dissenting: Article 262 of Treasury Eegulations 74, quoted in the majority opinion, provides, among other things, as follows: “Sums of money expended for lobbying purposes, the promotion or defeat of legislation, the exploitation of propaganda, including advertising other than trade advertising, and contributions for campaign expenses, are not deductible from gross income.” I think this is a wholesome regulation and correctly interpretative of the law. There seems to be little, if any, doubt that the expenditures which the petitioner sought to deduct as ordinary and necessary business expenses and which the Commissioner has disallowed as deductions from gross income fall within the foregoing regulation. The majority opinion, as I read it, concedes that fact, but holds that the regulation, when applied to expenditures such as were made in the instant case and disallowed by the Commissioner, is too broad and reads something into the law which is not there. I am unable to agree with that interpretation.
The Ninth Circuit, in the Sunset Scavenger Co. case, cited in the majority opinion, gave unqualified approval to the quoted Treasury regulation as being a reasonable and correct interpretation of the law.
In William P. Kyne, 35 B. T. A. 202, and Lelia S. Kirby, 35 B. T. A. 578, we cited and followed the court’s opinion in the Simset Scavenger Go. case. I am not convinced that we should depart from that position in the instant case. It is perfectly true, as the majority opinion points out, that there are some differences in the facts in the Kyne and Kirby cases from the facts of the instant case, but I do not think these differences are sufficient to justify a distinction and a different ruling in the instant case from that which we made in the Kyne and Kirby cases. I, therefore, record my dissent from the majority opinion and think the decision on this point should be for the Commissioner.
Mellott and DiSNey agree with this dissent.