NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-6013-17T3
IN THE MATTER OF
MUHAMMED OJIBARA
FIRE FIGHTER (M1540T),
IRVINGTON.
___________________________
Submitted December 18, 2019 – Decided January 9, 2020
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Mawla.
On appeal from the New Jersey Civil Service
Commission, Docket No. 2018-2920.
Eldridge T. Hawkins, attorney for appellant
Muhammed Ojibara.
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent Civil Service Commission (Donna Sue
Arons, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Beau
Charles Wilson, Deputy Attorney General, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Muhammed Ojibara was arrested on three outstanding warrants
when he appeared for an interview with the Township of Irvington for a fire
fighter position. As a result, the appointing authority removed Ojibara's name
from the fire fighter eligibility list and on July 20, 2018, the Civil Service
Commission denied his appeal seeking restoration to the eligibility list. Ojibara
challenges the Commission's final agency decision. We affirm.
Ojibara's arrest occurred on September 14, 2016, under N.J.A.C. 16:87-
2.2(a)(1) on a 2007 Newark and a 2008 Jersey City warrant for failure or refusal
to pay prescribed fare and a 2008 Newark warrant for evading or attempting to
evade payment. Ojibara appealed from the appointing authority's decision to
remove him from the eligibility list, arguing he did not receive any of the
summonses and was not using public transportation at the time of the incidents.
He also claimed the Jersey City charge was dismissed and provided proof the
Newark charges were dismissed on September 26 and 28, 2016. He argued the
appointing authority's background check revealed no arrests or convictions and
provided a letter from the State Police to that effect.
In its written decision, the Commission concluded Ojibara's arrest
adversely related to his employment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 11A:4-11 and N.J.A.C.
4A:4-4.7(a)(4). The Commission reasoned the documentation Ojibara provided
relating to the dismissal of the warrants did not substantiate his claims because
the warrants were not dismissed until after his arrest. Additionally, the
Commission found Ojibara did not provide evidence to prove his claim—he was
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not involved in the underlying incidents which led to the issuance of the
warrants. The Commission concluded:
In this matter, [Ojibara's] adverse background
information pertaining to the warrants and charges
against him, as well as his arrest that occurred in
September 2016[,] are relevant to the position sought,
as such conduct is indicative of [his] exercise of poor
judgment, which is not conducive to the performance
of the duties of a [f]ire [f]ighter. . . . [T]he [public]
expects [f]ire [f]ighters to present a personal
background that exhibits respect for the law and the
rules. Accordingly, the appointing authority has
presented sufficient cause to remove [Ojibara's] name
from the [f]ire [f]ighter Irvington eligibl[ity] list.
Where an agency, such as the Commission, issues a final decision, our
review is limited. See Lavezzi v. State, 219 N.J. 163, 172 (2014). We will not
disturb the final determination of an agency unless it was "'arbitrary, capricious
or unreasonable, or it is not supported by substantial credible evidence in the
record as a whole.'" Id. at 171 (quoting Prado v. State, 186 N.J. 413, 427
(2006)). This highly deferential standard reflects the Commission's expertise in
administering its legislative authority. In re Stallworth, 208 N.J. 182, 194-95
(2011).
Ojibara argues the Commission exceeded the authority the Legislature
granted it. He asserts the New Jersey Constitution prohibits the delegation of
legislative authority to an executive agency. He contends a discrimination
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complaint he filed in federal court supersedes the Commission's authority to
remove him from the eligibility list.
Ojibara's arguments relating to the Commission's authority are legally
unsupported. The Legislature expressly granted the Commission authority to
"promulgate . . . rules and regulations to effectuate the purposes of [the Civil
Service A]ct." N.J.S.A. 11A:4-1.2.
Furthermore, sufficient credible evidence on the record as a whole
supports the Commission's decision. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(D). In matters involving
disqualification appeals, an appellant bears the burden of proof to show the
agency committed reversible error. N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.3(b). N.J.A.C. 4A:4-6.1
states "[a] person may be denied . . . appointment [for]: . . . (9) Other sufficient
reasons." We stated the Commission "has historically construed this regulatio n
as allowing an appointing authority to consider an applicant's arrest in
determining his qualification for . . . fire fighter civil service positions." Tharpe
v. City of Newark Police Dep't, 261 N.J. Super. 401, 405 (App. Div. 1992). An
arrest may "'warrant the removal of an appellant's name particularly where the
position sought involves enforcement or administration of the law.'" In re J.B.,
386 N.J. Super. 512, 515 (App. Div. 2006) (quoting Tharpe, 261 N.J. Super. at
406).
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The Supreme Court has stated fire fighters work closely with police in an
"almost symbiotic relationship." Karins v. City of Atlantic City, 152 N.J. 532,
552 (1998). As a result, "[a]ny conduct jeopardizing [such] an excellen t
working relationship places at risk the citizens of the municipality as well as the
men and women of those departments who place their lives on the line on a daily
basis." Ibid.
Ojibara demonstrated poor judgment warranting his disqualification for
several reasons. He appeared for a job interview with three active warrants for
his arrest. The warrants were mailed to his return address, which rebutted his
claims he did not receive notice. He provided no support for the claim he did
not commit the infractions which led to the issuance of the warrants. The
dismissal of the warrants after his arrest did not cure these issues. For these
reasons, the Commission's decision was neither arbitrary, capricious nor
unreasonable, and was instead supported by the credible evidence.
Ojibara's remaining arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant
discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
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