18-584
Singh v. Barr
BIA
Loprest, IJ
A205 421 917
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
SUMMARY ORDER
RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION
TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED
AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS
COURT=S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT
FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX
OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A
PARTY CITING TO A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY
NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.
At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall
United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of
New York, on the 31st day of January, two thousand twenty.
PRESENT:
ROBERT A. KATZMANN,
Chief Judge,
JON O. NEWMAN,
SUSAN L. CARNEY,
Circuit Judges.
_____________________________________
RAVINDER SINGH,
Petitioner,
v. 18-584
NAC
WILLIAM P. BARR, UNITED STATES
ATTORNEY GENERAL,
Respondent.
_____________________________________
FOR PETITIONER: Natasha Mallhi, Esq., Dalbir
Singh & Associates, New York, NY.
FOR RESPONDENT: Aaron D. Nelson, Trial Attorney;
Terri J. Scadron, Assistant
Director; Joseph H. Hunt,
Assistant Attorney General, United
States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC.
UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) decision, it is hereby
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that the petition for review
is DENIED.
Petitioner Ravinder Singh, a native and citizen of India,
seeks review of a BIA decision affirming the decision of an
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denying Singh’s application for
asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the
Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). In re Ravinder Singh,
No. A 205 421 917 (B.I.A. Feb. 2, 2018), aff’g No. A 205 421
917 (Immig. Ct. N.Y. City Dec. 20, 2016). We assume the
parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural
history in this case.
We have reviewed the IJ’s decision as modified by the
BIA; i.e., we address the adverse credibility determination
minus the IJ’s finding that Singh testified inconsistently
concerning the circumstances of his father’s death. See Xue
Hong Yang v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 426 F.3d 520, 522 (2d
Cir. 2005). The standards of review are well established.
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See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B); Hong Fei Gao v. Sessions, 891
F.3d 67, 76 (2d Cir. 2018) (reviewing adverse credibility
determination for substantial evidence). “Considering the
totality of the circumstances, and all relevant factors, a
trier of fact may base a credibility determination on the
demeanor, candor, or responsiveness of the applicant . . . ,
the consistency between the applicant’s . . . written and
oral statements . . . , the internal consistency of each such
statement, [and] the consistency of such statements with
other evidence of record . . . without regard to whether an
inconsistency, inaccuracy, or falsehood goes to the heart of
the applicant’s claim, or any other relevant factor.” 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii). “We defer . . . to an IJ’s
credibility determination unless, from the totality of the
circumstances, it is plain that no reasonable fact-finder
could make such an adverse credibility ruling.” Xiu Xia Lin
v. Mukasey, 534 F.3d 162, 167 (2d Cir. 2008); accord Hong Fei
Gao, 891 F.3d at 76. We conclude that substantial evidence
supports the agency’s determination that Singh was not
credible as to his claim that he was attacked by members of
the Congress Party and the police in India because of his
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membership in a rival party, the Shiromani Akali Dal Mann
Amritsar Party (“Akali Dal”).
The agency reasonably based its adverse credibility
determination, in part, on Singh’s demeanor, citing several
examples where Singh’s testimony was vague, “script-like,” or
unresponsive, and finding that his “apparent lack of ‘candor
or responsiveness’” further eroded the IJ’s confidence in its
veracity. Certified Administrative Record at 174 (quoting
INA § 208(b)(1)(B)(iii)). We grant “particular deference”
to the IJ’s demeanor finding, Dong Gao v. BIA, 482 F.3d 122,
126–27 (2d Cir. 2007), because “the IJ’s ability to observe
the witness’s demeanor places h[im] in the best position to
evaluate . . . credibility,” Jin Chen v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, 426 F.3d 104, 113 (2d Cir. 2005).
The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent
testimony concerning his medical treatment. He initially
testified on direct examination that he saw a doctor only
after the second alleged attack, but, when pressed by his
attorney, he stated that he also saw a doctor after the first
attack. Additionally, on cross-examination, Singh first
testified that he went to the doctor only once after the first
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attack, but when confronted with his own medical records, he
stated that he went to the doctor for follow-up visits for
one week. Singh argues that such minor inconsistencies were
not relevant to his claim of past persecution. The agency
properly relied on them, however, because they concern the
severity of his injuries from the two incidents of past
persecution that form the primary basis of his claim. See
Xian Tuan Ye v. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 446 F.3d 289, 295 (2d
Cir. 2006) (holding that a material inconsistency regarding
the basis of an applicant’s asylum claim is substantial
evidence of adverse credibility). Furthermore, the agency
may rely on “any inconsistency” so long as the totality of
the circumstances support its conclusion that the applicant
is not credible. Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
The agency also reasonably relied on Singh’s inconsistent
and vague testimony about Khalistan, the Akali Dal’s
aspirational separate Sikh state. Singh initially testified
that Khalistan was a “political party,” not a hoped-for
independent state, and his additional explanation was vague
and nonresponsive, even when he was pressed numerous times
for additional detail. For example, Singh stated that
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Khalistan is where “Sikhs will get their rights,” that Akali
Dal supports Khalistan “[b]ecause the Sikhs do not get their
rights there,” and that Khalistan will be located “at a place
which will be neat and clean, and where people are truthful.”
Certified Administrative Record at 234-35. Since the
creation of Khalistan was a central tenet of the political
party for which Singh claimed to have been persecuted, the IJ
did not err in relying on the lack of detail and clarity in
Singh’s responses in support of its adverse credibility
finding. See Jin Shui Qiu v. Ashcroft, 329 F.3d 140, 152 (2d
Cir. 2003) (holding that where an applicant gives “very spare”
testimony, the fact-finder may “fairly wonder whether the
testimony is fabricated”), overruled in part on other grounds
by Shi Liang Lin v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 494 F.3d 296, 305
(2d Cir. 2007) (en banc); see also Rizal v. Gonzales, 442
F.3d 84, 90 (2d Cir. 2006) (while there is no requirement of
a “certain level of doctrinal knowledge” to support asylum
eligibility, there can be “instances in which the nature of
an individual applicant’s account would render his lack of a
certain degree of doctrinal knowledge suspect and could
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therefore provide substantial evidence in support of an
adverse credibility finding”).
Having questioned Singh’s credibility, the agency
reasonably found that Singh’s corroborating evidence failed
to rehabilitate it. Singh has abandoned any challenge to
this finding by failing to raise the issue in his brief. See
Norton v. Sam's Club, 145 F.3d 114, 117 (2d Cir. 1998).
Given Singh’s demeanor, inconsistent testimony on the
extent of his medical treatment, and lack of knowledge of one
of Akali Dal’s central tenets, we conclude that substantial
evidence supports the adverse credibility determination. See
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii); Xiu Xia Lin, 534 F.3d at 167.
Although it was not identified by Singh, we note one
error in the agency’s decision. Contrary to the IJ’s
observation, see Certified Administrative Record at 172-73,
Singh did testify that he received documentation of his
medical treatment, see id. at 243. Given the other grounds
for the adverse credibility determination, however, we find
that this error does not require remand. See Xiao Ji Chen
v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 471 F.3d 315, 339 (2d Cir. 2006)
(remand is futile when we can “confidently predict” that the
7
agency would reach the same decision absent any errors). The
agency’s adverse credibility determination is dispositive of
his claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief
because all three rest on the same factual predicate. See
Paul v. Gonzales, 444 F.3d 148, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2006).
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is
DENIED.
FOR THE COURT:
Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe,
Clerk of Court
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