NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FEB 11 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 19-30198
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No. 6:09-cr-00012-CCL-1
v.
MEMORANDUM*
ANDREW THOMAS SWAGER,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Montana
Charles C. Lovell, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted February 4, 2020**
Before: FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, and TALLMAN, Circuit Judges.
Andrew Thomas Swager appeals from the district court’s judgment revoking
his supervised release and imposing a 10-month sentence. We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
Swager first contends that the district court abused its discretion by revoking
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
his supervised release because there was insufficient evidence to establish the six
violations of supervised release. In evaluating a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting a supervised release revocation, “we ask whether, viewing the
evidence in the light most favorable to the government, any rational trier of fact
could have found the essential elements of a violation by a preponderance of the
evidence.” United States v. King, 608 F.3d 1122, 1129 (9th Cir. 2010) (internal
quotations omitted). The evidence presented at the contested revocation hearing,
including witness testimony from Swager’s probation officer and drug test reports,
was sufficient to support the district court’s finding that Swager committed six
violations of the terms of his supervised release. Accordingly, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by revoking Swager’s supervised release. See United
States v. Perez, 526 F.3d 543, 547 (9th Cir. 2008).
Swager also contends that his sentence is substantively unreasonable given
the nature of his violations and because he eventually reported to his probation
officer and explained and documented his delay. The district court did not abuse
its discretion. See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The sentence is
substantively reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances and the 18
U.S.C. § 3583(e) sentencing factors, particularly Swager’s history and
characteristics and the need to protect the public. See Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.
2 19-30198