NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 20a0038n.06
No. 19-5450
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, )
FILED
Jan 23, 2020
)
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) DEBORAH S. HUNT, Clerk
)
v. ) ON APPEAL FROM THE
) UNITED STATES DISTRICT
GREGORY P. PRITCHETT, ) COURT FOR THE EASTERN
) DISTRICT OF KENTUCKY
Defendant-Appellant. )
)
Before: BATCHELDER, LARSEN, and MURPHY, Circuit Judges.
LARSEN, Circuit Judge. Gregory Pritchett appeals his sentence for violating the terms of
his supervised release, arguing that his sentence is substantively unreasonable. For the reasons
stated, we AFFIRM.
I.
In 2007, Pritchett pleaded guilty to possessing a firearm as a felon; for this crime, he was
sentenced to 84 months’ imprisonment, followed by 5 years’ supervised release. Pritchett was
released from prison in 2014. Four years later, he was indicted on four counts of distributing
heroin and/or fentanyl and one count of possessing a firearm as a felon. Pritchett pleaded guilty
to possessing a firearm as a felon in exchange for the dismissal of the drug charges. He was
sentenced to 188 months’ imprisonment on the firearm count, followed by 5 years’ supervised
release. Pritchett also admitted that his possessing a gun and committing another federal crime
constituted a Grade A violation of the terms of his supervised release. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1).
No. 19-5450, United States v. Pritchett
For violating the supervised-release terms, the district court sentenced Pritchett to a within-
Guidelines sentence of 54 months, to run consecutively to his 188-month sentence on the firearm
charge. Pritchett appeals his sentence, arguing only that the 54-month sentence was substantively
unreasonable.
II.
A challenge by the defendant to the substantive reasonableness of a sentence focuses on
whether the sentence is too long. United States v. Rayyan, 885 F.3d 436, 442 (6th Cir. 2018). It
is “a complaint that the court placed too much weight on some of the § 3553(a) factors and too
little on others in sentencing the individual.” Id. While a district court must “impose a sentence
sufficient, but not greater than necessary, to comply with the purposes set forth in § 3553(a)(2),”
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), our task on review is different—we “must determine whether a different
sentence is required.” United States v. Reilly, 662 F.3d 754, 761 n.3 (6th Cir. 2011) (quotation
marks omitted). We review for an abuse of discretion. Rayyan, 885 F.3d at 442.
Pritchett faces a heavy burden in showing that his sentence was too long. Sentences within
the Guidelines range are presumed reasonable. United States v. Mosley, 635 F.3d 859, 865 (6th
Cir. 2011). Pritchett’s 54-month sentence fell at the lower end of his Guidelines range of 51 to 60
months.
Although Pritchett had asked for a sentence below the Guidelines, the district court
concluded that a sentence within the Guidelines was warranted. The court noted that Pritchett had
“a history of violating conditions of probation” and that Pritchett had “committed the violations
relatively promptly” after being released from prison. The court recognized that even the
Guidelines range did not account for the fact that Pritchett was “also selling personal use amounts
of heroin and fentanyl.” Finally, the district court noted that the reasons justifying the firearm
-2-
No. 19-5450, United States v. Pritchett
sentence also supported the supervised-release sentence. Among those reasons were Pritchett’s
lengthy criminal history, which reflected his continued, poor decision-making, and the need to
protect the public, given Pritchett’s “history of violating conditions of release.” At the same time,
the district court also considered the factors in Pritchett’s favor, including his family support. In
sum, the district court did what it was supposed to do when crafting a sentence—it “properly
considered all of the factors, balanced them, and imposed a reasonable sentence.” Rayyan,
885 F.3d at 443.
Pritchett’s arguments to the contrary fail to persuade. He argues that the sentence was
longer than necessary to protect the public. But, as the district court recognized, prior stints of
supervised release had failed to deter Pritchett from committing further crimes. The district court
was free to believe that this time would be no different and that, therefore, a sentence within the
Guidelines was appropriate. For related reasons, we are not convinced by Pritchett’s argument
that the combined sentence of 242 months for his underlying conviction and the supervised-release
violation was beyond what was necessary for “just punishment.” Both sentences were near the
bottom of the Guidelines, and Pritchett offers no reason why the district court was required to go
lower. See United States v. Brown, 579 F.3d 672, 687 (6th Cir. 2009). Finally, Pritchett argues
that supervised release is a rehabilitative measure, but that his 54-month sentence serves no
rehabilitative purposes. Pritchett misunderstands the effect of his violating the supervised-release
terms. While he is right that “[s]upervised release is essentially rehabilitative, and is not intended
for punishment,” United States v. Lewis, 498 F.3d 393, 397 (6th Cir. 2007), Pritchett failed to
comply with those rehabilitative measures by possessing a gun and distributing drugs. In such a
situation, Congress afforded the district court discretion to revoke the terms of Pritchett’s
supervised release and sentence him to a term of imprisonment, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), and
-3-
No. 19-5450, United States v. Pritchett
we see no abuse of discretion in the district court’s decision here. For these reasons, Pritchett has
not overcome the presumption that his sentence is substantively reasonable. See Mosley, 635 F.3d
at 865.
***
We AFFIRM.
-4-