UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 19-4661
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
BILLY WAYNE PAGE,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia, at Big
Stone Gap. James P. Jones, District Judge. (2:03-cr-10069-JPJ-1)
Submitted: March 17, 2020 Decided: March 24, 2020
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and DIAZ, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
W. Andrew Harding, CONVY & HARDING, PLC, Harrisonburg, Virginia, for Appellant.
Thomas T. Cullen, United States Attorney, Roanoke, Virginia, S. Cagle Juhan, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Abingdon,
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Billy Wayne Page appeals the 21-month sentence the district court imposed after it
revoked his supervised release. Page contends that his sentence is procedurally
unreasonable because the district court did not address his argument that he would not have
been on supervised release at the time of his violation had he not been sentenced under the
Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2018). Finding no error, we affirm.
“A district court has broad discretion when imposing a sentence upon revocation of
supervised release.” United States v. Webb, 738 F.3d 638, 640 (4th Cir. 2013). “We will
affirm a revocation sentence if it is within the statutory maximum and is not plainly
unreasonable.” United States v. Slappy, 872 F.3d 202, 207 (4th Cir. 2017) (internal
quotation marks omitted). “When reviewing whether a revocation sentence is plainly
unreasonable, we must first determine whether it is unreasonable at all.” United States v.
Thompson, 595 F.3d 544, 546 (4th Cir. 2010). We generally employ the same procedural
and substantive considerations that guide our review of original sentences. Slappy, 872
F.3d at 207.
“A revocation sentence is procedurally reasonable if the district court adequately
explains the chosen sentence after considering the Sentencing Guidelines’ nonbinding
Chapter Seven policy statements and the applicable 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) [(2018)] factors.”
Id.; see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e) (2018). “[A] district court, when imposing a revocation
sentence, must address the parties’ nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular
sentence, and if the court rejects those arguments, it must explain why in a detailed-enough
manner that this Court can meaningfully consider the procedural reasonableness of the
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revocation sentence imposed.” Slappy, 872 F.3d at 208. An explanation is sufficient if we
can determine “that the sentencing court considered the applicable sentencing factors with
regard to the particular defendant before it and also considered any potentially meritorious
arguments raised by the parties with regard to sentencing.” United States v. Gibbs, 897
F.3d 199, 204 (4th Cir. 2018) (brackets and internal quotation marks omitted). “[W]here
a court entirely fails to mention a party’s nonfrivolous arguments in favor of a particular
sentence, or where the court fails to provide at least some reason why those arguments are
unpersuasive, even the relaxed requirements for revocation sentences are not satisfied.”
Slappy, 872 F.3d at 209.
The Government is correct that Page never raised the argument that he claims the
district court did not address. Rather than arguing that he should not have been on
supervised release at the time of his violation, Page argued that the court should consider
the fact that he was sentenced under the ACCA when he was no longer an armed career
criminal after Johnson. * The district court addressed this argument but found that it failed
when measured against the breach of trust evidenced by this being Page’s fourth violation
of supervised release. The record shows that the court conducted a thorough hearing in
which it was familiar with the facts and parties’ arguments. We discern no procedural
error.
*
Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551 (2015).
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Therefore, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral argument
because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this
court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED
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