[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOV 30, 2006
No. 06-10970 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00060-CR-T-30-EAJ
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
MANUEL CASTILLO,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 30, 2006)
Before BLACK, MARCUS and WILSON, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Manuel Castillo appeals his seventy month sentence for conspiracy to
possess cocaine with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1).
Castillo argues that he played a minor role in the conspiracy and that he was
completely truthful about his involvement. He claims that the trial court therefore
erred in denying him safety-valve relief and a minor-role reduction. He also
argues that the court failed to properly evaluate his arguments for a sentence
below the Sentencing Guidelines range. Because we find that the trial court did
not clearly err in denying such relief and was not unreasonable in determining his
sentence, we affirm the decision below.
Background
Following a plea agreement, Castillo was sentenced to seventy months for
possession with intent to distribute cocaine. Castillo admitted that following
negotiations between a confidential source (“CI”) and co-defendant Roberto
Cayetano-Rijo (“Cayetano”) about the sale of several kilograms of cocaine,
Castillo and Cayetano traveled to Tampa to inspect the cocaine. While there,
Castillo, upon viewing the cocaine, cut a piece of it, rubbed it in his hand, and
smelled it. According to Cayetano’s account, they then left in order to acquire
money to make the purchase, eventually receiving money via Western Union from
the Dominican Republic. Cayetano and Castillo were arrested when they met with
the CI again to purchase the cocaine. Despite having this information confirmed
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by Western Union records, Castillo denied any knowledge of the financial
transaction.
At sentencing following a guilty plea, Castillo asserted that he had been
truthful regarding his involvement with the drugs and that he played a minor role
in the conspiracy, acting merely as a driver. The district court disagreed, finding
that he taken part in arranging for money for their purchase and that he had tested
the drugs to ensure that they were cocaine. Accordingly, it found that he was not
entirely truthful, and denied him both safety-valve relief and a minor-role
reduction. On appeal, Castillo first argues that the district court erred by denying
him safety-valve relief because the government did not sufficiently refute his
explanations for his actions in smelling the cocaine. He further argues that since
the district court conceded that, compared to his co-defendant, he was a lesser
participant in the criminal venture, it should have granted the minor-role
reduction. Additionally, he contends that the district court failed to properly
consider his arguments for a sentence below the Guidelines.
Standard of Review
The standard of review of a district court’s factual determinations of
whether to grant safety-valve relief is clear error. United States v. Cruz, 106 F.3d
1553, 1557 (11th Cir. 1997). The district court’s findings of credibility are
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accorded special deference. United States v. Amedeo, 370 F.3d 1305, 1318 (11th
Cir. 2004). Additionally, we review a district court’s decision on whether to grant
a minor-role reduction for clear error. United States v. Rodriguez De Varon, 175
F.3d 930, 937 (11th Cir. 1999) (en banc). Finally, we review sentences under the
advisory guideline regime for “unreasonable[ness].” United States v. Booker, 543
U.S. 220, 261, 125 S. Ct. 738, 765, 160 L. Ed. 2d 621 (2005).
Discussion
A defendant is entitled to safety-valve relief if he “meets [inter alia, the]
criteria [that] not later than the time of the sentencing hearing, the defendant has
truthfully provided the Government all information and evidence the defendant
has concerning the offense or offenses that were part of the same course of
conduct.” United States v. Simpson, 228 F.3d 1294, 1304-1305 (11th Cir.
2000)(citing 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f); U.S.S.G. § 5C1.2). “The burden of proof on the
truthfulness issue lies, of course, with the defendant.” United States v. Espinosa,
172 F.3d 795, 797 (11th Cir. 1999)(per curiam).
In this case, Castillo repeatedly denied knowledge of the Western Union
transaction, despite the contradictory testimony of his co-defendant and the
government’s proffer of financial records demonstrating otherwise. Following the
introduction of this evidence, his only explanation for the discrepancy was his
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alleged failure to remember the transaction. In light of the fact that Castillo
carried the burden of demonstrating his truthfulness, we find that it was not clearly
erroneous for the district court to conclude that he was not eligible for safety-valve
relief.
Castillo further argues that he played a minor role in the conspiracy and is
therefore entitled to a minor role reduction. “Minor participants may receive a
two-level reduction, and. . . a minor role in the offense ‘means any participant who
is less culpable than most other participants, but whose role could not be described
as minimal.’” Rodriguez De Varon, 175 F.3d at 939 (citing U.S.S.G. § 3B1.2,
comment. (n.3)). The defendant has the burden of establishing his role by a
preponderance of evidence. Id. For a sentencing court to determine whether to
grant a minor-role reduction, it considers two principles. Id. at 940. First, the
court must measure the defendant’s role against the relevant conduct for which he
is being held accountable. Id. The second prong of the minor-role reduction
analysis permits a district court, “where the record evidence is sufficient . . . [, to]
measure the defendant’s conduct against that of other participants in the criminal
scheme attributed to the defendant.” Id. at 934.
In this case, the district court noted that Casteyano appeared to have played
a bigger role than Castillo in the drug purchase. However, the court also
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considered that Castillo was only being held accountable for his role in the
conspiracy and that he performed several aspects of the conspiracy, namely
driving, testing the cocaine and receiving money on behalf of the group. In light
of the extent of his participation, we find that the district court did not clearly err
in denying the minor role reduction.
Finally, Castillo argues that his sentence was unreasonable, despite being at
the low end of the advisory guideline range, because the district court did not
“sufficiently evaluate” his arguments for a sentence below the guideline range, in
light of the factors enumerated in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). To successfully challenge
his sentence, Castillo must establish that his sentence is unreasonable in the light
of the factors in section 3553(a). United States v. Scott, 426 F.3d 1324, 1330
(11th Cir. 2005). While a sentence within the advisory guideline range is not per
se reasonable, it is expected to be reasonable. See id.
We have held that in determining sentences, the district court must first
correctly calculate the defendant's guideline range, then, using the § 3553(a)
sentencing factors, the court can impose a more severe or more lenient sentence, as
long as it is reasonable. United States v. Crawford, 407 F.3d 1174, 1179 (11th
Cir. 2005). In this case, the district court calculated the sentence range and stated
that it had taken into account the § 3553(a) factors before sentencing. The district
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court was not required to engage in a detailed, step-by-step analysis of every
factor. Scott, 426 F.3d at 1329. Rather, the district court’s acknowledgment and
consideration of these factors is sufficient, especially since it sentenced Castillo to
the low end of the guidelines range, demonstrating that it had considered his
evidence in mitigation.
Upon review of the record and consideration of the parties’ briefs, we
discern no reversible error.
AFFIRMED.
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