DCPP VS. J.O., H.J., F.T.A., R.K.M., AND K.H., IN THE MATTER OF O.S.J., J.T.O., M.O., M.O., AND B.O. (FN-21-0116-18, WARREN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1817-18T3
NEW JERSEY DIVISION
OF CHILD PROTECTION
AND PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
J.O.,
Defendant-Appellant,
and
H.J., F.T.A., R.K.M. and K.H.,
Defendants.
_____________________________
IN THE MATTER OF O.S.J.,
J.T.O., M.O., M.O., and B.O.,
Minors.
_____________________________
Argued telephonically November 22, 2019 –
Decided January 14, 2020
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Warren County,
Docket No. FN-21-0116-18.
David Anthony Gies, Designated Counsel, argued the
cause for appellant (Joseph E. Krakora, Public
Defender, attorney; Robyn A. Veasey, Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel; David Anthony Gies, on the
briefs).
Amy M. Mc Kinsey, Deputy Attorney General, argued
the cause for respondent (Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney
General, attorney; Jane C. Schuster, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Amy M. Mc Kinsey, on the brief).
Noel Christian Devlin, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, argued the cause for minors (Joseph E.
Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney;
Olivia Belfatto Crisp, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
The Division of Child Protection and Permanency (the Division) filed this
Title 9 action charging defendant J.O. with abuse and neglect of four of her six
children who were between the ages of one and thirteen when she voluntarily
stopped taking her methadone treatment, triggering a week-long psychotic
episode, in which she failed to seek proper assistance. Following a two-day
fact-finding hearing, Judge Haekyoung Suh issued an order and a twenty-nine-
A-1817-18T3
2
page written decision on October 30, 2018, determining defendant's 1 conduct
constituted abuse and neglect under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b). 2
Defendant argues on appeal:
POINT ONE
THE FAMILY PART JUDGE'S CONCLUSION THAT
J.O.'S CONDUCT WAS GROSSLY NEGLIGENT IS
ERRONEOUS WHERE IT CATEGORICALLY
THEORIZED THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE SOUGHT
HELP GIVEN HER MENTAL HEALTH STATUS.
POINT TWO
WITHOUT CHALLENGING THE CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESSES, THE FAMILY PART JUDGE'S
FINDINGS OF HARM AND OF IMMINENT RISK
OF HARM WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY
COMPETENT, RELEVANT AND CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE.
The Law Guardian supports the finding of abuse and neglect on appeal as it did
before the trial judge.
We will not recite in detail the history of the Division's interactions with
defendant and the children. Instead, we incorporate by reference the factual
1
Although this case lists multiple defendants, unless otherwise indicated, any
reference to defendant is only to J.O.
2
On November 15, 2018, the matter was dismissed in order to proceed under a
Title 30 termination of parental rights complaint.
A-1817-18T3
3
findings and legal conclusions contained in Judge Suh's decision. Based on our
review of the record and applicable law, we are satisfied that the evidence in
favor of the abuse and neglect charges strongly supports Judge Suh's findings.
We add the following brief comments and highlight some significant
conclusions in the judge's decision.
N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c)(4)(b) provides:
"Abused or neglected child" means . . . a child whose
physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming
impaired as the result of the failure of his parent or
guardian . . . to exercise a minimum degree of care . . .
in providing the child with proper supervision or
guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to
be inflicted harm, or substantial risk thereof, including
the infliction of excessive corporal punishment; or by
any other acts of a similarly serious nature requiring the
aid of the court.
[(Emphasis added).]
In her thoughtful opinion, Judge Suh found defendant's failure to comply
with her substance abuse treatment, then not seek proper help, "reach[ed] a
different level," that constituted abuse and neglect. Ibid. The judge wrote:
The court finds [defendant] failed to exercise a
minimum degree of care when she unilaterally stopped
her methadone maintenance treatment program, which
triggered her psychosis. She could have reported the
hallucinations to her . . . therapist and received
immediate care had she adhered to the court's . . . order
A-1817-18T3
4
and engaged in individual counseling. Instead, she
allowed the delusions to consume her and her children
for days. [Defendant] is hardly the first defendant to
conceal a potential problem to the Division. But given
the extent of perceived dangers in the home, namely
demons, spirits and ghosts, she had an affirmative duty
to seek help.
Judge Suh agreed with the defense that ceasing to take medication
voluntarily ordinarily does not rise to abuse or neglect, however in this situation
the children's mental health was jeopardized. The judge held:
When [defendant] experienced psychosis after she
stopped taking her methadone treatment, [she] did not
contact her therapist, the police, her doctors or the
Division as she should have done. Instead, she called a
friend and the landlord to help exorcise the evil spirits
from the house. Her bizarre behavior, compounded by
her failure to seek assistance, presents as a failure to
exercise a minimum degree of care. If one gauge of
abuse and neglect is the refusal to obtain mental health
treatment when necessary, the needle here is in the red
zone.
In recounting the harm to the children, Judge Suh wrote:
. . . [Defendant] mentioned fears of her house being
haunted to the children which not only upset and scared
the children, but made them believe the house was in
fact possessed by demons, spirits, [defendant's]
deceased mother, and wizards. The children were not
able to sleep upstairs for fear of the ghosts and spirits
that [defendant] told them about. And when they slept
downstairs, the children remained afraid. The impact
on the children was significant.
A-1817-18T3
5
The judge found defendant unreasonably inflicted harm on the children's
mental and emotional health citing the testimony of the Division's expert
licensed psychologist regarding his evaluation of her nine-year-old son. The
judge continued:
[Defendant's six-year-old daughter] informed the
Division's caseworker that [defendant] was afraid of a
wizard or spirits in the home, and [defendant's four-
year-old son] expressed hysteria about how his mother
hears voices in the basement. . . . Only time will tell
the full impact of the emotional damage to them as a
result of their exposure to [defendant].
In this appeal, our review of the judge's decision is limited. We defer to
her expertise as a Family Part judge, Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998),
and we are bound by her factual findings so long as they are supported by
sufficient credible evidence, N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189
N.J. 261, 279 (2007) (citing In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super 172, 188
(App. Div. 1993)).
Applying these principles, we conclude that Judge Suh's factual findings
are fully supported by the record and, considering those facts, her legal
conclusions are unassailable.
Affirmed.
A-1817-18T3
6