IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA
No. 239A18
Filed 28 February 2020
STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA
v.
NEIL WAYNE HOYLE
Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) from the decision of a divided panel of
the Court of Appeals, 818 S.E.2d 149 (N.C. Ct. App. 2018), vacating a judgment
entered on 1 June 2017 by Judge Jeffrey P. Hunt in Superior Court, Catawba County,
and remanding for a new trial. On 5 December 2018, the Supreme Court allowed the
parties’ petitions for discretionary review of additional issues. Heard in the Supreme
Court on 5 November 2019.
Joshua H. Stein, Attorney General, by Tiffany Y. Lucas, Special Deputy
Attorney General, for the State-appellant.
Anne Bleyman for defendant-appellee.
NEWBY, Justice.
In this case we decide whether a defendant charged with felony indecent
exposure is entitled to an instruction requiring the jury to find that the victim could
have seen the exposed private part had the victim looked. We hold that a defendant
is not entitled to such an instruction. It is sufficient for the instruction to explain that
the jury must find beyond a reasonable doubt that the exposure was in the presence
STATE V. HOYLE
Opinion of the Court
of another person. We also conclude that the evidence at trial was sufficient for the
jury to find that defendant exposed himself in the presence of the child victim.
Finding no error in defendant’s conviction, we therefore reverse the decision of the
Court of Appeals in part.
The child victim was four years old at the time of the incident. His mother
drove home from the grocery store with him in the car. After the mother parked, she
began removing grocery bags from the car while the child played in the yard. As she
was removing the bags, defendant came to her home in his car. Defendant parked
along the street at the edge of the yard and called out to her to ask for directions. She
explained to defendant that she could not help him; defendant then offered to do some
work on her house. She declined, but defendant persisted. Finally, at defendant’s
request, the mother walked over to defendant’s car to take his business card. When
she arrived at the passenger side window and reached in to take the card, she saw
defendant’s exposed genitals. She quickly pulled her hand back, stumbled, dropped
the groceries, and ran to grab her child and go inside the house. As she ran from
defendant’s car, she heard him laugh. During this encounter, the child was playing
by a tree in the yard about twenty feet from defendant’s car. Law enforcement
identified defendant by the business card he had given the mother.
Defendant was tried in Superior Court, Catawba County, for one count of
felony indecent exposure, the child being the victim, and one count of misdemeanor
indecent exposure, the mother being the victim, both under N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9
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Opinion of the Court
(2017). After the State presented its evidence, and again after all evidence was
presented, defendant moved to dismiss the felony indecent exposure charge for
insufficient evidence. The trial court denied the motion. Defendant also asked the
court to instruct the jury that, to find that defendant’s exposure was in the presence
of someone under the age of sixteen as required by the statute, it must find beyond a
reasonable doubt that the child “could have seen [the exposure] had [he] looked.” The
court declined and, instead, followed the pattern jury instruction. It instructed the
jury that to satisfy the “presence” element, the State must prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the exposure “was in the presence of at least one other person.” It also
explained that “[i]t is not necessary that [the exposure] be directed at or even seen by
another person.” The jury found defendant guilty of both felony and misdemeanor
indecent exposure, and the trial court arrested judgment on the misdemeanor charge.
Defendant was sentenced to ten to twenty-one months in custody and was ordered to
register as a sex offender and enroll in lifetime satellite-based monitoring.
Defendant appealed to the Court of Appeals, arguing that the trial court
committed prejudicial error by refusing to give the instruction he requested. He also
argued that the Court of Appeals should vacate his conviction for felony indecent
exposure because the evidence was insufficient to show that he exposed himself “in
the presence of” the child. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court should have
instructed the jury that to satisfy the “presence” element the State must show that
the victim could have seen the exposure had he looked, and that failure to give the
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Opinion of the Court
instruction was reversible error. The Court of Appeals, however, agreed with the trial
court that the evidence was sufficient to allow the jury to consider whether the
presence element was satisfied. It thus ordered a new trial requiring defendant’s
requested jury instruction. The dissent thought the trial court properly instructed the
jury. The State appealed to this Court based on the dissent. This Court also allowed
the parties’ petitions for discretionary review, including defendant’s request that the
Court review the sufficiency of the evidence issue.
The State argues that the Court of Appeals wrongly held that the “presence”
requirement under subsection 14-190.9(a1) means the child must have been able to
see defendant’s exposed private part had he looked. Defendant claims the Court of
Appeals was correct about the jury instruction and also argues that the evidence was
insufficient to satisfy the presence element of felony indecent exposure.
Subsection 14-190.9(a1) provides that
any person at least 18 years of age who shall willfully
expose the private parts of his or her person in any public
place in the presence of any other person less than 16 years
of age for the purpose of arousing or gratifying sexual
desire shall be guilty of a Class H felony.
The elements of felony indecent exposure under this statute are that the defendant
was at least eighteen years old at the time of the exposure, that he willfully exposed
his private parts, that the exposure was in a public place, that the exposure was in
the “presence” of someone under the age of sixteen, and that the exposure was
committed to arouse or gratify sexual desire. See State v. Fly, 348 N.C. 556, 559, 501
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S.E.2d 656, 658 (1998) (interpreting a similarly worded prior version of section 14-
190.9). The presence element is the only element defendant contests before this
Court, so we do not address the others.
This Court previously considered the presence element of indecent exposure in
State v. Fly. In that case, the victim walked up the steps of her condominium building,
and, upon rounding a section of stairs, looked up and saw the defendant “mooning”
her. Id. at 557, 501 S.E.2d at 657. The defendant’s pants were pulled down to his
ankles and the victim could see the “crack of his [exposed] buttocks.” Id. When the
victim saw the defendant, she yelled, and the defendant quickly pulled up his pants
and ran away. Id. One issue in Fly was whether the defendant could be convicted
when the victim saw the “crack of his buttocks,” but could not see his genitals. Id. at
559, 501 S.E.2d at 658. The Court first held that though the buttocks is not a “private
part” under the indecent exposure statute, “the external organs of sex and excretion”
are. Id. at 560, 501 S.E.2d at 659. It then held that a jury could reasonably find that
the defendant had exposed “either his anus, his genitals, or both.” Id. at 561, 501
S.E.2d at 659. The Court explained that the statute does not require the victim to
have seen the exposure; instead, it only requires that the exposure was willfully made
in a public place and in the presence of another. Id. The exposure need not have been
to another, as long as it occurred in the presence of another. Id. Indecent exposure,
the Court said, “does not go to what the victim saw but to what defendant exposed in
her presence without her consent.” Id. Therefore, the Court held that a jury could
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Opinion of the Court
have found that the defendant exposed his genitals in the presence of the victim, even
though the victim did not see them and could not have seen them without being
positioned differently. Id.
In light of the plain language of N.C.G.S. § 14-190.9 as interpreted in Fly, we
hold that the requirement that the exposure be “in the presence of” the victim does
not require a jury to find that the victim could have seen the exposed private parts
had he or she looked. The statutory requirement that the exposure be in the presence
of another focuses on where a defendant places himself relative to others; it concerns
what the defendant does, not what the victim does or could do. See, e.g., Fly, 348 N.C.
at 561, 501 S.E.2d at 659 (“The statute does not go to what the victim saw but to what
defendant exposed in her presence without her consent.”). If a defendant exposes
himself in public and has positioned himself so he is sufficiently close to someone
under the age of sixteen, the presence element of subsection 14-190.9(a1) is satisfied.1
The jury instruction in this case drew directly from the statutory language and
the Fly opinion. The trial court instructed the jury that to return a guilty verdict it
must find beyond a reasonable doubt “that the exposure was in the presence of at
1 To hold otherwise would lead to absurd results. If the offense of indecent exposure is
not committed unless the victim could have seen the exposure had he or she looked, then a
conviction could hinge on considerations like the quality of the victim’s vision. We see nothing
in the statute’s language indicating that the General Assembly intended a defendant to be
culpable for indecent exposure by exposing himself near a child with 20/20 vision, but not for
exposing himself near a visually impaired child who left her glasses at home that day. In the
same way, we do not think the General Assembly would have intended defendant’s
culpability to be contingent on whether the victim child happened to climb a tree or otherwise
move to a position where he could more easily see the exposure.
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Opinion of the Court
least one other person” and that “[i]t is not necessary that [the exposure] be directed
at or even seen by another person.” This instruction was correct.
Finally, the evidence at trial was sufficient to satisfy the presence element of
the felony indecent exposure statute. When we consider a defendant’s motion to
dismiss, the question is “whether there is substantial evidence . . . of each essential
element of the offense charged.” State v. Fritsch, 351 N.C. 373, 378, 526 S.E.2d 451,
455 (2000) (quoting State v. Powell, 299 N.C. 95, 98, 261 S.E.2d 114, 117 (1980)).
“Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept
as adequate to support a conclusion.” State v. Smith, 300 N.C. 71, 78–79, 265 S.E.2d
164, 169 (1980) (citation omitted). The trial court must consider the evidence in the
light most favorable to the State. State v. Rose, 339 N.C. 172, 192–93, 451 S.E.2d 211,
223 (1994). Because defendant has only contested the sufficiency of the evidence as
to the “presence” element of the offense, that is the only element we consider.
At the time of the exposure, defendant was in his car along a road in front of
the victim’s house. He exposed himself while the child was about twenty feet away.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, the proximity of the
exposure to the victim was sufficiently close that a jury could find it was in the child’s
presence. The properly instructed jury, by returning a guilty verdict, apparently
concluded it was. The conviction was thus appropriate. We therefore agree with the
Court of Appeals that the evidence was sufficient to support defendant’s felony
indecent exposure conviction. That portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision is
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Opinion of the Court
affirmed.
But because the Court of Appeals erroneously held that defendant was entitled
to an instruction requiring the jury to find that the child could have seen the exposure
had he looked, and that the failure to give the instruction was prejudicial to
defendant, we reverse that portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals that
awarded defendant a new trial and find no error in defendant’s conviction for felony
indecent exposure.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART.
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