21} With respect to the rape charge, Appellant submits the evidence was
insufficient as Appellant adamantly denied the incident giving rise to the rape charge and
there was no corroborating evidence. With respect to the sexual battery counts, Appellant
explains the Child testified there was only one incident involving force, which was the
basis for the rape charge.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 9
{¶22} The Ohio Supreme Court in State v. Eskridge, 38 Ohio St.3d 56, 526 N.E.2d
304(1988), a case involving the rape of a four year old by her father, addressed the
element of force in a rape count. The Ohio Supreme Court explained:
Force need not be overt and physically brutal, but can be subtle and
psychological. As long as it can be shown that the rape victim's will was
overcome by fear or duress, the forcible element of rape can be established.
State v. Martin (1946), 77 Ohio App. 553, 68 N.E.2d 807 [33 O.O. 364];
State v. Wolfenberger (1958), 106 Ohio App. 322, 154 N.E.2d 774 [7
O.O.2d 73]. In the within case, we are confronted with a child being told to
do something by an important figure of authority, and commanded not to tell
anyone about it. In such a case, we find nothing unreasonable about a
finding that the child's will was overcome. Consequently, the forcible
element of rape was properly established. State v. Fowler (1985), 27 Ohio
App.3d 149, 154, 27 OBR 182, 187, 500 N.E.2d 390, 395. Id. at 58-59.
{¶23} The evidence at trial established Appellant was the Child’s adoptive father.
The Child testified about an incident which occurred when she was 15 years old. She
was homeschooled at the time and needed help with algebra. The Child sought
Appellant’s assistance. She proceeded to Appellant’s bedroom. Appellant began to help
her with her math, but then pushed her onto his bed and removed her clothes. Appellant
vaginally penetrated her. Appellant told the Child not to tell anyone or he would not be
her father anymore. Appellant also threatened to do the same to the Child’s sister if the
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 10
Child told anyone. The Child stated Appellant had sexual intercourse with her at least
five times.
{¶24} We find coercion is inherent in parental authority when a father sexually
abuses his child. Further, we find Appellant’s threat of assaulting the Child’s sister was a
subtle and psychological force. The Child’s will was overcome by the fear and duress of
harm to her sibling. Accordingly, we find the forcible element of rape was properly
established. We also find the element of sexual battery were established. Bowen testified
she and Appellant were the Child’s adoptive parents. The Child detailed several incidents
during which Appellant engaged in sexual conduct with her.
{¶25} Based upon the foregoing, we find Appellant's convictions were based upon
sufficient evidence.
{¶26} Appellant’s first assignment of error is overruled.
II
{¶27} In his second assignment of error, Appellant challenges his convictions as
against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶28} In determining whether a verdict is against the manifest weight of the
evidence, the appellate court acts as a thirteenth juror and “in reviewing the entire record,
weighs the evidence and all reasonable inferences, considers the credibility of witnesses,
and determines whether in resolving conflicts in evidence the jury ‘clearly lost its way and
created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be reversed and
a new trial ordered’.” State v. Thompkins, 78 Ohio St.3d 380, 387, 678 N.E.2d 541 (1997),
quoting State v. Martin, 20 Ohio App.3d 172, 175, 485 N.E.2d 717 (1983).
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 11
{¶29} “The weight to be given the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses are
primarily for the trier of the facts.” State v. DeHass, 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 227 N.E.2d 212
(1967), at paragraph one of the syllabus. The trier of fact is in the best position to judge
the credibility of the witnesses.
{¶30} Appellant asserts the Child was not a credible witness for several reasons.
First, Appellant refers to the Child’s initial disclosure of the abuse to Bowen in 2016.
When Bowen confronted the Child after she was caught sneaking out of the house to
meet her boyfriend, the Child declared Appellant had abused her. The Child later
recanted her allegation, explaining she had lied to get herself out of trouble. Next,
Appellant points to the Child’s testimony she never told her sister about the abuse.
Appellant submits this statement was not credible as the two sisters were extremely close;
therefore, the Child would have told her sister about the abuse. Appellant adds the Child
acknowledged she was angry about the break-up of Bowen and Appellant’s marriage,
explaining her anger translated to revenge at Appellant. Finally, Appellant notes the Child
waited until 2018, to disclose the abuse to anyone.
{¶31} Det. James Henry testified it is not unusual for a victim to initially deny abuse
has occurred. In fact, when the Child was questioned during her cross-examination about
her January, 2018 denial, she commented, “Why would I want to tell four (4) strangers
what I was going through?” Tr. at 148. The Child finally acknowledged the abuse after
she had “worked up enough courage.” Tr. at 149.
{¶32} In addition, the videotape of Appellant’s interview with Det. Henry was
played for the jury. During the interview, Appellant confessed to the crimes. Appellant
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 12
did not, however, concede he threatened the Child not to tell anyone or forced her to have
intercourse with him on the first occasion.
{¶33} The jury was free to accept or reject any or all of the evidence offered by
the parties and assess the witnesses' credibility. Indeed, the jurors need not believe all of
a witness' testimony, but may accept only portions of it as true. State v. McGregor, 5th
Dist. Ashland No. 15-COA-023, 2016-Ohio-3082, 2016 WL 294299. The jury clearly
believed the testimony of the Child and the state’s other witnesses.
{¶34} Upon review of the entire record, including reading the entire transcript, we
find Appellant’s convictions were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶35} Appellant’s second assignment of error is overruled.
III
{¶36} In his third assignment of error, Appellant argues the trial court erred in
precluding the introduction of the Child’s text messages as a sanction for an alleged
discovery violation. Appellant maintains such sanction was not the least restrictive and
violated his right to due process.
{¶37} “Although a criminal defendant has the right to present witness testimony
on his behalf, a trial court may ‘exclude such evidence when the orderly administration of
justice is threatened by the accused's failure to promptly disclose witnesses.’ “ State v.
Calise, 9th Dist. No. 26027, 2012–Ohio–4797, ¶ 30, quoting State v. Moon, 74 Ohio
App.3d 162, 169, 598 N.E.2d 726 (9th Dist. 1991). “The rules of discovery, and more
specifically Crim. R. 16, imbue trial courts with the discretion to exclude testimony that is
not disclosed in a timely manner in order to prevent surprise and ensure a fair trial.” Calise
at ¶ 30, citing State v. Barrios, 9th Dist. No. 06CA009065, 2007–Ohio–7025, ¶ 18.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 13
“Exclusion is a permissible sanction ‘as long as it would not completely deny the
defendant his constitutional right to present a defense’.” Barrios at ¶ 18, quoting State v.
Sinkfield, 2d Dist. No. 18663, 2001 WL 1517314, *8 (Nov. 30, 2001). Because a trial
court's decision to exclude testimony is a discretionary one, we review a court's decision
to exclude evidence under an abuse of discretion standard of review. Barrios at ¶ 18. An
abuse of discretion implies that the trial court's attitude was unreasonable, arbitrary, or
unconscionable. Blakemore v. Blakemore, 5 Ohio St.3d 217, 219, 450 N.E.2d 1140
(1983).
{¶38} In Lakewood v. Papadelis, 32 Ohio St.3d 1, 511 N.E.2d 1138 (1987), the
Ohio Supreme Court stated, “[a] trial court must inquire into the circumstances
surrounding a discovery rule violation and, when deciding whether to impose a sanction,
must impose the least severe sanction that is consistent with the purpose of the rules of
discovery.” Id. at paragraph two of the syllabus. The High Court noted, “[t]he philosophy
of the Criminal Rules is to remove the element of gamesmanship from a trial.” Id. at *3.
(Citation omitted.) The Papadelis Court explained, “[t]he purpose of discovery rules is to
prevent surprise and the secreting of evidence favorable to one party. The overall purpose
is to produce a fair trial.” Id.
{¶39} In Papadelis, the Supreme Court also sets forth a list of factors to be
considered by the trial court prior to issuing a sanction. Those factors included: “the
extent to which the prosecution will be surprised or prejudiced by the witness' testimony,
the impact of witness preclusion on the evidence at trial and the outcome of the case,
whether violation of the discovery rules was willful or in bad faith, and the effectiveness
of less severe sanctions.” Id. at *5.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 14
{¶40} At trial, during the cross-examination of the Child, defense counsel sought
to introduce text messages, which were either to or from the Child’s phone, for the
purpose of refreshing her recollection. The state objected to the introduction of the text
message, indicating it had not received such in discovery. Defense counsel explained
she just recently obtained the text messages and did not know how the Child would testify.
The trial court would not allow defense counsel to use the text messages for any purpose.
Defense counsel noted her objection for the record.
{¶41} Assuming, arguendo, the trial court erred in excluding the text messages,
we find any error to be harmless. Appellant failed to make a proffer of the nature of text
messages. Without such a proffer, this Court cannot find Appellant was prejudiced by the
exclusion of the evidence.
{¶42} Appellant’s third assignment of error is overruled.
IV
{¶43} In his final assignment of error, Appellant maintains the trial court erred in
allowing discussion of a computerized voice stress analyzer test, and violated his right to
due process as a result. Specifically, Appellant argues the trial court should have
precluded defense counsel from questioning Det. Henry about why he did not offer
Appellant the opportunity to take a CVSA test.
{¶44} We review this assignment of error under a plain error analysis. In State v.
Thomas, 152 Ohio St.3d 15, 92 N.E.3d 821, 2017–Ohio–8011, he Ohio Supreme Court
clarified the standard of review for plain error:
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 15
Crim.R. 52(B) affords appellate courts discretion to correct “[p]lain
errors or defects affecting substantial rights” notwithstanding an accused's
failure to meet his obligation to bring those errors to the attention of the trial
court. However, the accused bears the burden to demonstrate plain error
on the record, State v. Quarterman, 140 Ohio St.3d 464, 2014–Ohio–4034,
19 N.E.3d 900, ¶ 16, and must show “an error, i.e., a deviation from a legal
rule” that constitutes “an ‘obvious’ defect in the trial proceedings,” State v.
Barnes, 94 Ohio St.3d 21, 27, 759 N.E.2d 1240 (2002).
Even if the error is obvious, it must have affected substantial rights,
and “[w]e have interpreted this aspect of the rule to mean that the trial
court's error must have affected the outcome of the trial.” Id. We recently
clarified in State v. Rogers, 143 Ohio St.3d 385, 2015–Ohio–2459, 38
N.E.3d 860, that the accused is “required to demonstrate a reasonable
probability that the error resulted in prejudice—the same deferential
standard for reviewing ineffective assistance of counsel claims.” (Emphasis
sic.) Id. at ¶ 22, citing United States v. Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74,
81–83, 124 S.Ct. 2333, 159 L.Ed.2d 157 (2004).
If the accused shows that the trial court committed plain error
affecting the outcome of the proceeding, an appellate court is not required
to correct it; we have “admonish[ed] courts to notice plain error ‘with the
utmost caution, under exceptional circumstances and only to prevent a
manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” (Emphasis added.) Barnes at 27, 759
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 16
N.E.2d 1240, quoting State v. Long, 53 Ohio St.2d 91, 372 N.E.2d 804
(1978), paragraph three of the syllabus.
Id. at ¶¶ 32–34.
{¶45} During her cross-examination of Det. Henry, defense counsel asked the
detective if he had offered Appellant an opportunity to take a CVSA or lie detector test to
“confirm his confession.” Tr. at 206. Det. Henry responded he would have offered the
test if Appellant had not confessed. The detective would not concede the test would be
a tool to further verify or support Appellant’s confession. Det. Henry explained he does
“believe in them” and will only offer the test as a chance to conduct a second interview.
{¶46} We find Appellant opened the door to this line of questioning and Appellant
has failed to establish the alleged plain error affected the outcome of the trial. Det. Henry
stated he did not believe in CVSA’s or polygraphs, and utilized them only as a means to
a second interview with an accused. The detective’s testimony neither incriminated nor
cleared Appellant. Accordingly, we find no error, plain or otherwise.
Holmes County, Case No. 19CA0007 17
{¶47} Appellant’s fourth assignment of error is overruled.
{¶48} The judgment of the Holmes County Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
By: Hoffman, P.J.
Wise, John, J. and
Delaney, J. concur