FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
MAR 2 2020
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
In re: CHRISTOPHER JOHN No. 19-55441
HAMILTON; ELIZABETH LEIGH
TESOLIN, D.C. No.
3:18-cv-02341-GPC-NLS
Debtors,
______________________________
MEMORANDUM*
CHRISTOPHER JOHN HAMILTON;
ELIZABETH LEIGH TESOLIN,
Appellants,
v.
ELITE OF LOS ANGELES, INC.; SAN
DIEGO TESTING SERVICES, INC.,
Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of California
Gonzalo P. Curiel, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted February 6, 2020
Pasadena, California
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
Before: BOGGS,** IKUTA, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
Appellant Christopher Hamilton appeals from a district court order affirming
a bankruptcy court’s ruling that the automatic stay in his Chapter 11 proceeding
did not apply to a state-court action filed by appellees Elite of Los Angeles, Inc.
and San Diego Testing Services, Inc. (Elite) against third-party Hamilton College
Consulting (HCC). See Hamilton v. Elite of L.A., Inc., No.
18-CV-2341-GPC-NLS, 2019 WL 1259164 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 19, 2019). We have
jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1), and we affirm.1
The automatic stay arising from 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) generally protects only
the debtor, the property of the debtor, and the property of the estate. Chugach
Timber Corp. v. N. Stevedoring & Handling Corp. (In re Chugach Forest Prods.,
Inc.), 23 F.3d 241, 246 (9th Cir. 1994)). It does not apply to “actions against
guarantors, sureties, corporate affiliates, or other non-debtor parties liable on the
debts of the debtor.” Id. (quoting Advanced Ribbons and Office Prods., Inc. v. U.S.
Interstate Distrib., Inc. (In re Advanced Ribbons & Office Prods.), 125 B.R. 259,
263 (B.A.P. 9th Cir. 1991)).
**
The Honorable Danny J. Boggs, United States Circuit Judge for the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, sitting by designation.
1
Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of
this case, we recount it only as is necessary to explain our disposition.
2
The parties do not dispute that Hamilton is liable to Elite for a prepetition
judgment that the bankruptcy court determined was nondischargeable in Chapter
11, see In re Hamilton, 785 F. App’x 438, 439 (9th Cir. 2019), nor that HCC
entered into an indemnity agreement with Hamilton for the nondischargeable
judgment.
Elite argues that HCC’s indemnity agreements with Hamilton make it
contractually liable for the judgment. See generally Cal. Civ. Code § 2778(1).
Elite did not name Hamilton as a defendant in the state-court action, but instead
seeks to recover directly from HCC pursuant to a state law that authorizes creditor
actions against third parties indebted to a judgment debtor. See Cal. Civ. Code
Proc. § 708.210.
Hamilton contends that Chugach does not apply because indemnity differs
from surety or guaranty, the types of non-debtor liability we specifically identified
in that case. See Chugach, 23 F.3d at 246. He argues that because HCC’s liability
for the nondischargeable judgment arises, if at all, pursuant to the indemnity
agreements, HCC is liable solely to Hamilton, and any payment HCC owes is
property of the estate subject to the automatic stay.
We are unpersuaded that the distinct nature of indemnity overcomes our
holding in Chugach that the automatic stay does not apply to actions against “non-
3
debtor parties liable on the debts of the debtor.” Id. (quoting Advanced Ribbons,
125 B.R. at 263); see also Cal. Civ. Code § 2778(1) (providing rule of contract
interpretation that “[u]pon an indemnity against liability . . . the person indemnified
is entitled to recover upon becoming liable”). The bankruptcy court did not err by
concluding that the automatic stay did not extend to Elite’s state-court action
against HCC.
AFFIRMED.
4