IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
JAMES ROCHESTER, §
§ No. 298, 2019
Defendant Below, §
Appellant, § Court Below: Superior Court of the
§ State of Delaware
v. §
§ Criminal ID No. 1810008309
STATE OF DELAWARE, §
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: January 8, 2020
Decided: January 21, 2020
Before, VAUGHN, TRAYNOR, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES Justices.
ORDER
This 21st day of January, 2020, upon consideration parties’ briefs and the
record below, it appears to the Court that:
(1) The appellant, James Rochester, appeals from a Superior Court order
sentencing him for one count of drug dealing and one count of possession of a
firearm during the commission of a felony (“PFDCF”). The State of Delaware
argues that Rochester’s appeal is meritless. We agree and affirm.
(2) On October 15, 2018, a Kent County grand jury indicted Rochester for
fourteen counts of drug and gun possession. Rochester filed a motion to suppress
on April 25, 2019, arguing that his arrest and subsequent search violated his right to
be free from unreasonable search and seizure under both Delaware and federal law.
After a hearing, the Superior Court denied the motion on June 10, 2019.
(3) On July 17, 2019, Rochester entered a plea agreement. Under the terms
of the agreement, Rochester pled guilty to one count of drug dealing and one count
of PFDCF; the State nolle prossed all remaining charges.
(4) On August 2, 2019, Rochester filed a notice of appeal. He contends that
the State violated his rights under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
and Article I, § 6 of the Delaware Constitution by arresting him without probable
cause. 1 Thus, he claims his convictions under the plea agreement must be reversed.
(5) It is well established that a knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any
objection to alleged errors and defects occurring before entry of the plea.2 The
record in this case reflects that Rochester knowingly and voluntarily entered a guilty
plea. In the Truth-In-Sentencing Guilty Plea Form, Rochester’s signature indicated
that he freely and voluntarily decided to plead guilty, no one forced him to plead
guilty, and he understood that he was waiving certain constitutional rights by
pleading guilty. 3 Additionally, Rochester reiterated verbally during the plea
1
Opening Br. 1.
2
Benge v. State, 945 A.2d 1099, 1101 (Del. 2008). See also Hobbs v. State, 2016 WL
3751838, at *2 (Del. July 5, 2016); Miller v. State, 840 A.2d 1229, 1232 (Del. 2003);
Downer v. State, 543 A.2d 309, 312-13 (Del. 1988).
3
App. to Answering Br. 2 (Guilty Plea Form).
2
colloquy before the Superior Court that he understood he was waiving certain
constitutional rights, no one had forced him to plead guilty, and he was guilty of the
charges to which he pled guilty. 4 The Superior Court Judge even specifically asked
if Rochester was aware that he was relinquishing his right to appeal to the Supreme
Court, to which Rochester responded, “[y]es, sir.”5
(7) In the absence of clear and convincing evidence that the plea agreement is
invalid, Rochester is bound by his representations. 6 Thus, Rochester’s knowing and
voluntary guilty plea constitutes a waiver of his arguments raised in his motion to
suppress and during the suppression hearing.7
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Tamika R. Montgomery-Reeves
Justice
4
Id. at 3-7 (Plea Colloquy).
5
Id. at 5.
6
Hobbs, 143 A.3d 711, at *2.
7
Rochester does not claim his counsel was ineffective or that there were any procedural
inadequacies with the plea agreement, and there is no evidence in the record of any such
inadequacy. As it is uncontested that the plea agreement was validly entered, Rochester is
bound by its terms.
3