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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
ROBERT LIONEL MATTHEWS :
:
Appellant : No. 1151 WDA 2019
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered February 12, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-26-CR-0000947-2018
BEFORE: McLAUGHLIN, J., McCAFFERY, J., and PELLEGRINI, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY PELLEGRINI, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 24, 2020
Robert Lionel Matthews (Matthews) appeals nunc pro tunc from the
judgment of sentence entered in the Court of Common Pleas of Fayette County
(trial court) following his jury conviction of driving under the influence of a
controlled substance (DUI) and recklessly endangering another person
(REAP).1 Matthews challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting
these convictions. We affirm.
On November 23, 2017, just after 7:00 a.m., Matthews received a dose
of methadone at a clinic as treatment for his addiction to pain medication. He
changed a flat tire after leaving the clinic and proceeded to travel north on the
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2) and 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705.
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roadway. Joseph Webster (Webster) was also travelling behind Matthews in
the northbound lane. Webster observed Matthews’ vehicle begin to straddle
the two travel lanes heading north and then started to move into the
southbound lane. Webster also observed Matthews make a rocking motion
and slump down in the seat. Matthews drove through an empty parking lot,
ran into a stop sign, crossed a street, and moved into the driveway of David
Pato’s (Pato) residence. Matthews’ vehicle then collided into Pato’s garage.
The garage was attached to the residence. Pato was in the residence laying
down in his bed, 15 feet away from the crash site. Webster exited his vehicle
and saw Matthews slumped over into the front seat and called 911.
Pennsylvania State Police Officer Cameron Craig responded to the scene
and observed that Matthews’ legs were pinned in the drivers’ seat area of his
vehicle and his torso was over into the passenger area. Matthews explained
that he had just come from the methadone clinic located a quarter mile down
the road and that he had ingested methadone. Matthews’ speech was slurred
and slow and his breathing was slow as well. Officer Craig obtained a search
warrant for a blood draw, which showed positive findings for methadone.
On February 4, 2019, following a jury trial, Matthews was found guilty
of DUI, REAP and three summary traffic offenses.2 On February 12, 2019, the
trial court sentenced him to a term of intermediate punishment of 24 months,
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2 Driving on Roadways Laned for Traffic, Reckless Driving, and Failure to Use
a Seat Belt. See 75 Pa.C.S. §§ 3309(1), 3736(a), and 4581(a)(2)(ii).
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with 180 days served on house arrest with electric monitoring. Although
Matthews did not initially file a timely direct appeal, the trial court later
entered an order restoring his direct appeal rights nunc pro tunc on June 7,
2019. Matthews filed his notice of appeal more than 30 days later on July 30,
2019. He and the trial court complied with Rule 1925. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(a) - (b).
On appeal, Matthews challenges the sufficiency of the evidence
supporting his DUI and REAP convictions. Before reaching the merits of these
issues, we must address the timeliness of this appeal.
“When the trial court issues an order reinstating an appellant’s appeal
rights, the appellant must file the appeal within 30 days of the order
reinstating the appeal rights.” Commonwealth v. Wright, 846 A.2d 730,
734–35 (Pa. Super. 2004) (citation omitted). However, quashal of an appeal
is not warranted, even when filed past the 30-day deadline, if the trial court’s
order restoring an appellant’s direct appeal rights did not advise him of the
thirty-day requirement. See id.
As previously noted, the record reflects that Matthews filed his notice of
appeal more than 30 days after the trial court reinstated his direct appeal
rights. We nonetheless decline to quash this appeal because the court’s order
restoring his direct appeal rights did not inform him of the 30-day deadline.
We will, therefore, consider Matthews’ sufficiency claims on the merits.
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“The standard we apply in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence is
whether viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most favorable
to the verdict winner, there is sufficient evidence to enable the fact-finder to
find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Commonwealth v. Reed, 216 A.3d 1114, 1119 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation
omitted). “In applying the above test, we may not weigh the evidence and
substitute our judgment for the fact-finder.” Id. (citation omitted). “The
Commonwealth may sustain its burden of proving every element of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt by means of wholly circumstantial evidence.” Id.
(citation omitted). Finally, the jury, while assessing the credibility of
witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part
or none of the evidence. See id.
Matthews first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his
DUI conviction, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to demonstrate that he
was under the influence of a prescription medication to a degree that impaired
his ability to drive his vehicle safely. (See Matthews’ Brief, at 6-9). He
maintains that he was on a therapeutic level of methadone at the time of the
accident. (See id.).
The applicable provision of the DUI statute states:
(d) Controlled substances.—An individual may not drive,
operate or be in actual physical control of the movement of a
vehicle under any of the following circumstances:
* * *
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(2) The individual is under the influence of a drug or
combination of drugs to a degree which impairs the individual’s
ability to safely drive, operate or be in actual physical control of
the movement of the vehicle.
75 Pa.C.S. § 3802(d)(2).
This section does not require proof of a specific amount of a drug in the
individual’s system. See Commonwealth v. Tarrach, 42 A.3d 342, 345 (Pa.
Super. 2012). “It requires only proof that the driver was under the influence
of a drug or combination of drugs to a degree that the ability to drive is
impaired.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Williamson, 962 A.2d 1200, 1204
(Pa. Super. 2008) (testimony of erratic driving and intoxicated demeanor,
coupled with proof that drugs were present, were together sufficient to prove
that operator’s ability to drive safely was impaired).
At trial, Matthews testified that on the morning of the collision, he
received a 30-milligram dose of methadone. (See N.T Trial, 2/04/19, at 45-
46). Webster testified that he was driving directly behind Matthews
immediately before the accident, and that he observed Matthews’ vehicle
straddle the northbound lanes of traffic. (See id. at 8). Matthews crossed
into the opposite southbound lane of traffic and ran into a stop sign. (See
id.). Webster observed Matthews slump down in the front seat before the
crash, and Matthews remained slumped over across the seat after the
accident. (See id. at 8-9). The laboratory report showed a positive result for
methadone in Matthews’ blood and explained that “[a]dverse affects from
methadone are characterized by stupor, lethargy, pupillary constriction,
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hypotension and coma.” (Id. at 33). Officer Craig testified that his
observation of Matthews after the crash was consistent with the adverse
reactions listed in the report. (See id. at 35).
Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, we
conclude that the evidence was sufficient to permit the jury to find that
Matthews operated his vehicle while under the influence of a drug that
impaired his ability to control its maneuvering. Matthews drove erratically
outside of his lane on the roadway, struck a stop sign, and lost control of his
vehicle, landing in Pato’s garage. Thus, Matthews’ first sufficiency claim
merits no relief.
Matthews next argues that the evidence supporting his REAP conviction
was insufficient because he did not place anyone in fear of serious bodily injury
or death. (See Matthews’ Brief, at 4). He maintains that the Commonwealth
presented no evidence that he had driven carelessly or at an excessive speed.
(See id. at 10).
A defendant commits the offense of REAP “if he recklessly engages in
conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death or
serious bodily injury.” 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705. The Commonwealth must prove
that the defendant had an actual ability to inflict harm and that danger was
created. See Commonwealth v. Martuscelli, 54 A.3d 940, 949 (Pa. Super.
2012). As the Commonwealth points out, that fear of death or serious bodily
is not an element of the crime. (See Commonwealth’s Brief, at 6).
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The evidence at trial established that Matthews recklessly engaged in
conduct that placed Pato in danger of death or serious bodily injury. The
record reflects that Matthews received a dose of methadone, changed a flat
tire, and drove erratically from the clinic. (See N.T. Trial, at 8, 46-47). He
then collided into Pato’s garage, while Pato was in his attached residence,
laying only 15 feet away from the point of impact of Matthews’ vehicle. (See
id. at 18-19). By erratically driving his vehicle before crashing it headlong
into Pato’s residence in close proximity to where Pato was resting, Matthews
clearly placed Pato in danger of both death and serious bodily injury.
Accordingly, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Matthews
was guilty of REAP.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/24/2020
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