IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0246
Filed March 18, 2020
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHAEL T. FERGUSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Bethany Currie,
Judge.
Michael Ferguson appeals the denial of his motion in arrest of judgment.
AFFIRMED.
Martha J. Lucey, State Appellate Defender, and Robert P. Ranschau,
Assistant Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Considered by Bower, C.J., and May and Greer, JJ.
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MAY, Judge.
Michael Ferguson entered an Alford plea.1 See North Carolina v. Alford,
400 U.S. 25, 37 (1970) (permitting a defendant to plead guilty to a crime without
admitting participation in the underlying facts that constitute the crime). He pled to
four counts of lascivious acts with a child, class “C” felonies,2 and one count of
lascivious acts with a child, a class “D” felony.3 The trial court accepted the plea
and found Ferguson guilty of all five charges.
A week later, Ferguson filed a pro se motion in arrest of judgment. Through
his motion, Ferguson asked to withdraw his plea on various grounds, most of which
concerned alleged deficiencies of his attorney.4 Following a hearing, the district
court denied the motion.
Then, through counsel, Ferguson filed another motion. This time, Ferguson
raised a claim of actual innocence. Following an evidentiary hearing, the district
court found Ferguson had not met his burden of proof.
Ultimately, the district court sentenced Ferguson to prison. Ferguson now
appeals.
1 We recognize Iowa Code section 814.6 (2019) was recently amended to prohibit
most appeals from guilty pleas. See 2019 Iowa Acts ch. 140 § 28. In State v.
Macke, however, our supreme court held these amendments “apply only
prospectively and do not apply to cases pending on July 1, 2019.” 933 N.W.2d
226, 228 (Iowa 2019). We are bound by our supreme court’s holding. We
conclude, therefore, the amendments “do not apply” to this case, which was
pending on July 1, 2019. See id.
2 These crimes were violations of Iowa Code sections 709.8(1)(b), 709.8(1)(c),
692A.104, and 903B.1 (2018).
3 This crime was a violation of Iowa Code sections 709.8(1)(b), 692A.104, and
903B.1.
4 The pro se motion also requested a new attorney. But Ferguson withdrew that
request at the hearing on the motion.
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I. Knowing and Voluntary Plea
Ferguson claims the district court should have allowed him to withdraw his
plea because it was not knowing and voluntary. He contends that, following his
guilty plea, his counsel gave him about 217 pages of reports that proved he was
not guilty. He further contends that, if he had received the reports earlier, he would
not have entered his plea. Rather, he claims, “he could have used that information
at trial and the jury would not have found him not guilty.”
“We review a denial of a motion in arrest of judgment for abuse of discretion
and will reverse only if the ruling was based on reasons that are clearly
unreasonable or untenable.” State v. Myers, 653 N.W.2d 574, 581 (Iowa 2002).
“The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, and shall not accept a plea of
guilty without first determining that the plea is made voluntarily and intelligently and
has a factual basis.” Iowa R. Crim. P. 2.8(2)(b). But, “[t]he record at a plea hearing
presumptively reflects the facts. Where a defendant challenges the voluntariness
of a plea, but had asserted the plea was voluntary at the plea hearing, the
defendant must overcome that presumption.” State v. Bringus, No. 15-0478, 2016
WL 903161, at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 9, 2016) (citation omitted).
Ferguson has not overcome that presumption. See id. During the plea
hearing, Ferguson made it clear he understood the charges against him, he
understood the consequences of his plea, and he was “voluntarily” entering his
plea. While he claims withdrawal of his plea was warranted because of additional
evidence he obtained after pleading, we cannot agree. He has never revealed any
of the alleged 217 pages of reports. And we see no other record evidence
indicating the plea was involuntary or made without sufficient information. Instead,
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the record clearly supports the district court’s finding that the plea was voluntary
and intelligent. We reject Ferguson’s contrary claims.
II. Actual Innocence
Ferguson also brings an actual-innocence claim. He contends (1) his
ex-wife fabricated the allegations against him and, moreover, manipulated the
alleged victims to assist with her scheme; and (2) one alleged child victim is known
to lie and, indeed, that child’s credibility was diminished when the child stated
Ferguson abused another child, who denied abuse.
The district court held a hearing on Ferguson’s claims. Both Ferguson and
the State were allowed to present evidence. The district court ultimately found
Ferguson “failed to meet his burden by clear and convincing evidence that no
reasonable factfinder could convict him” of the crimes to which he had entered an
Alford plea.
Our review is de novo. State v. Gonzalez, No. 18-0137, 2018 WL 6130305,
at *2 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2018). To succeed on an actual-innocence claim,
“the applicant must show by clear and convincing evidence that, despite the
evidence of guilt supporting the conviction, no reasonable fact finder could convict
the applicant of the crimes for which the . . . court found the applicant guilty in light
of all the evidence, including the newly discovered evidence.” Schmidt v. State,
909 N.W.2d 778, 797 (Iowa 2018).
Like the district court, we conclude Ferguson failed to show that no
reasonable fact finder could convict him. See id. Indeed, we doubt Ferguson has
presented “newly discovered” evidence. See Jones v. State, 479 N.W.2d 265, 274
(Iowa 1991) (defining “newly discovered evidence”). Ferguson’s allegations about
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his ex-wife (that she is a liar and a manipulator) concern facts known to him before
he pled. See id. And his claims of dishonesty by one alleged child victim is merely
“impeaching” and, therefore, cannot support a claim of “newly discovered”
evidence. See id. (noting a claim of newly discovered evidence requires evidence
that is “not merely cumulative or impeaching”). So we affirm the district court’s
denial of Ferguson’s actual-innocence claim.
AFFIRMED.