IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MISSISSIPPI
NO. 2017-CT-00607-SCT
CHASITY ANDERSON
v.
DARNICE WIGGINS
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI
DATE OF JUDGMENT: 11/29/2016
TRIAL JUDGE: HON. JOHN S. GRANT, III
TRIAL COURT ATTORNEYS: JAMES B. GRENFELL
JAMES N. SCARFF, II
DREW MARTIN
GRETA KEMP
COURT FROM WHICH APPEALED: RANKIN COUNTY CHANCERY COURT
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT: JAMES N. SCARFF, II
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE: THOMAS J. LOWE, JR.
JAMES B. GRENFELL
NATURE OF THE CASE: CIVIL - TORTS-OTHER THAN PERSONAL
INJURY & PROPERTY DAMAGE
DISPOSITION: REVERSED AND REMANDED - 02/20/2020
MOTION FOR REHEARING FILED:
MANDATE ISSUED:
EN BANC.
COLEMAN, JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT:
¶1. The Rankin County Chancery Court granted summary judgment in favor of Darnice
Wiggins in a conversion case she brought against Chasity Anderson, the fiancée of Wiggins’s
deceased son Jhonte Sanders. As the basis for granting summary judgment, the chancellor
determined that Anderson failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact. Anderson
appealed, and the Court of Appeals deadlocked in a 5-5 decision. Once the Court of Appeals
denied her motion for rehearing, Anderson filed a petition for writ of certiorari, and we
granted it. Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeals’ judgment, and we remand the case
for further proceedings.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
¶2. Sanders and Anderson met each other while serving in the military in 2009. The two
lost touch with one another. In 2011, Sanders was diagnosed with leukemia while living in
Chicago, Illinois. In May 2013, Sanders reconnected with Anderson online. Sanders then
moved to Rankin County and continued his chemotherapy treatment at University of
Mississippi Medical Center (UMMC). After suffering multiple seizures in 2014, Sanders
required hospitalization. Following his hospitalization, Wiggins, Sanders’s mother, moved
to Jackson, Mississippi, and became his primary caregiver. On November 14, 2014, UMMC
transferred Sanders to Methodist Rehabilitation Center (Methodist) in Jackson, Mississippi,
for two weeks of rehabilitative treatment. Dr. Clea Evans is a neuropsychologist at
Methodist in Jackson, Mississippi, and was a part of a team that treated Sanders the fourteen
days he was there. Methodist released Sanders on November 28, 2014. However, Sanders
continued outpatient rehabilitative-speech-therapy treatments from December 1, 2014,
through January 2015. On December 19, 2014, Sanders settled a personal-injury claim and
received a monetary settlement in excess of $350,000. Sanders made multiple transfers of
those settlement funds to Anderson.
¶3. Sanders died soon after the transfer of his funds. Following Sanders’s death, the
Rankin County Chancery Court appointed Wiggins, Sanders’s mother, administratrix of his
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estate. Wiggins filed a “Complaint for Conversion” against Anderson. Though other
transactions occurred, the crux of Wiggins’s conversion complaint revolved around transfers
Sanders made after his personal-injury settlement. In support of her conversion claim,
Wiggins alleged that Anderson was aware of Sanders’s pending settlement, that Sanders
qualified as a vulnerable adult, and that Anderson either unduly influenced him to transfer
the funds or utilized her position of trust to take advantage of him while he was a vulnerable
adult. Wiggins also alleged that “at all times complained of herein, . . . Sanders was in a
constant state of confusion . . . and did not have the mental capacity to manage his money nor
make cognizant decisions which were in his best interest.” After filing the complaint,
Wiggins sent Anderson requests for admissions. Anderson failed to respond to the requests,
and the chancery court deemed them admitted. Wiggins then filed a motion for summary
judgment.
¶4. During the summary judgment hearing, Wiggins offered multiple exhibits into
evidence, including an affidavit from neuropsychologist, Dr. Evans. Wiggins argued that the
court should grant her motion because Anderson’s admissions, the established facts, and Dr.
Evans’s affidavit proved that no genuine issue of material fact existed. The chancellor
agreed and granted summary judgment, reasoning that the pleadings, answers to discovery
and requests for admission, together with the affidavit of Dr. Evans showed no genuine issue
of material fact.
¶5. Anderson appealed, and we assigned the case to the Court of Appeals. Looking to the
admissions, the established facts, and Dr. Evans’s affidavit, the prevailing opinion of the
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court reasoned that Wiggins had supported her conversion claim by arguing that Sanders was
a vulnerable adult. Anderson v. Wiggins, No. 2017-CA-00607-COA, 2019 WL 2098392,
at *5 (¶ 21) (Miss. Ct. App. May 14, 2019). De facto affirming the chancery court’s decision
by a 5-5 vote, the prevailing opinion wrote that Anderson’s failure to respond to the motion
for summary judgment meant she rested upon her allegations, and those were insufficient to
show there was a genuine dispute of material fact. Id. at *6 (¶ 24).
¶6. Following the denial of Anderson’s motion for rehearing, she filed a petition for
certiorari review, and we granted it.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶7. “We employ a de novo standard of review of a trial court’s grant or denial of a
summary judgment and examine all the evidentiary matters before it—admissions in
pleadings, answers to interrogatories, depositions, affidavits, etc.” Foster v. Williams (In
re Estate of Laughter), 23 So. 3d 1055, 1060 (¶ 17) (Miss. 2009) (quoting Bullock v. Life
Ins. Co., 872 So. 2d 658, 660 (¶ 6) (Miss. 2004)). “The evidence must be viewed in the light
most favorable to the party against whom the motion has been made, and the moving party
bears the burden of demonstrating that no genuine issue of material fact exists.” Moore v.
Delta Reg’l Med. Ctr., 23 So. 3d 541, 544 (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (citing Heigle v.
Heigle, 771 So. 2d 341, 345 (¶ 8) (Miss. 2000)). If there is no genuine issue of material fact,
then “the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law . . . .” Heigle, 771 So. 2d
at 345 (¶ 8) (quoting Miss. Dep’t of Wildlife, Fisheries & Parks v. Miss. Wildlife Enf’t
Officers’ Ass’n, Inc., 740 So. 2d 925, 930 (¶ 11) (Miss. 1999)). “On the other hand, ‘[i]f
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there is doubt as to whether or not a fact issue exists, it should be resolved in favor of the
non-moving party.’” Neely v. N. Miss. Med. Ctr., Inc., 996 So. 2d 726, 729 (¶ 11) (Miss.
2008) (quoting Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Berry, 669 So. 2d 56, 70 (Miss. 1996) overruled
on other grounds by Owen v. Miss. Farm Bureau Cas. Ins. Co., 910 So. 2d 1065 (Miss.
2005)).
DISCUSSION
¶8. Anderson’s petition for writ of certiorari raises two issues. First, Anderson argues
that the chancery court erred by affirming the grant of summary judgment, and the Court of
Appeals erred by failing to reverse. Anderson also argues that Wiggins lacked evidence to
prove that Sanders was a vulnerable adult.
¶9. “[T]he threshold for summary judgment is high and requires that ‘the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
. . . show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact . . . .’” Stuckey v. The
Provident Bank, 912 So. 2d 859, 864 (Miss. 2005) (¶ 8) (quoting Miss. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).
A fact is material if it “tends to resolve any of the issues properly raised by the parties.”
Ladnier v. Hester, 98 So. 3d 1025, 1028 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2012) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Moss v. Batesville Casket Co., Inc., 935 So. 2d 393, 398 (¶ 16) (Miss.
2006)). “If any triable facts exist, the lower court’s grant of a summary judgment will be
reversed; otherwise the decision will be affirmed.” Stuckey, 912 So. 2d at 864 (¶ 8)
(emphasis added) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Miller v. Meeks, 762 So. 2d
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302, 304 (¶ 3) (Miss. 2000)). Judge Tindell’s dissent in Anderson v. Wiggins explained
which party bears the burden of production and proof:
In a summary[-]judgment hearing, the burden of producing evidence in
support of, or in opposition to, the motion is a function of Mississippi rules
regarding the burden of proof at trial on the issues in question. The movant
bears the burden of persuading the trial judge that: (1) no genuine issue of
material fact exists, and (2) on the basis of the facts established, [s]he is
entitled to [a] judgment as a matter of law. The movant bears the burden of
production if, at trial, [s]he would bear the burden of proof on the issue raised.
Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *7 (¶ 34) (Tindell, J., dissenting) (quoting Palmer v. Biloxi
Reg’l Med. Ctr. Inc., 564 So. 2d 1346, 1355 (Miss. 1990)). “[B]ecause [d]efendants do not
carry any burden of production at trial, they also do not carry any burden of production at the
summary-judgment stage.” Karpinsky v. Am. Nat’l Ins. Co., 109 So. 3d 84, 89 (¶ 13) (Miss.
2013).
¶10. In Stuckey, the court reviewed a sworn complaint to determine if it constituted
evidence of triable issues of fact sufficient to defeat a motion for summary judgment.
Stuckey, 912 So. 2d at 864-65 (¶ 7). Stuckey had responded to a motion for summary
judgment with a sworn complaint, which contained a litany of allegations, after the moving
party had met its burden of persuasion. Id. at 866 (¶ 13). Stuckey relied solely on the sworn
complaint and argued it created a genuine issue of material fact. Id. Rejecting Stuckey’s
contention, the Court explained the provisions of Mississippi Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e)
in the context of whether a response to a motion for summary judgment is necessary. Id. at
867 (¶ 14). The Court reasoned,
The provisions of Rule 56(e) which caution practitioners that “they may not
rest upon the mere allegations or denials of [their] pleadings,” clearly do not
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mandate a grant of summary judgment if there is no response to the summary
judgment motion; however, Rule 56(e) does caution that if the non-moving
party fails to respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered
against [the non-moving party].
Id. at (¶ 15) (emphasis added).
¶11. Here, Wiggins bore the initial burden of establishing the nonexistence of issues of
material fact when she moved for summary judgment on her conversion claim. Wiggins
argued that Anderson’s failure to provide evidence of a genuine issue of material fact entitled
her to summary judgment as a matter of law.
¶12. “To establish a conversion, there must be proof of a wrongful possession, or the
exercise of a dominion in exclusion or defiance of the owner’s right, or of an unauthorized
and injurious use, or of a wrongful detention after demand.’” Evans v. Miss. Dep’t of
Human Servs., 36 So. 3d 463, 477 (¶ 59) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (emphasis added) (quoting
Cmty. Bank of Ellisville, Miss. v. Courtney, 884 So. 2d 767, 772–73 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2004)).
“[I]n order to maintain an action for conversion, there must have been, on the part of the
defendant, some unlawful assumption of dominion over the personal property [of the
plaintiff] . . . .” Wilson v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 883 So. 2d 56, 69 (¶ 51) (Miss.
2004) (emphasis added) (quoting First Inv’rs Corp. v. Rayner, 738 So. 2d 228, 234–35 (¶
27) (Miss. 1999)).
¶13. Here, the Court of Appeals focused on Wiggins’s vulnerable adult argument when
reviewing the chancery court’s granting of summary judgment and explained that “at issue
is whether Sanders qualifies as a vulnerable adult.” Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *5 (¶
21). The Court of Appeals relied on Dr. Evans affidavit that explained that Sanders “did not
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have the . . . mental capacity to realize he was transferring this large sum of money or any
money to Chasity Anderson or the consequences of his actions . . . .” Id. at *5 (¶ 23). The
Court of Appeals wrote that Anderson had more than sixty-eight days to respond to Wiggins
motion for summary judgment and failed to do so. Id. at *5 (¶ 23). Affirming the decision
of the chancery court, the Court of Appeals reasoned that “Anderson could not show that
there was a genuine dispute of material fact.” Id. at *5 (¶ 23). However, resting on mere
allegations or failing to respond to a motion for summary judgment does not mandate
granting the motion. Stuckey, 912 So. 2d at 864-65 (¶ 15); see also Dennis v. Searle, 457
So. 2d 941, 947 (Miss. 1984) (overruling a grant of summary judgment, finding that the
moving party failed to carry the required burden of establishing the nonexistence of genuine
issues of material fact; despite [the] non-moving party’s offering nothing to dispute the
motion for summary judgment), disagreed with on other grounds by Thornhill v. Sys. Fuels,
Inc., 523 So. 2d 983 (Miss. 1988)). Moreover, there is more than one genuine issue of
material fact here.
¶14. While vulnerability may be one issue, it is not the only one. The vulnerable adult
statute, Mississippi Code Section 11-7-165 (Rev. 2019), provides, in relevant part,
In a civil action where it is proven that a person took property having a value
of Two Hundred Fifty Dollars ($250.00) or more belonging to a vulnerable
adult by conversion, embezzlement, extortion, theft or fraud without the
owner’s consent, or obtained the owner’s consent by intimidation, deception,
undue influence or by misusing a position of trust or a confidential relationship
with the owner, then whether the action is to recover the property or damages
in lieu thereof, or both, damages shall be recoverable up to three (3) times the
amount of the monetary damages or value of the property embezzled,
converted or otherwise stolen, in addition to any other damages.
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Miss. Code. Ann. § 11-7-165(1)(a) (Rev. 2019) (emphasis added).
¶15. The plain language of the statute sets out the factual elements of Wiggins’s claim.
Those issues are whether Wiggins—as the moving party—proved that: (1) Anderson; (2)
took property having a value of $250.00 or more (3) that belonged to Sanders, a vulnerable
adult, by (4) conversion, undue influence or by utilizing her position of trust to take
advantage of a vulnerable adult.
¶16. It is true that Wiggins supported her claim of conversion by producing evidence
showing that Sanders qualified as a vulnerable adult. Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *5
(¶ 21). Indeed, as the plain language of the Vulnerable Adult Statute reveals, individuals can
make a complaint for conversion by proving that, among other things, an adult is vulnerable.
Miss. Code Ann. § 11-7-165 (Rev. 2019). In support of her motion for summary judgment,
Wiggins offered multiple exhibits:
Exhibit A: A copy of the complaint, which included copies of the
following: (1) a July 25, 2014 check for $12,295 to J&J Auto
Brokers signed by Sanders from his account; (2) a January 12,
2015 bank check for $100,072.73 to Anderson; (3) a January 23,
2015 bank check for $100,000 to Anderson; and (4) a Trustmark
National Bank gift letter signed by Sanders acknowledging that
Sanders was gifting $105,000 to Anderson for the purchase of
property located at 112 Saint Charles Avenue, Florence,
Mississippi 39073.
Exhibit B: A January 6, 2015 check for $500 to Remax Alliance signed by
Anderson from her account.
Exhibit C: A MLS listing for a house for sale located at 112 Saint Charles
Avenue, and the accompanying purchase contract executed on
January 6, 2015, for the same house for a purchase price of
$261,000.
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Exhibit D: A warranty deed to Anderson dated February 5, 2015, for the
property at 112 Saint Charles Avenue.
Exhibit E: A judgment deeming requests for admissions admitted.
Exhibit F: Wiggins’s first set of requests for admissions propounded to
Anderson.
Exhibit G: Dr. Evans’s opinion and affidavit.
Exhibit H: Anderson’s answer to the complaint and affirmative defenses.
Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *7 (¶ 36) (Tindell. J., dissenting).
¶17. Of all the transfers made, the crux of Wiggins’s complaint for conversion rests with
three:
1. On January 12, 2015, Sanders issued a check payable to Trustmark
Bank in the amount of $100,072.73;
2. A Trustmark National Bank gift letter signed by Sanders on January 22,
2015, acknowledged that he was gifting $105,000 to Anderson for the
purchase of property located at 112 Saint Charles Avenue, Florence,
Mississippi;
3. January 23, 2015: a bank check for $100,000, payable to Anderson
from Sanders account.
Wiggins averred that Anderson’s admissions and Dr. Evans’s opinion “remove[d] any
question of there being a factual dispute to be rendered by this Court.”
¶18. We agree with Judge Tindell’s dissent pertaining to Exhibits A through D. Judge
Tindell explained that “Exhibits A through D only offer evidence of financial transactions
made between or by Sanders and Anderson. . . . Sanders himself authorized the transactions
. . . .” Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *8 (¶ 37) (Tindell, J., dissenting). Indeed, a review
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of the record reveals no evidence that Anderson exercised “dominion in exclusion or
defiance of [Sanders’s] rights.” Evans v. Miss. Dep’t of Human Servs., 36 So. 3d 463, 477
(¶ 59) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (internal quotation mark omitted) (quoting Cmty. Bank of
Ellisville, Miss. v. Courtney, 884 So. 2d 767, 772–73 (¶ 10) (Miss. 2004)). Additionally,
there is no evidence in the record that Sanders demanded Anderson return the funds;
therefore, there can be “no wrongful detention after demand.” Id. (internal quotation mark
omitted) (quoting Courtney, 884 So. 2d at 772–73 (¶ 10)). Accordingly, as it pertains to her
claim of conversion at the summary judgment hearing, Wiggins bore the burden of
establishing Sanders’s vulnerability and that Anderson wrongfully converted and possessed
Sanders’s funds by means of undue influence.
¶19. To raise a presumption of undue influence, the contestant must show “the existence
of a confidential relationship between the testator and a beneficiary . . . , along with
suspicious circumstances.” Stover v. Davis, 268 So. 3d 559, 563 (¶ 12) (Miss. 2019) (citing
Croft v. Alder, 237 Miss. 713, 723, 115 So. 2d 683, 686 (1959)). “Th[e] Court has held in
numerous cases that the burden of establishing the existence of a confidential relationship
is upon the party asserting it.” West v. Johnson (In re Estate of Johnson), 237 So. 3d 698,
708 (¶ 27) (Miss. 2017) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Norris v. Norris, 498
So. 2d 809, 813 (Miss. 1986)). Several factors are considered when determining whether a
confidential relationship exists:
(1) whether one person has to be taken care of by others, (2) whether one
person maintains a close relationship with another, (3) whether one person is
provided transportation and has their medical care provided for by another, (4)
whether one person maintains joint accounts with another, (5) whether one is
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physically or mentally weak, (6) whether one is of advanced age or poor
health, and (7) whether there exists a power of attorney between the one and
another.
Dabney v. Hataway (In re Estate of Dabney), 740 So. 2d 915, 919 (¶ 12) (Miss. 1999).
However, in another case, the Court explained,
A presumption of undue influence is not raised merely because a beneficiary
occupies a confidential relationship with the testator; something more is
required, such as active participation by the beneficiary in the procurement,
preparation or execution of the will or mental infirmity of the testator.
In other words, there must be some showing that [the beneficiary] abused the
relationship either by asserting dominance over the testator or by substituting
her intent for that of [the testator].
Gallaspy v. Gallaspy (In re Will of Wasson), 562 So. 2d 74, 78 (Miss. 1990) (quoting Simm
v. Adams (In re Will of Adams), 529 So. 2d 611, 615 (Miss. 1988)).
¶20. To prove her claim of conversion by undue influence, Wiggins relied on Anderson’s
admissions and the affidavit of Dr. Evans. As to the first element of a confidential
relationship, Sanders undoubtedly needed care given to him by others. Importantly, Wiggins
proclaimed that she “was the primary care giver[,] as she basically to moved to Jackson,
Mississippi, in the fall of 2014 where she cared for and was present . . . for over three (3)
months.” Moreover, there is evidence of Sanders’s deteriorating health. As it pertains to
Anderson and Sanders’s relationship, Wiggins’s complaint explains that the two
“reconnected online.” The admissions do prove that the day Sanders signed the gift letter,
Anderson’s mother drove him from the hospital to Anderson’s place of employment.
However, the nature of that transaction and its circumstances are unknown. Additionally,
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there is no proof that Anderson and Sanders shared a joint account or that a power of attorney
for Sanders existed.
¶21. Weighing these factors raises doubt about whether there was a confidential
relationship between Sanders and Anderson. Even assuming a confidential relationship
exists, there is no proof in the record as to what extent, if any, Anderson participated in the
procurement, preparation, or execution of the transfers. Accordingly, we hold that Wiggins
failed to prove, at the summary judgment hearing, that Anderson wrongfully converted
Sanders’s funds by means of undue influence.
¶22. Anderson’s second argument is that there is a lack of evidence as to whether Sanders
qualified as a vulnerable adult. Like her conversion argument, Wiggins relied on Anderson’s
admissions and Dr. Evans’s affidavit to support her contention that Sanders was a vulnerable
adult and lacked the mental capacity necessary to understand the transfers he made. Wiggins
also argued that Anderson took advantage of her position of trust with Anderson when he
was vulnerable. Wiggins averred that Sanders “was in a constant state of confusion and did
not have the mental capacity to manage his money nor make cognizant decisions which were
in his best interest.” Mississippi Code Section 43-47-5(q) (Rev. 2015) defines a “vulnerable
person” as
[A] person, whether a minor or adult, whose ability to perform the normal
activities of daily living or to provide for his or her own care or protection
from abuse, neglect, exploitation or improper sexual contact is impaired due
to a mental, emotional, physical or developmental disability or dysfunction, or
brain damage or the infirmities of aging.
Miss. Code Ann § 43-47-5(q) (Rev. 2015).
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¶23. Assuming Sanders is a vulnerable adult “does not mean that the individual is
incompetent to transfer his or her assets to another.” Anderson, 2019 WL 2098392, at *9
(¶ 41) (Tindell, J., dissenting). Incapacity requires a showing that the person either “(1) did
not understand the legal consequences of his actions; (2) suffered from a general ‘weakness
of intellect’ with either inadequate consideration given for the transfer, or a confidential
relationship; or (3) suffered from permanent insanity up to and after the date of execution.”
Van Quinn v. Quinn, 278 So. 3d 1160, 1166 (¶ 23) (Miss. Ct. App. 2019) (quoting Smith
v. Smith, 574 So. 2d 644, 653-54 (Miss. 1990)). Except for permanent insanity, the critical
time for determining capacity is the transfer date. Smith, 574 So. 2d at 653.
¶24. In In re Estate of Laughter, the Court sought to determine whether a testator had
testamentary capacity to make an inter vivos gift to his wife. In re Estate of Laughter, 23
So. 3d at 1061 (¶ 18). The court explained that “[t]he mere fact that someone is too ill to
handle his affairs does not in and of itself render him mentally incompetent or void of
testamentary capacity.” Id. at (¶ 22). “Th[e] Court recognize[d] that mental incapacity or
insanity, ‘is not always permanent, and a person may have lucid moments or intervals when
that person possesses necessary capacity to convey property.’” Whitworth v. Kines, 604 So.
2d 225, 229 (Miss. 1992) (quoting Smith, 574 So. 2d at 653). “[T]he testator must be of
‘sound and disposing mind’ at the time of . . . execution.” Noblin v. Burgess, 54 So. 3d 282,
291 (¶ 32) (Miss. Ct. App. 2010) (quoting Miss. Code Ann. § 91-5-1 (Rev. 2004)). “The
requirement of a sound and disposing mind does not mean the testator’s mind must be as
good as it ever was.” Noblin, 54 So. 3d at 291 (¶ 32).
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¶25. In Edwards v. Edwards (In re Estate of Edwards), 520 So. 2d 1370 (Miss. 1988), the
Court considered similar facts. On September 30, 1982, Jimmie Edwards, the testator, and
his son, Jerry, drove to their lawyer’s firm to draw up a new will. Id. at 1371. Jimmie
created the will and he and Jerry proceeded to the bank where two individuals witnessed the
will’s execution. Id. at 1371-72. After Jimmie’s death, Loree, Jimmie’s wife, contested the
validity of the will, arguing undue influence and a lack of testamentary capacity. Id. Loree
relied on the testimony of Jimmie’s doctors, who were not present during the will’s execution
on September 30, 1982. Id. The doctors testified that, based on their previous examinations,
Jimmie’s mental capacity would have been substantially impaired by the date Jimmie
executed the will due to previous “chronic mental problems.” Id. However, the two
witnesses that personally observed Jimmie’s execution of the will testified that they found
Jimmie “sane and sober,” explaining that they “noticed nothing unusual” about the testator.
Id.
¶26. Though the chancery court found no undue influence, the Edwards Court reversed the
court’s finding that Jimmie lacked the requisite testamentary capacity. Id. at 1373. The
Edwards Court explained that capacity “is to be tested as of the date of execution of the
will.” In re Estate of Edwards, 520 So. 2d 1370, 1372 (Miss. 1988) (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Scally v. Wardlaw, 123 Miss. 857, 878, 86 So. 625, 626 (1920)).
The Court noted that the chancellor leaned heavily on the testimony of the doctors whose
most recent examination of Jimmie had occurred more than one year before. In re Estate of
Edwards, 520 So. 2d at 1373. The Court explained that
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[W]hether Jimmie D. Edwards possessed testamentary capacity when attended
by his physicians months before the will’s execution, is irrelevant to the issue
before us; rather, we are concerned with his testamentary capacity on
September 30, 1982. Recognizing that a testator may not always possess
testamentary capacity, we have held that he may nevertheless execute a valid
will during a lucid interval.
Id. (citing Lee v. Lee, 337 So. 2d 713, 715 (Miss. 1976); Gholson v. Peters, 180 Miss. 256,
267, 176 So. 605, 606 (1937); Lum v. Lasch, 93 Miss. 81, 87, 46 So. 559 (1908)).
¶27. Here, Wiggins argues that Dr. Evans’s opinion supports a finding that Sanders lacked
the requisite capacity to transfer his assets. Dr. Evans is a neuropsychologist at Methodist
in Jackson, Mississippi, and was a part of a team that treated Sander the fourteen days he was
there. Sanders’s treatment dates ranged from November 14, 2014, to November 28, 2014.
While at Methodist, Dr. Evans observed Sanders’s “aberrant behavior and neurological
seizures.” She also opined that Sanders was on multiple medications, some of which could
have affected his mental capacity and cognitive deficits. Dr. Evans opined that “at the time
of discharge from Methodist, Sanders was weak, ill and had cognitive impairments which
classified him as a vulnerable adult under the laws of the State of Mississippi.”
¶28. When it came to formulating a medical opinion regarding Sanders’s mental capacity
at the time of the January 2015 transfers, Dr. Evans referenced her previous interactions with
Sanders and medical notes taken by a speech pathologist during Sanders’s outpatient-
rehabilitation services. The outpatient services continued from December of 2014 through
January of 2015. Looking to the January 12, 2015 transfer, Dr. Evans relied upon a review
of the therapist’s notes taken on January 13, 2015, which stated that Sanders was “having
trouble remembering to take his medications.” Dr. Evans opined, to a reasonable degree of
16
neuropsychological/medical probability, that Sanders did not have the cognitive ability or
mental capacity to realize he was transferring large sums of money. As for the January 22,
2015 transactions, it appears that Dr. Evans relied on the therapist’s notes taken four days
earlier to reach the same conclusion. However, Dr. Evans opined she reviewed notes taken
by the speech pathologist on the same day that Sanders signed the gift letter. The therapist’s
notes explained that “[Sanders] showed delays in speed of processing and needed assistance
(cues) when working on executive functioning exercises with regard to reasoning and
problem solving.”
¶29. Nowhere in Dr. Evans’s affidavit does she state that Sanders was incompetent or
insane. Because Dr. Evans did not claim that Sanders was incompetent or insane, we need
not concern ourselves with Sanders’s capacity when attended by his physicians months or
even days before he made the transfers. Therefore, the critical date for determining
Sanders’s capacity to transfer his funds is the transfer dates. Smith v. Smith, 574 So. 2d 644,
653 (Miss. 1990) (explaining that the critical time for determining the capacity of someone
who suffers from a weakness of intellect or great weakness of mind is the date of execution).
Accordingly, there must be a showing that Sanders either “did not understand the legal
consequences of his actions” or that he “suffered from a ‘general weakness of intellect’ [and
had] a confidential relationship” with Anderson. Van Quinn, 278 So. 3d at 1166 (¶ 23)
(quoting Smith, 574 So. 2d at 653-54).
¶30. Taking Dr. Evans’s affidavit as true and assuming Dr. Evans did review notes taken
on the same day that Sanders signed the gift letter does not necessarily mean that he was
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unable to understand the legal consequence of his actions. The record contains no evidence
of the level of difficulty as it pertains to the “executive functioning exercises” that Sanders
supposedly performed on the day he signed his gift letter. In fact, there is no proof that these
exercises pertained to Sanders testamentary capacity. Moreover, even if these exercises
prove that Sanders suffered from a general “weakness of intellect,” Anderson’s admissions
do not establish a confidential relationship. Though Dr. Evans’s opinion provides a plethora
of persuasive facts, it, at most, establishes that Sanders may have qualified as a vulnerable
adult the day of the transfers. However, it is unclear that Dr. Evans properly understood the
legal term “testamentary capacity.”
¶31. At its core, the case sub judice arose from a conversion claim. Assuming Sanders
qualified as a vulnerable adult does not prove that Anderson wrongfully obtained Sanders’s
funds by means of undue influence. Of the three main transfers made, we only know that
Anderson’s mother drove Sanders to Anderson’s place of employment to sign the gift letter.
We know nothing of the surrounding facts and circumstances as it pertains to the other
transfers made.
¶32. The Court of Appeals opinions both make reasonable arguments. However, genuine
issues of material fact remain unresolved. “If there is doubt as to whether or not a fact issue
exists, it should be resolved in favor of the nonmoving party.” Neely, 996 So. 2d at 729 (¶
11). Here, doubt remains as to whether Anderson wrongfully converted Sanders’s funds.
CONCLUSION
18
¶33. The Chancery Court erred by granting the motion for summary judgment. Viewing
the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party leaves genuine issues of
material fact unresolved. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgments of the Rankin
County Chancery Court and of the Court of Appeals and remands the case to the chancery
court for further proceedings.
¶34. REVERSED AND REMANDED.
RANDOLPH, C.J., KITCHENS AND KING, P.JJ., MAXWELL, BEAM,
CHAMBERLIN, ISHEE AND GRIFFIS, JJ., CONCUR.
19
Chasity Anderson v. Darnice Wiggins
Combined Opinion