MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Mar 13 2020, 11:07 am
court except for the purpose of establishing
CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
William T. Myers Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Whitehurst & Myers Law Attorney General of Indiana
Marion, Indiana
Courtney Staton
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
April L. Christal, March 13, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2388
v. Appeal from the Blackford
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Nick Barry, Judge
Appellee-Plaintiff Trial Court Cause No.
05D01-1905-F6-148
Baker, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 1 of 7
[1] April Christal appeals her convictions for Level 6 Felony Possession of
Methamphetamine1 and Class B Misdemeanor Possession of Marijuana.2
Christal argues that the trial court erred by admitting evidence obtained as a
result of a traffic stop that she maintains violated her constitutional rights.
Finding no error, we affirm.
Facts
[2] On May 3, 2019, Blackford County Sheriff’s Deputy Taylor LaFever was
working traffic interdiction and observed a vehicle fail to signal its intention to
turn when leaving a Village Pantry parking lot. Deputy LaFever pulled behind
the vehicle and initiated a traffic stop for the infraction.
[3] Deputy LaFever approached the vehicle and asked the four occupants,
including Christal, for their information. The deputy noticed that Christal
appeared to be nervous. Deputy LaFever walked back to his police cruiser,
provided the information to dispatch, and requested a canine unit to assist.
Deputy LaFever then returned to the vehicle to obtain the vehicle’s registration
documentation. He noticed that Christal still appeared to be nervous and was
hunched over as if she was attempting to conceal something in her lap. Deputy
LaFever received the vehicle’s registration information and was in the process
of writing a citation when the canine unit arrived.
1
Ind. Code § 35-48-4-6.1(a).
2
I.C. § 35-48-4-11(a)(1).
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[4] The canine conducted a sniff of the vehicle and indicated the possible presence
of contraband within the vehicle. At that point, Deputy LaFever and another
officer removed the occupants of the car and placed them under arrest. The
officer searched Christal’s person, finding an “unknown foreign object”
protruding from Christal’s shirt near her bra. Tr. Vol. II p. 68. The officer
secured the item, which was a clear glass smoking device. The officer asked
Christal if she had anything else on her person and she advised that she had an
orange pill bottle. She retrieved the pill bottle from inside her clothing and
handed it to the officer. Subsequent testing confirmed that the clear glass
smoking device contained methamphetamine residue and the orange pill bottle
contained 2.14 grams of marijuana.
[5] On May 6, 2019, the State charged Christal with Level 6 felony possession of
methamphetamine, Class B misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and Class C
misdemeanor possession of paraphernalia. On August 15, 2019, Christal
moved to suppress the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop.
Following a hearing, the trial court denied the motion to suppress.
[6] Christal’s jury trial took place on August 28, 2019. At trial, Christal objected to
the admission of evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop; the trial court
overruled the objection. At the conclusion of the trial, the jury found Christal
guilty as charged. Because of double jeopardy concerns, the trial court entered
judgments of conviction only on the possession of methamphetamine and
possession of marijuana charges. The trial court sentenced Christal to an
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 3 of 7
aggregate term of two years imprisonment, with one of those years suspended
to probation. Christal now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[7] Christal argues that the evidence obtained as a result of the traffic stop should
not have been admitted because the stop violated her rights under the United
States Constitution.3 Specifically, Christal insists that the traffic stop was
impermissible at the outset because no traffic law was violated.
[8] When considering a trial court’s decision regarding the admissibility of
evidence, we will reverse only if the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances before it. E.g., Edmond v. State, 951 N.E.2d
585, 587 (Ind. Ct. App. 2011). We apply a de novo standard of review to a trial
court’s legal conclusions regarding the constitutionality of a search and seizure.
Id. at 588.
[9] Under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a warrantless
traffic stop and limited search is permissible “where an officer has at least a
reasonable suspicion that a traffic law has been violated.” Peak v. State, 26
N.E.3d 1010, 1014-15 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). The “stopping officer must be able
to articulate some facts that provide a particularized and objective basis for
3
Christal briefly mentions the Indiana Constitution but makes no separate argument thereunder. We will
not develop one on her behalf. We note, however, that had this issue been raised, the result—an affirm—
would have remained the same.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 4 of 7
believing a traffic violation occurred. That is reasonable suspicion—the
constitutional floor—for a traffic stop.” Marshall v. State, 117 N.E.3d 1254,
1259 (Ind. 2019) (internal citation omitted).
[10] Here, Deputy LaFever stopped the vehicle because the driver failed to use the
turn signal before turning out of the parking lot. Indiana Code section 9-21-8-
25 provides that “a signal of intention to turn right or left shall be given
continuously during not less than the last two hundred (200) feet traveled by a
vehicle before turning or changing lanes.”
[11] Christal argues that compliance with the requirements of this statute was
impossible under the circumstances because the driver may not have had 200
feet within the parking lot to use his turn signal before turning onto the
roadway.4 This Court has addressed this argument before. Datzek v. State, 838
N.E.2d 1149 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006). In Datzek, the defendant turned from a
parking lot onto a roadway without using his turn signal; an officer then
initiated a traffic stop and issued Datzek a citation for violating Indiana Code
section 9-21-8-25. On appeal, Datzek argued that the statute did not apply to
him because it does not mention turning from a parking lot and because it
4
Christal makes this argument for the first time on appeal and has, therefore, waived it. E.g., Washington v.
State, 808 N.E.2d 617, 625 (Ind. 2004). During the suppression hearing, she argued that the positive canine
sniff in combination with her nervous demeanor did not rise to the level of probable cause needed to search
her person. She has abandoned that argument on appeal. Waiver notwithstanding, we will address her
argument.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2388 | March 13, 2020 Page 5 of 7
would have been impossible for him to have used his signal for 200 feet before
turning from the parking lot.
[12] This Court found the argument unavailing, concluding that the “plain language
of the statute requires that a vehicle must use a signal whenever it intends to
turn or change lanes. There are no restrictions that it only applies in certain
circumstances or on certain roadways.” Id. at 1155. Furthermore, we noted
that “the statute does not require that a person use his turn signal for 200 feet
before turning in order for it to be applicable. Instead, it requires that a person
use his turn signal for ‘not less than the last’ 200 feet traveled.” Id. This Court
ultimately found that the traffic stop was justified because Datzek failed to use
his turn signal when turning from the parking lot.
[13] Here, likewise, it is undisputed that the driver of the vehicle failed to use a turn
signal when turning from the parking lot. Consequently—and whether or not
there was 200 feet of roadway leading to the location at which the vehicle
turned—Deputy LaFever’s traffic stop was permissible and the trial court did
not err by admitting evidence obtained from the traffic stop.5
5
Christal argues on appeal that the State failed to meet its burden because it did not present evidence
showing at least 200 feet between the place in the parking lot where the driver began operating the vehicle
and the place where the driver exited the parking lot. We note again that Christal did not make this
argument below. Consequently, the State would have had no notice that it needed to have such evidence in
hand. Given the arguments on which the suppression hearing turned, the State had no need to present
testimony to show that compliance with the statute was possible or refer to Datzek to refute the argument.
Therefore, this argument is unavailing.
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[14] The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Riley, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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April L. Christal v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.)
Combined Opinion