MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 30 2020, 8:16 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
R. Patrick Magrath Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Alcorn Sage Schwartz & Attorney General of Indiana
Magrath, LLP
Thomas J. Flynn
Madison, Indiana Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Shawn Marshall, January 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-1746
v. Appeal from the Decatur Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Matthew D.
Appellee-Plaintiff Bailey, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
16D01-1903-F6-403
Baker, Judge.
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[1] Shawn Marshall appeals his convictions and sentence for Level 6 Felony
Resisting Law Enforcement1 and Level 5 Felony Escape,2 arguing that the
evidence is insufficient to support the convictions and that the sentence is
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offenses and Marshall’s character. We
find the evidence to be sufficient and that the sentence is not inappropriate, but
that double jeopardy principles prohibit allowing both convictions to stand. As
such, we affirm the conviction and sentence for Level 5 Felony Escape, and
remand with instructions to vacate the conviction of Level 6 Felony Resisting
Law Enforcement.
Facts
[2] On March 28, 2019, Decatur County Sheriff’s Deputy Patrick Graue detected a
vehicle traveling seventy-seven miles per hour in a fifty-five-miles-per-hour zone
on State Road 3/46 at County Road 450 West. Deputy Graue turned on his
emergency lights and initiated a routine traffic stop. Upon approaching the
stopped vehicle, Deputy Graue encountered Marshall as the driver. When he
requested Marshall’s license and registration, Deputy Graue smelled burnt
marijuana, but he refrained from immediately questioning Marshall and instead
went back to his own vehicle to check the license and registration through
dispatch.
1
Ind. Code § 35-44.1-3-1(a)(3), -(c)(1)(A).
2
I.C. § 35-44.1-3-4(a).
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[3] While checking Marshall’s license and registration, Deputy Graue learned of
Marshall’s extensive criminal history and requested that a second deputy be
sent to the scene. Deputy Kevin Rohr arrived soon thereafter, and the two
deputies then approached Marshall’s vehicle together. At that point, Deputy
Graue informed Marshall that he smelled burnt marijuana coming from the
vehicle and asked if there was anything illegal inside the vehicle. In response,
Marshall “be[came] irate” and accused Deputy Graue of “harassing him” and
“trying to frame him.” Tr. Vol. II p. 55. The two deputies calmly ordered
Marshall to exit his vehicle and explained that they were going to perform a
probable cause search of the vehicle. But Marshall refused to exit the vehicle,
and he repeatedly stated “you’re not searching my car” and that he did not give
his consent to a search. Id. at 56. The deputies continued to calmly try to order
Marshall to get out of the car, explaining again that the odor of burnt marijuana
emanating from the interior of the car gave them probable cause to search, but
that if no illegal substance was found, Marshall would be free to go.
[4] Despite these orders, “[Marshall’s] hostility continued to escalate.” Id. at 57.
Deputy Graue began to request that another officer be dispatched to the scene.
But, as he was doing so, he “observed Mr. Marshall take his stare off Deputy
Rohr and . . . began looking straight ahead as his right hand went down to the
gearshift, placing his vehicle into forward motion.” Id. The two deputies
shouted for Marshall to stop, but Marshall instead proceeded to accelerate the
vehicle and drove at a high speed down the road and away from the traffic stop.
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[5] Both deputies returned to their vehicles and initiated emergency pursuit of
Marshall, following him for approximately two miles before Marshall suddenly
pulled over and parked on the side of the highway. The deputies approached his
vehicle with their service weapons drawn and ordered Marshall out of the car.
Marshall finally complied and was promptly placed under arrest.
[6] The same day, the State charged Marshall with one count of Level 6 felony
resisting law enforcement. On April 26, 2019, the State moved to amend the
charging information by adding one count of Level 5 felony escape, and the
trial court granted the motion on April 29, 2019. A jury trial was held on June
3, 2019, at the conclusion of which the jury found Marshall guilty on both
counts. At a sentencing hearing held on June 28, 2019, the trial court sentenced
Marshall to two and one-half years for resisting law enforcement and six years
for escape, to be served concurrently, for an aggregate sentence of six years fully
executed. Marshall now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Double Jeopardy
[7] At the outset, we must confront a double jeopardy problem. The State concedes
the issue and asks that we vacate the conviction for resisting law enforcement.
[8] Under Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution, “[n]o person shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” This has been interpreted by our
Supreme Court to mean “that two or more offenses are the ‘same offense’ in
violation of Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution if, with respect to
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either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual evidence used
to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also establish the
essential elements of another challenged offense.” Richardson v. State, 717
N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999) (emphases in original).
[9] Marshall argues, and the State readily agrees, that the convictions for both
resisting law enforcement and escape are based upon the same actual evidence.
We agree. As such, both convictions cannot stand without violating double
jeopardy principles. We therefore remand with instructions to vacate the Level
6 felony resisting law enforcement conviction.
II. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[10] Next, Marshall argues that the evidence is insufficient to support either the
resisting law enforcement conviction or the escape conviction. 3 In reviewing the
sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we must consider only the
probative evidence and the reasonable inferences supporting the conviction, and
we will neither assess witness credibility nor reweigh the evidence. Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007). We will affirm unless no reasonable
factfinder could find the elements of the crime proved beyond a reasonable
doubt. Id.
3
Because we have ordered the resisting law enforcement conviction to be vacated, we need not and will not
address the evidence supporting that conviction.
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[11] To convict Marshall of escape, the State had to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that Marshall 1) intentionally 2) fled 3) from lawful detention. I.C. § 35-
44.1-3-4(a). Marshall’s conduct was unquestionably intentional. “A person
engages in conduct ‘intentionally’ if, when he engages in the conduct, it is his
conscious objective to do so.” Ind. Code § 35-41-2-2(a). We agree with the State
that “[p]utting one’s vehicle in drive and pressing down on the gas pedal is a
volitional act. A vehicle doesn’t just drive away by itself. It requires intent by
the driver to operate in such a fashion.” Appellee’s Br. p. 16.
[12] With regards to the fleeing and lawful detention elements, Marshall argues that
the evidence does not support a conclusion that he was detained before he
drove away. Specifically, he contends that, because he was never placed in
handcuffs, put in jail, or otherwise physically restrained, he was not lawfully
detained for purposes of the escape offense. He also emphasizes that he was not
explicitly told he was being detained, advised of his rights, or asked for his
consent before he drove away from the traffic stop.
[13] In the traffic stop context, Indiana Code section 34-28-5-3 authorizes detention
by a law enforcement officer of a person who the officer in good faith believes
has committed an infraction or ordinance violation. Indiana Code section 35-
31.5-2-186 enumerates a list of circumstances that qualify as “lawful detention,”
which includes the types of detention cited by Marshall—arrest, being placed in
jail, and so forth—as well as “any other detention for law enforcement
purposes.” Our Court has interpreted this catch-all provision to mean that a
person can be lawfully detained even if they are not subject to the types of
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restraint Marshall points out were lacking in his case. Rather, “what is critical
in determining the meaning of ‘any other detention for law enforcement
purposes’ is that an individual is being detained so that he is subject to
legitimate law enforcement purposes.” Anglin v. State, 787 N.E.2d 1012, 1017
(Ind. Ct. App. 2003).
[14] In Anglin, the Court found that the defendant had been subject to lawful
detention for purposes of the escape statute where he exited the courthouse after
being ordered by the trial court to wait in the hallway for transportation to jail
to serve the sentence he had just been ordered to serve. “Anglin was ‘detained’
by the trial court in that he was not free to leave the building as soon as he was
informed that the Sheriff’s Department would pick him up at the designated
location in the courthouse. That Anglin was not in the physical custody of the
transport officer at the time that he fled does not exclude the conclusion that he
was in ‘detention for law enforcement purposes.’” Id.
[15] Here, the same logic can be applied to Marshall: though not under the physical
control of the deputies, he was nonetheless being detained for the law
enforcement purposes of conducting a traffic stop and a probable cause search
of his vehicle, and the officers repeatedly informed him of such and ordered
him out of his vehicle. There was no indication at the time Marshall drove
away that he was free to go; the officers even told him as much when they
explained that he would only be free to go following the vehicle search if no
illegal substances were found. As such, we find that Marshall was subject to
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lawful detention at the time he fled the scene, and that all elements of the
escape offense are therefore supported by sufficient evidence.
III. Sentence
[16] Marshall next argues that his sentence is inappropriate in light of the nature of
the offense and his character. Indiana Appellate Rule 7(B) provides that this
Court may revise a statutorily authorized sentence “if, after due consideration
of the trial court’s decision, the Court finds that the sentence is inappropriate in
light of the nature of the offense and the character of the offender.” In
conducting this review, “substantial deference” must be given to the trial court’s
decision, “since the ‘principal role of [our] review is to attempt to leaven the
outliers,’ and not to achieve a perceived ‘correct’ sentence.” Knapp v. State, 9
N.E.3d 1274, 1292 (Ind. 2014) (quoting Chambers v. State, 989 N.E.2d 1257,
1259 (Ind. 2013)) (internal citations omitted). The defendant bears the burden
of proving that the sentence is inappropriate. Childress v. State, 848 N.E.2d 1073,
1080 (Ind. 2006).
[17] For Level 5 felony escape, Marshall faced a term of one to six years, with an
advisory sentence of three years. Ind. Code § 35-50-2-6(b). The trial court
imposed a maximum six-year term.4
4
Because both sentences were ordered to be served concurrently, our instructions to vacate the resisting law
enforcement conviction—which carried the lesser of the two sentences—will impact neither the length of the
sentence nor our analysis regarding its inappropriateness.
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[18] With respect to the nature of the offense, Marshall sped away from the officers
in a manner that forced Deputy Rohr to quickly back up into oncoming traffic
to avoid being harmed by Marshall’s moving vehicle. Though Deputy Rohr was
not injured, Marshall’s actions nonetheless endangered the life of another
human. The offense also demonstrated a high lack of respect for law
enforcement, as Marshall blatantly ignored orders and became increasingly
hostile and angry with officers despite their attempts to remain calm and keep
the situation under control.
[19] With respect to his character, we first note Marshall’s extensive criminal
history. Marshall has been charged with over eleven felonies since 1990, and
since 2004 has been convicted and sentenced for two additional felonies,
robbery and battery resulting in bodily injury. Even now, all of the following
felony charges are currently pending against Marshall for offenses that occurred
on or after July 18, 2018: unlawful possession of a syringe, synthetic identity
deception, possession of methamphetamine, maintaining a common nuisance
via controlled substances, and intimidation by way of threatening to commit a
forcible felony.
[20] Additionally, Marshall was out on bail for two of those felony charges when he
committed the offense in this case. He was also on probation in Georgia at the
time he committed the present offense and violated his probation by fleeing the
state to come to Indiana and by committing additional offenses while on
probation.
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[21] Furthermore, Marshall’s behavior while in jail has been far from commendable.
From March to June 2019, when Marshall was incarcerated in the Decatur
County Detention Center, Marshall had fifteen separate disciplinary incidents
and misconduct write ups, and he has been described as “a very aggressive
inmate, aggressive towards other inmates and then towards other staff. He
constantly violates security protocols and security violations.” Tr. Vol. II. p.
129. Among other things, he has been written up for threatening to throw feces
and bodily fluids on staff members, covering cameras and lights, flooding his
cell, and getting into physical altercations, some of which involved makeshift
weapons. See id. at 130-33. Marshall is also known to be a current member of a
gang and has been evaluated as having a high likelihood to reoffend.
[22] Marshall argues that the chronological remoteness of much of his criminal
history—with multiple charges and offenses occurring over ten years ago—and
the difference in nature of those offenses from the present offense render the
imposition of a maximum sentence inappropriate. While the chronological
remoteness of prior criminal history should be taken into account, “we will not
say that remoteness in time, to whatever degree, renders a prior conviction
irrelevant,” and it is still within the trial court’s discretion to consider it an
aggravating circumstance. Buchanan v. State, 767 N.E.2d 967, 972 (Ind. 2002).
And here, Marshall’s criminal history is not limited to those charges and
convictions that are chronologically distant, but rather represents a
longstanding pattern, continuing into the present, of an irreverence towards the
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law, aggressiveness towards others, and a complete lack of remorse and
willingness to change his behavior.
[23] We do not find the six-year maximum sentence imposed by the trial court to be
inappropriate in light of the nature of the offense and Marshall’s character.
[24] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed and remanded with instructions to
vacate the conviction for Level 6 felony resisting law enforcement.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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