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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
CHARLES DEMAI WASHINGTON
Appellant No. 885 EDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 4, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County
Criminal Division at No: CP-39-CR-0002109-2014
BEFORE: STABILE, NICHOLS, JJ., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY STABILE, J.: FILED FEBRUARY 28, 2020
Appellant, Charles Demai Washington, appeals pro se from the March 4,
2019 order dismissing his petition pursuant to the Post Conviction Collateral
Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 9541-46. We affirm.
The record reveals that, on July 10, 2015, Appellant pled guilty to third-
degree murder, robbery, and conspiracy.1 Appellant admitted shooting and
killing the victim, taking property from the victim, and conspiring with others
to take property from the victim. N.T. Guilty Plea Sentencing, 7/10/15, at 21-
22. In exchange for his plea, the Commonwealth amended its homicide
charge to third-degree murder and recommended a 35-year minimum term
of incarceration. Id. at 3, 5. Appellant agreed to waive his right to appeal
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1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2501
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and/or file a PCRA petition. Id. at 5. Appellant executed a written waiver
colloquy governing his waiver appellate and collateral review rights, and he
confirmed his understanding of that waiver in an oral colloquy with the trial
court. Id. at 5-7. Immediately after the guilty plea, the trial court imposed
an aggregate 35 to 80 years of incarceration. Id. at 52.
Notwithstanding the plea agreement, Appellant, proceeding pro se, filed
this timely first PCRA petition on July 19, 2016. The PCRA court denied the
petition without appointing counsel, and Appellant appealed to this Court. By
memorandum of July 16, 2018, this Court vacated and remanded for
appointment of counsel. After remand, appointed counsel filed a no merit
letter and petition to withdraw pursuant to Commonwealth v. Turner, 544
A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988) and Commonwealth v. Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa.
Super. 1988) (en banc). On January 24, 2019, after conducting a hearing,
the PCRA court permitted appointed counsel to withdraw. On March 4, 2019,
the PCRA court conducted a hearing on the merits of Appellant’s petition.
Upon concluding that hearing, the PCRA court entered the order on appeal.
Appellant’s pro se brief raises five assertions of error, which we will
paraphrase. In issues I, III, and IV, which appear to be related, Appellant
claims the trial court lacked subject matter jurisdiction, that Appellant was
prosecuted under statutes that lack an enacting clause, and that counsel was
ineffective for advising him to plead guilty to crimes whose enactment was
invalid. Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 4. In issue II, Appellant claims counsel
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was ineffective for failing to present mitigating factors. Id. In issue V,
Appellant claims counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the weight of
the evidence.
We review the PCRA court’s order for error of law and record support for
its findings of fact. Commonwealth v. Williams, 828 A.2d 981, 987 (Pa.
2003) Before we address the merits of Appellant’s claims, which are very
poorly presented in his brief, we must consider the validity of his waiver of
collateral review. Waiver of further review, including post-conviction review,
is valid so long as the waiver is knowing, intelligent, and voluntary, and the
defendant was competent at the time. Id. at 992.
As noted, Appellant signed a written waiver of his rights to further
review, including collateral review. N.T. Guilty Plea and Sentencing, 7/10/15,
at 5-7. Defense counsel stated she “spent a considerable amount of time”
going over the pertinent waiver form with Appellant. Id. at 5. The trial court
confirmed that Appellant could read, write, and understand English and that
nothing was impeding his ability to comprehend the plea proceeding. Id. at
5-6. The trial court expressly asked Appellant whether he understood that his
waiver included “any PCRA or post-conviction relief,” and Appellant
responded, “Yes.” Id. at 6-7. Appellant had no questions about any of the
rights he was waiving. Id. at 7. Moreover, Appellant acknowledges in his pro
se brief that he filed the instant petition “in contravention of the plea
agreement.” Appellant’s Pro Se Brief at 5. The record supports the PCRA
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court’s finding that Appellant entered a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary
waiver of his right to file the instant petition, and we discern no error in the
court’s enforcement of the waiver.
Furthermore, Appellant’s arguments would fail even if we reached the
merits. Regarding Appellant’s apparent assertion that he was convicted under
inoperative criminal statutes, this Court, in Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114
A.3d 865 (Pa. Super. 2015), appeal denied, 125 A.3d 1201 (Pa. 2015),
provided a very thorough analysis in its rejection of a similar argument.
Appellant’s argument about counsel’s failure to present mitigating factors is
illogical, given his negotiated plea and negotiated minimum term of
incarceration. Finally, a challenge to the weight of the evidence is cognizable
only after trial. Pa.R.Crim.P. 607.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the PCRA court’s order.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 2/28/20
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