J-S73012-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
SEAN DARRINGTON :
:
Appellant : No. 512 MDA 2019
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered March 8, 2019
In the Court of Common Pleas of Dauphin County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-22-CR-0002322-1993
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., LAZARUS, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED MARCH 10, 2020
Appellant, Sean Darrington, appeals pro se from the order dismissing
his serial petition filed pursuant to the Post Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42
Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. We affirm.
The crimes committed in this case relate to the 1993 robbery and
murder of Dale Bloom, who was found dead in his home. An autopsy revealed
that Mr. Bloom suffered five gunshot wounds, five puncture wounds, and he
had been cut with a hand saw about his neck. On October 9, 1994, a jury
convicted Appellant of first-degree murder and robbery. On October 18, 1994,
the trial court sentenced Appellant to serve a term of life imprisonment for the
first-degree murder conviction and a consecutive term of incarceration of ten
to twenty years for the robbery conviction. On direct appeal, a panel of this
Court affirmed Appellant’s judgment of sentence on July 10, 1995, and our
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Supreme Court subsequently denied Appellant’s petition for allowance of
appeal on December 14, 1995. Commonwealth v. Darrington, 667 A.2d
417 (Pa. Super. filed July 10, 1995) (unpublished memorandum), appeal
denied, 668 A.2d 1122 (Pa. 1995).
Appellant filed multiple petitions seeking collateral relief. Appellant’s
most recent PCRA petition, which is the subject of this appeal, was filed on
January 31, 2019. On February 5, 2019, pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907, the
PCRA court issued notice of its intent to dismiss Appellant’s petition. The PCRA
court then dismissed the instant petition on March 8, 2019. This timely appeal
followed. Both Appellant and the PCRA court complied with Pa.R.A.P. 1925.
Appellant presents the following issues for our review:
1) DOES NEWLY DISCOVERED FACTS ESTABLISH THAT TRIAL
COUNSEL WAS INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO MOTION THE TRIAL
COURT FOR PRESIDING JUDGE LEWIS’ RECUSAL AND APPELLATE
COUNSEL INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THIS CLAIM ON
APPEAL; VIOLATING APPELLANT’S SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS
AND FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS
UNDER THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION?
2) DOES NEWLY DISCOVERED EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE
ESTABLISH TRIAL COUNSEL’S INEFFECTIVENESS FOR FAILING
TO INVESTIGATE, INTERVIEW AND PRESENT KNOWN
EXCULPATORY WITNESSES AT TRIAL, AND APPELLATE COUNSEL
INEFFECIVE FOR FAILING TO RAISE THIS CLAIM ON APPEAL;
VIOLATING HISD SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHTS AND FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT RIGHTS TO DUE PROCESS UNDER THE UNITED
STATES CONSTITUTION?
Appellant’s Brief at 1 (verbatim).
When reviewing the propriety of an order denying PCRA relief, we
consider the record “in the light most favorable to the prevailing party at the
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PCRA level.” Commonwealth v. Stultz, 114 A.3d 865, 872 (Pa. Super.
2015) (quoting Commonwealth v. Henkel, 90 A.3d 16, 20 (Pa. Super. 2014)
(en banc)). This Court is limited to determining whether the evidence of
record supports the conclusions of the PCRA court and whether the ruling is
free of legal error. Commonwealth v. Robinson, 139 A.3d 178, 185 (Pa.
2016). The PCRA court’s findings will not be disturbed unless there is no
support for them in the certified record. Commonwealth v. Lippert, 85 A.3d
1095, 1100 (Pa. Super. 2014).
A PCRA petition must be filed within one year of the date that the
judgment of sentence becomes final. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). A judgment
of sentence “becomes final at the conclusion of direct review, including
discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking the
review.” 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3). This time requirement is mandatory and
jurisdictional in nature, and the court may not ignore it in order to reach the
merits of the petition. Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 79 A.3d 649, 651
(Pa. Super. 2013).
However, an untimely petition may be received when the petition
alleges, and the petitioner proves, that any of the three limited exceptions to
the time for filing the petition, set forth at 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and
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(iii), is met.1 A petition invoking one of these exceptions must be filed within
one year of the date the claim could have been presented. 42 Pa.C.S.
§ 9545(b)(2).
Our review of the record reflects that Appellant’s judgment of sentence
was affirmed by this Court on July 10, 1995, and our Supreme Court denied
Appellant’s petition for allowance of appeal on December 14, 1995.
Darrington, 667 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. filed July 10, 1995) (unpublished
memorandum), appeal denied, 668 A.2d 1122 (Pa. 1995). Appellant did not
file a petition for writ of certiorari with the United States Supreme Court.
Accordingly, Appellant’s judgment of sentence became final on March 13,
1996, ninety days after the Pennsylvania Supreme Court denied Appellant’s
petition for allowance of appeal and the time for filing a petition for review
____________________________________________
1 The exceptions to the timeliness requirement are:
(i) the failure to raise the claim previously was the result of
interference by government officials with the presentation of the
claim in violation of the Constitution or laws of this Commonwealth
or the Constitution or laws of the United States;
(ii) the facts upon which the claim is predicated were unknown
to the petitioner and could not have been ascertained by the
exercise of due diligence; or
(iii) the right asserted is a constitutional right that was
recognized by the Supreme Court of the United States or the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania after the time period provided in
this section and has been held by that court to apply retroactively.
42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(i), (ii), and (iii).
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with the United States Supreme Court expired. See 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(3)
(providing that “a judgment becomes final at the conclusion of direct review,
including discretionary review in the Supreme Court of the United States and
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, or at the expiration of time for seeking
the review.”); U.S.Sup.Ct.R. 13. Thus, the instant PCRA petition, filed on
January 31, 2019, is patently untimely.
As stated, if a petitioner does not file a timely PCRA petition, his petition
may nevertheless be received under any of the three limited exceptions to the
timeliness requirements of the PCRA. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1). If a petitioner
asserts one of these exceptions, he must file his petition within one year of
the date that the exception could be asserted. 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(2).
The exception to the one-year time bar claimed in Appellant’s PCRA
petition is that the facts upon which the claim were based were unknown to
Appellant, pursuant to 42 Pa.C.S. § 9545(b)(1)(ii). The facts were that
On or about December 13, 2018, [Appellant] received an
anonymous package from someone who claimed they used to
work at the Dauphin County Public Defenders [sic] Office.
This package contained police reports of several interviews
conducted by Officer [Victor] Rivera prior to [Appellant’s] arrest.
One interview in particular was one of Mr. Carl Thomas. Mr.
Thomas outlines a plot, plan, and execution by three (3) friends,
to rob the victim and his home, on the night in question. . . . Mr.
Thomas implicated himself and his friends while incarcerated on
unrelated charges. On June 24, 1993, Mr. Thomas told a fellow
inmate, Mr. Barry Wilkerson, that he witnessed his friends stab a
guy to death with a ’’long object p[o]inty”. . . . This is not a
coincidence that the victim in the case at bar, was also killed with
a “long object pointy”. This is not a coincidence that the victim in
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the case at bar, was killed with three (3) different weapons, and
Mr. Thomas describes three different people involved.
PCRA Petition, 1/31/19, at 5-6.
To qualify for an exception to the PCRA’s time limitations under
subsection 9545(b)(1)(ii), a petitioner need only establish that the facts upon
which the claim is based were unknown to him and could not have been
ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Commonwealth v. Burton,
158 A.3d 618, 629 (Pa. 2017). “Due diligence demands that the petitioner
take reasonable steps to protect his own interests. A petitioner must explain
why he could not have obtained the new fact(s) earlier with the exercise of
due diligence.” Commonwealth v. Monaco, 996 A.2d 1076, 1080 (Pa.
Super. 2010) (citations omitted). Our Supreme Court has articulated that due
diligence “does not require perfect vigilance and punctilious care, but merely
a showing the party has put forth reasonable effort to obtain the information
upon which a claim is based.” Commonwealth v. Cox, 146 A.3d 221, 230
(Pa. 2016) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
Initially, we observe that Appellant has failed to establish that he
exercised due diligence by putting forth any effort to obtain this information
in the form of Carl Thomas’s statements to police. Indeed, Appellant claims
that the information was received anonymously from a person who allegedly
worked in the Public Defender’s office. Moreover, we have thoroughly
reviewed Mr. Thomas’s interview with the police, which is attached to
Appellant’s PCRA Petition at Exhibit A, and we conclude it has no exculpatory
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benefit. Although Mr. Thomas described to police a plan to rob and murder a
man, there is no indication that the victim discussed by Mr. Thomas was Dale
Bloom, the person who Appellant admitted to killing. Appellant appended to
his PCRA petition his own inculpatory statements to police in which he
described the murder and subsequent events. Appellant’s PCRA Petition
1/31/19, Exhibits C and D. Hence, the attempt to invoke the second exception
fails. Therefore, the instant PCRA petition remains time-barred.
We observe that Appellant also argues that the second exception applies
to the allegedly unknown fact that the district attorney who initially presided
over the prosecution of this case later served as the presiding judge in the
matter. Again, Appellant fails to explain, let alone allege, that this fact could
not have been ascertained by the exercise of due diligence. Accordingly, this
claim fails to invoke the exception to the PCRA timeliness requirement.
In conclusion, because Appellant’s PCRA petition was untimely and no
exceptions apply, the PCRA court lacked jurisdiction to address the issues
presented and grant relief. See Commonwealth v. Fairiror, 809 A.2d 396,
398 (Pa. Super. 2002) (holding that PCRA court lacks jurisdiction to hear
untimely petition).
Order affirmed.
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Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 03/10/2020
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