NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5982-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
FRANK P. RENDFREY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Submitted February 25, 2020 – Decided March 18, 2020
Before Judges Hoffman and Currier.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Middlesex County, Indictment No. 09-09-
1481.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Craig S. Leeds, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
Christopher L.C. Kuberiet, Acting Middlesex County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (David Michael
Liston, Special Deputy Attorney General/Acting
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.
PER CURIAM
Defendant Frank Rendfrey appeals from an April 13, 2018 order denying
his petition for post-conviction relief (PCR).
Defendant raises the following points of argument in his counseled brief:
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL IN
VIOLATION OF THE UNITED STATES AND [THE]
NEW JERSEY CONSTITUTIONS AND THE LOWER
COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING OTHERWISE
POINT II
THE CUMULATIVE EFFECT OF THE ERRORS
COMPLAINED OF RENDERED THE TRIAL
UNFAIR
POINT III
DEFENDANT WAS DENIED THE EFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF APPELLATE COUNSEL
POINT IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR [PCR] WITHOUT
AFFORDING HIM AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING
In a pro se supplemental brief, without point headings, defendant argues
that trial counsel was ineffective because counsel: 1) failed to raise the issue of
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2
the victim's dogs to discredit an eyewitness's testimony; 2) failed to explore the
victim's mental health as a defense; 3) disallowed defendant from testifying in
his own defense; and 4) he lacked the competence to handle the technology
required to put forth an effective defense. He also raised two arguments that are
identical to those in the counseled brief.
After thoroughly reviewing the record, we conclude that all of defendant's
arguments are without merit and, except as briefly addressed below, they do not
warrant discussion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We affirm substantially for the reasons
stated by the PCR judge in his oral decision of April 13, 2018. We add these
comments.
Defendant was convicted of third-degree theft, contrary to N.J.S.A.
2C:20-3; first-degree murder, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1) to (2); third-
degree hindering own apprehension, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b); and first-
degree witness tampering, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:28-5(a)(2). He was also
found guilty of criminal trespass, contrary to N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3, a lesser-included
offense of burglary. He was found eligible for an extended term sentence and
sentenced to a prison term of life plus fifteen years, with thirty-five years of
parole ineligibility.
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We affirmed defendant's convictions on direct appeal. State v. Rendfrey,
No. A-3897-11 (App. Div. Nov. 20, 2013). The matter was remanded for
resentencing under the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. On remand,
defendant was resentenced on the murder count to life imprisonment with 63.75
years of parole ineligibility.
The evidence was discussed in detail and need not be repeated here. In
summary, defendant strangled his girlfriend and staged her death as a heroin
overdose, putting a rubber band around her arm, a syringe in her arm and placing
empty heroin packets on the floor. He later told the mother of his child he had
strangled the victim in self-defense; he told police he was in New York at the
time of these events.
In his PCR brief, defendant raised eighteen grounds on which he asserted
trial counsel was ineffective. He also contended appellate counsel was
ineffective for failing to raise additional issues on appeal.
The PCR court addressed and rejected each of the arguments in its oral
decision. He noted that some of the arguments of ineffective assistance were
dispelled by the evidence of counsel's actions in the record, some were bald
assertions with no supporting certifications, some were already raised and
decided on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-5, and others were barred because they could
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4
have been raised on direct appeal, Rule 3:22-4. The court also found defendant's
contentions regarding appellate counsel meritless as counsel raised four
arguments on appeal, evidencing he made a "learned," "strategic decision" to
omit the other claims.
The PCR court's analysis of the raised claims is supported by credible
evidence. Many of the issues were procedurally barred as they could have been
raised on direct appeal. "Issues that could and should have been raised on direct
appeal from the defendant's conviction are barred by Rule 3:22-4(a) unless the
exceptions to the Rule have been established." State v. Reevey, 417 N.J. Super.
134, 148 (App. Div. 2010) (citation omitted). "Where the exceptions do not
apply, consideration of such issues is properly barred." Ibid. (citations omitted).
Defendant has not asserted any applicable exceptions.
The remainder of the assertions were not supported by certifications or
affidavits. To establish a prima facie case of ineffective assistance of counsel,
a defendant must present legally competent evidence, rather than "bald
assertions . . . ." See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170 (App. Div.
1999). Defendant did not meet that standard here.
As stated, defendant presented a pro se supplemental brief raising an
additional four arguments. The PCR court did not explicitly address those
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5
contentions. We are mindful that under Rule 3:22-11, a PCR court must "state
separately its findings of fact and conclusions of law" regarding the arguments
set forth in a PCR petition. Here, the PCR court stated he had "read all the
papers" but he did not refer to the supplemental arguments. Nevertheless, we
are satisfied after reviewing the pro se arguments in light of the record and
applicable principles of law, that a remand is unnecessary.
The contention regarding the victim's dogs is intertwined with the
argument the PCR court considered and rejected in its analysis regarding the
cross-examination of a particular eyewitness. The remaining contentions are all
bald assertions, without merit, and unsupported by any certification or affidavit.
Defendant has not presented a prima facie case as to either prong of the
Strickland1 test. Therefore, he was not entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his
PCR petition.
Affirmed.
1
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
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