Singh v. Barr

17-3504 Singh v. Barr BIA Poczter, IJ A208 618 125 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 1 At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals 2 for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United 3 States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, 4 on the 17th day of January, two thousand twenty. 5 6 PRESENT: 7 BARRINGTON D. PARKER, 8 MICHAEL H. PARK, 9 Circuit Judges. 1 10 _____________________________________ 11 12 SATNAM SINGH, 13 Petitioner, 14 15 v. 17-3504 16 NAC 17 WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES 18 ATTORNEY GENERAL, 19 Respondent. 20 _____________________________________ 21 22 FOR PETITIONER: Dalbir Singh, New York, NY. 23 24 FOR RESPONDENT: Joseph H. Hunt, Assistant 25 Attorney General; Linda S. 26 Wernery, Assistant Director; 1 Judge Christopher F. Droney, who was originally assigned to the panel, retired from the Court, effective January 1, 2020, prior to the resolution of this case. The remaining two members of the panel, who are in agreement, have determined the matter. See 28 U.S.C. § 46(d); 2d Cir. IOP E(b); United States v. Desimone, 140 F.3d 457, 458–59 (2d Cir. 1998). 1 Gregory M. Kelch, Trial Attorney, 2 Office of Immigration Litigation, 3 United States Department of 4 Justice, Washington, DC. 5 UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a 6 Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby 7 ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review 8 is DENIED. 9 Petitioner Satnam Singh, a native and citizen of India, 10 seeks review of a September 29, 2017, decision of the BIA 11 affirming a January 31, 2017, decision of an Immigration Judge 12 (“IJ”) denying asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 13 under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Satnam 14 Singh, No. A206 618 125 (B.I.A. Sept. 29, 2017), aff’g No. 15 A206 618 125 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Jan. 31, 2017). We assume 16 the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and 17 procedural history in this case. 18 Under the circumstances of this case, we have reviewed 19 both the BIA’s and IJ’s decisions. See Yun-Zui Guan v. 20 Gonzales, 432 F.3d 391, 394 (2d Cir. 2005). The applicable 21 standards of review are well established. See 8 U.S.C. 22 § 1252(b)(4); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891 F.3d 67, 76 (2d 23 Cir. 2018). 24 “Considering the totality of the circumstances, and all 25 relevant factors, a trier of fact may base a credibility 2 1 determination on the . . . candor[] or responsiveness of the 2 applicant . . . , the consistency between the applicant’s . 3 . . written and oral statements . . . , the internal 4 consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such 5 statements with other evidence of record . . . without regard 6 to whether an inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to 7 the heart of the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant 8 factor.” 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to 9 an IJ’s credibility determination unless, from the totality 10 of the circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact- 11 finder could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu 12 Xia Lin v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord 13 Hong Fei Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. Although two of the IJ’s 14 findings are questionable, we find substantial evidence for 15 the adverse credibility determination given Singh’s clearly 16 contradictory statements about whether members of opposition 17 political parties visited his family home looking for him and 18 beat his mother. 19 Singh alleged that he was attacked twice on account of 20 his status as a worker for the Shiromani Akali Dal Man 21 Amritsar, or SADA. He testified that at some point after 22 the second attack, opposition party members went to his 23 family home looking for him and beat his mother. The 3 1 agency reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent statements 2 about what happened to his mother. See 8 U.S.C. 3 § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). Singh testified that people went to 4 his family home, asked where he was, and beat his mother, 5 which was why she no longer lived in the home. When asked 6 why his mother’s letter did not mention this incident, 7 Singh retracted his testimony and stated that she was not 8 beaten, and that people did not ask where he was; rather, 9 he said his mother feared that she would be beaten if she 10 returned to the family home. As the IJ noted, Singh’s 11 application also omitted any allegation that his mother was 12 beaten or that she fled the family home out of fear of 13 being beaten. These inconsistencies provide substantial 14 evidence because they go to the heart of Singh’s claim that 15 opposition party members continue to target him for harm. 16 See Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 17 295 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that a single material 18 inconsistency relating to the persecution from which an 19 applicant sought asylum provided substantial evidence for 20 an adverse credibility determination); see also Siewe v. 21 Gonzales, 480 F.3d 160, 170 (2d Cir. 2007) (“[A] single false 22 document or a single instance of false testimony may (if 23 attributable to the petitioner) infect the balance of the 4 1 alien’s uncorroborated or unauthenticated evidence.”). 2 Singh does not challenge the IJ’s findings that he failed 3 to rehabilitate his testimony with reliable corroborating 4 evidence. See Yueqing Zhang v. Gonzales, 426 F.3d 540, 545 5 n.7 (2d Cir. 2005) (providing that issues not raised in an 6 opening brief are waived). 7 The IJ’s remaining findings do not add significant 8 support for the adverse credibility determination. Although 9 in response to a question on cross examination about whether 10 he was a member of SADA, Singh said yes, he otherwise 11 affirmatively and consistently stated that he was only a 12 worker for the party. To the extent the IJ found an 13 inconsistency about whether Singh left hiding to travel to 14 Delhi for a visa, while we acknowledge that Singh could have 15 been more candid, there is no internal inconsistency in his 16 testimony: he said he did not leave hiding during the day and 17 when questioned about his trip to Delhi, explained that he 18 traveled at night. Despite these two questionable findings, 19 remand is not warranted given the direct inconsistencies 20 regarding his mother’s beating and the visit to his family 21 home. See Xiao Ji Chen v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 22 315, 335 (2d Cir. 2006) (holding that an error does not 23 require remand if “we can state with confidence that the same 5 1 decision would be made if we were to remand”). 2 Given the inconsistencies in Singh’s testimony and the 3 lack of reliable corroboration, the adverse credibility 4 determination is supported by substantial evidence. See 5 8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167; 6 Biao Yang v. Gonzales, 496 F.3d 268, 273 (2d Cir. 2007) (“An 7 applicant’s failure to corroborate his or her testimony may 8 bear on credibility, because the absence of corroboration in 9 general makes an applicant unable to rehabilitate testimony 10 that has already been called into question.”). The agency 11 therefore properly denied asylum, withholding of removal, and 12 CAT relief because all three forms of relief are based on the 13 same discredited factual predicate. See Paul v. Gonzales, 14 444 F.3d 148, 156–57 (2d Cir. 2006). 15 For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 16 DENIED. All pending motions and applications are DENIED and 17 stays VACATED. 18 FOR THE COURT: 19 Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, 20 Clerk of Court 21 6