NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAR 12 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
MARIA DE JESUS MEDINA-RAMIREZ, No. 18-70626
Petitioner, Agency No. A034-036-818
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted March 12, 2020**
San Francisco, California
Before: PAEZ, BERZON, and R. NELSON, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Maria de Jesus Medina-Ramirez challenges her order of removal
to Mexico. A lawful permanent resident since 1972, Medina-Ramirez was placed
into removal proceedings after being convicted of a drug trafficking aggravated
felony. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Medina-Ramirez’s application for
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”), and the Board
of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) affirmed. In her petition for review, Medina-
Ramirez challenges the denial of her CAT claim and asserts that the agency lacked
jurisdiction under an intervening decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,
2110 (2018). We deny the petition.
1. The agency did not err in concluding that Medina-Ramirez was not eligible
for CAT relief. Medina-Ramirez claims past harm by men who physically abused
her and fear of future torture by individuals who planted the drugs in the car
leading to her conviction. First, assuming that the gender-based harm she suffered
took place in Mexico, the IJ erred in holding that neither rape, attempted sexual
assault, nor domestic violence rises to the level of torture. See Avendano-
Hernandez v. Lynch, 800 F.3d 1072, 1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (recognizing that “[r]ape
can constitute torture . . . [as it] is a form of aggression constituting an egregious
violation of humanity.” (alterations in original) (internal citation and quotation
marks removed)). Although the IJ committed error, it does not compel reversal
because Medina-Ramirez testified that the main perpetrator of her past harm is no
longer living and therefore no longer posed a threat to her. See id. at 1080 (noting
that past torture “is ordinarily the principal factor” to support a CAT claim unless
there are “changed circumstances”). Moreover, Medina-Ramirez did not testify
that she was afraid of any future gender-based harm in Mexico.
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Second, Medina-Ramirez’s testimony about her fear of future torture by the
“narcos” in retaliation for losing the drugs in the car she was driving is insufficient
to show how the Mexican government would sanction or acquiesce in torture
against her specifically. See Lopez v. Sessions, 901 F.3d 1071, 1078 (9th Cir.
2018) (“[The petitioner]’s contentions regarding his fears of returning to Mexico
are not sufficiently particularized.”). Although Medina-Ramirez also submitted a
country conditions report documenting the role of police and government agents in
arbitrary killings, torture, and forced disappearances, “generalized evidence of
violence and crime in Mexico is not particular to [Medina-Ramirez] and is
insufficient to meet [the CAT] standard.” Delgado-Ortiz v. Holder, 600 F.3d 1148,
1152 (9th Cir. 2010). She has not, for instance, claimed inability to seek protection
from the Mexican police, nor that she would be singled out by government actors.
See Avendano- Hernandez, 800 F.3d at 1080–82 (holding that government
acquiescence prong of CAT can be shown by “torture at the hands of local
officials” or record of “ineffective police protection”). On this record, we
conclude that substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that
Medina-Ramirez did not establish a clear probability of torture at the acquiescence
of the Mexican government.
2. Medina-Ramirez also argues that the agency lacked jurisdiction over her
case because her notice to appear lacked the place or time of the removal
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proceedings required under Pereira, 138 S. Ct. at 2110. This argument, however,
is foreclosed by Karingithi v. Whitaker, 913 F.3d 1158, 1159 (9th Cir. 2019), cert.
denied sub nom. Karingithi v. Barr, 2020 WL 871705, at *1 (Feb. 24, 2020).
Petition DENIED.
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