FILED
United States Court of Appeals
PUBLISH Tenth Circuit
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS February 25, 2020
Christopher M. Wolpert
FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court
_________________________________
LAWRENCE HENRY SMALLEN AND
LAURA ANNE SMALLEN
REVOCABLE LIVING TRUST,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff - Appellant,
and
UA LOCAL 13 PENSION FUND,
individually and on behalf of all others
similarly situated,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 19-1154
THE WESTERN UNION COMPANY;
HIKMET ERSEK; SCOTT T.
SCHEIRMAN; RAJESH K. AGRAWAL,
Defendants - Appellees,
and
BARRY KOCH,
Defendant.
_________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Colorado
(D.C. No. 1:17-CV-00474-KLM)
_________________________________
Michael Grunfeld (Jeremy A. Lieberman, Emma Gilmore, and Jonathan D. Lindenfeld
with him on the brief) of Pomerantz LLP, New York, New York, for Plaintiff-Appellant.
Hille R. Sheppard of Sidley Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois (David F. Graham of Sidley
Austin LLP, Chicago, Illinois; and Holly Stein Sollod and Christina Gomez of Holland &
Hart LLP, Denver, Colorado, with her on the brief) for Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________________
Before HARTZ, BALDOCK, and EID, Circuit Judges.
_________________________________
BALDOCK, Circuit Judge.
_________________________________
This appeal arises from the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiff–Appellant
Lawrence Henry Smallen and Laura Anne Smallen Revocable Living Trust’s
securities-fraud class action against Defendant–Appellee The Western Union
Company and several of its current and former executive officers (collectively,
“Defendants”). Following the announcements of Western Union’s settlements with
regulators in January 2017 and the subsequent drop in the price of the company’s stock
shares, Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on behalf of itself and other similarly situated
shareholders. In its complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants committed securities fraud
by making false or materially misleading public statements between February 24, 2012,
and May 2, 2017 (the “Class Period”) regarding, among other things, Western Union’s
compliance with anti-money laundering (“AML”) and anti-fraud laws.
With respect to Defendants’ alleged misstatements concerning Western Union’s
legal compliance, the district court dismissed the complaint because Plaintiff failed to
adequately plead scienter under the heightened standard imposed by the Private
Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (“PSLRA”), 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4. Plaintiff
2
appeals this determination. Although the complaint may give rise to some plausible
inference of culpability on the part of Defendants, Plaintiff has failed to plead
particularized facts giving rise to the strong inference of scienter required to state a
claim under the PSLRA. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm.
I.
The actors involved in this case are many, and the allegations in Plaintiff’s
complaint are legion.1 Because the parties are well-acquainted with the record, we
need not provide a comprehensive recitation of the full factual background underlying
Plaintiff’s claims. Rather, we set forth only the facts and procedural history necessary
for our analysis and then turn to the merits of the arguments on appeal.
Western Union is the world’s largest provider of money-transfer services,
operating through an international network of over 500,000 agent locations in more
than 200 countries and territories worldwide. As a major player in the money-
transmitter industry, which is heavily regulated, Western Union is no stranger to
dealing with compliance issues and government investigations.2 On January 19, 2017,
1
Plaintiff’s complaint is 176 pages long, consists of 580 paragraphs, and
includes a three-page table of contents. Because plaintiffs must carry a heavy burden
in private securities-fraud actions to survive a motion to dismiss, we understand
complaints in such cases will require more detail than in other contexts. But packing
a complaint with excessive and redundant allegations, as Plaintiff does here, merely
adds unnecessary length to an already long pleading, taxes judicial economy, and
therefore should be avoided.
2
A more detailed account of the regulatory investigations into Western Union’s
compliance with AML and anti-fraud laws can be found in City of Cambridge Ret. Sys.
v. Ersek, 921 F.3d 912 (10th Cir. 2019), which involved many of the same facts and
3
Western Union reached a joint settlement (“Joint Settlement”) with several federal
regulators, including the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) and the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”), in which it agreed to pay $586 million to resolve investigations
into the company’s AML and anti-fraud programs. As part of the settlement with DOJ,
Western Union entered into a deferred prosecution agreement (“DPA”) wherein the
company admitted to willfully failing to implement an effective AML compliance
program from 2004 through December 2012. Less than two weeks later, Western
Union also agreed to pay $5 million to settle charges arising out of the same compliance
issues with the attorney generals of 49 states and the District of Columbia.
Following the announcement of the Joint Settlement, the price of Western Union
stock shares declined. And shortly thereafter, Plaintiff filed its Consolidated Amended
Class Action Complaint, on behalf of itself and other similarly situated shareholders,
against Western Union and a select group of its senior executives. These senior
officers (collectively, the “Individual Defendants”) include:
Mr. Hikmet Ersek, who has served as Western Union’s Chief Executive Officer
and President since September 2010, and as a member of the company’s Board
of Directors since April 2010. He held each of these positions throughout the
Class Period.
Mr. Scott T. Scheirman, who was Western Union’s Chief Financial Officer and
an Executive Vice President from September 2006 until December 31, 2013. He
then served as a “Senior Advisor” until February 28, 2014. Mr. Scheirman was
also responsible for “Global Operations” at Western Union from January 2012
through November 2012.
allegations as the instant appeal. Id. at 914–17 (affirming dismissal of shareholder
derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duties).
4
Mr. Rajesh K. Agrawal, who has served as Western Union’s Chief Financial
Officer since July 2014 and as Executive Vice President since November 2011.
He was the company’s interim CFO from January 2014 to July 2014. Before
that, Mr. Agrawal served as President of Western Union Business Solutions
from August 2011 through December 2013.
In the complaint, Plaintiff alleges Defendants violated Section 10(b) of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b), and Securities Exchange
Commission Rule 10b–5, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5, by making false and materially
misleading statements during the five-year Class Period. As relevant here, these
misrepresentations include Defendants’ statements in public and in SEC filings that
Western Union’s then-current compliance efforts were legally sufficient and
effectively combating the significant AML and fraud problems the company faced
around the world. Count II of Plaintiff’s complaint also asserts claims against the
Individual Defendants under Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C.
§ 78t(a), which creates joint and several liability for “control persons” of entities found
liable for violations of securities laws.
Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Plaintiff’s complaint under Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b) and the PSLRA. As for the misstatements
concerning Western Union’s compliance with AML and anti-fraud laws, which is the
only category of statements at issue, the district court held that the complaint failed to
create a strong inference of scienter as required to state a claim under the PSLRA.3
3
The district court determined Defendants’ statements regarding government
investigations into Western Union, the company’s compliance expenditures, and
competitive advantages gained from Western Union’s compliance program were
5
Accordingly, the court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims of securities fraud under Section
10(b) and Rule 10b–5. Because Plaintiff failed to plead a primary violation of the
securities laws—a required element for control-person liability—the district court also
held Plaintiff’s Section 20(a) claims could not proceed. The court therefore dismissed
the complaint with prejudice, and this appeal followed.
II.
On appeal, Plaintiff argues the district court erred in concluding the complaint
does not create a strong inference of scienter with respect to Defendants’ misstatements
concerning Western Union’s compliance with AML and anti-fraud laws. We disagree.
To be sure, the complaint contains a plethora of allegations regarding unresolved
compliance problems and government investigations into Western Union. But Plaintiff
pleads very few particularized allegations, if any, showing Defendants made their
statements with either intent to defraud investors or conscious disregard of a risk
shareholders would be misled. Without such allegations, the complaint flounders on
the PSLRA’s heightened pleading standard.
A.
Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule 10b–5 promulgated
thereunder “prohibit making any material misstatement or omission in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.” Halliburton Co. v. Erica P. John Fund, Inc.,
neither false nor misleading and thus dismissed Plaintiff’s claims to the extent they
relied on these statements. Plaintiff has not appealed this aspect of the court’s ruling.
6
573 U.S. 258, 267 (2014); accord 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b); 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b–5. To
establish a violation under Section 10(b) and Rule 10b–5, a plaintiff must prove:
(1) the defendant made an untrue or misleading statement of material fact,
or failed to state a material fact necessary to make statements not
misleading; (2) the statement complained of was made in connection with
the purchase or sale of securities; (3) the defendant acted with scienter,
that is, with intent to defraud or recklessness; (4) the plaintiff relied on
the misleading statements; and (5) the plaintiff suffered damages as a
result of his reliance.
In re Zagg, Inc. Sec. Litig., 797 F.3d 1194, 1200 (10th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Level
3 Commc’ns, Inc. Sec. Litig., 667 F.3d 1331, 1333 (10th Cir. 2012)). Only the element
of scienter is at issue here.
Scienter is “‘a mental state embracing [1] intent to deceive, manipulate, or
defraud,’ or [2] recklessness.” Anderson v. Spirit Aerosystems Holdings, Inc., 827 F.3d
1229, 1236–37 (10th Cir. 2016) (quoting Adams v. Kinder–Morgan, Inc., 340 F.3d
1083, 1105 (10th Cir. 2003)). “Intentional misconduct is easily identified since it
encompasses deliberate illegal behavior.” City of Phila. v. Fleming Cos., 264 F.3d
1245, 1260 (10th Cir. 2001) (quoting Novak v. Kasaks, 216 F.3d 300, 308 (2d Cir.
2000)). Recklessness, on the other hand, is defined as “conduct that is an extreme
departure from the standards of ordinary care, and which presents a danger of
misleading buyers or sellers that is either known to the defendant or is so obvious that
the actor must have been aware of it.” In re Zagg, 797 F.3d at 1201 (quoting Fleming,
264 F.3d at 1258). In the securities-fraud context, recklessness is akin to conscious
disregard—allegations of negligence or even gross negligence fall “below the high
7
threshold for liability under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.” Dronsejko v.
Thornton, 632 F.3d 658, 668 (10th Cir. 2011).
B.
We review de novo the district court’s dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6). Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1237. In conducting our review, we accept
the complaint’s well-pleaded factual allegations as true. Id. Generally, we only
consider facts alleged in the complaint itself in evaluating the sufficiency of the
complaint. Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Rhode Island v. Williams Companies, Inc., 889
F.3d 1153, 1158 (10th Cir. 2018). Notwithstanding this general rule, we may consider
documents “the complaint incorporates by reference,” “documents referred to in the
complaint if the documents are central to the plaintiff’s claim and the parties do not
dispute the documents’ authenticity,” and “matters of which a court may take judicial
notice.” Id. (quoting Gee v. Pacheco, 627 F.3d 1178, 1186 (10th Cir. 2010)).4
A plaintiff asserting a claim under Section 10(b) bears a heavy burden at the
pleading stage because such claims are governed by the PSLRA, which imposes a
heightened standard for pleading the element of scienter. In re Zagg, 797 F.3d at 1201;
accord 15 U.S.C. § 78u–4(b)(2). The PSLRA requires a plaintiff to, “with respect to
each act or omission alleged . . . , state with particularity facts giving rise to a strong
4
Consistent with this principle, we consider the DPA, FTC Complaint, Western
Union’s SEC filings, and Western Union’s board and committee meeting materials in
conducting our de novo review. Plaintiff did not object to the district court’s
consideration of these documents, which Defendants submitted in support of their
motion to dismiss. Nor does Plaintiff argue we should refrain from considering these
materials in resolving this appeal.
8
inference that the defendant[s] acted with the required state of mind” in violating the
securities laws. In re Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1333 (emphasis added) (quoting 15 U.S.C.
§ 78u–4(b)(2)). In assessing the sufficiency of a plaintiff’s allegations under the
PSLRA, a court “must consider the complaint in its entirety” and decide “whether all
of the facts alleged, taken collectively, give rise to a strong inference of scienter, not
whether any individual allegation, scrutinized in isolation, meets that standard.”
Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322–23 (2007).
Although an inference of scienter “need not be irrefutable, i.e., of the ‘smoking-
gun’ genre,” it “must be more than merely plausible or reasonable.” Id. at 324.
Because the inference must be “powerful or cogent” not only in its own right but
“strong in light of other explanations[,]” we must “consider plausible, nonculpable
explanations for the defendant’s conduct, as well as inferences favoring the plaintiff.”
Id. at 323–24. Under this standard, a complaint survives dismissal “only if a reasonable
person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as compelling as any
opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.” Id. at 324.
C.
To survive dismissal, Plaintiff must have pleaded particularized facts giving rise
to a strong inference Defendants made their misstatements regarding Western Union’s
AML and anti-fraud compliance systems with either knowledge or reckless disregard
of their falsity. Plaintiff argues (1) it sufficiently alleges the Individual Defendants
acted with scienter, and their culpable state of mind is imputed to Western Union; and,
alternatively, (2) the complaint adequately pleads corporate scienter on behalf of
9
Western Union. Because neither argument succeeds, we affirm the district court’s
dismissal of Plaintiff’s complaint.5
1.
Turning first to the alleged scienter of the Individual Defendants, the complaint
identifies facts in five categories Plaintiff argues collectively give rise to a strong
inference the Western Union executives intended to defraud investors or acted
recklessly in making false statements. Plaintiff relies on: (1) various “red flags”
regarding fraud and compliance violations; (2) discussions about compliance issues at
Western Union board and committee meetings; (3) Western Union’s interactions with
government regulators and pending investigations; (4) the company’s admissions in
the DPA and the FTC’s conclusions in the Joint Settlement; and (5) Western Union
executives’ motive to defraud investors. We examine each category of facts in turn
5
Plaintiff also argues the district court “botched the standard for pleading
scienter” under the PSLRA by resolving a tie of competing inferences in favor of
Defendants. Because we review de novo the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s scienter
allegations, whether the district court stumbled in some regard in applying the
appropriate legal standard would be of little, if any, importance in our resolution of
this appeal. Nevertheless, the district court clearly posed the correct question
mandated under Supreme Court precedent and unequivocally answered that question
in the negative: “Simply stated, even if the Amended Complaint gives rise to some
plausible inference of scienter, it is not the strong inference required by the PSLRA.”
See Aplt. App. Vol. V at 1341 (citing Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 314); id. at 1330 (“Here,
taken as a whole, the Court finds that the Amended Complaint [#40] does not create
an inference of scienter that is at least as strong as any opposing inference.”); see also
id. at 1337–38 (“The Court is hard-pressed to draw any inference from these allegations
that Defendants knew of or recklessly disregarded the full scope and extent of the
alleged illicit behavior at Western Union, much less that they condoned it and
defrauded investors despite it.”).
10
and then “assess all the allegations holistically” to determine whether they satisfy the
PSLRA. Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 326.
a.
First, Plaintiff contends various red flags alerted the Individual Defendants to
ongoing regulatory compliance violations. These red flags include the following
allegations: (1) Western Union received at least 550,928 consumer complaints between
January 1, 2004, and August 29, 2015, concerning at least $632,721,044 in fraud
transactions; (2) fraudulent transfers involved Western Union’s agents in several
countries; and (3) several third-party agents, reaching as far back as 2007, were
arrested for fraud and money laundering. Because of the serious and pervasive nature
of the fraud involving Western Union’s money-transfer system, Plaintiff argues the
Individual Defendants must have known the company’s compliance programs were
ineffective at the time they made their alleged misstatements.
There are two problems with this argument. For one thing, although surely a
noteworthy sum, the $632,721,044 in fraudulent transactions—which occurred over a
twelve-year period—represents less than 1% of the dollars transferred through Western
Union’s system in 2014 alone, which amounted to $85 billion. This is not a case where
allegedly fraudulent transactions amounted to an overwhelming percentage of the
company’s business. Compare Adams, 340 F.3d at 1106 (considering fact that
fraudulent dollars “represented more than one quarter of the $22.4 million in net
income reported by the [c]ompany” contributed to an inference of fraudulent intent),
and In re Suprema Specialties, Inc. Secs. Litig., 438 F.3d 256, 278–79 (3d Cir. 2006),
11
abrogated on other grounds by Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 322–23 (concluding allegation that
“fictitious transactions . . . constituted ‘more than two-thirds of the company’s
revenue’” supported inference of scienter), with Mizzaro v. Home Depot, Inc., 544 F.3d
1230, 1251 (11th Cir. 2008) (declining to consider $1 billion in alleged fraud as
evidence of scienter where the cited figure was less than 2% of the corporate
defendant’s annual sales).
More importantly, Plaintiff does not plead any particularized facts either tying
the Individual Defendants to the consumer complaints or the agent arrests, or otherwise
demonstrating the Individual Defendants were aware Western Union’s compliance
program had failed to redress these issues. These allegations demonstrate fraudsters,
including Western Union’s agents, used the company’s system to commit fraud both
before and during the Class Period. But the issue here is not simply whether bad actors
used Western Union’s money-transfer system to perpetrate widespread fraud. Rather,
Plaintiff must show the Individual Defendants knew this fraud was occurring (or were
severely reckless in not knowing about it) and were also aware Western Union’s
compliance program was not effectively addressing these issues. This is where this
category of allegations falls short. Thus, we are not persuaded these “red flags” support
any inference the Individual Defendants knew about or consciously disregarded
ongoing illegality at the time they made their misstatements regarding Western Union’s
compliance programs.
Plaintiff also argues materials from Western Union’s board and committee
meetings, which the Individual Defendants allegedly attended, evidences their
12
knowledge of flaws in the company’s compliance programs. These materials derive
from meetings which took place between May 2010 and October 2013. The relevant
discussions at these meetings concerned regulators’ increased attention to Western
Union’s agents, the need for improvement in compliance programs to mitigate AML
and fraud in high-risk regions, and a competitor’s settlement agreement with DOJ.
Even assuming the Individual Defendants were briefed on these compliance
matters while attending the identified meetings, “mere attendance at meetings does not
contribute to an inference of scienter.” Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1246; see also In re
Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1344 (concluding the fact the defendants “monitored [a contested
program] through regular meetings and reports” did not give rise to a “strong
inference” of scienter). We fail to see how either government regulators’ increased
attention to certain regions or discussions about the need for improving Western
Union’s compliance controls equates to knowledge of ongoing, unaddressed
compliance violations. Additionally, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the terms of a
2012 settlement agreement Moneygram—Western Union’s main competitor—reached
with DOJ for compliance failures like those at issue here amount to “allegations of
‘fraud by hindsight,’ which does not constitute securities fraud.” See Anderson, 827
F.3d at 1247. These allegations therefore also fail to suggest any inference of scienter.
Turning to the third category of scienter-related allegations, Plaintiff’s
complaint is replete with facts concerning government investigations into Western
Union’s legal compliance, interactions with regulators, and the company’s disclosures
in SEC filings regarding these matters. Defendants do not dispute the notion that
13
governmental investigations into a company can contribute to an inference of scienter.
See In re ITT Educ. Servs., Inc. Sec. Litig., 34 F. Supp. 3d 298, 307, 309–10 (S.D.N.Y.
2014) (attaching relevance to the existence of government investigations but noting its
insufficiency, standing alone, to support a strong inference of scienter). Nor do
Defendants argue they were unaware of the government investigations into Western
Union’s legal compliance. Although the existence of government investigations into
Western Union, standing alone, is insufficient to support a cogent and compelling
inference of scienter, we will consider it as one piece of the puzzle in our holistic
analysis of Plaintiff’s allegations.
Dovetailing with the existence of the governmental investigations, Plaintiff
argues the Individual Defendants knew about Western Union’s compliance violations
because the company produced, among other things, internal reports and records
analyzing consumer fraud complaints and suspicious agents to the investigators. These
investigations, Plaintiff alleges, revealed the deficiencies in Western Union’s
compliance programs and provided the basis for DOJ’s and FTC’s conclusions that
Western Union turned a blind eye to third-party agents complicit in money laundering
and consumer fraud. Defendants, on the other hand, contend Plaintiff fails to provide
any particularized allegations showing the Individual Defendants themselves dealt
with the government regulators, reviewed the underlying documents submitted as part
of the investigations, or were otherwise informed legal noncompliance existed within
the company during the Class Period. We agree with Defendants.
14
Plaintiff’s argument is strongest against Mr. Ersek, the CEO of Western Union
during the Class Period. Confidential Witness (“CW”) 4, who worked as a former
high-level compliance officer at Western Union between late 2011 and April 2013,
“regularly briefed Ersek on relevant compliance-related issues, including the status of
the Southwest Border Agreement and system and compliance changes.” CW4’s
statements demonstrate Mr. Ersek was a hands-on chief executive, which is “a fact
relevant in our weighing of the totality of the allegations.” Adams, 340 F.3d at 1106.
But we “cannot infer scienter based only on a defendant’s position in a company or
involvement with a particular project.” Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1245; see also Adams,
340 F.3d at 1106 (explaining the defendant’s status as chief executive of the company
was a relevant fact but direct knowledge of the chief financial officer was “an important
link in the inferential chain”). Neither CW4’s account nor the accounts of the other
confidential sources cited in the complaint establish that Mr. Ersek reviewed the
documents submitted as part of the investigations or was informed about ongoing,
unaddressed compliance violations during the Class Period.6
6
CW1, a senior AML compliance manager at Western Union, explained that
consumer complaints were aggregated and distilled into composite reports distributed
to senior managers at the company. CW2, who served as a Western Union vice
president and senior Global Customer Care of Operations manager from December
2012 to January 2015, stated that the company “chose not to implement the stronger
AML protocol that Moneygram adopted as part of its 2012 agreement with DOJ.” CW3
served as a senior compliance employee at Western Union from June 2013 to
November 2015, worked in other AML positions before that time, and reported to the
company’s chief compliance officer. According to CW3, there is “no way [the
Individual Defendants] were not informed about the on-going investigations that
resulted in the Joint Settlement because the [c]ompany made upper managers available
to investigators and spent years cooperating with the investigation.” There are no
15
The link between Mr. Scheirman and Mr. Agrawal and their alleged knowledge
of ongoing illegality at Western Union is more speculative than that of Mr. Ersek.
There are no allegations either Mr. Scheirman or Mr. Agrawal, in their role as CFO,
had any responsibility for compliance matters at Western Union, and Plaintiff does not
allege any employees reported to them on compliance issues. Such an omission weighs
against inferring fraudulent intent on the part of these executives. See Adams, 340 F.3d
at 1088–89, 1106 (finding inference of scienter where a GAAP violation was paired
with particularized facts demonstrating the CFO knew the company’s profit was being
falsely reported, including allegations that the company’s assistant treasurer informed
the CFO of unprofitable ventures and the CFO himself complained of the financial
losses). The facts Plaintiff advances provide little reason to believe either of these
executives reviewed the documents submitted as part of the governmental
investigations or were otherwise informed of Western Union’s failure to maintain an
effective compliance program at the time of their alleged misstatements.7
allegations either CW1, CW2, or CW3 directly reported to any of the Individual
Defendants or even had any form of contact with them, much less informed them
Western Union’s compliance systems were failing. Nor do any of the confidential
witnesses indicate the Individual Defendants ever discussed the ongoing illegality or
knew the fraudulent transactions analyzed in the internal reports were not being
properly addressed by Western Union’s compliance systems. The accounts of the CWs
cited in the complaint add little, if any weight, to Plaintiff’s side of the scienter scale.
7
Plaintiff also points to a July 2013 report the Individual Defendants allegedly
received concerning suspicious fraudulent activity, occurring since March 2013, by an
agent in India. The report indicates the matter was escalated to Regional Compliance,
but there are no allegations regarding what happened after the escalation or how
Western Union resolved this issue. Even assuming the Individual Defendants read this
16
Plaintiff also points to Western Union’s admissions in the DPA and the FTC’s
conclusions in the Joint Settlement regarding the company’s awareness of serious
compliance problems as evidence of scienter. In the DPA, Western Union admitted to
willfully failing to implement an effective AML compliance program from 2004
through December 2012. Similarly, the FTC Complaint, the underlying allegations of
which Western Union did not admit to, concluded the company ignored compliance
violations through October 2015. Based on these admissions and conclusions in
January 2017, Plaintiff argues the Individual Defendants must have been aware of these
ongoing legal violations when they made their alleged misstatements.
The problem with Plaintiff’s argument is the PSLRA does not permit allegations
of “fraud by hindsight.” See Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1247. Put another way, Plaintiff
may not rely on a subsequent event triggering a decrease in stock price “to say that the
later, sobering revelations make the earlier, cheerier statement a falsehood.” Grossman
v. Novell, Inc., 120 F.3d 1112, 1124 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). Rather,
Plaintiff must provide particularized allegations showing the Individual Defendants,
before the announcement of the Joint Settlement, knew of or recklessly disregarded the
falsity of the challenged statements at the time they made the statements. See In re
Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1347 (“[H]indsight review . . . contributes nothing to an inference
of scienter.”).
report, we fail to see how it demonstrates the Western Union executives’ knowledge
of widespread failures to discipline agents engaging in fraudulent transactions.
17
No such allegations exist here. While the DPA and FTC Complaint highlight
the wrongdoing of Western Union’s agents and indicate some of the company’s
executives knew about ongoing violations, neither document provides particularized
facts tying the Individual Defendants to these violations or otherwise showing they
were aware of ongoing illegality and widespread disciplinary failures during the Class
Period. In the absence of such allegations, Plaintiff’s argument is simply another
variation of fraud by hindsight, which fails to support an inference of scienter.8
Finally, Plaintiff argues the Individual Defendants had motive to defraud
investors because they, along with other Western Union executives, used nonpublic
information to sell company stock at artificially inflated prices during the Class Period.
Specifically, Plaintiff alleges Mr. Ersek sold approximately 600,000 shares of Western
Union common stock for proceeds of more than $12 million between 2013 and August
2016. Plaintiff also avers Mr. Agrawal sold over 9,000 shares for proceeds of
approximately $200,000 in August 2016. The complaint contains additional
allegations regarding other non-defendant executives who allegedly profited by selling
Western Union stock during the Class Period.
8
We recently rejected a similar attempt to impute knowledge of wrongdoing in
the DPA to Western Union’s board of directors, which included Mr. Ersek, who has
been on the board since 2010. Ersek, 921 F.3d at 925 & n.20 (affirming dismissal of
shareholder derivative action alleging breach of fiduciary duties). There, we explained
“[t]he DPA doesn’t attribute knowledge of this criminal misconduct either to the Board
or to any individual Director. Nor does it support an inference that the Board
consciously disregarded the misconduct.” Id. Neither Mr. Scheirman nor Mr. Agrawal
are mentioned in the DPA. Additionally, Western Union’s admissions in the DPA
refers to conduct that occurred before Mr. Agrawal became CFO and made his first
allegedly misleading statement.
18
“Motive can be a relevant consideration, and personal financial gain may weigh
heavily in favor of a scienter inference,” Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 325, but these factors are
“typically insufficient in themselves” to give rise to a strong inference of scienter.
Pirraglia v. Novell, Inc., 339 F.3d 1182, 1191 (10th Cir. 2003). While suspicious
insider stock trading is evidence of motive and weighs in favor of inferring fraudulent
intent, the amount of profit realized through executive stock sales, standing alone, is
insufficient to support an inference of scienter. See In re Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1346–
47 (considering various factors in concluding corporate executives’ stock sales did not
establish a motive). To determine whether trading activity is suspicious, courts
consider several factors, including “the amount of profit from the sales, the portion of
stockholdings sold, the change in volume of insider sales, and the number of insiders
selling.” In re Scholastic Corp. Sec. Litig., 252 F.3d 63, 74–75 (2d Cir. 2001).
Even assuming the timing of Mr. Ersek’s and Mr. Agrawal’s stock sales is
suspicious—notwithstanding the fact these transactions were made in connection with
an exercise of expiring options—the sales are not unusual when viewed in context.
Both Mr. Ersek and Mr. Agrawal increased their aggregate holdings during the Class
Period, and their respective sales yield from the identified transactions constituted only
a fraction of their respective holdings.9 These factors militate against an inference of
scienter. See Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1346–47 (noting that increased holdings weakens an
9
These facts are derived from Plaintiff’s complaint and proxy statements
Western Union publicly filed with the SEC, of which this court can take judicial notice.
See Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Rhode Island, 889 F.3d at 1158 (noting it is not unusual to
consider public documents filed with the SEC in securities cases).
19
inference of scienter); Ronconi v. Larkin, 253 F.3d 423, 435–36 (9th Cir. 2001)
(considering stock options in calculations and finding sales of 10% and 17% of
holdings were not unusual in amount but sales of 69% to 98% of holdings were
suspicious in amount).
Critically, Plaintiff does not allege Mr. Scheirman sold any Western Union stock
during the Class Period. While suspicious stock sales are not necessary to adequately
plead scienter, see In re Level 3, 667 F.3d at 1346, “the failure of other defendants to
sell their stock undermine[s] [Plaintiff’s] theor[y] that negative information was
withheld to obtain a higher sell price.” In re Scholastic, 252 F.3d at 75; see also
Southland Sec. Corp. v. INSpire Ins. Sols., Inc., 365 F.3d 353, 369 (5th Cir. 2004)
(same). Because the complaint does not allege Mr. Scheirman sold any Western Union
stock, we view Plaintiff’s argument regarding Mr. Ersek’s and Mr. Agrawal’s motive
to defraud investors with greater skepticism based on the record before us.
As for the stock sales of other Western Union executives identified in the
complaint, Plaintiff fails to provide adequate context for these transactions. There are
no allegations concerning the price initially paid for the stock, what percentage of total
shares these sales consisted of, or whether they were buying other types of shares at
the same time. Without such information, it is hard to reach any conclusion as to what
kind of financial gain is at issue and whether these sales are unusual or suspicious.
In sum, we are not persuaded the stock sales of Mr. Ersek, Mr. Agrawal, or the
other Western Union executives identified in the complaint demonstrate the Individual
Defendants had motive to defraud investors. Plaintiff has therefore failed to plead facts
20
showing any of the Individual Defendants had a particularized motive to engage in
wrongful conduct. Although the absence of an alleged motive is not fatal to Plaintiff’s
claims, it does weigh against a finding of scienter. See Employees’ Ret. Sys. of Rhode
Island, 889 F.3d at 1173.10
b.
Viewing all of Plaintiff’s allegations holistically, we must decide “if a
reasonable person would deem the inference of scienter cogent and at least as
compelling as any plausible opposing inference one could draw from the facts alleged.”
Tellabs, 551 U.S. at 324. Two inferences compete for credence here. The culpable
inference is the Individual Defendants were aware, at some point during the Class
Period, of ongoing illegality not being redressed by Western Union’s compliance
programs and yet continued to assure investors the company complied with applicable
AML and anti-fraud laws. The innocent inference, on the other hand, is the Individual
Defendants neither knew about nor consciously disregarded the ongoing illicit
behavior at Western Union when they made their alleged misstatements but rather were
overly optimistic about the effectiveness of the company’s compliance systems.
10
“We likewise find the presence of the SOX certifications unpersuasive
because they are not accompanied by any ‘particularized facts to support an inference
that [the Individual Defendant] knew [their] sworn SOX statements were false at the
time they were made.’” In re Zagg, 797 F.3d at 1205 (quoting In re Gold Res. Corp.
Sec. Litig., 776 F.3d 1103, 1116 (10th Cir. 2015)). Plaintiff’s bare assertion regarding
the Individual Defendants’ execution of the SOX certifications “adds nothing
substantial to the scienter calculus” and, at best, “support[s] an inference of
negligence.” Id.
21
Based on the totality of the allegations, the inference of scienter arising from
Plaintiff’s complaint is neither cogent nor as compelling as the competing inference of
nonfraudulent intent. Plaintiff supplies few, if any, particularized facts giving rise to
a strong inference any of the Individual Defendants intentionally mispresented when
they made their alleged misstatements regarding Western Union’s then-current legal
compliance. In the absence of such allegations, the complaint does not adequately
allege the Individual Defendants’ misstatements were made with the knowledge of a
danger of misleading investors.
Even if the complaint fails to raise a strong inference of intent to deceive,
manipulate, or defraud, Plaintiff argues it at least raises a strong inference the
Individual Defendants “acted with a reckless disregard of a substantial likelihood of
misleading investors.” See Nakkhumpun v. Taylor, 782 F.3d 1142, 1150 (10th Cir.
2015). The allegations Plaintiff advances demonstrate the Individual Defendants were
too optimistic about Western Union’s compliance systems and failed to give adequate
weight to certain red flags, such as pending government investigations, at the time they
made their alleged misstatements. But as we explained above, “recklessness in this
context is a particularly high standard, something closer to a state of mind
approximating actual intent.” In re Zagg, 797 F.3d at 1206 (quotation marks and
citations omitted). The more compelling inference to be drawn from Plaintiff’s
complaint is, at most, one of negligence or possibly even gross negligence.
In sum, after evaluating all of Plaintiff’s allegations with respect to the alleged
misstatements regarding Western Union’s legal compliance and considering the
22
competing inference of nonfraudulent intent, we conclude the complaint fails to raise
a strong inference any of the Individual Defendants acted with scienter. The district
court, therefore, did not err in dismissing Plaintiff’s Section 10(b) claims against the
Individual Defendants.
2.
Although Plaintiff fails to adequately plead scienter for any of the Individual
Defendants, the complaint could, in theory, still give rise to a strong inference Western
Union acted with the requisite state of mind. Corporations, of course, do not have their
own state of mind. Rather, the scienter of a corporation’s agents must be imputed to
it. See Adams, 340 F.3d at 1106. The question remains, however: Whose state of mind
matters?
The appropriate standard for evaluating whether a non-defendant corporate
agent’s state of mind can be imputed to a corporate defendant under the PSLRA
appears to be an open question in this circuit. We have recognized “[t]he scienter of
the senior controlling officers of a corporation may be attributed to the corporation
itself to establish liability as a primary violator of § 10(b) and Rule 10b–5 when those
senior officials were acting within the scope of their apparent authority.” Id.
(emphasis added). Applying this principle in Adams, we determined the complaint
adequately alleged scienter on behalf of Kinder–Morgan, the corporate defendant,
because the allegations gave rise to a strong inference the company’s CEO and CFO,
who also were named defendants and parties on appeal, acted with scienter when they
signed the company’s misleading financial statements. Id. at 1105–07.
23
Plaintiff suggests the scienter of any Western Union agent, including lower-
level corporate officers who played no role in the misstatement, can be imputed to the
company for purposes of liability under the PSLRA. We disagree. If the scienter of
any agent is imputable to a corporation, “then it is possible that a company could be
liable for a statement made [ ] so long as a low-level employee, perhaps in another
country, knew something to the contrary.” In re Omnicare, Inc. Sec. Litig., 769 F.3d
455, 476 (6th Cir. 2014). Such a result runs afoul of the PSLRA’s heightened standard
for pleading scienter. Id. (noting Congress “increased the scienter pleading
requirements to prevent strike suits”). Because the allegations here concern allegedly
fraudulent public statements, we will look to the state of mind of “the individual
corporate official or officials who make or issue the statement (or order or approve it
or its making or issuance, or who furnish information or language for inclusion therein,
or the like)[.]” Alaska Elec. Pension Fund v. Flotek Indus., Inc., 915 F.3d 975, 982
(5th Cir. 2019) (quoting Southland, 365 F.3d at 366); see also Mizzaro, 544 F.3d at
1254 (same); Pugh v. Tribune Co., 521 F.3d 686, 697 (7th Cir. 2008) (same).
Here, Plaintiff argues the alleged scienter of other Western Union executives—
including Mr. Barry Koch, Mr. Stewart Stockdale, and “the Company’s counsel and/or
the Company’s compliance officer” responsible for responding to the government’s
investigative inquiries—is attributable to the company.11 Most of the allegations
11
Both Mr. Koch and Mr. Stockdale were named as defendants in Plaintiff’s
complaint. Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed Mr. Stockdale from the lawsuit before
Defendants filed their motion to dismiss. Because Plaintiff only appeals the district
court’s ruling on the alleged misstatements regarding Western Union’s legal
24
regarding these executives’ state of mind, such as the pervasive nature of AML
violations at Western Union identified in the Joint Settlement, are identical to
Plaintiff’s insufficient allegations against the Individual Defendants. Even assuming,
for the sake of argument, the state of mind of all these individuals can be imputed to
Western Union, Plaintiff’s argument fails because the complaint does not raise a strong
inference any of these individuals acted with scienter.
Plaintiff contends Mr. Koch “had every reason to know in the ordinary course
of his job the information described in the Joint Settlement” because he was Western
Union’s Chief Compliance Officer from May 2013 to November 2015. Mr. Koch’s
position would help establish whether he should have known about deficiencies in
Western Union’s compliance systems. “But additional particularized facts are
necessary for an inference of scienter.” See Anderson, 827 F.3d at 1245.
The only additional particularized fact allegedly revealing Mr. Koch’s scienter
is a September 2013 report he received concerning a master agent’s failure to properly
record transactions. Western Union did not terminate this agent, but the report
indicates the company had already implemented remedial measures to address the
issue. Although Plaintiff argues this action was insufficient, as the FTC concluded in
the Joint Settlement, it fails to show Mr. Koch knew or consciously disregarded
widespread failures by Western Union to address compliance issues. Plaintiff’s
compliance, it has also abandoned its claims against Mr. Koch, whose statements fall
under other categories the district court dismissed as neither false nor misleading.
Thus, neither Mr. Koch nor Mr. Stockdale are a party in this appeal.
25
argument here falters for the same reason as its contentions regarding the Individual
Defendants: the complaint lacks particularized allegations giving rise to a strong
inference Mr. Koch ignored ongoing, unremedied illegality or was otherwise aware
Western Union’s compliance systems were failing during the Class Period.
Plaintiff also points to the alleged scienter of Mr. Stockdale, who was an
executive in several different capacities at Western Union until October 2012.
According to the complaint, Mr. Stockdale communicated in June 2010 that efforts
were being made to “save” an agent engaging in fraudulent transactions, which
demonstrates the executive’s culpable state of mind at that time. But this
communication took place nearly two years before the start of the Class Period in
February 2012, as well as before any of the identified misstatements concerning
Western Union’s then-current legal compliance. Moreover, Western Union terminated
this agent in December 2011—months before the Class Period began. This fact, taken
with all of Plaintiff’s other allegations, fails to support the inference Mr. Stockdale
knew about or consciously disregarded ongoing legal violations during the Class
Period. See id. at 1240 (concluding admissions regarding a company’s problems made
months before the class period did not support an inference of scienter).
Plaintiff’s argument regarding the scienter of “the Company’s counsel and/or
the Company’s compliance officer” who oversaw Western Union’s responses to
governmental investigations is also without merit. The only particularized allegation
supporting Plaintiff’s contention is CW4’s account, which provides “the Company’s
General Counsel w[as] always briefed on the discipline or shutdown of agents and any
26
related investigations.” This fact, even when considered with all the other allegations
Plaintiff advances, clearly falls short of giving rise to an inference—must less a strong
inference—Western Union’s General Counsel or some unnamed compliance officer
was aware of ongoing, unaddressed illegality within the company.
Notwithstanding the complaint’s failure to give rise to a strong inference of
scienter as to any identifiable Western Union officer, Plaintiff contends the company
is nonetheless subject to § 10(b) liability under the doctrine of “corporate scienter,”
alternatively referred to as “collective scienter.” This doctrine—which several of our
sister circuits have addressed, but few have adopted, and even less have applied to find
scienter—allows a plaintiff to plead scienter against a corporate defendant without
doing so for a specific individual. See In re NVIDIA Corp. Sec. Litig., 768 F.3d 1046,
1063 (9th Cir. 2014) (“[T]here could be circumstances in which a company’s public
statements were so important and so dramatically false that they would create a strong
inference that at least some corporate officials knew of the falsity upon publication.”)
(quoting Glazer Capital Mgmt., LP v. Magistri, 549 F.3d 736, 744 (9th Cir. 2008)).
We have neither accepted nor rejected this theory of corporate scienter, and we
need not do so now. Although the compliance violations at Western Union were
serious and long-lasting, the facts pleaded are a far cry from the hypothetical situation
our sister courts have provided as to when the doctrine would apply:
Suppose General Motors announced that it had sold one million SUVs in
2006, and the actual number was zero. There would be a strong inference
of corporate scienter, since so dramatic an announcement would have
been approved by corporate officials sufficiently knowledgeable about
the company to know that the announcement was false.
27
Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd. v. Tellabs Inc., 513 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2008); see also
In re NVIDIA, 768 F.3d at 1063 & n.13 (using the same example); Teamsters Local
445 Freight Div. Pension Fund v. Dynex Capital Inc., 531 F.3d 190, 195–96 (2d Cir.
2008) (same). Even if we deemed it possible to plead scienter against a corporation
without pleading scienter against an individual, the facts alleged here would not give
rise to corporate scienter under any recognized theory of the doctrine. Thus, Plaintiff
has failed to adequately plead scienter with respect to Western Union, and the district
court correctly determined the § 10(b) claim against the company could not proceed.
III.
Finally, we conclude Plaintiff has failed to state a control-person claim against
the Individual Defendants. Control-person claims under Section 20(a) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78t(b), are predicated on some underlying primary
violation of the securities laws. Adams, 340 F.3d at 1107. Because the complaint does
not allege a primary violation of the securities laws, Plaintiff’s Section 20(a) claims
necessarily fail. Therefore, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint.
***
For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court.
28