[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
NOVEMBER 8, 2006
No. 05-15085 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 01-00457-CV-FTM-16-DNF
PEDRO PONCE DOMINGUEZ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
DR. LANG,
ROBERT BRIGGS,
Senior Physician,
WARREN CORNELL,
Superintendent,
JAMES MCDONOUGH,
Secretary, Department of Corrections,
MICHAEL SCHMIDT, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(November 8, 2006)
Before TJOFLAT, ANDERSON and BARKETT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Pedro Ponce Dominguez, a Florida prison inmate proceeding pro se, appeals
the grant of summary judgment to all defendants in this civil rights action, brought
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Dominguez essentially reasserts his original claims
that state prison officials were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs
in failing to provide him with a liquid diet, failing to issue him passes for a single-
man cell and a low bunk, and failing to provide him treatment for wires that he
alleges were placed in his body in an illegal surgical procedure.
“[D]eliberate indifference to a prisoner’s serious illness or injury states a
cause of action under § 1983.” Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105, 97 S.Ct. 285,
291, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976). To succeed on a claim of deliberate indifference to a
serious medical need, “a plaintiff must set forth evidence of an objectively serious
medical need” and “prove that the prison official acted with an attitude of
‘deliberate indifference’ to that serious medical need.” Farrow v. West, 320 F.3d
1235, 1243 (11th Cir. 2003) (internal citations omitted). “[A] serious medical need
is considered one that has been diagnosed by a physician as mandating treatment or
one that is so obvious that even a lay person would easily recognize the necessity
for a doctor’s attention.” Id. (citation and internal quotation omitted).
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“[D]eliberate indifference has three components: (1) subjective knowledge of a risk
of serious harm; (2) disregard of that risk; (3) by conduct that is more than mere
negligence.” Id. at 1245 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
“‘[S]upervisory officials are not liable under § 1983 for the unconstitutional
acts of their subordinates on the basis of respondeat superior or vicarious
liability.’” Cottone v. Jenne, 326 F.3d 1352, 1360 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting
Hartley v. Parnell, 193 F.3d 1263, 1269 (11th Cir. 1999)). Rather, such liability
attaches under § 1983 only “when the supervisor personally participates in the
alleged unconstitutional conduct or when there is a causal connection between the
actions of a supervising official and the alleged constitutional deprivation.”
Hartley, 193 F.3d at 1269 (internal quotations and citations omitted).
Because Dominguez presented no competent evidence to substantiate his
claim that the defendant prison officials had been deliberately indifferent to his
serious medical needs, the district court was duty bound to grant these officials
summary judgment.
AFFIRMED.
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