TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISTRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00646-CV
C. O., Appellant
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 21ST DISTRICT COURT OF LEE COUNTY, NO. 16,773,
THE HONORABLE CARSON TALMADGE CAMPBELL, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant C.O. (the mother) appeals from the district court’s order terminating
her parental rights to her one-year-old son, A.H. (the child). The district court terminated the
mother’s parental rights following a bench trial.
At trial, the Department presented evidence that the mother had tested positive for
methamphetamines in June and August 2018, while she was pregnant with the child. Based on
the positive drug tests, as well as an admission by the mother that she and the father of the child
had sold methamphetamines prior to the child’s birth, the Department filed this suit for
protection of the child. 1 While the case was ongoing, the mother was charged with criminal
trespass and fraudulent use of identifying information. She pleaded guilty to both charges and
1 The suit was brought against both parents. However, prior to trial, the father voluntarily
relinquished his parental rights to the child.
was sentenced to eight months in jail. 2 After the mother got out of jail, she tested negative for
methamphetamines. However, the mother later tested positive for methamphetamines on June
14 and 28, 2019. During the mother’s testimony, she denied that she had used
methamphetamines after her release from jail but admitted to using cocaine while the case was
ongoing.
There was also evidence presented that while the mother was in jail, she had been
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and psychotic depression. The mother did not agree with these
diagnoses and refused to take medication to treat them. However, when asked if she had “issues
with rage and getting very, very angry,” the mother testified, “Yes, I do,” and she also agreed
that on occasion, she would “just snap and do things” that she would later regret. The
Department also presented evidence that the mother had failed to comply with the terms of her
family service plan, including failing to complete a drug-and-alcohol assessment, failing to
submit to a psychiatric evaluation, failing to complete individual counseling sessions with a
psychiatrist, and failing to complete protective-parenting classes. Additionally, the mother had
missed five scheduled visits with the child.
The child is currently placed with a foster family. The Department presented
evidence that the child has bonded with the foster family, that the foster family provides a stable
home for the child, that the Department has no concerns regarding the care the child is receiving
in the foster home, and that the Department’s goal for the child is adoption by the foster parents.
2 The mother had an extensive criminal history dating back to 2006. The Department
entered into evidence eighteen exhibits, all of which were either judgments of conviction, orders
placing the mother on community supervision, or orders revoking the mother’s community
supervision. Additionally, in September 2019, shortly before the termination case went to trial,
the mother was arrested for assault.
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At the conclusion of trial, the district court found that termination of the mother’s
parental rights was in the best interest of the child and that the mother had: (1) engaged in
conduct or knowingly placed the child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangered
the physical or emotional well-being of the child; and (2) failed to comply with the provisions of
a court order that specifically established the actions necessary for the mother to obtain the return
of the child. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E), (O), (2). This appeal followed.
The mother’s court-appointed counsel on appeal has filed an Anders brief,
concluding that the appeal is frivolous and without merit. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S.
738, 744 (1967); In re P.M., 520 S.W.3d 24, 27 & n.10 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (approving use
of Anders procedure in appeals from termination of parental rights because it “strikes an
important balance between the defendant’s constitutional right to counsel on appeal and
counsel’s obligation not to prosecute frivolous appeals” (citations omitted)). The brief meets the
requirements of Anders by presenting a professional evaluation of the record and demonstrating
why there are no arguable grounds to be advanced on appeal. See 386 U.S. at 744; Taylor v.
Texas Dep’t of Protective & Regulatory Servs., 160 S.W.3d 641, 646-47 (Tex. App.—Austin
2005, pet. denied). The mother’s counsel has certified to this Court that he has provided the
mother with a copy of the Anders brief and informed her of her right to examine the appellate
record and to file a pro se brief. No pro se brief has been filed.
Upon receiving an Anders brief, we must conduct a full examination of the record
to determine whether the appeal is wholly frivolous. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80, 109 S.
Ct. 346, 102 L. Ed. 2d 300 (1988); Taylor, 160 S.W.3d at 647. We have reviewed the entire
record, including the Anders brief submitted on the mother’s behalf. We have found nothing in
the record that might arguably support an appeal, and we agree with counsel that the appeal is
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frivolous. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s order terminating the mother’s parental
rights. 3
__________________________________________
Gisela D. Triana, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Triana and Smith
Affirmed
Filed: January 24, 2020
Counsel’s obligation to the mother has not yet been discharged. See In re P.M., 520
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S.W.3d 24, 27 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam). If the mother, after consulting with counsel, desires to
file a petition for review, counsel should timely file with the Texas Supreme Court “a petition for
review that satisfies the standards for an Anders brief.” See id. at 27-28.
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