17-4071
Jiang v. Barr
BIA
A200 939 375
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER
FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF
APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER
IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN
ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY
ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
3 United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
4 New York, on the 13th day of January, two thousand twenty.
5
6 PRESENT:
7 JON O. NEWMAN,
8 JOHN M. WALKER, JR.,
9 Circuit Judges.1
10 _____________________________________
11
12 WEI HUA JIANG,
13 Petitioner,
14
15 v. 17-4071
16 NAC
17 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
18 ATTORNEY GENERAL,
19 Respondent.
20 _____________________________________
21
22 FOR PETITIONER: Gary J. Yerman, New York, NY.
23
24 FOR RESPONDENT: Chad A. Readler, Acting Assistant
25 Attorney General; Melissa Neiman-
26 Kelting, Assistant Director; Sara
27 J. Bayram, Trial Attorney, Office
1The panel originally included Circuit Judge Christopher F. Droney, who fully
retired from the court on December 31, 2019. This case is decided by the
remaining two judges, consistent with section E(b) of the Internal Operating
Procedures of the Second Circuit.
1 of Immigration Litigation, United
2 States Department of Justice,
3 Washington, DC.
4 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
5 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
6 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
7 is DENIED.
8 Petitioner Wei Hua Jiang, a native and citizen of the
9 People’s Republic of China, seeks review of a December 4,
10 2017, decision of the BIA denying Jiang’s motion to reopen
11 his removal proceedings. In re Wei Hua Jiang, No. A 200 939
12 375 (B.I.A. Dec. 4, 2017). We assume the parties’
13 familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history
14 in this case.
15 We review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of
16 discretion and the BIA’s country conditions determination for
17 substantial evidence. Jian Hui Shao v. Mukasey, 546 F.3d
18 138, 168-69 (2d Cir. 2008). An alien seeking to reopen may
19 file one motion to reopen no later than 90 days after the
20 final administrative decision. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A),
21 (C)(i); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). It is undisputed that
22 Jiang’s motion to reopen filed in 2017 was untimely because
2
1 it was filed more than four years after the 2012 final
2 administrative decision. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i);
3 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). This time limitation is excused if
4 the motion is filed in order to apply for asylum “based on
5 changed country conditions arising in the country of
6 nationality or the country to which removal has been ordered,
7 if such evidence is material and was not available and would
8 not have been discovered or presented at the previous
9 proceedings.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also
10 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Substantial evidence supports
11 the agency’s conclusion that Jiang’s evidence was
12 insufficient to establish a material change in conditions in
13 his home province of Fujian.
14 The country conditions evidence reveals that the Chinese
15 government’s treatment of Christians has remained consistent
16 since Jiang’s 2011 hearing. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N.
17 Dec. 247, 253 (BIA 2007) (“In determining whether evidence
18 accompanying a motion to reopen demonstrates a material
19 change in country conditions that would justify reopening,
20 [the agency] compare[s] the evidence of country conditions
21 submitted with the motion to those that existed at the time
3
1 of the merits hearing below.”). The United States has
2 designated China as a “Country of Particular Concern” under
3 the Religious Freedom Act since 1999. The record
4 demonstrates that since at least 2011, Christians attending
5 unauthorized churches in certain areas in China have faced
6 repression.
7 As evidence that conditions have worsened, Jiang cites
8 2016 reports for the proposition that “the Chinese government
9 has a strong will to promote ‘Sinicization’ of house churches
10 and religious activities.” This statement, however, does not
11 demonstrate an increase in persecution because it does not
12 connect the new policy to incidents of harm amounting to
13 persecution or changed treatment of Christian worshippers.
14 See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii) (requiring material change
15 in conditions); In re S-Y-G-, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 257 (“Change
16 that is incremental or incidental does not meet the regulatory
17 requirements for late motions of this type.”).
18 Moreover, even though the Chinese government announced a
19 Sinicization policy, and even if the persecution of
20 Christians increased in some areas of China, Jiang’s evidence
21 did not show an increase in persecution in his home province,
4
1 Fujian. When conditions vary throughout a country, an
2 applicant is required to show a material change in conditions
3 in his area. See Jian Hui Shao, 546 F.3d at 170 (reasoning
4 that, when policies “vary widely from one area of the country
5 to another . . . . it is appropriate to review the evidence
6 to determine, first, what policy applies to the circumstances
7 at issue and, second, whether local officials would be
8 inclined to view the petitioner’s actions as a violation of
9 that policy”). However, the only new evidence that Jiang
10 cites regarding persecution of Christians in Fujian Province
11 describes demolitions of unregistered churches. Given his
12 2011 evidence that the Chinese government pressured
13 unregistered churches to affiliate with patriotic religious
14 associations, Jiang’s new evidence demonstrates not an
15 increase in subjugation of Christian groups but rather a
16 continuation of a decades-long government effort to control
17 religious doctrine, repress unsanctioned religious groups,
18 and crack down on religious growth. See In re S-Y-G-, 24 I.
19 & N. Dec. at 257.
20 Therefore, because the agency reasonably concluded that
21 Jiang’s evidence failed to demonstrate a material change in
5
1 conditions as needed to excuse the untimely filing of his
2 motion, the agency did not abuse its discretion in denying
3 his motion to reopen. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C).
4 Because this finding is dispositive, we do not reach the
5 agency’s alternative finding that Jiang failed to establish
6 his prima facie eligibility for relief. See INS v.
7 Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976) (“As a general rule courts
8 and agencies are not required to make findings on issues the
9 decision of which is unnecessary to the results they reach.”).
10 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
11 DENIED. As we have completed our review, any stay of removal
12 that the Court previously granted in this petition is VACATED,
13 and any pending motion for a stay of removal in this petition
14 is DISMISSED as moot. Any pending request for oral argument
15 in this petition is DENIED in accordance with Federal Rule of
16 Appellate Procedure 34(a)(2), and Second Circuit Local Rule
17 34.1(b).
18 FOR THE COURT:
19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
20 Clerk of Court
21
6