[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT FILED
________________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
October 31, 2006
No. 06-11061 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 05-00078-CR-WS
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ALEXANDER LASHAWN BOHANNON,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(October 31, 2006)
Before DUBINA, BLACK and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Appellant Alexander Lashawn Bohannon appeals his convictions and life
sentence for carjacking, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2119, and discharging a firearm
during the course of a violent felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c). Bohannon
argues that the district court abused its discretion by denying his motions to
continue trial and stay sentencing pending the resolution of separate, capital
charges. He further argues that his life sentence was unreasonable.
“Whether to grant a continuance is a matter committed to the sound
discretion of the trial court, and its decision will not be disturbed unless there is a
clear showing of abuse of discretion.” United States v. Knowles, 66 F.3d 1146,
1160 (11th Cir. 1995). It is the defendant’s burden to demonstrate that “the denial
was an abuse of discretion and that it produced specific substantial prejudice.”
United States v. Smith, 757 F.2d 1161, 1166 (11th Cir. 1985). The denial of a
motion to continue sentencing also is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Lee, 427 F.3d 881, 896 (2005), cert. denied, Wyman v. United States, 126
S. Ct. 1447 (2006).
“In reviewing the ultimate sentence imposed by the district court for
reasonableness, we consider the final sentence, in its entirety, in light of the §
3553(a) factors.” United States v. Martin, 455 F.3d 1227, 1237 (11th Cir. 2006)
(internal quotations and citation omitted). The § 3553(a) factors include:
(1) the nature and circumstances of the offense and the history and
characteristics of the defendant; (2) the need to reflect the seriousness
2
of the offense, to promote respect for the law, and to provide just
punishment for the offense; (3) the need for deterrence; (4) the need to
protect the public; (5) the need to provide the defendant with needed
educational or vocational training or medical care; (6) the kinds of
sentences available; (7) the Sentencing Guidelines range; (8) pertinent
policy statements of the Sentencing Commission; (9) the need to
avoid unwanted sentencing disparities; and (10) the need to provide
restitution to victims.
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). We have held that the district court need not state on the
record that it has explicitly considered each factor and need not discuss each factor.
United States v. Talley, 431 F.3d 784, 786 (11th Cir. 2005). We have also held,
however, that, “when imposing a sentence falling far outside of the Guidelines
range, based on the § 3553(a) factors, ‘[a]n extraordinary reduction must be
supported by extraordinary circumstances.’” United States v. McVay, 447 F.3d
1348, 1357 (11th Cir. 2006) (quoting United States v. Dalton, 404 F.3d 1029, 1033
(8th Cir. 2005)).
Because Bohannon did not demonstrate that the denial of his motions to
continue trial or stay sentencing caused him substantial prejudice, we conclude that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying his motions. Moreover,
because Bohannon’s life sentence was based on the extraordinarily brutal nature of
his crime and the extent of his criminal history, we conclude that the sentence was
reasonable.
AFFIRMED.
3