NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
LORD PUNCHARD, AKA Billy Punchard, No. 19-16385
Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 4:19-cv-00159-JGZ
v.
MEMORANDUM*
LUNA COUNTY NEW MEXICO BOARD
OF COMMISSIONS; et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Arizona
Jennifer G. Zipps, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted March 3, 2020**
Before: MURGUIA, CHRISTEN, and BADE, Circuit Judges.
Lord Punchard AKA Billy Punchard appeals pro se from the district court’s
judgment dismissing his action alleging federal and state law claims related to
alleged mining leases. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review
de novo. CollegeSource, Inc. v. AcademyOne, Inc., 653 F.3d 1066, 1073 (9th Cir.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
2011) (dismissal under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(2)); Libas Ltd. v.
Carrillo, 329 F.3d 1128, 1130 (9th Cir. 2003) (dismissal under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Punchard’s claims against defendants
State of New Mexico, Grisham, Martinez, Luna County Board of Commissions,
and Deming City Council because Punchard failed to allege facts sufficient to
make a prima facie showing that the district court had personal jurisdiction over
these defendants. See CollegeSource, Inc., 653 F.3d at 1074-80 (discussing
requirements for general and specific personal jurisdiction). As to the State of
New Mexico, dismissal of Punchard’s claims was also proper because the claims
are barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S.
159, 169 n.17 (1985) (“§ 1983 was not intended to abrogate a State’s Eleventh
Amendment immunity”).
The district court properly dismissed Punchard’s claim against the Bureau of
Land Management because Punchard failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
plausible claim. See Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 341-42 (9th Cir. 2010)
(although pro se pleadings are to be construed liberally, a plaintiff must present
factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief); see also Ashcroft
v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (a plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[] the
court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
2 19-16385
misconduct alleged”).
The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Punchard’s motion
for recusal because Punchard failed to demonstrate extrajudicial bias or prejudice.
See 28 U.S.C. § 144 (requirements for recusal), § 455 (circumstances requiring
disqualification); United States v. Hernandez, 109 F.3d 1450, 1453-54 (9th Cir.
1997) (standard of review; under § 144 and § 455, the substantive standard for
recusal is whether “a reasonable person with knowledge of all the facts would
conclude that the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned” (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Punchard’s motion
for preliminary injunction because Punchard failed to demonstrate that he was
likely to succeed on the merits of his claims. See Jackson v. City & County of San
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir. 2014) (plaintiff must establish that he is
likely to succeed on the merits, likely to suffer irreparable harm in the absence of
preliminary relief, the balance of equities tips in his favor, and an injunction is in
the public interest).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by denying Punchard’s motion
for default judgment because the Clerk never entered a default. See Eitel v.
McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471-72 (9th Cir. 1986) (standard of review and factors
for entry of default judgment).
3 19-16385
Punchard’s motion to expedite is denied as moot.
AFFIRMED.
4 19-16385