[Cite as State v. Lawler, 2020-Ohio-849.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
UNION COUNTY
STATE OF OHIO,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT, CASE NO. 14-19-25
v.
ERICA S. LAWLER, OPINION
DEFENDANT-APPELLEE.
Appeal from Union County Common Pleas Court
Trial Court No. 2018 CR 0231
Judgment Affirmed
Date of Decision: March 9, 2020
APPEARANCES:
Andrew M. Bigler for Appellant
Joshua A. Peistrup for Appellee
Case No. 14-19-25
PRESTON, J.
{¶1} Plaintiff-appellant, the State of Ohio, appeals the July 18, 2019
judgment of the Union County Court of Common Pleas granting the motion to
suppress evidence of defendant-appellee, Erica S. Lawler (“Lawler”). For the
reasons that follow, we affirm.
{¶2} This case arises from a January 16, 2018 traffic stop on US 33 near
Marysville, Ohio. At approximately 5:15 p.m., Trooper Blake Prather (“Trooper
Prather”) of the Ohio State Highway Patrol was in his patrol vehicle monitoring
westbound traffic. At that time, a Buick passed his patrol vehicle, and he noticed
that the driver’s arms were “locked out on the steering wheel” and that both the
driver and the passenger “were sitting upright and rigid.” (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 9-
10). Based on these observations, Trooper Prather decided to follow the Buick, and
at approximately 5:16 p.m., he stopped the Buick after witnessing the driver of the
vehicle “move[] from the right lane to the left lane without the use of a turn signal
to indicate their lane change.” (Id. at 11).
{¶3} Trooper Prather identified Bradley Schidecker (“Schidecker”) as the
driver of the Buick. (Id. at 16). Lawler was identified as the passenger. (Id.). After
speaking with Lawler and Schidecker for a few moments, Trooper Prather learned
that neither Lawler nor Schidecker was the registered owner of the Buick. (Id.).
Trooper Prather obtained the registered owner’s contact information and returned
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to his patrol vehicle at approximately 5:21 p.m. (Id. at 16-17, 22); (State’s Ex. 1).
Once inside his patrol vehicle, Trooper Prather radioed his dispatcher and asked the
dispatcher to establish contact with the registered owner. (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 17).
Trooper Prather also requested the assistance of a canine unit “off of the behavior[s]
[he] observed” prior to returning to his patrol vehicle. (Id.).
{¶4} At approximately 5:24 p.m., Trooper Prather was informed by the
dispatcher that although Lawler and Schidecker were allowed to use the Buick,
Schidecker was not supposed to be driving. (Id. at 22-23). By that time, Trooper
Prather had also discovered that Schidecker’s license was suspended. (Id. at 26).
However, after learning this information, Trooper Prather did not return to the Buick
to speak to Lawler and Schidecker. Instead, Trooper Prather waited in his patrol
vehicle for approximately 25 minutes until the canine unit arrived on scene at 5:49
p.m. (Id. at 24-25, 33). At 5:52 p.m., about 36 minutes after Trooper Prather first
stopped the Buick, the drug-detection dog was led to the vehicle, and shortly
thereafter, it alerted to the presence of drugs. (Id. at 41-42); (State’s Ex. 1). A
subsequent search of the vehicle yielded roughly 2 grams of suspected heroin, 23.6
grams of suspected methamphetamine, drug paraphernalia, a small digital scale, and
other items associated with drug trafficking.
{¶5} On September 11, 2018, the Union County Grand Jury indicted Lawler
on five counts: Count One of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C.
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2925.11(A), (C)(1)(a), a fifth-degree felony; Count Two of aggravated trafficking
in drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2), (C)(1)(d), a second-degree felony;
Count Three of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(6)(b), a
fourth-degree felony; Count Four of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of
R.C. 2925.11(A), (C)(1)(c), a second-degree felony; and Count Five of illegal use
or possession of drug paraphernalia in violation of R.C. 2925.14(C)(1), (F)(1), a
fourth-degree misdemeanor. (Doc. No. 1). On April 22, 2019, Lawler appeared for
arraignment and pleaded not guilty to the counts of the indictment. (Doc. No. 6).
{¶6} On June 26, 2019, Lawler filed a motion to suppress evidence. (Doc.
No. 18). In her motion to suppress, Lawler argued that the evidence seized from the
Buick during the traffic stop should be suppressed because Trooper Prather
unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop while awaiting the arrival of the drug-
detection dog. (Id.).
{¶7} A hearing on Lawler’s motion to suppress evidence was held on July
17, 2019. (Doc. No. 26); (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 1). On July 18, 2019, the trial court
granted Lawler’s suppression motion and ordered that the evidence obtained from
the search of Buick be suppressed. (Doc. No. 26).
{¶8} On July 22, 2019, the State filed a notice of appeal and a certification
pursuant to Crim.R. 12(K). (Doc. Nos. 32, 35). It raises one assignment of error
for our review.
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Assignment of Error
The trial court erred by finding the totality of the circumstances
did not justify prolonging defendant’s traffic stop to allow for a
canine to arrive at the scene and conduct a sniff of the vehicle.
{¶9} In its assignment of error, the State argues that the trial court erred by
granting Lawler’s motion to suppress evidence. Specifically, the State argues that
the trial court erred by concluding that Trooper Prather did not have a reasonable,
articulable suspicion to justify prolonging the traffic stop.
{¶10} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents a mixed question
of law and fact.” State v. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, ¶ 8. At
a suppression hearing, the trial court assumes the role of trier of fact and, as such, is
in the best position to evaluate the evidence and the credibility of witnesses. Id. See
State v. Carter, 72 Ohio St.3d 545, 552 (1995). When reviewing a ruling on a
motion to suppress, “an appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact
if they are supported by competent, credible evidence.” Burnside at ¶ 8, citing State
v. Fanning, 1 Ohio St.3d 19 (1982). With respect to the trial court’s conclusions of
law, however, our standard of review is de novo, and we must independently
determine whether the facts satisfy the applicable legal standard. Id., citing State v.
McNamara, 124 Ohio App.3d 706 (4th Dist.1997).
{¶11} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Section
14, Article I of the Ohio Constitution guarantee the right to be free from
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unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-
Ohio-4539, ¶ 7, citing State v. Orr, 91 Ohio St.3d 389, 391 (2001). “Temporary
detention of individuals during the stop of an automobile by the police, even if only
for a brief period and for a limited purpose, constitutes a ‘seizure’ of ‘persons’
within the meaning” of the Fourth Amendment. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S.
806, 809-810, 116 S.Ct. 1769 (1996), citing Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 653,
99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979), United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 556, 96 S.Ct.
3074 (1976), and United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873, 878, 95 S.Ct. 2574
(1975). The individuals “seized” during the stop of an automobile by law
enforcement officers include persons riding in the automobile as passengers.
Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249, 251, 127 S.Ct. 2400 (2007); State v. Clark,
6th Dist. Wood No. WD-17-025, 2018-Ohio-2029, ¶ 22, quoting State v. Carter, 69
Ohio St.3d 57, 63 (1994). Because an automobile stop involves the seizure of
persons within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, “[a]n automobile stop is * *
* subject to the constitutional imperative that it not be ‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances.” Whren at 810. A traffic stop is reasonable, and therefore
constitutionally permissible, if it is supported either by probable cause or by a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that a motorist has committed, is committing, or is
about to commit a crime, including a violation of the traffic laws. State v.
Moiduddin, 3d Dist. Union No. 14-18-15, 2019-Ohio-3544, ¶ 11. However,
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“[w]hen police stop a vehicle without either probable cause or a reasonable
articulable suspicion of criminal activity, the seizure is violative of constitutional
rights and evidence derived from such a stop must be suppressed.” Clark at ¶ 22,
citing Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655, 81 S.Ct. 1684 (1961).
{¶12} In her motion to suppress, Lawler did not challenge the
constitutionality of the initial stop of the vehicle, and after reviewing the record, we
are satisfied that Trooper Prather had probable cause to stop the vehicle after he
observed Schidecker fail to signal a lane change in violation of R.C. 4511.39. State
v. Matheney, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26876, 2016-Ohio-7690, ¶ 16 (“[I]f a traffic
stop is based on a traffic violation, such as one’s failure to signal a turn, which
occurred in the officer’s presence, the officer possesses probable cause to stop the
vehicle and the stop is constitutionally valid.”), citing Dayton v. Erickson, 76 Ohio
St.3d 3, 11 (1996). Instead, Lawler argued that the evidence seized from the vehicle
should be suppressed because Trooper Prather unreasonably prolonged the traffic
stop to await the arrival of the drug-detection dog.
{¶13} “[A] seizure that is lawful at its inception can violate the Fourth
Amendment if its manner of execution unreasonably infringes interests protected by
the Constitution.” Illinois v. Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407, 125 S.Ct. 834 (2005),
citing United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 124, 104 S.Ct. 1652 (1984). For
example, “[a] seizure that is justified solely by the interest in issuing a * * * ticket
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to the driver can become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete that mission.” Id.
{¶14} “‘When an officer detains a motorist for a traffic violation, the stop
should delay the motorist only for the amount of time necessary to issue a citation
or warning.’” State v. Hall, 2d Dist. Darke No. 2016-CA-13, 2017-Ohio-2682, ¶ 8,
quoting State v. Hill, 2d Dist. Montgomery No. 26345, 2016-Ohio-3087, ¶ 9, citing
State v. Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, ¶ 12; State v. Troutman, 3d
Dist. Marion No. 9-11-17, 2012-Ohio-407, ¶ 22 (“[T]he duration of the stop ‘is
limited to “effectuate the purpose for which the initial stop was made.”’”), quoting
State v. Smith, 117 Ohio App.3d 278, 285 (1st Dist.1996), quoting State v. Venham,
96 Ohio App.3d 649, 655 (4th Dist.1994). “‘The reasonable stop time includes the
amount of time it takes to conduct a computer check on the driver’s license,
registration, and vehicle plates.’” Hall at ¶ 8, quoting Hill at ¶ 9; Rodriguez v.
United States, 575 U.S. 348, 355, 135 S.Ct. 1609 (2015) (“[A]n officer’s mission
includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop’ * * * [such as] checking
the driver’s license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants against the
driver, and inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.”),
quoting Caballes at 408. “‘“In determining if an officer completed these tasks
within a reasonable length of time, the court must evaluate the duration of the stop
in light of the totality of the circumstances and consider whether the officer
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diligently conducted the investigation.”’” Batchili at ¶ 12, quoting State v. Howard,
12th Dist. Preble Nos. CA2006-02-002 and CA2006-02-003, 2006-Ohio-5656, ¶
15, quoting State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio App.3d 585, 598-599 (9th Dist.1995).
{¶15} In contrast, a canine sniff, because it is “a measure aimed at
‘detect[ing] evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing,’” “[l]ack[s] the same close
connection to roadway safety as the ordinary inquiries” and is thus “not fairly
characterized as part of [a law enforcement] officer’s traffic mission.” Rodriguez at
355-356, quoting Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 40-41, 121 S.Ct. 447
(2000). Nevertheless, a law enforcement officer is not constitutionally prohibited
from conducting a canine sniff of a vehicle during the course of a lawful traffic stop.
An exterior sniff of a vehicle by a trained drug-detection dog does not constitute a
“search” within the meaning of the United States Constitution or the Ohio
Constitution. State v. Mote, 3d Dist. Mercer No. 10-15-05, 2015-Ohio-3715, ¶ 17,
quoting State v. Cahill, 3d Dist. Shelby No. 17-01-19, 2002-Ohio-4459, ¶ 22,
quoting State v. Rusnak, 120 Ohio App.3d 24, 28 (6th Dist.1997) and citing United
States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 103 S.Ct. 2637 (1983); State v. Alexander-Lindsey,
4th Dist. Lawrence No. 15CA11, 2016-Ohio-3033, ¶ 36, quoting State v. Waldroup,
100 Ohio App.3d 508, 514 (12th Dist.1995). Consequently, a law enforcement
officer may conduct a canine sniff of a vehicle without reasonable suspicion of
additional illegal activity, provided that “‘the officer conducts [the] canine sniff of
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the vehicle before the reasonable completion of the traffic stop procedures * * *.’”
State v. Casey, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2013-10-090, 2014-Ohio-2586, ¶ 22,
quoting State v. Elliott, 7th Dist. Mahoning No. 11 MA 182, 2012-Ohio-3350, ¶ 23,
citing State v. Winger, 2d Dist. Darke No. 1688, 2007-Ohio-2605, ¶ 17.
{¶16} “‘However, if the officer extends the traffic stop in order to conduct a
canine sniff, he must have reasonable suspicion that the vehicle contains drugs in
order to detain the driver while a canine unit is brought to the scene.’” Id., quoting
Elliott at ¶ 23. See Batchili at ¶ 15 (noting that “‘the detention of a stopped driver
may continue beyond [the normal] time frame when additional facts are encountered
that give rise to a reasonable, articulable suspicion of criminal activity beyond that
which prompted the initial stop’”), quoting Howard at ¶ 16; Troutman at ¶ 23-24.
Reasonable, articulable suspicion “exists when there are ‘“specific and articulable
facts which, taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably
warrant the intrusion.”’” Troutman at ¶ 24, quoting State v. Stephenson, 3d Dist.
Union No. 14-04-08, 2004-Ohio-5102, ¶ 16, quoting State v. Bobo, 37 Ohio St.3d
177, 178 (1988). “In forming reasonable articulable suspicion, law enforcement
officers may ‘draw on their own experience and specialized training to make
inferences from and deductions about the cumulative information available to them
that “might well elude an untrained person.”’” Id. at ¶ 25, quoting United States v.
Arvizu, 534 U.S. 266, 273, 122 S.Ct. 744 (2002), quoting United States v. Cortez,
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449 U.S. 411, 417-418, 101 S.Ct. 690 (1981). “‘The “reasonable and articulable
suspicion” analysis is based on the collection of factors, not on the individual factors
themselves.’” (Emphasis sic.) Mays, 119 Ohio St.3d 406, 2008-Ohio-4539, at ¶ 12,
quoting Batchili at ¶ 19.
{¶17} In its judgment granting Lawler’s suppression motion, the trial court
found as follows:
[Trooper] Prather testified he stopped a westbound Buick driven by *
* * Schidecker at 5:16 p.m. [Lawler] was a passenger. The stop was
for a traffic offense of failure to signal a lane change. Within eight *
* * minutes the trooper found Schidecker’s license was suspended and
that the owner of the car had loaned it to [Lawler]. The officer
requested a “drug dog” come to the scene to sniff for drugs. The
driver and [Lawler] were detained for approximately twenty-eight
minutes while a drug dog from the Hilliard Police Department was
brought to [the] scene.
(Doc. No. 26). In addition, the trial court found that Trooper Prather “relied on body
language and inconsistent statements to justify holding [Lawler and Schidecker] for
almost * * * half an hour for a drug dog to be brought to the scene.” (Id.).
{¶18} At the July 17, 2019 suppression hearing, Trooper Prather testified that
on January 16, 2018 at approximately 5:15 p.m., he was stationed on US 33 near
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Marysville, Ohio when he observed a westbound Buick pass his marked patrol
vehicle. (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 7-9). Trooper Prather stated that the Buick caught his
attention because “the driver and the passenger were sitting upright and rigid” and
the “driver had his arms locked out on the steering wheel.” (Id. at 9-10). He testified
that the driver was “pushed back into the seat almost as if to avoid being seen.” (Id.
at 10). Trooper Prather stated that he regarded the driver’s and passenger’s
behaviors as abnormal and that, consequently, he decided to follow the Buick. (Id.
at 10-11). Trooper Prather conceded that when he decided to follow the Buick, he
did not have probable cause or reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle. (Id. at 11).
However, according to Trooper Prather, after following the Buick for a short period
of time, he observed the Buick move “from the right lane to the left lane without the
use of a turn signal to indicate their lane change.” (Id.). Trooper Prather testified
that he then activated his overhead lights and effected a stop of the Buick. (Id. at
11-12).
{¶19} Trooper Prather stated that when he approached the Buick, “the first
thing that really caught [his] eye was the driver threw his head back against the
seat,” which was “out of the ordinary for what [he] usually see[s]” and an “odd”
reaction to being stopped for a “seemingly minor infraction.” (Id. at 15). Trooper
Prather also noted that when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, the
passenger-side window was rolled only halfway down. (Id.). Trooper Prather
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testified that after identifying Lawler and Schidecker as the occupants of the Buick,
he learned that the vehicle was not registered to Lawler or Schidecker. (Id. at 16).
He stated that he obtained the registered owner’s telephone number “to see if
[Schidecker and Lawler] were allowed to use the vehicle.” (Id.). He testified that
when he inquired why Lawler and Schidecker were using a vehicle that neither of
them owned, they explained that “they were going to be babysitting for a friend,”
though “[n]either one of them [were] from the area according to their licenses.” (Id.
at 16-17).
{¶20} Trooper Prather stated that after speaking with Lawler and Schidecker,
he returned to his patrol vehicle, provided dispatch with the telephone number of
the Buick’s registered owner, and “ask[ed] dispatch to contact her to verify that
[Lawler and Schidecker] were supposed to have the vehicle.” (Id. at 17); (State’s
Ex. 1). He testified that he also “requested a canine off of the behavior that [he]
observed prior to the stop and walking up to the car.” (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 17).
Trooper Prather testified that, based on his training and experience, he suspected
potential criminal activity because Lawler and Schidecker were both “staring
straight ahead sitting upright and rigid” in the Buick, the passenger-side window
was rolled only halfway down, which was “out of the ordinary” but “not necessarily
indicative of anything huge,” and Schidecker “threw his head back” against his
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headrest. (Id. at 19-21). Trooper Prather explained why he found it particularly
“odd” that Schidecker hit his head against his headrest:
[I]f you’re just on a traffic stop, * * * in my opinion, there’s no reason
to throw your head back against the seat almost in * * * like an oh,
crap situation. That was my suspicion when I walked up there that
there was no reason to do that. And then I asked if his license was
suspended thinking that that may be the reason to do that. Because I
have pulled over a lot of people that have suspended licenses, and they
are a little bit more amped up than usual. When [Schidecker] said that
[his license] should be valid, that automatically threw that out of my
mind. You know, if you’re saying that you should be valid, you
should not have a reaction like that.
(Id. at 20). Trooper Prather stated that after Schidecker told him that his license
“should be valid,” he eliminated driving under suspension as an explanation for
Schidecker’s behaviors. (Id. at 20-21).
{¶21} Trooper Prather testified that he requested the canine unit at
approximately 5:21 p.m., roughly 5 minutes after he activated his overhead lights to
initiate the traffic stop. (Id. at 22); (State’s Ex. 1). He stated that the canine unit
arrived around 5:49 p.m., approximately 33 minutes after the Buick was stopped.
(July 17, 2019 Tr. at 22, 24-25); (State’s Ex. 1).
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{¶22} Trooper Prather testified that while he was waiting for his dispatcher
to contact the registered owner of the Buick, he conducted a check of Schidecker’s
license and learned that Schidecker’s license was, in fact, suspended. (July 17, 2019
Tr. at 26). He stated that this information was “contrary” to Schidecker’s previous
statement that his license “should be valid.” (Id.).
{¶23} Trooper Prather testified that at 5:24 p.m., about 8 minutes after he
initiated the traffic stop, his dispatcher informed him that the Buick’s registered
owner had been contacted and that the registered owner “said that [Schidecker] was
not supposed to be driving the vehicle, and [Lawler] was only supposed to have the
vehicle to go to the store.” (Id. at 23); (State’s Ex. 1). According to Trooper Prather,
the registered owner’s statement that the Buick was supposed to be used for the
limited purpose of going to the store was significant because “[it was] completely
different than why [Lawler and Schidecker] said they had the vehicle in the first
place.” (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 23). He stated that both Lawler and Schidecker have
Columbus-area addresses and that because “[t]here are numerous stores between
Columbus and Marysville, many of which are the same type of store that [they]
could have gone to,” “there appeared to be no reason to be in Marysville,
specifically.” (Id.). Trooper Prather remarked that the registered owner’s statement
“mean[t] that [he] had been lied to while [he] was standing at the side of the car”
and that it was a “major problem” that Schidecker was driving the Buick when the
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registered owner said that he should not be driving. (Id.). Trooper Prather indicated
that he believed that Lawler and Schidecker were being deceptive, which is another
indicator of potential criminal activity. (Id. at 23-24).
{¶24} On cross-examination, Trooper Prather testified that after stopping the
Buick and speaking with Lawler and Schidecker, he returned to his patrol vehicle at
approximately 5:21 p.m., which was roughly 5 minutes after he first stopped the
vehicle. (Id. at 27). Trooper Prather confirmed that he requested the canine unit
immediately on returning to his patrol vehicle and that he learned that Schidecker’s
license was suspended approximately 6 to 7 minutes after stopping the Buick. (Id.).
He also confirmed that at 5:24 p.m., he learned that the Buick was not stolen but
that Schidecker was not supposed to be driving it. (Id. at 31). However, Trooper
Prather never spoke directly with the registered owner of the Buick, and he did not
get any of the “specific details” from the owner concerning Lawler and Schidecker’s
use of the vehicle. (Id. at 37-38). He testified that he knew that Schidecker’s license
was suspended before he learned that Schidecker was not supposed to be driving the
Buick. (Id. at 32). Trooper Prather stated that the next time he spoke to Lawler and
Schidecker after he had returned to his patrol vehicle was at approximately 5:48 or
5:49 p.m. when the canine unit arrived. (Id. at 32-33). He agreed that he sat in his
patrol vehicle “for at least 25 minutes” before the canine unit arrived. (Id. at 33).
Trooper Prather testified that the exterior sniff of the vehicle was not performed
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until around 5:52 p.m., approximately 36 minutes after he originally stopped the
Buick. (Id. at 41-42); (State’s Ex. 1).
{¶25} Trooper Prather testified that during the 25 minutes that he waited for
the canine unit to arrive, he was “just waiting for [the] canine” and did not “do
anything additional to further the search or [his] investigation.” (July 17, 2019 Tr.
at 33). He stated that because “the vehicle was under an unauthorized use [as
Schidecker was] not supposed to be driving it,” he would not have permitted Lawler
and Schidecker to leave until he finished, which meant until the canine unit arrived.
(Id.). Trooper Prather agreed that, “[b]ased on the fact that that car wasn’t supposed
to be driven by [Schidecker],” he “would have waited another half an hour * * * for
that canine to show up because it was en route” from Hilliard. (Id. at 37).
{¶26} Trooper Prather testified that if he “were under ideal situations and *
* * had everything in front of [him] at the time and * * * [was not] waiting for any
other information from [his] dispatch,” he could write a citation in “three to four
minutes.” (Id. at 30). When asked whether he had “all the information [he] needed
at [5:24 p.m.] to issue any citation for any information that [he] had as a result of
[his] investigation,” Trooper Prather responded that he did. (Id. at 32, 39-40).
Trooper Prather testified that he ultimately cited Schidecker for driving under
suspension and for failing to use his turn signal. (Id. at 38). However, he stated that
he did not cite Schidecker for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, and he could not
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recall whether he cited Lawler and Schidecker for failing to wear their seatbelts.
(Id. at 38-39). Trooper Prather agreed that he “[c]ould have” made the decision
whether to cite Schidecker for unauthorized use of a motor vehicle based on the
information he possessed at 5:24 p.m., but that he “did not.” (Id. at 39).
{¶27} Trooper Prather testified that he did not detect the smell of marijuana
in the Buick, that he did not see anything thrown from the vehicle, and that he did
not see any drugs, drug paraphernalia, or potential stolen property in the vehicle.
(Id. at 35-36). Trooper Prather also testified that there was snow on the ground on
the day of the traffic stop and that it “was not warm.” (Id. at 28); (State’s Ex. 1).
{¶28} On redirect examination, Trooper Prather testified that when the
registered owner of a stopped vehicle is not in the vehicle, it is common practice to
“exhaust all means” to contact the registered owner of the vehicle to “make sure that
the vehicle * * * is supposed to be there with the people that are occupying that
vehicle.” (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 43). Finally, Trooper Prather reiterated that he would
need “[t]hree to four minutes under completely ideal circumstances” to write a
traffic citation, and he suggested that the circumstances were not completely ideal
on the day of the traffic stop, though he did not provide an estimate of how long it
would have taken him to write a citation under the circumstances. (Id. at 45).
{¶29} Based on the foregoing review of the record, we conclude that
competent, credible evidence supports the trial court’s findings of fact. See
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Moiduddin, 2019-Ohio-3544, at ¶ 13. Hence, we accept and defer to the trial court’s
findings. Burnside, 100 Ohio St.3d 152, 2003-Ohio-5372, at ¶ 8. Yet, the State
maintains that one of the trial court’s findings of fact—that Trooper Prather “relied
on body language and inconsistent statements to justify holding [Lawler and
Schidecker] for almost * * * half an hour for a drug dog to be brought to the
scene”—is not supported by the record. (Appellant’s Brief at 6-7). The State argues
that the trial court’s findings of fact are incomplete because it did not consider that
Schidecker “explicitly did not have consent to be driving” or that Trooper Prather
“believed there could be a possible unauthorized use of a motor vehicle violation,
and his investigation shifted along those lines approximately 8 minutes after the
traffic stop began.” (Id. at 7). The State thus asserts that Trooper Prather’s
prolonged detention of Lawler was based on more than “body language and
inconsistent statements.” It contends that Trooper Prather’s prolongation of the
traffic stop was justified because the “totality of the circumstances gives rise to a
reasonable and articulable suspicion of at least a violation of R.C. 2913.03(A).”1
(Id. at 8).
{¶30} We disagree. Although Trooper Prather may well have had reason to
extend the traffic stop for some period of time beyond that which was necessary to
1
R.C. 2913.03(A) provides, in relevant part, that “[n]o person shall knowingly use or operate [a] * * * motor
vehicle * * * without the consent of the owner or person authorized to give consent.” Generally, a violation
of R.C. 2913.03(A) is a first-degree misdemeanor. R.C. 2913.03(D)(2).
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investigate Schidecker’s failure to signal a lane change and issue a warning or
citation, Trooper Prather’s suspicion that Schidecker violated R.C. 2913.03, or that
Schidecker committed other traffic offenses such as driving under suspension, did
not justify the length of the detention at issue in this case. Once Trooper Prather’s
dispatcher informed him that Schidecker was not permitted to drive the Buick,
Trooper Prather encountered facts that would support a reasonable, articulable
suspicion that Schidecker was violating or had violated R.C. 2913.03.
Consequently, Trooper Prather might have been justified in prolonging the traffic
stop for some period of time to investigate Schidecker’s potential violation of R.C.
2913.03. See Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 15. Likewise,
when Trooper Prather learned that Schidecker’s license was suspended, he might
have been able to extend the traffic stop in order to cite Schidecker for driving under
suspension and to determine whether Lawler was capable of safely and legally
driving the Buick away from the traffic stop.
{¶31} However, even with reasonable suspicion to believe that Schidecker
had violated R.C. 2913.03 or that he was driving under suspension, Trooper Prather
would have been justified in extending the duration of the traffic stop only for such
time as would have been reasonably necessary to investigate these additional
potential infractions. See United States v. Spears, 636 Fed.Appx. 893, 901 (5th
Cir.2016) (“‘If the officer develops reasonable suspicion of additional criminal
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Case No. 14-19-25
activity, * * * he may further detain [the] occupants [of the vehicle] for a reasonable
time while appropriately attempting to dispel this reasonable suspicion.’”), quoting
United States v. Andres, 703 F.3d 828, 833 (5th Cir.2013); United States v. Winters,
782 F.3d 289, 296 (6th Cir.2015) (the extension of a traffic stop based on new
reasonable suspicion “‘must be “limited in scope and duration.”’”), quoting United
States v. Johnson, 482 Fed.Appx. 137, 143 (6th Cir.2012), quoting Florida v. Royer,
460 U.S. 491, 500, 103 S.Ct. 1319 (1983). In assessing whether a law enforcement
officer reasonably extended the duration of a traffic stop, this court must “‘examine
whether the police diligently pursued a means of investigation that was likely to
confirm or dispel their suspicions quickly, during which time it was necessary to
detain the defendant.’” Troutman, 2012-Ohio-407, at ¶ 38, quoting United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686-687, 105 S.Ct. 1568 (1985). Therefore, while Trooper
Prather may have acquired additional reasonable suspicion sufficient to prolong the
traffic stop, “the more important question is whether [Trooper Prather] diligently
pursued a means of investigation that was likely to confirm or dispel [his] suspicions
quickly.” Id. at ¶ 40.
{¶32} From the record before us, we cannot conclude that Trooper Prather
diligently pursued a means of investigation likely to confirm or dispel his suspicions
that Schidecker had violated R.C. 2913.03 or that he was driving under suspension.
The record reflects that by 5:24 p.m., 8 minutes after the initial traffic stop, Trooper
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Case No. 14-19-25
Prather had learned that Schidecker’s license was suspended and that Schidecker
did not have permission to drive the Buick. Yet, for the next 24-25 minutes, Trooper
Prather sat in his patrol vehicle. He did not approach the Buick to reestablish contact
with Schidecker and Lawler, and he did not attempt to communicate further with
the vehicle’s registered owner. By Trooper Prather’s own admission, he did not “do
anything additional to further the search or [his] investigation”; he was “just waiting
for [the] canine.” (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 33). Finally, and perhaps most importantly,
the drug-detection dog could not possibly have advanced Trooper Prather’s
investigation because an exterior sniff of a vehicle cannot confirm or dispel a
suspicion that the driver is driving the vehicle without the owner’s consent or with
a suspended license. In other words, prolonging a vehicle stop to await the arrival
of a drug-detection dog is not a reasonable way to investigate whether the driver is
authorized to drive the vehicle or whether the driver is properly licensed. Therefore,
the length of the detention at issue in this case was not justified by Trooper Prather’s
suspicions that Schidecker had violated R.C. 2913.03 or that Schidecker was driving
under suspension because Trooper Prather did not investigate these suspicions in a
reasonable manner. See Troutman at ¶ 40-43.
{¶33} Moreover, we are unable to conclude that the sniff by the drug-
detection dog occurred within the period of time reasonably required for Trooper
Prather to complete the tasks associated with the initial traffic stop or with
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Schidecker’s possible driving-under-suspension offense and violation of R.C.
2913.03. Trooper Prather testified that by 5:24 p.m., when he learned that
Schidecker’s license was suspended and that Schidecker was not supposed to be
driving the Buick, he had all the information he needed to issue any citations to
Schidecker and Lawler. (See July 17, 2019 Tr. at 32, 39-40). Trooper Prather
specifically stated that he “could have” made the decision to cite Schidecker for
unauthorized use of a motor vehicle based on the information he had at 5:24 p.m.
(Id. at 39). Although Trooper Prather testified that it takes him 3 to 4 minutes to
complete a traffic citation under ideal circumstances, he seemed to suggest that
conditions were not ideal at the time, and our survey of relevant case law reveals
that the preparation of traffic citations and criminal summonses often requires more
than 3 to 4 minutes. (Id. at 45). See In re $75,000.00 U.S. Currency, 8th Dist.
Cuyahoga No. 105314, 2017-Ohio-9158, ¶ 27 (noting that some Ohio courts have
held that “the longest a traffic stop and citation issuance should take is
approximately 15 minutes”); State v. Eggleston, 11th Dist. Trumbull No. 2014-T-
0068, 2015-Ohio-958, ¶ 12 (documenting officer’s testimony that “it generally takes
8-10 minutes to issue a summons or citation for a traffic violation” and “10-15
minutes to complete a summons” when a stop results in criminal charges); State v.
Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-Ohio-6535, ¶ 5, 17 (2d Dist.) (assuming, with
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reservations, that 30 minutes was a reasonable length of time to process citations for
a marked-lane violation, an expired license, and a seatbelt violation).
{¶34} Nevertheless, even allowing Trooper Prather significantly more than
3 to 4 minutes to determine whether to cite Schidecker and Lawler and prepare the
citations or summonses, and yet more time to provide Schidecker and Lawler with
the citations or summonses and determine whether Lawler would be permitted to
drive the Buick away, there is no evidence in the record that Trooper Prather
undertook a diligent effort to complete any of these tasks. See Ramos at ¶ 17. While
Trooper Prather ultimately cited Schidecker for failing to signal a lane change and
for driving under suspension, the record does not clearly indicate whether Trooper
Prather began writing the citations during the 25-minute period that he waited in his
patrol vehicle for the drug-detection dog or whether he prepared the citations at
some point after the dog had arrived.
{¶35} To the extent that the record does speak to Trooper Prather’s efforts,
it suggests that he did little to process the traffic stop while he waited for the drug-
detection dog. (See July 17, 2019 Tr. at 33) (testifying that he “just wait[ed] for
[the] canine” and did not “do anything additional to further the search or [his]
investigation”). Furthermore, Trooper Prather testified that Schidecker and Lawler
would not have been free to leave until the canine unit arrived and that he would
have waited another half-hour for the canine unit. (Id. at 33, 37). Thus, not only
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does the record document Trooper Prather’s apparent lack of activity in processing
the traffic stop, it suggests that Trooper Prather’s primary motivation for extending
the traffic stop may have been to allow for an exterior sniff of the Buick. Stated
differently, there is “‘some evidence that the normal procedures were delayed for
reasons unrelated to the investigation of the traffic violation[s] * * *.’” State v.
Blatchford, 12th Dist. Preble No. CA2015-12-023, 2016-Ohio-8456, ¶ 32, quoting
State v. Neal, 10th Dist. Franklin No. 15AP-771, 2016-Ohio-1406, ¶ 23.
Accordingly, we conclude that the dog sniff did not occur within the time reasonably
necessary to complete the traffic-related investigation and that the traffic stop was
therefore prolonged by the dog sniff. See Hall, 2017-Ohio-2682, at ¶ 11-13
(concluding that “[e]ven if the canine sniff occurred within the 12 to 13 minutes that
it typically took [the officer] to issue a citation,” the officer “indisputably added
time to the stop” by “doing nothing for eight minutes while awaiting a canine unit”);
Eggleston at ¶ 25-28 (holding that the officer unreasonably prolonged the traffic
stop where he “waited a period of time, surrounded by at least four other officers,
before beginning to issue a summons * * * solely * * * because he was waiting for
the K-9 unit to arrive”); Elliott, 2012-Ohio-3350, at ¶ 25-28 (concluding that the
officer “acted unreasonably in failing to write the traffic citation and in failing to
conduct the field sobriety tests while detaining appellant for [a] half-hour waiting
for a canine unit to arrive”); Ramos at ¶ 17-18.
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Case No. 14-19-25
{¶36} Even so, the fact that a traffic stop was continued beyond the time
reasonably required to complete the traffic-related investigation does not necessarily
mean that the stop was unconstitutionally prolonged. It is well established that if a
law enforcement officer has a reasonable, articulable suspicion that a vehicle
contains drugs or that the vehicle’s occupants are engaged in drug-related activity,
the officer may detain the vehicle and its occupants beyond the time reasonably
necessary to complete the traffic-related investigation in order to allow a drug-
detection dog to be brought to the scene. Blatchford at ¶ 28, quoting Neal at ¶ 13;
Casey, 2014-Ohio-2586, at ¶ 22; Ramos, 155 Ohio App.3d 396, 2003-Ohio-6535,
at ¶ 13. See Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355; Batchili, 113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-
2204, at ¶ 15. Although the trial court’s conclusion is not perfectly clear, it seems
to have concluded that Trooper Prather lacked reasonable suspicion to believe that
the Buick contained drugs or that Schidecker and Lawler were engaged in drug-
related activity. (See Doc. No. 26). Specifically, the trial court appears to have held
that Schidecker’s and Lawler’s “body language” and “inconsistent statements” “did
not rise to the standard of a reasonable suspicion” of drug-related activity required
to detain them until the drug-detection dog arrived. (Id.).
{¶37} We conclude that the trial court did not err by holding that Trooper
Prather did not have a reasonable, articulable suspicion that the Buick contained
drugs or that Schidecker and Lawler were engaged in drug-related activity. Here,
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Case No. 14-19-25
Trooper Prather relied, to some degree, on each of the following factors to justify
prolonging the detention of Schidecker and Lawler: (1) Schidecker’s and Lawler’s
rigid, upright postures and their failure to look at Trooper Prather as they passed his
patrol vehicle; (2) the fact that Schidecker “threw his head” against his headrest as
Trooper Prather approached the Buick; (3) the fact that the passenger-side window
was rolled only halfway down; (4) Schidecker’s suspended license and the fact that
he misrepresented that his license was valid; (5) Schidecker’s potential unauthorized
use of the Buick; (6) the discrepancy between Schidecker and Lawler’s explanation
that they were using the Buick to babysit and the owner’s statement that Lawler was
supposed to use the Buick to go to the store; and (7) the fact that Schidecker and
Lawler did not need to be in Marysville to go to the store because they could have
gone to one of many stores closer to their Columbus-area addresses. We recognize
that in evaluating whether Trooper Prather had a reasonable, articulable suspicion
of drug-related activity, we must refrain from considering whether any one of
Trooper Prather’s observations was “itself readily susceptible to an innocent
explanation” and instead focus on whether the collection of factors, including those
factors that may appear unsuspicious in isolation, cumulatively supports a finding
of reasonable suspicion. Arvizu, 534 U.S. at 274; Batchili at ¶ 19. Nonetheless, in
considering whether the factors articulated by Trooper Prather amount to a
reasonable suspicion of drug-related activity when considered together, it is
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Case No. 14-19-25
appropriate to assess the extent to which a given factor is indicative of criminal
activity. See United States v. Bowman, 884 F.3d 200, 214 (4th Cir.2018); United
States v. Stepp, 680 F.3d 651, 665-667 (6th Cir.2012); United States v. Townsend,
305 F.3d 537, 542-545 (6th Cir.2002).
{¶38} The first factor—Schidecker’s and Lawler’s unrelaxed postures and
the fact that they “star[ed] straight ahead” as they passed Trooper Prather—is
appropriately considered as a potential indicator of criminal activity by some courts.
See State v. Stephenson, 12th Dist. Warren No. CA2014-05-073, 2015-Ohio-233, ¶
23 (considering trooper’s observations that the driver’s arms were “locked out” and
that both driver and passenger were “staring straight ahead” and had “rigid postures”
as factors supporting reasonable suspicion). However, we are hesitant to draw too
strong an association between lawful, safe driving behavior and criminal activity.
See United States v. Hernandez-Mandujano, 721 F.3d 345, 349-350 (5th Cir.2013)
(“[I]t is counterintuitive to condone the notion that drivers are less likely to be
stopped if they are talking on the phone and driving with one hand—or no hands—
on the wheel than they are if they engage in safe driving practices.”); United States
v. Dukes, 257 Fed.Appx. 855, 856 (6th Cir.2007), fn. 1; State v. Davis, 9th Dist.
Lorain No. 14CA010639, 2015-Ohio-4218, ¶ 28 (Moore, J., concurring). In
addition, we are dubious that Schidecker and Lawler’s failure to look at Trooper
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Prather constituted highly suspicious behavior. See Hernandez-Mandujano at 349;
Dukes at 856, fn. 1. As explained by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals:
[T]he government has * * * on some occasions contend[ed] that it is
suspicious for a person to look and on other occasions insist[ed] that
it is suspicious not to look. * * * [I]n the ordinary case, whether a
driver looks at an officer or fails to look at an officer, taken alone or
in combination with other factors, should be accorded little weight.
To conclude otherwise “would put the officers in a classic ‘heads I
win, tails you lose’ position. The driver, of course, can only lose.”
United States v. Moreno-Chaparro, 180 F.3d 629, 632 (5th Cir.1998), quoting
United States v. Escamilla, 560 F.2d 1229, 1233 (5th Cir.1977). Therefore,
although these behaviors are relevant to the formation of reasonable suspicion, we
find them to be relatively weak indicators of criminal activity generally and of drug-
related activity specifically.
{¶39} Likewise, we find that the second and third factors—Schidecker’s act
of hitting his head against his headrest and the partially rolled down passenger-side
window—carry little to no weight. We defer to Trooper Prather’s assessment that
Schidecker exhibited irregular behavior by banging his head against his headrest in
an apparently exaggerated fashion. Nevertheless, given the frustration that even the
most law-abiding of citizens can experience when stopped by the police and the
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Case No. 14-19-25
various ways that a person might vent their frustrations, Schidecker’s conduct was
not so far outside the bounds of ordinary behavior as to be considered strongly
suggestive of drug-related activity. Furthermore, we find no significance in the fact
that the passenger-side window was only partially rolled down. Schidecker and
Lawler were stopped in the early evening on a frigid day in mid-January. While it
might be abnormal for a person to roll down their window only partially on a warm
evening, it is hardly out of place or surprising on a cold day.
{¶40} The fourth factor—Schidecker’s suspended license and the fact that
he misrepresented that his license was valid—is somewhat, but not strongly,
indicative of additional criminal activity in this case. First, we question whether the
record actually supports that Schidecker misrepresented the status of his license.
Trooper Prather’s only testimony on this point was that Schidecker stated that his
license “should” be valid. (July 17, 2019 Tr. at 20-21). Thus, it is unclear whether
Schidecker lied to Trooper Prather or whether he was simply mistaken about the
status of his license. Regardless, “driving with a suspended license can ‘contribute
to the formation of an objectively reasonable suspicion of illegal activity.’” United
States v. Pettit, 785 F.3d 1374, 1382 (10th Cir.2015), quoting United States v.
Hunnicutt, 135 F.3d 1345, 1349 (10th Cir.1998), citing United States v. Jones, 44
F.3d 860, 872 (10th Cir.1995), and citing United States v. Pack, 612 F.3d 341, 361
(5th Cir.2010). This is in part because “licenses are usually suspended for less than
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Case No. 14-19-25
law abiding conduct.” Pack at 361. Yet, there is nothing in the record indicating
definitively whether Schidecker’s license was suspended for a drug-related offense
or whether Schidecker’s license was suspended for some other reason, such as the
accumulation of points on his driving record. The reason for Schidecker’s license
suspension has some bearing on the formation of reasonable suspicion because a
license suspension for drug-related offenses would be “related to the same
suspicions that [Trooper Prather] was developing—that [Schidecker and Lawler]
might be involved in drug trafficking,” whereas a license suspension for a non-drug-
related reason would not relate as strongly to Trooper Prather’s suspicions of drug
activity. See Stepp, 680 F.3d at 667. Accordingly, under the known facts of this
case, Schidecker’s license suspension is only a slight indicator of his and Lawler’s
involvement in drug-related activity.
{¶41} In addition, we do not find that the fifth factor—Schidecker’s potential
unauthorized use of the Buick—is a particularly strong indicator of drug-related
activity, at least under the facts of this case. In some cases, courts have given weight
to the fact that none of the occupants of a vehicle was expressly authorized to drive
the vehicle. E.g., Winters, 782 F.3d at 300-301 (giving “some weight” to the fact
that the occupants of a rental car, which was rented by a third party who was not in
the vehicle, were not listed as authorized drivers in the rental agreement). However,
the fact that the driver of a vehicle does not have permission to operate the vehicle
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Case No. 14-19-25
is “noticeably less suspicious” when the owner or authorized driver is present in the
vehicle. See Stepp at 666. Here, although Schidecker may not have been authorized
to drive the Buick, Lawler did have the owner’s permission to operate the vehicle
and she was in the vehicle with Schidecker during the traffic stop. Under the
circumstances of this case, we fail to see how Schidecker’s operation of the vehicle
suggested involvement in drug-related activity much more strongly than Lawler’s
operation of the vehicle would have. As a result, we find Schidecker’s possible
unauthorized use of the Buick to be a comparatively weak indicator of Schidecker
and Lawler’s involvement in drug-related activity.
{¶42} Unlike the other five factors relied on by Trooper Prather, we find that
the sixth and seventh factors—the discrepancy between Schidecker and Lawler’s
explanation for driving the Buick and the owner’s statement that Lawler was
supposed to use the vehicle to drive to the store and Trooper Prather’s belief that
Schidecker and Lawler did not need to be in Marysville to go to the store—are
modest, though not especially strong, indicators of additional criminal activity. To
be sure, inconsistent stories or explanations, including those concerning travel plans,
frequently factor into a court’s conclusion that reasonable suspicion existed to
prolong a traffic stop. E.g., State v. Balanik, 11th Dist. Lake No. 2015-L-112, 2016-
Ohio-3511, ¶ 27; Alexander-Lindsey, 2016-Ohio-3033, at ¶ 35; Stephenson, 2015-
Ohio-233, at ¶ 23; United States v. Hill, 195 F.3d 258, 272 (6th Cir.1999). However,
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Case No. 14-19-25
these cases typically involve situations in which one of the occupants of a vehicle
gives a statement that conflicts with another occupant’s statement or in which an
occupant changes her story during the course of the traffic stop. E.g., Balanik at ¶
27; Alexander-Lindsey at ¶ 35; United States v. Vaughan, 700 F.3d 705, 712 (4th
Cir.2012); United States v. Figueroa-Espana, 511 F.3d 696, 702-703 (7th
Cir.2007); Hill at 272.
{¶43} In this case, as far as can be ascertained from the record, Schidecker
and Lawler both claimed that they were using the Buick so that they could babysit.
In addition, since Trooper Prather did not return to the Buick until the drug-detection
dog arrived, Schidecker and Lawler’s story remained constant throughout the time
that the stop was prolonged. Logically, it is possible both that Schidecker and
Lawler were being truthful about their travel plans and that the owner of the Buick
had permitted Lawler to drive the vehicle only to the store. Moreover, it is possible
that the store that Lawler was permitted to drive to was a Marysville-specific store.
Because Trooper Prather did not conduct any additional investigation that could
have shed light on whether Schidecker and Lawler were lying about their travel
plans or whether they were simply operating the Buick even further outside of the
scope of the owner’s authorization, Schidecker and Lawler’s explanation of their
travel plans lacks any clear “indicia of * * * untruthfulness.” Townsend, 305 F.3d
at 543. Therefore, although the sixth and seventh factors are the strongest of the
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Case No. 14-19-25
factors relied on by Trooper Prather, they are still only moderately suggestive of
criminal activity beyond the potential unauthorized use of the Buick.
{¶44} Finally, we observe that the traffic stop lacked stronger indicators of
criminal activity that often accompany and bolster weaker indicators of criminal
activity such as those relied on by Trooper Prather. For example, although Trooper
Prather testified that he was trained to associate displays of conspicuous or abnormal
nervousness, such as “someone’s pulse beating heavily in their neck,” pupil dilation,
or out-of-place sweating, with possible criminality, he did not observe Schidecker
or Lawler exhibiting any of these indicators of heightened nervousness. (See July
17, 2019 Tr. at 18-19). The only potentially unusual behaviors Trooper Prather
observed were those that made up the first, second, and third factors, discussed
above, and these behaviors are far less striking than the physiological reactions
Trooper Prather referenced in his testimony. See United States v. Simpson, 609 F.3d
1140, 1148 (10th Cir.2010) (noting that “[e]xtreme and persistent nervousness * *
* ‘is entitled to somewhat more weight’” than normal nervousness), quoting United
States v. West, 219 F.3d 1171, 1179 (10th Cir.2000).
{¶45} In addition, with the possible exception of Schidecker’s suspended
license, there is no evidence that Schidecker or Lawler had a previous criminal
history at the time of the traffic stop, drug related or otherwise, or that Trooper
Prather learned of any such history during the course of the stop. See United States
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Case No. 14-19-25
v. Calvetti, 836 F.3d 654, 667 (6th Cir.2016) (noting that a person’s relevant
criminal history is entitled to significant weight in the reasonable suspicion
analysis); United States v. White, 584 F.3d 935, 951 (10th Cir.2009) (“‘[I]n
conjunction with other factors, criminal history contributes powerfully to the
reasonable suspicion calculus.’”) (Emphasis sic.), quoting United States v. Santos,
403 F.3d 1120, 1132 (10th Cir.2005). Furthermore, there is no evidence that
Schidecker or Lawler disclosed bizarre, implausible, or contradictory travel plans
to Trooper Prather or that they were traveling along a known “drug corridor.” See
United States v. Santillan, 902 F.3d 49, 57-58 (2d Cir.2018) (noting that “reasonable
suspicion may be based, at least in part, on * * * an implausible explanation of the
purpose of a trip” and collecting cases); Calvetti at 667 (noting that the Sixth Circuit
had previously “‘placed weight on implausible travel plans in considering whether
reasonable suspicion has arisen,’ such as when inconsistent explanations are
offered”), quoting Stepp, 680 F.3d at 666. Lastly, there was no testimony that
Trooper Prather saw any items commonly linked to drugs or drug trafficking, such
as multiple air fresheners or numerous cell phones, in plain view in the Buick. See
United States v. Cardoza, 713 F.3d 656, 660 (D.C. Cir.2013) (noting that the
defendant’s possession of three disposable cell phones when he was arrested
increased the likelihood that he was involved in drug trafficking activity); Batchili,
113 Ohio St.3d 403, 2007-Ohio-2204, at ¶ 19 (noting that “a vehicle smelling of
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Case No. 14-19-25
deodorizer” was a factor properly contributing to the trooper’s development of
reasonable suspicion).
{¶46} Again, we acknowledge that in considering whether Trooper Prather
had a reasonable, articulable suspicion to justify extending the traffic stop, we must
consider the totality of the circumstances. Nonetheless, while Trooper Prather relied
on factors that we regard as “valid considerations in forming reasonable suspicion,
they are all relatively minor and, in many cases, are subject to significant
qualification.” Townsend, 305 F.3d at 545. Moreover, this case lacks many of the
stronger indicators of drug-related activity that frequently accompany and cast a
suspicious light on otherwise weaker indicators of drug-related activity. See id.;
Stepp at 667; State v. Davenport, 9th Dist. Lorain No. 11CA010136, 2012-Ohio-
4427, ¶ 10. The weaker indicators of drug-related activity cited by Trooper Prather,
even when combined, do not support a conclusion that Trooper Prather had a
reasonable, articulable suspicion that Schidecker and Lawler were engaged in drug-
related activity. Johnson, 482 Fed.Appx. at 148. As a result, we concur with the
trial court that Trooper Prather was not justified in prolonging the traffic stop to
allow for the arrival of the drug-detection dog. Accordingly, because Trooper
Prather unreasonably prolonged the traffic stop, we conclude that the trial court did
not err by granting Lawler’s motion to suppress.
{¶47} The State’s assignment of error is overruled.
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{¶48} Having found no error prejudicial to the appellant herein in the
particulars assigned and argued, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Judgment Affirmed
SHAW, P.J. and ZIMMERMAN, J., concur.
/jlr
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State v. Lawler
Combined Opinion