[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
November 30, 2006
No. 06-12522 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-21369-CV-JAL
EUGENE MORRIS,
a.k.a. “Mercury,”
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
BERT BELL/PETE ROZELLE NFL PLAYER RETIREMENT PLAN,
NFL PLAYER SUPPLEMENTAL DISABILITY PLAN,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(November 30, 2006)
Before DUBINA, CARNES and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eugene “Mercury” Morris, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s
dismissal of his complaint for employment benefits on the merits and pursuant to
the doctrine of res judicata. Morris sued the Defendants, the Bert Bell/Pete Rozelle
NFL Player Retirement Plan (“the Plan”) and the NFL Player Supplemental
Disability Plan (“the Supplemental Plan”), pursuant to the Employee Retirement
Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”), alleging that he is a Vested NFL Player
Beneficiary pursuant to the Plan and Supplemental Plan. He sought retirement
pension benefits pursuant to the Plan, and the Retirement Board of the Plan denied
his claim for benefits and his subsequent appeal because Morris had settled and
released his claims to such benefits in a 1991 agreement between Morris and the
Plan. The Board also found that Morris had previously litigated the question of his
entitlement to the sought benefits in a prior suit, Morris v. Bert Bell NFL Player
Retirement Plan, Case No. 96-21959-CIV-Moore (“the 1996 action”). Morris filed
suit in the district court, and the court granted the Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss.
Morris now appeals.
Res judicata, the legal determination of which we review de novo, bars
relitigation of matters decided in a prior proceeding when four requirements are
met: (1) there must be a final judgment on the merits; (2) the decision must be
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the parties, or those in privity
2
with them, must be identical in both suits; and (4) the same cause of action must be
involved in both cases. Jang v. United Technologies Corp., 206 F.3d 1147, 1149
(11th Cir. 2000); Ragsdale v. Rubbermaid, Inc., 193 F.3d 1235, 1238 (11th Cir.
1999).
In this case, it is undisputed that the first three requirements are met, thus we
turn to the fourth—whether the same cause of action in this case was raised in the
1996 action.1 The principal test for determining whether the causes of action are
the same is whether, in comparing the substance of the actions, the primary right
and duty are the same in each case. Id. at 1239. In general, if a case arises out of
the same nucleus of operative fact, or is based upon the same factual predicate as a
former action, the two cases are really the same claim or cause of action for
purposes of res judicata. Id.
Morris argues on appeal that res judicata does not apply because the
arguments in his 1996 complaint and those in the instant complaint are factually
and legally different. Morris argues that his 1996 complaint sought a kind of
employee benefit that the district court ultimately determined was not available
under the former Bert Bell NFL Player Retirement Plan; he suggests that his
instant claim is for retirement benefits that the district court found were excepted
1
Morris agreed in the district court that the first three elements of res judicata were
present and he does not challenge the district court’s findings on those elements on appeal.
3
from Morris’s 1991 settlement with the Plan. Second, Morris argues that this
action, unlike his first action, was filed pursuant to ERISA. Third, Morris argues
that this case is different because he is now past the retirement age of 55 years old.
Finally, Morris contends that res judicata principles do not apply when the prior
action was for declaratory relief.
We conclude that the district court did not err in determining that res
judicata barred Morris’s instant complaint. Both cases involve Morris’s claim that
he should receive higher monthly retirement benefits pursuant to Article 5.4 of the
Retirement Plan. The type of benefits sought in this case were not excepted from
Morris’s 1991 settlement. Furthermore, regardless of the fact that Morris now cites
to ERISA and irrespective of Morris’s present age, this suit is based on the same
nucleus of operative fact as the 1996 action. The primary right and duty are the
same in each case, as although Morris alleges ERISA violations, he only seeks
relief under the Retirement Plan. Under our precedent, res judicata applies. See
Ragsdale, 193 F.3d at 1238-39.
Finally, Morris’s argument that res judicata does not bar the instant
complaint because his first action was for declaratory relief is meritless. While the
preclusive effect of a prior declaratory proceeding can sometimes present a special
problem of issue preclusion, see, e.g., Empire Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. J.
4
Transport, Inc., 880 F.2d 1291 (11th Cir. 1989), this special problem exists only
when the parties did not actually litigate an issue in a prior declaratory action, id. at
1296-97. The parties in this case fully litigated all issues relating to disability
benefits in Morris’s first action. Accordingly, the suit is barred by the doctrine of
res judicata.
AFFIRMED.
5