NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 6 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
JOSE LUIS PIEDRAS-SANTIAGO, AKA No. 18-71107
Jose Luis Pierdas-Santiago,
Agency No. A205-297-574
Petitioner,
v. MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 3, 2020**
Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Jose Luis Piedras-Santiago, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) order dismissing his appeal
from an immigration judge’s decision denying his applications for asylum,
withholding of removal, relief under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
cancellation of removal, and the BIA’s denial of his motion to remand. Our
jurisdiction is governed by 8 U.S.C. § 1252. We review de novo questions of law,
Cerezo v. Mukasey, 512 F.3d 1163, 1166 (9th Cir. 2008), except to the extent that
deference is owed to the BIA’s interpretation of the governing statutes and
regulations, Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371 F.3d 532, 535 (9th Cir. 2004). We review
for substantial evidence the agency’s factual findings. Garcia-Milian v. Holder,
755 F.3d 1026, 1031 (9th Cir. 2014). We review for abuse of discretion the BIA’s
denial of a motion to remand. Movsisian v. Ashcroft, 395 F.3d 1095, 1098 (9th
Cir. 2005). We dismiss in part and deny in part the petition for review.
We lack jurisdiction to consider Piedras-Santiago’s proposed social group
based on family because he failed to raise it before the BIA. See Barron v.
Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677-78 (9th Cir. 2004) (court lacks jurisdiction to review
claims not presented to the agency).
The agency did not err in finding that Piedras-Santiago failed to establish
membership in a cognizable social group. See Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125,
1131 (9th Cir. 2016) (in order to demonstrate membership in a particular group,
“[t]he applicant must ‘establish that the group is (1) composed of members who
share a common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3)
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socially distinct within the society in question.’” (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26
I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (BIA 2014))); see also Barbosa v. Barr, 926 F.3d 1053,
1059-60 (9th Cir. 2019) (finding that individuals returning to Mexico from the
United States who are believed to be wealthy does not constitute a particular social
group); Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148, 1151-52 (9th Cir. 2010)
(concluding “returning Mexicans from the United States” did not constitute a
particular social group).
Substantial evidence supports the BIA’s determination that Piedras-Santiago
otherwise failed to establish that the harm he fears in Mexico would be on account
of a protected ground. See Zetino v. Holder, 622 F.3d 1007, 1016 (9th Cir. 2010)
(an applicant’s “desire to be free from harassment by criminals motivated by theft
or random violence by gang members bears no nexus to a protected ground”).
Thus, Piedras-Santiago’s asylum and withholding of removal claims fail.
In light of this disposition, we do not reach Piedras-Santiago’s contentions
regarding the timeliness of his asylum application. See Simeonov v. Ashcroft, 371
F.3d 532, 538 (9th Cir. 2004) (courts and agencies are not required to decide issues
unnecessary to the results they reach).
Substantial evidence also supports the BIA’s denial of CAT relief because
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Piedras-Santiago failed to show it is more likely than not he would be tortured by
or with the consent or acquiescence of the government if returned to Mexico. See
Wakkary v. Holder, 558 F.3d 1049, 1067-68 (9th Cir. 2009) (no likelihood of
torture).
As to cancellation of removal, we lack jurisdiction to review the agency’s
discretionary determination that Piedras-Santiago failed to show exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship to a qualifying relative. See 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(2)(B)(i); see also Arteaga-De Alvarez v. Holder, 704 F.3d 730, 735-36
(9th Cir. 2012) (court lacks jurisdiction to review merits of hardship determination
and only retains jurisdiction over constitutional claims that have “some possible
validity” (internal quotation marks and citation omitted)).
The BIA did not abuse its discretion in denying Piedras-Santiago’s motion
to remand to consider additional evidence for cancellation of removal, where he
failed to demonstrate prima facie eligibility for relief. See Lopez-Vasquez v.
Holder, 706 F.3d 1072, 1080 (9th Cir. 2013) (“The BIA is entitled to deny
a motion to reopen where the applicant fails to demonstrate prima facie eligibility
for the underlying relief.”); see also Romero-Ruiz v. Mukasey, 538 F.3d 1057, 1063
(9th Cir. 2008) (“The formal requirements for a motion to reopen and a motion to
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remand are the same.”).
Finally, Piedras-Santiago’s request, raised in his opening brief, to remand for
consideration of new evidence is denied.
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part; DENIED in part.
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