United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 17, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-41449
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
TAJ RAMEL LEE,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Texas
USDC No. 4:04-CR-164-ALL
--------------------
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Taj Ramel Lee appeals his conviction and sentence for being
a convicted felon in possession of a firearm. He argues that the
district court erred by denying his motion to suppress and that
the evidence was not sufficient to support his conviction.
Lee argues that his warrantless arrest for evading arrest
was not supported by probable cause. Evidence presented at the
suppression hearing established that Paris, Texas, narcotics
investigators attempted to stop Lee for several traffic
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that
this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except
under the limited circumstances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-41449
-2-
violations. However, when the investigators activated their
unmarked patrol car’s emergency lights and sounded its air horn,
Lee continued to drive. The district court did not err in
determining that the investigators reasonably believed that Lee
violated the law by evading arrest. See United States v.
Brigham, 382 F.3d 500, 506 n.2, 508 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc);
see also TEX. PEN. CODE § 38.04; Ester v. State, 151 S.W.3d 660,
664 (Tex. App. 2004). Lee has not shown that the warrantless
arrest was unreasonable. See Brigham, 382 F.3d at 506 n.2.
Lee also argues that the district court erred when it
refused to suppress his post-arrest statements related to his
possession of a firearm because he was not Mirandized before he
made these statements. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436
(1966). After Lee was handcuffed and arrested and before he was
Mirandized, he said, “I guess you are looking for the gun, too.”
Because this statement was not made in response to any
questioning by the investigators, the district court did not err
in denying Lee’s motion to suppress this statement. See United
States v. Gonzales, 121 F.3d 928, 940 & n.7 (5th Cir. 1997).
After Lee made this statement, an investigator questioned
Lee concerning the location of Lee’s firearm. When asking Lee
these questions, the investigator was uncertain where Lee’s
firearm was located. Because the investigator’s questions were
based on his concern about the safety of the officers at the
scene and the numerous onlookers, the district court did not err
No. 05-41449
-3-
in denying Lee’s motion to suppress these statements. See New
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 653 (1984); Fleming v. Collins,
954 F.2d 1109, 1112-14 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
Lee also argues that the district court erred in denying his
motion to suppress evidence seized from apartment 115 at the Park
Garden Apartments. Lee contends that the apartment was searched
based on a warrant that was so lacking in probable cause that it
cannot be upheld, even under the good-faith exception. In
support of this contention, Lee argues that no officer could
reasonably rely on the affidavit underlying the warrant because
it relied “so heavily on an illegally-obtained statement” and was
so lacking in probable cause that it was, in essence, a bare
bones affidavit. These contentions are without merit.
Lee’s post-arrest statements were spontaneous or fell within
the public-safety exception to the rule in Miranda. The
affidavit supporting the warrant was sufficiently detailed and
set forth substantial indicia of probable cause. See United
States v. Cherna, 184 F.3d 403, 407-09 (5th Cir. 1999). The
good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applies because
Lee’s statements were not involuntarily obtained and the
investigator acted in good faith. See United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 920-21 (1984). The district court did not err in
denying the motion to suppress.
Lee argues that the evidence at his trial was insufficient
to establish that he possessed a firearm. He contends that the
No. 05-41449
-4-
evidence tends to show equally that the firearm belonged to Ebony
McAfee, the original tenant of apartment 115. The evidence at
trial established that Lee had a key to apartment 115, that Lee
was seen at the apartment complex on numerous occasions, that Lee
was seen at the apartment complex the week, and possibly the day,
the gun was recovered, and that McAfee stated that Lee stayed at
the apartment from time to time. The evidence also established
that the firearm was in plain view in the front room of the
apartment and that several pieces of mail addressed to Lee were
on the desk, just above the sliding computer keyboard tray on
which the firearm was located. Apart from the fact that McAfee
was the original tenant of the apartment, no evidence indicated
that the weapon belonged to McAfee.
When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, see
United States v. Ortega Reyna, 148 F.3d 540, 543 (5th Cir. 1998),
the evidence is sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Lee
constructively possessed the firearm. See United States v. De
Leon, 170 F.3d 494, 496-97 (5th Cir. 1999); United States v.
Ybarra, 70 F.3d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir. 1995). The conviction is
AFFIRMED.