Serial: 229874
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2019-M-01521
PHILLIP EARL YOUNG A/K/A PHILLIP Petitioner
E. YOUNG
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI Respondent
EN BANC ORDER
This matter is before the Court on Phillip Earl Young’s Petition for Permission to File
Motion for Post-Conviction Relief. Young raises issues regarding his indictment, pretrial
identification, lack of an initial appearance, and his right to counsel.
The Court of Appeals affirmed Young’s conviction and sentence, and the mandate
issued on August 21, 2007. Young v. State, 962 So. 2d 110 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007). Young
has sought post-conviction relief from the Court before, and the Court denied or dismissed
those filings. See Young v. State, No. 2013-M-00012; Young v. State, No. 2014-M-00406.
Thus, the present motion is time barred and barred as a successive writ. Miss. Code Ann. §§
99-39-5(2), 99-39-27(6) (Rev. 2015). Young’s claims also were raised before; thus, the
issues are barred under the doctrine of res judicata. Miss. Code Ann. § 99-39-21(3) (Rev.
2015). Further, Young fails to present an arguable basis for his claims to warrant an
exception to the procedural bars. Means v. State, 43 So. 3d 438, 442 (Miss. 2010). After
due consideration, the Court finds the present motion should be denied.
The Court also finds the successive application is frivolous. Young is warned that
future filings deemed frivolous may result not only in monetary sanctions but also in
restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief (or pleadings in that
nature) in forma pauperis. See Order, Dunn v. State, 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018).
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Phillip Earl Young’s Petition for Permission to
File Motion for Post-Conviction Relief is denied.
SO ORDERED, this the 19th day of February, 2020.
/s/ Michael K. Randolph
MICHAEL K. RANDOLPH, CHIEF JUSTICE
FOR THE COURT
TO DENY WITH SANCTIONS WARNING: RANDOLPH, C.J., COLEMAN, BEAM,
ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ.
TO DISMISS WITH SANCTIONS WARNING: MAXWELL AND CHAMBERLIN, JJ.
TO DENY: KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ.
KING, P.J., OBJECTS TO THE ORDER IN PART WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN
STATEMENT JOINED BY KITCHENS, P.J.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
No. 2019-M-01521
PHILLIP EARL YOUNG A/K/A PHILLIP
E. YOUNG
v.
STATE OF MISSISSIPPI
KING, PRESIDING JUSTICE, OBJECTING TO THE ORDER IN PART
WITH SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT:
¶1. Although Phillip Earl Young’s application for post-conviction relief does not merit
relief, I disagree with the Court’s finding that the application is frivolous and with the
warning that future filings deemed frivolous may result in monetary sanctions or restrictions
on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief in forma pauperis.1
¶2. This Court previously has defined a frivolous motion to mean one filed in which the
movant has “no hope of success.” Roland v. State, 666 So. 2d 747, 751 (Miss. 1995).
However, “though a case may be weak or ‘light-headed,’ that is not sufficient to label it
frivolous.” Calhoun v. State, 849 So. 2d 892, 897 (Miss. 2003). In his application for post-
conviction relief, Young made reasonable arguments that his charges were illegally changed
after his arrest, that he was not given a timely initial appearance, that his pretrial
identification was highly suggestive, and that he was denied his Sixth Amendment right to
counsel. As such, I disagree with the Court’s determination that Young’s application is
1
See Order, Dunn v. State, No. 2016-M-01514 (Miss. Nov. 15, 2018).
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frivolous.
¶3. Additionally, I disagree with this Court’s warning that future filings may result in
monetary sanctions or restrictions on filing applications for post-conviction collateral relief
in forma pauperis. The imposition of monetary sanctions on a criminal defendant proceeding
in forma pauperis only serves to punish or preclude that defendant from his lawful right to
appeal. Black’s Law Dictionary defines sanction as “[a] provision that gives force to a legal
imperative by either rewarding obedience or punishing disobedience.” Sanction, Black’s Law
Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (emphasis added). Instead of punishing the defendant for filing
a motion, I believe that this Court should simply deny or dismiss motions that lack merit. As
Justice Brennan wisely stated,
The Court’s order purports to be motivated by this litigant’s disproportionate
consumption of the Court’s time and resources. Yet if his filings are truly as
repetitious as it appears, it hardly takes much time to identify them as such. I
find it difficult to see how the amount of time and resources required to deal
properly with McDonald’s petitions could be so great as to justify the step we
now take. Indeed, the time that has been consumed in the preparation of the
present order barring the door to Mr. McDonald far exceeds that which would
have been necessary to process his petitions for the next several years at least.
I continue to find puzzling the Court’s fervor in ensuring that rights granted to
the poor are not abused, even when so doing actually increases the drain on our
limited resources.
In re McDonald, 489 U.S. 180, 186–87, 109 S. Ct. 993, 997, 103 L. Ed. 2d 158 (1989)
(Brennan, J., dissenting).2
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See also In re Demos, 500 U.S. 16, 19, 111 S. Ct. 1569, 1571, 114 L. Ed. 2d 20
(1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (“In closing its doors today to another indigent litigant, the
Court moves ever closer to the day when it leaves an indigent litigant with a meritorious
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¶4. The same logic applies to the restriction on filing subsequent applications for post-
conviction relief. To cut off an indigent defendant’s right to proceed in forma pauperis is to
cut off his access to the courts. This, in itself, violates a defendant’s constitutional rights, for
Among the rights recognized by the Court as being fundamental are the rights
to be free from invidious racial discrimination, to marry, to practice their
religion, to communicate with free persons, to have due process in disciplinary
proceedings, and to be free from cruel and unusual punishment. As a result of
the recognition of these and other rights, the right of access to courts, which
is necessary to vindicate all constitutional rights, also became a fundamental
right.
Joseph T. Lukens, The Prison Litigation Reform Act: Three Strikes and You’re Out of
Court-It May Be Effective, but Is It Constitutional?, 70 Temp. L. Rev. 471, 474–75 (1997).
This Court must not discourage convicted defendants from exercising their right to appeal.
Wisconsin v. Glick, 782 F.2d 670, 673 (7th Cir. 1986). Novel arguments that might remove
a criminal defendant from confinement should not be discouraged by the threat of monetary
sanctions and restrictions on filings. Id.
¶5. Therefore, although I find no merit in Young’s application for post-conviction relief,
I disagree with this Court’s contention that the application merits the classification of
frivolous and with its warning of future sanctions and restrictions.
KITCHENS, P.J., JOINS THIS SEPARATE WRITTEN STATEMENT.
claim out in the cold. And with each barrier that it places in the way of indigent litigants, and
with each instance in which it castigates such litigants for having ‘abused the system,’ . . .
the Court can only reinforce in the hearts and minds of our society’s less fortunate members
the unsettling message that their pleas are not welcome here.”).
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