In the
Court of Appeals
Second Appellate District of Texas
at Fort Worth
___________________________
No. 02-19-00007-CR
___________________________
CHRISTOPHER ARRON BOECKERS, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
On Appeal from the 396th District Court
Tarrant County, Texas
Trial Court No. 1534440D
Before Bassel, Womack, and Wallach, JJ.
Per Curiam Memorandum Opinion
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Appellant Christopher Arron Boeckers appeals from the trial court’s judgment
revoking his community supervision, adjudicating his guilt for possession of between
one and four grams of methamphetamine, sentencing him to four years’ confinement,
and ordering him to pay reparations in the amount of $375. See Tex. Health & Safety
Code Ann. § 481.115(c). Because we are unable to determine the authority for the
imposition of the portion of the reparations “DUE TO CSCD,” we modify the
judgment to delete $15 of the total reparations assessed, and we affirm the judgment
as modified.
Pursuant to a charge bargain, Appellant pleaded guilty to the possession
offense and the enhancement1 in exchange for the State’s dismissal of cause number
1534591, which involved a DWI offense. The trial court found the enhancement
paragraph true, deferred adjudicating Appellant’s guilt, and placed him on community
supervision for a period of four years. The trial court also ordered Appellant to pay
attorney’s fees in the amount of $670 and court costs in the amount of $349.
During the period of Appellant’s community supervision, the State filed a
motion to proceed with an adjudication of guilt. The State alleged that Appellant had
violated three conditions of his community supervision: (1) he failed to report at any
time during August 2018 as instructed by the trial court or his supervision officer;
The indictment included a repeat-offender notice stating that on October 10,
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2014, Appellant was convicted of possession of methamphetamine in an amount
between one and four grams.
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(2) he failed to report on or about July 11, 2018; and (3) he failed to report for an
assessment on or about July 3, 2018. Appellant pleaded “true” to the first alleged
violation and “not true” to the second and third alleged violations. The trial court
heard evidence regarding the State’s violation allegations, found all three allegations to
be true, and adjudicated Appellant guilty of the underlying offense. The trial court
sentenced Appellant to four years’ confinement. The trial court’s judgment
adjudicating guilt ordered Appellant to pay $375 in reparations.
Appellant’s court-appointed appellate counsel has filed a motion to withdraw as
counsel and a brief in support of that motion. Counsel’s brief and motion meet the
requirements of Anders v. California by presenting a professional evaluation of the
record demonstrating why there are no arguable grounds for relief. See 386 U.S. 738,
744, 87 S. Ct. 1396, 1400 (1967). In compliance with Kelly v. State, counsel notified
Appellant of the motion to withdraw, provided him a copy of the brief, informed him
of his right to file a pro se response, informed him of his pro se right to seek
discretionary review should this court hold that the appeal is frivolous, and took
concrete measures to facilitate Appellant’s review of the appellate record. 436 S.W.3d
313, 319 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). This court afforded Appellant the opportunity to
file a response on his own behalf, and he did so.
As the reviewing court, we must conduct an independent evaluation of the
record to determine whether counsel is correct in determining that the appeal is
frivolous. See Stafford v. State, 813 S.W.2d 503, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Mays v.
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State, 904 S.W.2d 920, 923 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1995, no pet.). Only then may we
grant counsel’s motion to withdraw. See Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 82–83, 109 S. Ct.
346, 351 (1988).
We have carefully reviewed counsel’s brief, Appellant’s response, and the
record and have determined that the trial court’s judgment requires modification
regarding the assessment of reparations in the amount of $375. We have previously
held that when reparations are comparable to fees, and are therefore not punishment
and not part of a defendant’s sentence, reparations do not have to be included in the
trial court’s oral pronouncement of sentence to be properly included in the written
judgment. See Brown v. State, No. 02-08-00063-CR, 2009 WL 1905231, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth July 2, 2009, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(per curiam). But we have struck reparations when a balance sheet described them
only as “Due to CSCD” because we were unable to determine the authority for the
imposition. See Lewis v. State, 423 S.W.3d 451, 461 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2013, pet.
ref’d); see also Lawson v. State, No. 02-18-00361-CR, 2019 WL 3244493, at *2 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth July 18, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication);
Gatewood v. State, No. 02-18-00021-CR, 2018 WL 4625780, at *2 (Tex. App.—
Fort Worth Sept. 27, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)
(per curiam).
Here, a balance sheet in the clerk’s record confirms that of the $375 in total
reparations that Appellant owes, $360 is for “PROBATION FEES” and $15 is “DUE
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TO CSCD.” We are unable to determine the authority for the imposition of the
latter. Consistent with our precedent above, we modify the judgment to reduce the
amount of reparations Appellant owes by $15 for a total of $360, which must also be
reflected in the incorporated order to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate trust
account. See Bray v. State, 179 S.W.3d 725, 726 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2005, no pet.)
(holding that an appellate court has authority to modify a judgment in an Anders
appeal); see also Lawson, 2019 WL 3244493, at *2 (modifying the judgment and the
incorporated order to withdraw funds from appellant’s inmate trust account in an
Anders appeal to delete reparations amount described only as “DUE TO CSCD”);
Gatewood, 2018 WL 4625780, at *2 (same).
Except for this necessary modification to the judgment and the incorporated
order to withdraw funds from Appellant’s inmate trust account, we agree with counsel
that this appeal is wholly frivolous and without merit; we find nothing in the record
that arguably might support an appeal. See Bledsoe v. State, 178 S.W.3d 824, 827–28
(Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Accordingly, we grant counsel’s motion to withdraw and
affirm as modified the trial court’s judgment and the order to withdraw funds
incorporated therein.
Per Curiam
Do Not Publish
Tex. R. App. P. 47.2(b)
Delivered: February 6, 2020
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