NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 7 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
THEODORE C. SHOVE, No. 18-17326
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:14-cv-02903-JD
v.
MEMORANDUM*
McDONALD, Warden, Captain; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
and
CHAPPELL, Warden,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
James Donato, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2020**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Theodore C. Shove appeals pro se from the district
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
court’s summary judgment in his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging deliberate
indifference to his serious medical needs. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. We review de novo a district court’s summary judgment for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies. Williams v. Paramo, 775 F.3d 1182, 1191 (9th
Cir. 2015). We affirm.
The district court properly granted summary judgment because Shove failed
to exhaust his available administrative remedies as required by the Prison
Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”), and failed to raise a genuine dispute of material
fact as to whether administrative remedies were effectively unavailable to him.
See Ross v. Blake, 136 S. Ct. 1850, 1856, 1858-60 (2016) (explaining that an
inmate must exhaust “such administrative remedies as are available” before
bringing suit, and describing limited circumstances in which administrative
remedies are unavailable, including when “prison administrators thwart inmates
from taking advantage of a grievance process through machination,
misrepresentation, or intimidation”); Williams, 775 F.3d at 1191 (a prisoner who
does not exhaust administrative remedies must show that “there is something
particular in his case that made the existing and generally available administrative
remedies effectively unavailable to him”); see also Rodriguez v. County of Los
Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 792 (9th Cir. 2018) (setting forth required showing for a
fear of retaliation to excuse the PLRA’s exhaustion requirement).
2 18-17326
We reject as unsupported by the record Shove’s contentions regarding
judicial bias.
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
We do not consider documents and facts not presented to the district court.
See United States v. Elias, 921 F.2d 870, 874 (9th Cir. 1990).
Appellees’ motion for summary affirmance (Docket Entry No. 17) is denied
as moot. All other pending motions and requests are denied.
AFFIRMED.
3 18-17326