UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
FREEDOM WATCH, INC.,
Plaintiff,
v. No. 18-cv-88 (EGS)
ROBERT S. MUELLER III, et al.
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Plaintiff Freedom Watch, Inc., a non-profit organization,
brings this action against Defendants Robert S. Mueller III
(“Mr. Mueller”), United States Department of Justice (“DOJ”),
and Federal Bureau of Investigation (“FBI”) (collectively,
“DOJ”) under the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”), 5 U.S.C.
§ 552. Freedom Watch seeks to obtain certain records from DOJ
and the Special Counsel’s Office (“SCO”)—a component of DOJ—
concerning the investigation into Russia’s interference in the
2016 presidential election and related matters—specifically,
communications to and from the media pertaining to the
activities of the FBI, Mr. Mueller, and his staff.
Pending before the Court is DOJ’s motion for summary
judgment. Upon careful consideration of the motion, opposition,
and reply thereto, the applicable law, and the entire record
herein, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s Motion for Summary Judgment.
I. Background
The following facts—drawn from the parties’ submissions—are
undisputed, unless otherwise indicated. On May 17, 2017, then-
Acting Attorney General Rod J. Rosenstein appointed Mr. Mueller
to serve as Special Counsel for DOJ and authorized him to
investigate the Russian government’s efforts to interfere in the
2016 presidential election, including any matters arising from
that investigation. Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-4 at 25
(Appointment of Special Counsel to Investigate Russian
Interference with the 2016 Presidential Election and Related
Matters, Order No. 3915-2017). 1 Seven months later, on January 2,
2018, Freedom Watch submitted a FOIA request to DOJ, the FBI,
and the SCO, seeking to obtain the following:
[D]ocuments and records . . . that refer or
relate with regard to communications to and
from the media . . . concerning the activities
of [Mr.] Mueller and/or his staff as well as
the [FBI], concerning the investigation of
alleged Russian collusion and related matters
concerning the Trump Presidential Campaign and
the Trump Transition Team . . . .
E.g., id. at 20 (FOIA Request); Defs.’ Statement of Material
Facts (“Defs.’ SOMF”), ECF No. 36-5 at 1 ¶ 1; Pl.’s Counter
Statement of Material Facts (“Pl.’s SOMF”), ECF No. 37-1 at 2 ¶
1 When citing electronic filings throughout this Opinion, the
Court cites to the ECF page number, not the page number of the
filed document.
2
1; Defs.’ Reply to Pl.’s SOMF, ECF No. 38-1 at 1 ¶ 1. 2 Freedom
Watch subsequently narrowed its FOIA request to “records of
communications to and from the media rather than purely internal
communications.” Defs.’ SOMF, ECF No. 36-5 at 1-2 ¶ 2.
Before the FBI granted Freedom Watch’s request for
expedited processing on January 23, 2018, id. at 2 ¶ 4, Freedom
Watch commenced the instant action on January 15, 2018, id. at 2
¶ 3. DOJ’s Office of Information Policy (“OIP”) informed Freedom
Watch that its request for expedited processing had been granted
for the records maintained by the SCO and DOJ’s Public Affairs
Office (“PAO”) on February 20, 2018. Id. at 2 ¶ 5. On the same
day, DOJ filed the answer to Freedom Watch’s complaint. Id. at 2
¶ 6. Freedom Watch moved for summary judgment on March 23, 2018,
see generally Pl.’s Mot. for Summ. J., ECF No. 10; the parties
then filed status reports at the Court’s direction concerning
DOJ’s production of the requested materials, see generally
Docket for Civ. Action No. 18-88; and the Court denied as moot
Freedom Watch’s motion for summary judgment in light of the
Court’s Order directing DOJ to produce all non-exempt documents
responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request, Min. Order of May
25, 2018.
2 From May 2017 to March 2019, Mr. Mueller investigated Russia’s
interference in the 2016 election. Elec. Privacy Info. Ctr. v.
DOJ, No. CV 19-810 (RBW), 2020 WL 1060633, at *2 (D.D.C. Mar. 5,
2020).
3
DOJ released responsive materials to Freedom Watch,
withholding, in part, certain records under FOIA exemptions.
E.g., Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 57-80 (OIP’s Vaughn Index);
Defs.’ Ex. 2, ECF No. 36-4 at 37-42 (FBI’s Vaughn Index). 3
Following DOJ’s notice to the Court regarding a technical issue
with its searches of responsive documents, see Defs.’ Status
Report, ECF No. 24 at 1-3, Freedom Watch sought discovery and in
camera review, see, e.g., Min. Order of Nov. 26, 2018; Joint
Status Report, ECF No. 27 at 1-2; Pl.’s Resp. to Order of the
Court, ECF No. 29 at 1. This Court denied Freedom Watch’s
request for discovery and in camera review as premature,
finding, among other things, that the request was based on mere
conjecture. Min. Order of Jan. 3, 2019 (explaining that “there
3 DOJ invokes Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C). E.g., Decl. of Vanessa
R. Brinkmann (“Brinkmann Decl.”), ECF No. 36-3 at 4 ¶¶ 6-8;
Decl. of David M. Hardy (“Hardy Decl.”), ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 18.
Exemption 5 covers “inter-agency or intra-agency memorandums or
letters that would not be available by law to a party other than
an agency in litigation with the agency.” 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5).
Exemption 6 protects “personnel and medical files and similar
files the disclosure of which would constitute a clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(6).
Exemption 7(C) exempts from disclosure “records or information
compiled for law enforcement purposes, but only to the extent
that the production of such law enforcement records or
information . . . could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.” Id. § 552(b)(7)(C).
And “[a] Vaughn index describes the documents withheld or
redacted and the FOIA exemptions invoked, and explains why each
exemption applies.” Prison Legal News v. Samuels, 787 F.3d 1142,
1145 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Vaughn v. Rosen, 484 F.2d 820
(D.C. Cir. 1973); Keys v. DOJ, 830 F.2d 337, 349 (D.C. Cir.
1987)).
4
[was] no basis in reality to believe that [DOJ’s] disclosure” of
the technical issue “was, as Freedom Watch puts it, an ‘attempt
to shield themselves from the public seeing evidence of their
routinely leaking grand jury information to the media and other
disclosures for their tactical motivations’”).
On April 8, 2019, DOJ moved for summary judgment. See
Defs.’ Mot. for Summ. J. (“Defs.’ MSJ”), ECF No. 36 at 1; see
generally Defs.’ Mem. of Law in Supp. of Defs.’ MSJ (“Defs.’
Mem.”), ECF No. 36-1. On May 9, 2019, Freedom Watch filed its
opposition brief. See generally Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37. 4 On June
10, 2019, DOJ filed the reply brief. See generally Defs.’ Reply,
ECF No. 38. The motion is ripe and ready for the Court’s
adjudication.
II. Legal Standard
The “vast majority” of FOIA cases can be resolved on
summary judgment. Brayton v. Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative, 641 F.3d 521, 527 (D.C. Cir. 2011). A court may
grant summary judgment only if “there is no genuine dispute as
to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). Under FOIA, “the
underlying facts and the inferences to be drawn from them are
4 Freedom Watch’s opposition brief was not accompanied by a
proposed order as required by Local Civil Rule 7.1(c). See LCvR
7.1(c) (“Each motion and opposition shall be accompanied by a
proposed order.”).
5
construed in the light most favorable to the FOIA requester[,]”
and summary judgment is appropriate only after “the agency
proves that it has fully discharged its [FOIA] obligations . . .
.” Moore v. Aspin, 916 F. Supp. 32, 35 (D.D.C. 1996) (citations
omitted).
When considering a motion for summary judgment under FOIA,
the court must conduct a de novo review of the record. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B). The court may grant summary judgment
based on information provided in an agency’s affidavits or
declarations when they are “relatively detailed and non-
conclusory,” SafeCard Servs., Inc. v. SEC, 926 F.2d 1197, 1200
(D.C. Cir. 1991) (citation omitted), and “not controverted by
either contrary evidence in the record nor by evidence of agency
bad faith,” Military Audit Project v. Casey, 656 F.2d 724, 738
(D.C. Cir. 1981). Such affidavits or declarations are “accorded
a presumption of good faith, which cannot be rebutted by ‘purely
speculative claims about the existence and discoverability of
other documents.’” SafeCard Servs., 926 F.2d 1197 at 1200
(citation omitted).
III. Analysis
Freedom Watch challenges DOJ’s response to its FOIA request
on five fronts: (1) the adequacy of DOJ’s search; (2) the
withholding of documents under Exemption 5’s deliberative
process privilege; (3) the withholding of names and other
6
personal identifying information pursuant to Exemption 6;
(4) the withholding of certain portions in a single e-mail under
Exemption 7(C); and (5) DOJ’s segregability determinations.
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 3-13. The Court addresses each
challenge in turn.
A. The Adequacy of DOJ’s Search for Responsive Records
To demonstrate the adequacy of its search at the summary
judgment stage, DOJ “must show that it made a good faith effort
to conduct a search for the requested records, using methods
which can be reasonably expected to produce the information
requested.” Oglesby v. U.S. Dep’t of the Army, 920 F.2d 57, 68
(D.C. Cir. 1990). “[T]he issue to be resolved is not whether
there might exist any other documents possibly responsive to the
request, but rather whether the search for those documents was
adequate.” Weisberg v. DOJ, 745 F.2d 1476, 1485 (D.C. Cir.
1984). “The adequacy of the search, in turn, is judged by a
standard of reasonableness and depends, not surprisingly, upon
the facts of each case.” Id. To meet its burden, an agency may
provide “a reasonably detailed affidavit, setting forth the
search terms and the type of search performed, and averring that
all files likely to contain responsive materials . . . were
searched.” Iturralde v. Comptroller of Currency, 315 F.3d 311,
313-14 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). “If, however, the record leaves substantial doubt as
7
to the sufficiency of the search, summary judgment for the
agency is not proper.” Truitt v. Dep’t of State, 897 F.2d 540,
542 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Here, DOJ has demonstrated that it has met its FOIA
obligations by conducting an adequate and reasonable search for
the responsive records from within OIP, SCO, and the FBI. DOJ’s
two declarations—(1) Brinkmann declaration; and (2) Hardy
declaration—“explain in reasonable detail the scope and method
of the search.” Kidd v. DOJ, 362 F. Supp. 2d 291, 295 (D.D.C.
2005) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). “To
satisfy the dictates of FOIA, [DOJ] must, at a minimum, ‘aver
that it has searched all files likely to contain relevant
documents.’” Huntington v. U.S. Dep’t of Commerce, 234 F. Supp.
3d 94, 103 (D.D.C. 2017) (quoting Am. Immigration Council v.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 21 F. Supp. 3d 60, 71 (D.D.C. 2014)).
For the reasons explained below, the Court is satisfied that OIP
and the FBI conducted adequate searches for all locations likely
to contain responsive documents. See, e.g., Brinkmann Decl., ECF
No. 36-3 at 12 ¶ 25; Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 7 ¶¶ 14-15.
1. OIP’s Search for Responsive Records
OIP—the office responsible for processing FOIA requests for
records from within OIP, DOJ’s six senior leadership offices,
and the SCO—located 5,881 pages of records responsive to Freedom
Watch’s FOIA request. Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 2 ¶ 1, 5
8
¶ 9, 10 ¶ 21. Of particular relevance here, the first declarant
avers that “OIP searched for potentially responsive records
within two Offices: PAO and SCO.” Id. at 7 ¶ 13. OIP reasonably
determined that both PAO and the SCO likely had records
responsive to Freedom Watch’s FOIA request for two reasons:
(1) Freedom Watch specifically requested communications from the
SCO; and (2) PAO is the “office tasked with coordinating
relations of DOJ with the news media.” Id.
According to the first declarant, “OIP conducted broad
searches of unclassified email records and computer hard drives
for seventeen custodians across these Offices (fifteen within
PAO and two within SCO).” Id. And the two “SCO custodians were
public affairs professionals responsible for communications with
the media, and both were on detail from other DOJ components—one
from PAO and the other from the United States Attorney’s Office
for the Eastern District of Virginia (EDVA).” Id. at 8 ¶ 15.
OIP’s search for responsive records included a search of the
SCO’s general press inquiries electronic mailbox
(Specialcounselpress@usdoj.gov). Id. The first declarant notes
that “OIP did not search hard-copy/paper files” because “none
were identified during the course of OIP’s search efforts.” Id.
at 7 n.2.
With regard to potentially responsive records within PAO,
the first declarant avers that OIP used the date range of July
9
1, 2015 through December 31, 2017 based on Freedom Watch’s
proposed start date and cut-off date. Id. at 8 ¶ 16. As to the
SCO, OIP’s “initial search included all emails from the date the
email accounts were created through December 31, 2017.” Id.
According to the first declarant, OIP used the following search
terms for both PAO and the SCO: “‘SCO,’ ‘OSC,’ ‘Special
Counsel,’ or ‘Mueller’ combined with the terms ‘Russia*,’ ‘Trump
Campaign,’ ‘Trump Presidential Campaign,’ or ‘Trump
Transition.’” Id. at 8 ¶ 17. As previously noted, DOJ
experienced a technical issue with the initial searches, and OIP
re-ran the searches. Id. at 9 ¶ 18. In addition, OIP’s searches
covered potentially responsive text messages from PAO and the
SCO. Id. at 9 ¶ 19. Uncovering a total of 5,881 pages of
responsive records, OIP released, in part, 1,941 pages with
redactions to Freedom Watch; and OIP released, in full, the
remaining 3,939 pages without redactions. Id. at 12 ¶ 26.
2. FBI’s Search for Responsive Records
The FBI located 320 pages of responsive records. Hardy
Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 18. Typically, the FBI searches its
Central Records System that consists of “applicant,
investigative, intelligence, personnel, administrative, and
general files compiled and maintained by the FBI in the course
of fulfilling its integrated missions and functions as law
enforcement, counterterrorism, and intelligence agency to
10
include performance of administrative and personnel functions.”
Id. at 5 ¶ 11. Given Freedom Watch’s request for communications
to and from the media, however, the FBI reasonably determined
that a targeted search within its Office of Public Affairs
(“OPA”) would yield responsive records. Id. at 7 ¶ 14. OPA—the
office that “manages and oversees the FBI’s media relations”—
approves and coordinates communications between FBI personnel
and the media concerning FBI matters. Id. at 7 ¶ 15.
The FBI identified the OPA employees with media contacts,
and searched the e-mail accounts of those employees using the
date range of July 1, 2015 through December 31, 2017. Id. at 7-8
¶ 16. The FBI used search terms similar to OIP’s search terms.
Id. 5 The second declarant avers that OPA sent the responsive
records to the FBI’s Record/Information Dissemination Section
(“RIDS”), and RIDS used the search terms to run “an automated e-
mail search of the [OPA] employees’ e-mail accounts.” Id. at 8 ¶
17. RIDS located additional responsive records, adding to the
total pages of responsive records. Id. at 9 ¶¶ 17-18. Based on
5 The FBI used the following search terms: “‘SCO’ AND ‘Russia’;
‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump campaign’; ‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump Presidential
Campaign’; ‘SCO’ AND ‘Trump Transition’; ‘OSC’ AND ‘Russia’;
‘OSC’ AND ‘Trump campaign’; ‘OSC’ AND ‘Trump Transition’;
‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Russia’; ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump
Campaign’; ‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump Presidential Campaign’;
‘Special Counsel’ AND ‘Trump Transition’; ‘Mueller’ AND
‘Russia’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump Campaign’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump
Presidential Campaign’; ‘Mueller’ AND ‘Trump Transition[.]’”
Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 8 ¶ 16.
11
the search and review, the second declarant avers that “[t]he
FBI found no information or leads logically leading to other
locations where responsive records would likely be located.” Id.
at 9 ¶ 17. In the final analysis, the FBI released 171 pages of
responsive records in full, and 122 pages in part, withholding
in full 27 pages. Id. at 9 ¶ 18.
3. DOJ’s Search Was Adequate Under the
Reasonableness Standard
DOJ argues—and the Court agrees—that “[r]easonableness, not
perfection, is . . . the Court’s guiding principle in
determining the adequacy of a FOIA search.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No.
36-1 at 13 (citing cases). Indeed, “[t]he adequacy of an
agency’s search is measured by a standard of reasonableness, and
is dependent upon the circumstances of the case.” Truitt, 897
F.2d at 542 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
Freedom Watch does not dispute the reasonableness standard. See
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4. Rather, Freedom Watch contends
that DOJ’s search was inadequate because DOJ’s “statement [of
material facts] and declarations are deficient.” Id. In Freedom
Watch’s view, DOJ’s statement and declarations “fail to provide
a sufficient description of (1) the records searched; (2) who
conducted the search; and (3) the search process.” Id. DOJ
disagrees, arguing that “[n]othing in [Freedom Watch’s]
opposition brief contravenes the declarations of Ms. Brinkmann
12
or Mr. Hardy, or provides any basis to rebut the presumption
that their declarations, and the agencies’ searches, were
executed in good faith.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 8.
Freedom Watch’s three arguments are unavailing. First,
Freedom Watch argues that DOJ’s description of the records
searched is inadequate because DOJ “merely restate[s] general
policy guidelines in an attempt to explain how [Freedom Watch’s]
FOIA request was searched” and the “FBI failed to describe
whether it searched paper records or all or any electronic
records other than certain email accounts of personnel.” Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4. DOJ responds—and the Court agrees—that
“the Brinkmann and Hardy declarations set forth in detail how
OIP and the FBI, respectively, conducted tailored and thorough
searches for records responsive to [Freedom Watch’s] request.”
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 8.
It is undisputed that Freedom Watch only seeks “records of
communications to and from the media rather than purely internal
communications.” Defs.’ SOMF, ECF No. 36-5 at 2 ¶ 2. Contrary to
Freedom Watch’s assertion that the FBI’s determination as to its
search failed to account for paper and other electronic records,
see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4, the Hardy declaration explains
that the FBI determined that “the most logical location for
‘communication’ records to or from the media would be within the
e-mails of specific authorized employees who have contact with
13
the media on a regular basis,” Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 7 ¶
16. Furthermore, the Hardy declaration states that “[t]he FBI
found no information or leads logically leading to other
locations where responsive records would likely be located.” Id.
at 9 ¶ 17.
In Competitive Enterprise Institute v. National Aeronautics
& Space Administration, 989 F. Supp. 2d 74, 93 (D.D.C. 2013), a
member of this Court rejected a FOIA requester’s argument that
the “agency should have searched for paper records” because
“there [was] nothing to suggest that responsive documents
exist[ed] in paper form” and “[n]o leads emerged during [the
agency’s] search that required [the agency] to expand its search
to include paper records.” Similarly, in this case, the FBI did
not find any information or leads to extend its search beyond
the OPA records. See Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 9 ¶ 17. The
Court therefore finds that the Hardy declaration provides a
rationale in a “relatively detailed” and “nonconclusory” fashion
for the FBI’s search. Goland v. CIA, 607 F.2d 339, 352 (D.C.
Cir. 1978).
Freedom Watch’s next argument—that the Brinkmann and Hardy
declarations fail to “disclose who carried out the searches,”
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 4—is foreclosed by case law in this
District. “FOIA does not require the disclosure of the names or
information about agency staff involved in processing FOIA
14
requests.” Kidder v. FBI, 517 F. Supp. 2d 17, 24 n.8 (D.D.C.
2007). Courts in this District have repeatedly rejected the
argument that an agency’s declaration must identify the
individuals, by name, who conducted the searches. See, e.g.,
Harrison v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 611 F. Supp. 2d 54, 65
(D.D.C. 2009) (finding that a FOIA requester’s “dispute[] that
[the agency’s] searches were adequate because they [did] not
identify, by individual name, who was conducting the search” was
a “frivolous argument”); Hillier v. CIA, No. CV 16-CV-1836
(DLF), 2018 WL 4354947, at *8 (D.D.C. Sept. 12, 2018) (same);
Bigwood v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 132 F. Supp. 3d 124, 142-43
(D.D.C. 2015) (same). Moreover, as DOJ correctly points out,
“the identities of agency staff who searched for responsive
records would be exempt from disclosure under Exemption 6 if
[they] were contained in an agency record.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF
No. 38 at 9 (citing Harrison, 611 F. Supp. 2d at 65).
Although Freedom Watch is correct that agency declarations
must “describe what records were searched, by whom, and through
what processes,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No 37 at 3 (quoting Sea
Shepherd Conservation Soc’y v. IRS, 208 F. Supp. 3d 58, 69
(D.D.C. 2016)), Freedom Watch ignores that the “by whom”
requirement permits an “agency [to] rely on an affidavit of an
agency employee responsible for supervising the search, even if
that individual did not conduct the search herself,” Truesdale
15
v. DOJ, 803 F. Supp. 2d 44, 50 (D.D.C. 2011) (citations and
internal quotation marks omitted). Here, the Brinkmann and Hardy
declarations meet that standard. See Brinkmann Decl., ECF No.
36-3 at 2 ¶ 1; see also Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 2-3 ¶ 1.
Freedom Watch’s third argument—that DOJ’s search is
inadequate because DOJ’s declarants “did not say which search
terms provided what information, how the records were searched,
or what types of records were searched,” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
at 5—fares no better. DOJ argues—and the Court agrees—that
Freedom Watch “cites no authority for the proposition that an
agency must map out specifically which search terms yielded what
specific potentially responsive records, and [DOJ is] not aware
of any such requirement.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 10.
“Courts in this [D]istrict, moreover, have declined to require
agencies to provide the granularity of detail in their
declarations that [Freedom Watch] seeks.” Coffey v. Bureau of
Land Mgmt., 249 F. Supp. 3d 488, 501 (D.D.C. 2017). And DOJ
retains “discretion in crafting a list of search terms that [it]
believe[s] to be reasonably tailored to uncover documents
responsive to the FOIA request.” Liberation Newspaper v. U.S.
Dep’t of State, 80 F. Supp. 3d 137, 146 (D.D.C. 2015) (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). “Where the search terms
are reasonably calculated to lead to responsive documents, the
Court should not ‘micro manage’ the agency’s search.” Id.
16
(quoting Johnson v. Exec. Office for U.S. Att’ys, 310 F.3d 771,
776 (D.C. Cir. 2002)). Freedom Watch does not challenge DOJ’s
search terms, see Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 5; thus, this Court
will not micro-manage DOJ’s searches. Neither will the Court
require additional details about DOJ’s searches because the
Brinkmann and Hardy declarations are “relatively detailed and
non-conclusory,” Mobley v. CIA, 806 F.3d 568, 581 (D.C. Cir.
2015).
The Court therefore finds that DOJ’s search is adequate
under the standard of reasonableness. See Truitt, 897 F.2d at
542. Accordingly, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for summary
judgment as to the adequacy of the search.
B. Information Withheld Under Exemption 5’s Deliberative
Process Privilege
The Court next considers DOJ’s withholdings under Exemption
5. “Exemption 5 permits an agency to withhold materials normally
privileged from discovery in civil litigation against the
agency.” Tax Analysts v. IRS, 117 F.3d 607, 616 (D.C. Cir.
1997). To withhold a document under Exemption 5, the “document
must meet two conditions: [1] its source must be a Government
agency, and [2] it must fall within the ambit of a privilege
against discovery under judicial standards that would govern
litigation against the agency that holds it.” Stolt–Nielsen
Transp. Grp. Ltd. v. United States, 534 F.3d 728, 733 (D.C. Cir.
17
2008) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Exemption
5’s deliberative process privilege is one of the privileges
against discovery, and that privilege protects from disclosure
documents that would reveal an agency’s deliberations prior to
arriving at a particular decision. Dent v. Exec. Office for U.S.
Att’ys, 926 F. Supp. 2d 257, 267–68 (D.D.C. 2013).
To fall within the scope of the deliberative process
privilege, withheld materials must be both “predecisional” and
“deliberative.” Mapother v. DOJ, 3 F.3d 1533, 1537 (D.C. Cir.
1993). A communication is predecisional if “it was generated
before the adoption of an agency policy” and deliberative if it
“reflects the give-and-take of the consultative process.”
Coastal States Gas Corp. v. Dep’t of Energy, 617 F.2d 854, 866
(D.C. Cir. 1980). “[E]ven if the document is predecisional at
the time it is prepared, it can lose that status if it is
adopted, formally or informally, as the agency position on an
issue[.]” Id. The deliberative process privilege is to be
“construed as narrowly as consistent with efficient Government
operation.” Taxation with Representation Fund v. IRS, 646 F.2d
666, 667 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
Here, OIP withheld, in part, 116 pages of responsive
records that the Brinkmann declaration describes as
“communications and ‘Weekly Press Reports’ generated by,
exchanged within, and wholly internal to, the DOJ.” Brinkmann
18
Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 14 ¶ 32. OIP’s withholdings fall into two
categories: (1) “deliberative discussions regarding press
coverage and press inquiries”; and (2) “deliberative notes
regarding press coverage and press inquiries.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF
No. 36-1 at 20 (citing Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 14 ¶
33); see also Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 58 (OIP’s Vaughn
Index). The Court will analyze each category in turn.
1. Deliberative Discussions Regarding Press
Coverage and Press Inquiries
The first category consists of three separate pages of
internal communications with redactions to each page. E.g.,
Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 13 ¶ 29; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No.
36-3 at 58. Specifically, the Brinkmann declaration states:
This category of records consists of internal
email communications from SCO staff to SCO’s
public affairs officials providing press
inquiries sent directly to them and noting
preliminary thoughts on if and how the SCO
might respond. In each instance, SCO staff are
reacting in real time, sharing their opinions
and suggestions for how to the SCO might
respond to particular press inquiries.
Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 15 ¶ 35.
Freedom Watch hypothesizes that the communications involve
“the secret meetings with Peter Carr, spokesperson for the [SCO]
and media representatives.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 8.
Freedom Watch contends that the redactions to DOJ’s internal
communications in the first category are neither pre-decisional
19
nor deliberative. See id. at 6-7. DOJ argues—and the Court
agrees—that the redactions to the communications are
deliberative and pre-decisional. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 20-23.
These documents squarely fall within the ambit of Exemption 5’s
deliberative process privilege “[b]ecause these documents
reflect intra-agency deliberations on communications with the
media.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. NSA, 49 F. Supp. 3d 1, 8 (D.D.C.
2014), aff’d and remanded by 783 F.3d 1340 (D.C. Cir. 2015);
accord Judicial Watch, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 736
F. Supp. 2d 202, 208 (D.D.C. 2010) (finding that agency properly
withheld under Exemption 5 “email messages involving
recommendations and evaluations for how to respond to
Congressional and media requests for information on [certain
topics]”). Exemption 5 covers these pre-decisional documents
because DOJ explains that “the redacted material contains
evaluative discussion and preliminary assessments by [DOJ] staff
as they analyzed, made recommendations, gave advice, and worked
toward formulating strategies for responding to the press.”
Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 21; see also Brinkmann Decl., ECF
No. 36-3 at 17 ¶¶ 40-41.
To be sure, courts in this District have consistently held
that Exemption 5 protects from disclosure “media-related
withholdings” reflecting an agency’s “ongoing decisionmaking
about ‘how the agency’s activities should be described to the
20
general public.’” Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 12 F. Supp.
3d 100, 118 (D.D.C. 2014) (quoting Nat’l Sec. Archive v. FBI,
No. 88–1507, 1993 WL 128499, at *2 (D.D.C. Apr. 15, 1993));
accord Competitive Enter. Inst. v. EPA, 232 F. Supp. 3d 172, 188
(D.D.C. 2017) (finding that Exemption 5 protected documents
“clearly generated as part of a media strategy in response to
FOIA litigation” and that “correspondence [was] predecisional in
that it pre-dated the release of a public statement and [was]
deliberative because it involved personal opinions and thoughts
of staff members working to identify the options”).
2. Deliberative Notes Regarding Press Coverage and
Press Inquiries
The second category consists of 113 pages of notes in the
SCO’s “Weekly Press Report” that “document[s] and aid[s]
determinations as to whether and how to address press
inquiries.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 15 ¶ 37. A Weekly
Press Report, generated by SCO’s public affairs officials, is a
“chart with seven columns that documents the following: (1) date
of the press inquiry; (2) the media outlet; (3) the name of the
reporter; (4) the method of contact; (5) the subject of the
inquiry; (6) research – which documents steps taken in
preparation of a response, if any; and (7) a proposed final
response to that inquiry.” Id. at 15-16 ¶ 37. The Weekly Press
Reports contain redacted information in the “research” and
21
“final response” columns, including “public affairs officials’
notes of what steps should be taken in order to develop a final
response to press inquiries, if any.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
at 21. As such, the “final response” column “does not actually
include the ultimate (‘final’) response to the media.” Id.; see
also Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 16 ¶ 38 (“Despite the
naming of [the “final response”] column, the information within
it does not consist of final responses to the press inquiries
but rather, recommendations regarding a potential response.”).
DOJ argues that the redacted information in the “research”
and “final response” columns is deliberative because: (1) the
notes summarize events, identify issues, and provide background
information in order to determine the most important issues and
information for senior SCO staff to review; and (2) SCO staff
made decisions to include certain factual information in the
notes during their research and preparation for a final
response. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 22. DOJ goes on to argue
that “the culling of other factual information was, in and of
itself, a necessary part of the SCO’s deliberations.” Id.
For its part, Freedom Watch appears to argue that the
withholdings are not deliberative because the redacted
information in the Weekly Press Reports do not discourage candid
discussion, and that its FOIA request seeks only the final
document that does not limit candid discussion. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF
22
No. 37 at 8. 6 Freedom Watch correctly points out that the “key
question [is] . . . whether the disclosure of materials would
expose an agency’s decisionmaking process in such a way as to
discourage candid discussion within the agency and thereby
undermine the agency’s ability to perform its functions.” Id.
(quoting Dudman Commc’ns. Corp. v. Dep’t of the Air Force, 815
F.2d 1565, 1568 (D.C. Cir. 1987)). But the Brinkmann declaration
directly addresses this point. See Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3
at 17-18 ¶¶ 40-41.
The declarant avers that the “[p]rotected portions of these
records reflect proposed actions provided to the SCO public
affairs officials by SCO staff regarding how to respond to press
inquiries, notes on research and steps taken in the SCO’s
preparation for responding to media inquiries, and selected
media inquiries and publications flagged for awareness and
determinations on whether any further actions may be necessary.”
Id. at 17 ¶ 40. The declarant states that release of the SCO’s
public affairs officials’ notes would result in DOJ employees
becoming “reticent to document notes of their internal decision-
making processes, to share their opinions, and they would be
6 To support its arguments as to the Exemption 5 withholdings,
Freedom Watch cites 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4). Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No.
37 at 8. That regulation, however, applies to the Federal
Election Commission, see 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4), and Freedom
Watch fails to explain its relevance. The Court therefore finds
that 11 C.F.R. § 5.4(a)(4) is inapplicable to this case.
23
circumspect in their willingness to engage in internal
discussions with other employees.” Id. at 17 ¶ 41. In addition,
the declarant avers that “[d]isclosure of such preliminary
assessments and opinions would make officials contributing to
pre-decisional deliberations much more cautious in providing
their views.” Id. Having reviewed the averments in the Brinkmann
declaration, the Court finds that the redacted information in
the Weekly Press Report qualifies for protection under the
deliberative-process privilege, and the disclosure of such
information would “stifle the creative thinking and candid
exchange of ideas necessary to produce good” work product.
Dudman, 815 F.2d at 1569.
Next, Freedom Watch contends that DOJ fails to “say whether
the communications, however, preliminary, were used in a final
decision.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 7. Freedom Watch, however,
acknowledges DOJ’s assertion that the redacted information is
pre-decisional because “the discussions ‘pre-date the final
response.’” Id. (quoting Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 20); see
also Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 20 (“[T]he material is
predecisional because it either consists of ongoing discussions
that pre-dated the final responses to press inquiries, or
reflects pre-decisional deliberations.”). Indeed, “courts have
generally found that documents created in anticipation of press
inquiries are protected even if crafted after the underlying
24
event about which the press might inquire” because “[t]he idea
is that these sorts of documents reflect deliberation about the
decision of how to respond to the press[.]” Protect Democracy
Project, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 320 F. Supp. 3d 162, 177
(D.D.C. 2018) (collecting cases). Here, DOJ argues—and the Court
agrees—that “Ms. Brinkmann’s description of the materials
withheld under Exemption 5 is more than sufficient to establish
that they are pre-decisional.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 12.
And Freedom Watch ignores the averment in the Brinkmann
declaration that clearly explains the withholdings “pertain to
entirely internal pre-decisional notes and emails among SCO
staff.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 17 ¶ 40.
Freedom Watch’s next argument is that the withholdings are
not pre-decisional because the withholdings lost the protection
under Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege when DOJ
“ch[ose] expressly to adopt or incorporate” the redacted
information in a final agency decision. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
at 7 (emphasis added) (quoting NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421
U.S. 132, 161 (1975)). In Sears, the Supreme Court held “that,
if an agency chooses expressly to adopt or incorporate by
reference an intra-agency memorandum previously covered by
Exemption 5 in what would otherwise be a final opinion, that
memorandum may be withheld only on the ground that it falls
within the coverage of some exemption other than Exemption 5.”
25
421 U.S. at 161 (“[W]hen adopted, the reasoning becomes that of
the agency and becomes its responsibility to defend.”). But the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia
Circuit (“D.C. Circuit”) rejected a FOIA requester’s argument
that the FBI waived the deliberative process privilege by
adopting a legal opinion by DOJ’s Office of Legal Counsel
(“OLC”) in dealings with Congress and the Office of the
Inspector General because the FOIA requester could not “point to
any evidence supporting its claim that the FBI expressly adopted
the OLC Opinion as its reasoning.” Elec. Frontier Found. v. DOJ,
739 F.3d 1, 11 (D.C. Cir. 2014). The same is true here. As noted
by DOJ, Freedom Watch “does not point to any evidence supporting
its claim that OIP expressly adopted any of the withheld
material in a final response.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 12.
Finally, Freedom Watch concedes DOJ’s argument that the
redacted information in the Weekly Press Report reflects the
SCO’s pre-decisional deliberative process because such
information constitutes “the culling of other factual
information [that] was, in and of itself, a necessary part of
the SCO’s deliberations.” Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 22; see
also Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 5-8. Nonetheless, “the Court
still has an independent duty to ‘determine for itself whether
the record and any undisputed material facts justify granting
summary judgment.’” Tokar v. DOJ, 304 F. Supp. 3d 81, 94 n.3
26
(D.D.C. 2018) (quoting Winston & Strawn, LLP v. McLean, 843 F.3d
503, 505 (D.C. Cir. 2016)). Based on DOJ’s description of the
redacted information in the Weekly Press Report, see, e.g.,
Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 21-22; Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-
3 at 15-18 ¶¶ 37-41; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 58, the Court
is satisfied that the redacted information that reflects the
culling of certain factual information is exempt under Exemption
5, see Ancient Coin Collectors Guild v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 641
F.3d 504, 513-14 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (concluding that Exemption 5
covered factual summaries because those documents “were culled
by the Committee from the much larger universe of facts
presented to it” and reflected an “exercise of discretion and
judgment calls”).
In sum, the Court therefore finds that DOJ has carried its
burden of demonstrating that the withholdings fall under
Exemption 5’s deliberative process privilege. See Coastal States
Gas Corp., 617 F.2d at 868 (“[T]he agency has the burden of
establishing what deliberative process is involved, and the role
played by the documents in issue in the course of that
process.”). Accordingly, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for
summary judgment as to Exemption 5.
C. Information Withheld Under Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
The Court next turns to the withholdings under Exemptions 6
and 7(C). DOJ withheld six narrow categories of information
27
under Exemption 6: (1) the names and personal identifying
information of certain DOJ and FBI employees based on the
sensitive nature of the SCO’s work and the law enforcement
conduct; (2) the reporters’ non-public contact information;
(3) the third parties’ names and personal identifying
information merely referenced in the records; (4) the non-public
information of third parties contained in e-mails from
reporters; (5) information concerning DOJ employees and
reporters prior to the SCO’s investigation; and (6) details
about purely personal material pertaining to DOJ employees,
reporters, and third parties (i.e. vacation details, holiday
plans, and religious observances). Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at
24-29. And DOJ withheld portions of a single e-mail
communication under Exemption 7(C), which contained information
that a member of the media believed was potentially relevant to
the SCO’s investigation. Id. at 30 (citing Brinkmann Decl., ECF
No. 36-3 at 25-26 ¶¶ 56-58).
To begin, “[t]he privacy interest in Exemption 6 is
narrower than in Exemption 7(C), so if the withholdings satisfy
the former, no examination of the latter is necessary.” McCann
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Servs., 828 F. Supp. 2d 317, 322
(D.D.C. 2011); see also Prop. of the People, Inc. v. DOJ, 405 F.
Supp. 3d 99, 112 (D.D.C. 2019) (Sullivan, J.) (“Both exemptions
are foundationally similar.”). “Exemption 6 protects
28
withholdings under the following criteria: first, the
information must be contained within ‘personnel and medical
files and similar files’; second, the disclosure of the
information ‘would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy’; and third, if the first two requirements are
met, the privacy interest must be weighed against the public
interest in disclosure.” McCann, 828 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (quoting
5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6); citing Armstrong v. Exec. Office of the
President, 97 F.3d 575, 582 (D.C. Cir. 1996)).
1. Similar Files
DOJ satisfies the first requirement of the Exemption 6
inquiry because the Supreme Court has broadly interpreted the
phrase “similar files,” recognizing that Exemption 6 covers all
“information which applies to a particular individual.” U.S.
Dep’t of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595, 602 (1982); see
also Judicial Watch, Inc. v. FDA, 449 F.3d 141, 152 (D.C. Cir.
2006) (explaining that Exemption 6 covers “not just files, but
also bits of personal information, such as names and
addresses”). “[I]nformation about an individual should not lose
the protection of Exemption 6 merely because it is stored by an
agency in records other than ‘personnel’ or ‘medical’ files.”
Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 601.
Nonetheless, Freedom Watch relies on Simpson v. Vance, 648
F.2d 10 (D.C. Cir. 1980) for the proposition that “the
29
information sought – particularly the information concerning
government personnel and third party information received from
reporters – is not considered a personnel file[.]” Pl.’s Opp’n,
ECF No. 37 at 10. In Simpson, the D.C. Circuit ruled that “[t]he
[requested] information contained in [the State Department’s
publication] [did] not fall within the meaning of ‘personnel’
files or ‘similar’ files, and the additional fact that foreign
service personnel [were] subject to terrorist attacks [did] not
change the personal quality of the information contained in the
materials at issue: no fact of an intimate nature or no
embarrassing disclosure suddenly appear[ed] because [the D.C.
Circuit was] told that the information might be abused by
terrorists once disclosed.” 648 F.2d at 17.
Freedom Watch is wrong on the law, and the D.C. Circuit’s
decision in Simpson upon which Freedom Watch relies is no longer
good law. See Wash. Post. Co., 456 U.S. at 602 n.5; see also
Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9-10. As DOJ correctly notes, “[t]wo
years after that decision, the Supreme Court, in [United States]
Department of State v. Washington Post Company, 456 U.S. 595
(1982), abrogated Simpson and held that the ‘similar files’
language in Exemption 6 must be interpreted broadly, and that
any information in government records that ‘applies to a
particular individual’ meets the threshold for Exemption 6
protection.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 13 (quoting Wash. Post.
30
Co., 456 U.S. at 602). Freedom Watch’s reliance on Simpson is
perplexing given that a member of this Court relied on the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States Department of State v.
Washington Post Company in a FOIA case brought by Freedom Watch,
and explained that the “similar files” categorization “broadly
include[s] documents containing purely personal information,”
such as “personal e-mail addresses, phone numbers, and details
of individuals’ personal lives.” Freedom Watch, Inc. v. NSA, 49
F. Supp. 3d at 9 (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted). More troubling is that one of the cited cases in
Freedom Watch’s opposition brief expressly states that “the
Supreme Court issued its opinion in [United States] Department
of State v. Washington Post [Company], 456 U.S. 595 (1982),
rejecting this [C]ircuit’s rule, see Simpson v. Vance, 648 F.2d
10, 13 (D.C. Cir. 1980), that the phrase ‘similar files’ in
§ 552(b)(6) is limited to files within which may be found
‘intimate details’ and ‘highly personal’ information.” Arieff v.
U.S. Dep’t of Navy, 712 F.2d 1462, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1983); see
also Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9 (citing Arieff, 712 F.2d at
1468-69).
2. Privacy Interests
The Court next considers the second requirement—“the
information must be of such a nature that its disclosure would
constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
31
Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 598. “This, in turn, requires a two-
part analysis.” SAI v. Transp. Sec. Admin., 315 F. Supp. 3d 218,
259 (D.D.C. 2018). First, the Court must “determine whether
disclosure of the files would compromise a substantial, as
opposed to de minimis, privacy interest, because [i]f no
significant privacy interest is implicated . . . FOIA demands
disclosure.” Multi Ag Media LLC v. Dep’t of Agric., 515 F.3d
1224, 1229 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). If the agency demonstrates that “a substantial
privacy interest is at stake, then [the Court] must balance the
privacy interest in non-disclosure against the public interest.”
Consumers’ Checkbook Ctr. for the Study of Servs. v. U.S. Dep’t
of Health & Human Servs., 554 F.3d 1046, 1050 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
“Substantial, in this context, means less than it might seem. A
substantial privacy interest is anything greater than a de
minimis privacy interest.” Humane Soc’y of United States v.
Animal & Plant Health Inspection Serv., 386 F. Supp. 3d 34, 43
(D.D.C. 2019) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, DOJ has demonstrated that the individuals’ privacy
interests are substantial. OIP withheld the names and contact
information of certain SCO and law enforcement personnel after
“[c]onsidering the sensitive and often contentious nature of the
work of the SCO, as well as the work law enforcement personnel
conduct.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 24 ¶ 53. OIP and the
32
FBI withheld the personal e-mail addresses and telephone numbers
of reporters on the basis that “the release of such information
could subject those individuals to unwarranted harassment in
their personal time and personal lives.” Id. at 24 ¶ 54; see
also Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 12 ¶ 27 (“[T]he public could
draw negative conclusions based on their inquiries to OPA or
devote unwanted attention and/or harassment toward the
individuals based on their communications with OPA if their
identities were publicly disclosed.”). In addition, OIP and the
FBI withheld the names and personal identifying information of
third parties referenced in the records at issue to prevent
unwarranted harassment. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1 at 27-29.
Finally, OIP redacted purely personal information of reporters,
third parties, and DOJ employees, such as “vacation details,
holiday plans, religious observances, and other similar
information unrelated to any government function or activity.”
Id. at 29.
Freedom Watch argues that DOJ’s “examples” of the privacy
interests of the government personnel, reporters, and third
parties constitute a “speculative secondary effect condemned in
Arieff.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 9. In dicta, the D.C.
Circuit in Arieff stated that Exemption 6 “does not apply to an
invasion of privacy produced as a secondary effect of the
release . . . . [I]t is the very ‘production’ of the documents
33
which must ‘constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy.’” 712 F.2d at 1468 (citation omitted); see
also Nat’l Ass’n of Retired Fed. Emps. v. Horner, 879 F.2d 873,
877 (D.C. Cir. 1989). In Arieff, the government invoked
Exemption 6 to withhold information that contained the names and
amounts of prescription drugs supplied to the Office of
Attending Physician to the United States Congress (“OAP”), but
the information sought there did not identify a particular
member of Congress. 712 F.2d at 1466-68. The D.C. Circuit held
that Exemption 6 did not cover the information about the
prescription drugs because the records contained no information
directly attributable to an individual. Id. at 1467 (concluding
that the FOIA requester “established no more than a ‘mere
possibility’ that the medical condition of a particular
individual might be disclosed”). The opposite is true here. The
disclosure of the redacted information in this case would work a
clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy because such
information is attributable to individuals. See Arieff, 712 F.2d
at 1467-68. As stated by DOJ, “the release of the requested
information would not result in a mere theoretical possibility
of an invasion of privacy, or mere speculation regarding the
names contained in the withheld material.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No.
38 at 14.
DOJ points out—and the Court agrees—that the release of
34
information connecting any individual to “the politically
charged environment surrounding the SCO’s work” would subject
him or her to unwarranted harassment. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
at 27-28. The historical significance and high-profile nature of
the SCO’s investigation into the Russian government’s efforts to
interfere in the 2016 presidential election have generated
widespread debate and speculation. It is beyond dispute that the
government employees in the SCO and the FBI were working in
“sensitive agencies” and “sensitive occupations.” Long v. Office
of Pers. Mgmt., 692 F.3d 185, 192 (2d Cir. 2012); see also
Walston v. U.S. Dep’t of Def., 238 F. Supp. 3d 57, 67 (D.D.C.
2017) (Sullivan, J.).
In Walston, this Court found that the agency properly
withheld the names and other personal identifying information of
low-level government employees who conducted an investigation
into the plaintiff’s allegations of hacking activity by a
government employee because the investigators had a “cognizable
privacy interest in keeping their names from being disclosed”
because they were “employed in a ‘sensitive agenc[y]’ and [had]
‘sensitive occupations.’” 238 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (citation
omitted); cf. Judicial Watch, Inc., 736 F. Supp. 2d at 211 (“It
is well-established that information identifying law enforcement
and support personnel can be withheld pursuant to Exemption
7(C).”). For the same reasons, the Court therefore finds that
35
DOJ properly withheld the names and other personal identifying
information of the government employees, reporters, and third
parties in the responsive materials based on their substantial
privacy interests.
3. The Privacy Interests Outweigh the Public
Interest
The Court turns to the balancing of the privacy interests
against the public interest. The privacy interests at stake here
outweigh the public interest in the release of the redacted
information. Freedom Watch contends that the disclosure of the
redacted information “is necessary to disseminate to the public
any information concerning grand jury leaks and other
confidential information made by the media and leaked by the
spokesperson.” Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 10. In response, DOJ
argues that Freedom Watch’s assertion is nothing more than a
“wholly unsubstantiated claim,” and that Freedom Watch “offers
nothing to show why the public interest in the withheld material
outweighs the substantial privacy interests involved.” Defs.’
Reply, ECF No. 38 at 14. DOJ contends that Freedom Watch’s
“suggestion of wrongdoing is pure speculation that is, of
course, inaccurate and unsupported by any evidence.” Id. (citing
Nat’l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 173
(2003)).
“In this balancing analysis, [Freedom Watch] bears the
36
burden of establishing a legitimate public interest supporting
disclosure which is in line with the core purpose of FOIA, to
contribute to greater general understanding of agency practice
and procedure.” Walston, 238 F. Supp. 3d at 67 (citation
omitted). Freedom Watch has failed to do so. Freedom Watch has
not demonstrated how the personal information of the government
employees, reporters, and third parties will “help the public
stay informed about ‘what their government is up to.’” Am.
Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Exec. Office for Immigration
Review, 830 F.3d 667, 674 (D.C. Cir. 2016) (quoting DOJ v.
Reporters Comm. For Freedom of Press, 489 U.S. 749, 773 (1989)).
The Court therefore finds that DOJ properly withheld the
redacted information under Exemptions 6 and 7(C). Accordingly,
the Court GRANTS DOJ’s motion for summary judgment as to
Exemptions 6 and 7(C). 7
D. The Disclosure of Reasonably Segregable, Non-
Privileged Material
Finally, DOJ argues that it is entitled to summary judgment
7 Having found that Freedom Watch failed to carry its burden of
demonstrating that the disclosure of the redacted information
would advance the public interest under Exemption 6, the Court
need not decide whether Freedom Watch met its evidentiary burden
under Favish. See Favish, 541 U.S. at 174 (When “the public
interest being asserted is to show that responsible officials
acted negligently or otherwise improperly in the performance of
their duties,” the FOIA requester has the burden under Exemption
7(C) to “establish more than a bare suspicion in order to obtain
disclosure” and “produce evidence that would warrant a belief”
of “the alleged Government impropriety[.]”).
37
on its segregability determinations. Defs.’ Mem., ECF No. 36-1
at 31. Freedom Watch does not advance any legal arguments in
opposition to DOJ’s segregability determinations. See Pl.’s
Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 12. Rather, Freedom Watch argues that
“without the Court’s in camera review, [DOJ has] not clearly
demonstrated that the documents [Freedom Watch] seeks contain no
reasonably segregable factual information.” Id. DOJ disagrees,
arguing that “[t]he Brinkmann and Hardy declarations confirm
that OIP and [the] FBI, respectively, conducted a line-by-line
review to carefully determine in good faith what portions of
responsive materials could be released and what portions must be
withheld.” Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 16.
The Court has an “affirmative duty” to consider whether DOJ
has satisfied its segregability obligations. Trans–Pac. Policing
Agreement v. U.S. Customs Serv., 177 F.3d 1022, 1028 (D.C. Cir.
1999). “Agencies are entitled to a presumption that they
complied with the obligation to disclose reasonably segregable
material,” which must be overcome by some “quantum of evidence”
from the FOIA requester. Sussman v. U.S. Marshals Serv., 494 F.
3d 1106, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 2007). Such a presumption is warranted
in this case.
Here, the Brinkmann and Hardy declarations aver that all
reasonably segregable, non-exempt information has been released
to Freedom Watch. E.g., Brinkmann Decl., ECF No. 36-3 at 25 ¶ 55
38
(“There is no additional, non-exempt information that can be
segregated for release to Plaintiff.”); Hardy Decl., ECF No. 36-
4 at 15 ¶ 32 (“The FBI provided Plaintiff all non-exempt records
or portions of records responsive to its FOIA request.”); id. at
16 ¶ 36 (“The FBI . . . released all reasonably segregable, non-
exempt information[.]”). The first declarant confirms that “OIP
conducted a line-by-line review of the responsive documents to
determine in good faith what material should be released
consistent with FOIA’s requirements.” Brinkmann Decl., ECF No.
36-3 at 25 ¶ 55. The second declarant confirms the same. Hardy
Decl., ECF No. 36-4 at 15 ¶ 32 (“During the processing of
[Freedom Watch’s] request, a line by line review of each
responsive page was conducted to identify non-exempt information
that could be reasonably segregated and released.”).
Freedom Watch fails to present a “quantum of evidence” that
overrides the presumption in favor of DOJ’s segregability
determinations. Sussman, 494 F. 3d at 1117. DOJ did not withhold
in full any responsive materials. See, e.g., Defs.’ Reply, ECF
No. 38 at 16; Defs.’ Ex. 1, ECF No. 36-3 at 57-80; Defs.’ Ex. 2,
ECF No. 36-4 at 37-42. And Freedom Watch does not identify one
document or piece of information to show that DOJ failed to
satisfy its obligations to segregate exempt information from
non-exempt information. See Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37 at 12. The
Court therefore finds that DOJ’s Vaughn indices and declarations
39
demonstrate that all reasonably segregable, non-exempt
information has been released to Freedom Watch. The Court need
not conduct an in camera review because DOJ adequately describes
its segregability analysis and justifies its withholdings under
Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C). See Mead Data Cent. v. U.S. Dep’t of
Air Force, 566 F.2d 242, 262 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (“[A] district
court need not conduct its own in camera search for segregable
non-exempt information unless the agency response is vague, its
claims too sweeping, or there is a reason to suspect bad
faith.”). 8
IV. Conclusion
For the reasons set forth above, the Court GRANTS DOJ’s
Motion for Summary Judgment. A separate Order accompanies this
Memorandum Opinion.
SO ORDERED
Signed: Emmet G. Sullivan
United States District Judge
March 23, 2020
8 Freedom Watch requests an in camera review of the redacted
information in the responsive materials. Pl.’s Opp’n, ECF No. 37
at 12. DOJ argues that “in camera review is particularly
unwarranted because the agencies have demonstrated that the
redacted material falls within Exemptions 5, 6, and 7(C).”
Defs.’ Reply, ECF No. 38 at 17. The Court agrees. The Court will
not exercise its discretion to conduct an in camera review. See
5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B); see also Canning v. U.S. Dep’t of
State, 134 F. Supp. 3d 490, 502 (D.D.C. 2015) (“In camera review
is a last resort.” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)). Having found that DOJ is entitled to summary
judgment, the Court DENIES Freedom Watch’s request for an in
camera review.
40