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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellant :
:
:
v. :
:
:
WELDON LUCAS : No. 2248 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered July 2, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-51-CR-0016035-2008
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., and COLINS, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: Filed: February 7, 2020
The Commonwealth appeals from the post-conviction court’s July 2,
2018 order granting Appellee, Weldon Lucas, a new trial based on the
ineffectiveness of his trial counsel. After careful review, we reverse the court’s
order and reinstate Lucas’s judgment of sentence.
This Court previously set forth the facts and procedural history of Lucas’s
underlying convictions, as follows:
On October 7, 2008, Lucas intervened to protect his friend
Shonda when she was being threatened by her boyfriend,
Hamski, who had beaten her on earlier occasions. Lucas
and Hamski got into a fight that ended when others pulled
the two men apart. The complaining witness in this case,
Alvin Morris…, was a friend of Hamski’s and saw the fight.
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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The following day, after Lucas finished work…, he went to
his sister Tonya’s house where he waited in his car for her
to get home safely. He was concerned for Tonya’s safety,
fearing potential retaliation for the fight of the previous day.
He talked with his friend, Ricky Myers, while he waited.
Lucas heard a noise and noticed bright flickering lights in
Tonya’s house. Both men rushed inside, discovered a
number of homemade Molotov cocktails had been lit and
thrown in through the window, and quickly put them out so
the house would not go up in flames. Lucas and Ricky Myers
immediately went in search of the culprit. Moments later,
Ricky Myers encountered Alvin Morris in an area near
Tonya’s house and shouted to Lucas to come over to where
they were standing. Lucas subsequently shot Morris eleven
times.
Trial Court Opinion, 5/3/11, at 1-2.
Lucas was arrested and charged with attempted murder,
conspiracy to commit murder, aggravated assault, reckless
endangerment, possession of instruments of crime (“PIC”),
firearms not to be carried without a license, possession of a
firearm by a person prohibited, and carrying a firearm on the
public streets of Philadelphia. Lucas pled not guilty and proceeded
to a jury trial.
During the jury’s deliberations, the trial judge, the
Honorable Lisa M. Rau, was called away to fulfill a longstanding
teaching obligation in San Francisco. As a result, the Honorable
Ramy Djerassi filled in for her for the purpose of responding to
any questions presented by the jury. On May 24, 2010, the jury
asked the following question: “Is Charge Number 2 ‘Criminal
conspiracy F-1’ synonymous with ‘conspiracy to commit murder’?”
Having consulted with Judge Rau, and [having] received the
agreement of both counsel, Judge Djerassi instructed the jury, in
pertinent part, as follows:
The defendant is charged with conspiracy to commit murder
and/or aggravated assault. So any suggestion otherwise on
Paragraph One of the written jury charges was a
typographical error. So it is conspiracy to commit murder
and/or aggravated assault.
N.T. Trial, 5/24/10, at 12.
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Lucas was found guilty of reckless endangerment, carrying
a firearm without a license, carrying a firearm on the public streets
of Philadelphia and criminal conspiracy. The jury did not specify
whether the conspiracy conviction related to murder or
aggravated assault. Lucas was acquitted of the remainder of the
charges, including attempted murder and aggravated assault.
Commonwealth v. Lucas, 368 EDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at 1-3
(Pa. Super. filed Feb. 8, 2012) (brackets omitted).
At Lucas’s subsequent sentencing hearing, the Commonwealth sought
application of a 10-year, mandatory-minimum sentence for Lucas’s conspiracy
offense under 42 Pa.C.S. § 9714(a)(1) (requiring a 10-year, mandatory-
minimum sentence for any person convicted of a second “crime of violence”).
Although defense counsel conceded that the mandatory term was applicable,
the trial court refused to apply that sentence, instead imposing a term of 11½
to 23 months’ incarceration for Lucas’s conspiracy conviction. The
Commonwealth timely appealed, and this Court vacated Lucas’s sentence and
remanded for the court to impose the mandatory term required by section
9714(a)(1). The trial court did so on September 9, 2016.
Lucas then filed a timely direct appeal, asserting several challenges to
the court’s jury instructions, including a claim that the trial court erred by
instructing the jury that he could be found guilty of conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault, when he had only been charged with conspiracy to
commit murder. Notably, the trial court agreed with Lucas that it had erred
in providing this instruction, and that a new trial was warranted. See Trial
Court Opinion, 12/30/16, at 4-5. Nevertheless, this Court affirmed,
concluding that Lucas had waived his jury instruction claims because his
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counsel never objected to the at-issue instructions. See Commonwealth v.
Lucas, No. 3011 EDA 2016, unpublished memorandum at 4-6 (Pa. Super.
filed Jan. 26, 2018).
On March 5, 2018, Lucas filed a timely PCRA petition, contending that
his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to object to two errors in the court’s
jury instructions: (1) the court’s failure “to specify, in its [c]onspiracy charge,
that in order to find [Lucas] guilty[,] the jury must find that he ‘intentionally
and with malice attempted to cause the death of another person’”; and (2)
the court’s improper instruction to the jury that Lucas was “charged with
conspiracy to commit murder and/or aggravated assault.” PCRA Petition,
3/5/18, at 3 (unnumbered). On May 14, 2018, the Commonwealth filed an
answer to Lucas’s petition. Lucas and the Commonwealth agreed that no
evidentiary hearing was necessary. On July 2, 2018, the trial court granted
the petition, vacated Lucas’s judgment of sentence, and ordered a new trial.
The Commonwealth filed a timely notice of appeal, as well as a Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b) concise statement of errors complained of on appeal. On September
26, 2018, the PCRA court filed a Rule 1925(a) opinion. Herein, the
Commonwealth states one issue for our review: “Did trial counsel, the
Defender Association of Philadelphia, commit constitutionally ineffective
assistance by agreeing to charge the jury on the lesser-included offense of
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault, where [Lucas] was fully apprised of
the applicable evidence and elements, and where the charge succeeded in
reducing [Lucas’s] potential liability?” Commonwealth’s Brief at 2.
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Preliminarily, we observe that,
“[o]n appeal from the denial of PCRA relief, our standard and
scope of review is limited to determining whether
the PCRA court’s findings are supported by the record and without
legal error.” Commonwealth v. Edmiston, 65 A.3d 339, 345
(Pa. 2013) (citation omitted). “[Our] scope of review is limited to
the findings of the PCRA court and the evidence of record, viewed
in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at
the PCRA court level.” Commonwealth v. Koehler, … 36 A.3d
121, 131 ([Pa.] 2012) (citation omitted). “The PCRA court’s
credibility determinations, when supported by the record, are
binding on this Court.” Commonwealth v. Spotz, 610 Pa. 17,
18 A.3d 244, 259 (2011) (citation omitted). “However, this Court
applies a de novo standard of review to the PCRA court’s legal
conclusions.” Id.
Commonwealth v. Medina, 92 A.3d 1210, 1214–15 (Pa. Super. 2014) (en
banc).
Additionally, where, as here, a petitioner claims that he received
ineffective assistance of counsel, our Supreme Court has stated that:
[A] PCRA petitioner will be granted relief only when he proves, by
a preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
resulted from the “[i]neffective assistance of counsel which, in the
circumstances of the particular case, so undermined the truth-
determining process that no reliable adjudication of guilt or
innocence could have taken place.” Generally, counsel’s
performance is presumed to be constitutionally adequate, and
counsel will only be deemed ineffective upon a sufficient showing
by the petitioner. To obtain relief, a petitioner must demonstrate
that counsel’s performance was deficient and that the deficiency
prejudiced the petitioner. A petitioner establishes prejudice when
he demonstrates “that there is a reasonable probability that, but
for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
would have been different.” … [A] properly pled claim of
ineffectiveness posits that: (1) the underlying legal issue has
arguable merit; (2) counsel’s actions lacked an objective
reasonable basis; and (3) actual prejudice befell the petitioner
from counsel’s act or omission.
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Commonwealth v. Johnson, 966 A.2d 523, 532-33 (Pa. 2009) (citations
omitted).
Here, the PCRA court concluded that Lucas is entitled to a new trial
based on his counsel’s failure to object to following three errors committed by
the trial court: (1) the erroneous instruction “that [] Lucas could be found
guilty of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault when he was never charged
or arraigned on that crime[;]” (2) the court’s failure “to properly instruct the
jury on the specific intent required to find [Lucas] guilty of either conspiracy
to commit murder or conspiracy to commit aggravated assault[;]” and (3) the
court’s “recording the verdict when the jury did not specify the underlying
crime that [] Lucas conspired to commit.” PCRA Court Opinion, 12/30/16, at
4-5 (footnotes omitted). For the reasons that follow, we disagree with the
PCRA court that any of these purported errors necessitates a new trial.
First, the PCRA court found that a new trial is warranted because Lucas’s
counsel acted ineffectively by failing to object to the instruction that Lucas
could be convicted of conspiracy to commit murder and/or aggravated
assault. In his petition, Lucas contended that this instruction improperly
permitted the jury to convict him of an offense for which he was not charged,
thereby prejudicing him by depriving him of notice and the opportunity to
defend against that charge. See PCRA Petition at 4 (unnumbered). On
appeal, he elaborates that his “trial strategy was geared toward defending
against the allegation that he [c]onspired to [m]urder the victim[,]” not that
he conspired to commit aggravated assault. Lucas’s Brief at 9. Therefore,
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Lucas insists that the court’s adding the conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault charge, without any objection by his counsel, “rendered his trial
strategy ineffective….” Id. Accordingly, Lucas argues that the PCRA court
correctly concluded that his counsel acted ineffectively, and properly granted
him a new trial.
In response, the Commonwealth maintains that Lucas failed to
demonstrate any error in the court’s instruction, nor that he was prejudiced
by counsel’s failure to object to it. The Commonwealth stresses that,
“[t]he settled law in Pennsylvania has been that a defendant may
be convicted of an offense that is a lesser-included offense of the
crime actually charged.” Commonwealth v. Sims, 919 A.2d
931, 938 (Pa. 2007). “As long as the conviction is for a lesser-
included offense, the defense will have been put on notice of the
charges against him and can adequately prepare a defense.”
Commonwealth v. Reese, 725 A.2d 190, 191 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(citation omitted). Conspiracy to commit aggravated assault [is]
a lesser-included offense of conspiracy to commit murder. See
Commonwealth v. Anderson, 650 A.2d 20, 24 (Pa. 1994)
(aggravated assault is a lesser-included offense of attempted
murder).
Commonwealth’s Brief at 17-18.
The Commonwealth’s argument is convincing. In Sims, our Supreme
Court upheld Sims’ conviction for the uncharged offense of attempted escape,
concluding it was a lesser-included offense of the charged crime of escape.
The Court explained that permitting convictions for uncharged, lesser-included
offenses “promotes judicial economy, avoids inconsistent results, and
enhances the quality of jury deliberations by assuring that factfinders,
informed of the option of convicting of related offenses, focus their attention
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on the presence or absence of those elements that distinguish the greater or
lesser offenses.” Sims, 919 A.2d at 938 (internal citations and quotation
marks omitted). However, the Sims Court recognized that, “[a]lthough
Pennsylvania has consistently approved of the doctrine, the more difficult
question has always been determining what constitutes a lesser-included
offense.” Id. To this end, the Court adopted the Model Penal Code’s definition
of ‘lesser-included offense,’ which “identifies three situations in which a
defendant may be convicted of an offense included in the offense charged….”
Id. at 940. The Model Penal Code states:
(4) Conviction of Included Offense Permitted. A defendant
may be convicted of an offense included in an offense charged in
the indictment [or the information]. An offense is so included
when:
(a) it is established by proof of the same or less than all the
facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged; or
(b) it consists of an attempt or solicitation to commit the
offense charged or to commit an offense otherwise included
therein; or
(c) it differs from the offense charged only in respect that a
less serious injury or risk of injury to the same person,
property or public interest or a lesser kind of culpability
suffices to establish its commission.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4) (alteration in original).
Id.
In the present case, the crime of conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault constitutes a lesser-included offenses of conspiracy to commit murder
under the ‘statutory elements approach’ of section 1.07(4)(a). See id.
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(stating that section 1.07(4)(a) “reflects the statutory element approach” to
defining a lesser-included offense). Both offenses require proof of: “1) an
agreement, 2) shared criminal intent, and 3) an overt act.” Commonwealth
v. Johnson, 180 A.3d 474, 479 (Pa. Super. 2018) (citation omitted). While
the criminal intent between the two crimes differs, our Supreme Court has
held that “the intent necessary to establish the offense of … murder — specific
intent to kill — is greater than and necessarily includes the intentional,
knowing, or reckless infliction of serious bodily injury, the intent required for
aggravated assault.” Anderson, 650 A.2d at 24. Thus, because the crime of
conspiracy to commit aggravated assault is proven by evidence of the same
or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of conspiracy to
commit murder, it constitutes a lesser-included offense under section
1.07(4)(a).
Alternatively, we also find the definition set forth in section 1.07(4)(c)
to be applicable to the at-issue offenses. Specifically, conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault differs from conspiracy to commit murder only in the
respect that a less serious injury or risk of injury to the victim (serious bodily
injury, rather than death) suffices to establish the commission of conspiracy
to commit aggravated assault. In addition, conspiracy to commit aggravated
assault differs from conspiracy to commit murder only in the fact that a lesser
culpability can establish its commission. See id. Accordingly, conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault also meets the definition of a lesser-included
offense of conspiracy to commit murder under section 1.07(4)(c).
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In sum, we conclude that the court did not err by instructing the jury
that it could convict Lucas of the lesser-included offense of conspiracy to
commit aggravated assault. Thus, Lucas’s claim that his counsel should have
objected to that charge lacks arguable merit.
Additionally, Lucas’s contention that he was prejudiced because he did
not have notice or an opportunity to defend against the charge of conspiracy
to commit aggravated assault clearly fails under the rationale of Sims. See
Sims, 919 A.2d at 940-41 (“The defendant does not need separate notice to
defend against [a lesser-included offense under section 1.07(4)(a)] because
the defense that he prepares against the offenses charged will necessarily
attempt to refute the Commonwealth’s evidence of the lesser offenses.”); id.
at 941-42 (“[B]y charging [a defendant] with the more serious offense, the
Commonwealth has given the defendant the information that he needs to
choose and tailor his defense strategy. Accordingly, [s]ection 1.07(4)(c)
likewise is consistent with a defendant’s right to due process.”). Moreover, as
the Commonwealth points out, Lucas’s actual “defense to the shooting of Mr.
Morris in no way depended on the legal distinction between conspiracy to
commit murder and conspiracy to commit aggravated assault.”
Commonwealth’s Brief at 20. The Commonwealth explains:
From opening to closing, and from [Lucas’s] own mouth on the
witness stand, the defense claim was that it was [Lucas’s] friend
who was the shooter, that [Lucas] had gone out with the
friend…[,] but that [Lucas] had no idea his friend was carrying a
gun or would actually shoot anyone. The defense, in short, was
that [Lucas] was essentially a bystander who did not conspire to
injure, let alone kill, the victim. Under these circumstances,
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[Lucas] is at a loss even to postulate any reason why counsel
would have wanted to object to the court’s legally correct charge
on conspiracy.
Id. at 20-21. We agree with the Commonwealth’s analysis.
We also agree with the Commonwealth that Lucas’s “argument that he
was unfairly exposed to unforeseen elements … is simply untrue.” Id. at 18.
The Commonwealth stresses that,
[a]ll elements of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault were
contained within the crimes charged: attempted murder,
aggravated assault, and conspiracy. And all of these elements
related to a single victim and a single set of facts: the testimony
of the Commonwealth’s witnesses that [Lucas] set out to shoot
Mr. Morris and acted with another person in doing so. Under
settled law, he cannot claim any lack of notice.
Id.
It is clear from the Commonwealth’s argument, the record before us,
and the case law discussed supra, that the trial court’s instruction that Lucas
could be convicted of conspiracy to commit aggravated assault was not
improper and it did not prejudice Lucas, as he had adequate notice and
opportunity to defend against that lesser-included offense. Consequently,
Lucas failed to demonstrate that his trial counsel acted ineffectively by not
objecting to that instruction, and the PCRA court erred by granting him a new
trial on this basis.
We next conclude that the PCRA court erred by basing its grant of a new
trial on a conclusion that Lucas’s counsel was ineffective for not objecting
when “the [c]ourt failed to properly instruct the jury on the specific intent
required to find [Lucas] guilty of either conspiracy to commit murder or
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conspiracy to commit aggravated assault….” PCO at 5 (footnote omitted). In
Lucas’s petition, his entire argument on this point was as follows:
Although the jury was instructed that [Lucas] was charged with
[c]riminal [c]onspiracy to commit [m]urder, the [c]ourt failed to
specify, in its [c]onspiracy charge, that in order to find [Lucas]
guilty[,] the jury must find that he “intentionally and with malice
attempted to cause the death of another person.” (See Exhibit 3
- Bills of Information). Counsel for [Lucas] failed to object or ask
for a more specific instruction on the charge of [c]riminal
[c]onspiracy.
PCRA Petition at 3.
Notably, Lucas did not mention the court’s failure to instruct on the
intent necessary for conspiracy to commit aggravated assault; thus, we agree
with the Commonwealth that the PCRA court erred by sua sponte raising that
issue. See Commonwealth’s Brief at 23 n.8.
The Commonwealth also points out that Lucas “failed to show the
necessary prejudice for his ineffective assistance claim.” Id. at 24. It is
apparent from the above-quoted portion of Lucas’s petition that he offered no
discussion of how he was prejudiced by the omission of a specific-intent
instruction regarding conspiracy. See Commonwealth v. Spotz, 84 A.3d
294, 320 (Pa. 2014) (“[T]o establish prejudice from trial counsel’s failure to
object to the challenged portion of the … charge, [a petitioner] must show
there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error or omission, the
result of the proceeding would have been different.”) (citation omitted). As
the Commonwealth stresses, the jury convicted Lucas of conspiracy generally;
thus, we cannot presume, as does Lucas and the PCRA court, that he was
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convicted of conspiracy to commit murder, which requires a specific intent to
kill.1 Lucas could have instead been convicted of conspiracy to commit
aggravated assault, which was the crime for which he was ultimately
sentenced. If so, then the court’s omission of an instruction on specific intent
to kill would not have changed the outcome of the trial. Again, Lucas offered
no argument in his PCRA petition regarding how, under the unique
circumstances of this case, the jury’s verdict would have been different, had
his counsel objected to the court’s failure to provide a specific-intent
instruction for conspiracy. Therefore, he failed to demonstrate prejudice, and
the PCRA court erred by granting him a new trial.
Order reversed. Judgment of sentence reinstated. Jurisdiction
relinquished.
Judge Dubow joins this memorandum.
Judge Colins notes his dissent.
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1 We reiterate that Lucas did not object to the court’s recording the jury’s
general verdict on conspiracy, without specification of the object crime. The
PCRA court concluded that Lucas’s counsel was ineffective for this failure. See
PCO at 5. However, we do not see this claim raised anywhere in Lucas’s PCRA
petition. Therefore, the court erred by sua sponte finding that counsel acted
ineffectively in this regard. We observe that this Court previously chastised
this trial/PCRA court for raising errors sua sponte, concluding that the court
was effectively “engag[ing] in what amounts to advocacy on behalf of Lucas.”
See Lucas, No. 368 EDA 2011, unpublished memorandum at 6 n.12. As we
stressed in our prior decision, “[s]ua sponte consideration of issues deprives
counsel of the opportunity to brief and argue the issues and the court of the
benefit of counsel’s advocacy.” Id. (citing Wiegand v. Wiegand, 337 A.2d
256, 257 (Pa. 1975)).
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/7/20
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