FILED
MARCH 26, 2020
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
IN THE MATTER OF THE MARRIAGE ) No. 36670-7-III
OF )
)
SHENNEN MARGARET GOODYEAR- )
BLACKBURN, ) OPINION PUBLISHED
) IN PART
Appellant, )
)
v. )
)
SHAWN DAVID BLACKBURN, )
)
Respondent. )
LAWRENCE-BERREY, J. — Shawn Blackburn sought reimbursement from Shennen
Goodyear-Blackburn for overpaid day care expenses. Shennen1 claimed she incurred
over $15,000 of day-care expenses, but could not produce cancelled checks or invoices.
The trial court applied a 10-year statute of limitations and entered judgment in favor of
Shawn for $43,300. We hold that the two-year catchall statute of limitations applies and
reverse Shawn’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
1
To avoid overuse of “Mr.” and “Ms.” when parties have the same last name, we
often refer to them by their first names.
No. 36670-7-III
In re Marriage of Blackburn
FACTS
In 2009, the parties agreed on terms to a legal separation, including primary
placement of their son with Shennen. The agreement required Shawn to pay Shennen 100
percent of educational expenses. When the agreement was presented, the trial court
interlineated “and day care” so the provision required Shawn to pay Shennen 100 percent
of “educational and day care expenses.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 13.
In 2010, the trial court converted the legal separation into a dissolution. The final
orders did not alter the earlier set child care obligation. As part of the dissolution decree,
both parties were permitted to purchase the family home from the other by paying the
other one-half of the net equity after a professional appraisal.
In June 2012, the Department of Child Services administratively set the monthly
child care expense payment at $650. The parties do not dispute that Shawn paid that
monthly amount.
At some point, Shawn questioned to what extent Shennen had incurred child care
expenses for their son. Shawn and Shennen tried to resolve this question. Between
May 2016 and March 2017, Shennen issued Shawn four checks totaling $3,500. In the
memo area of the first $1,000 check, Shennen wrote: “Repayment settlement total
[$]11,050 due @ 4/30 – this [$]1,000.” CP at 110.
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In September 2018, Shawn brought a motion requiring Shennen to show cause
why he should not receive a $43,300 credit toward his purchase of Shennen’s interest in
the former family home. The amount reflects a $3,500 credit against monthly payments
of $650 from June 1, 2012 through May 31, 2018.
Shennen opposed the motion. She asserted Shawn had agreed to various offsets
that significantly reduced the debt he now claimed. Shawn disputed an agreement was
reached.
Shennen claimed the governing statute of limitations was two years. In addition,
she claimed she was entitled to offsets totaling $15,550 for child care, $7,423 for their
son’s unreimbursed medical costs, and $1,900 for additional amounts. The
documentation she presented in support of her requests for offsets did not include checks
or invoices. With respect to child care expenses, her documentation included signed
verifications from two persons attesting to monthly amounts, each purportedly received to
care for the couple’s child. At Shennen’s request, the trial court gave her additional time
to produce checks and invoices to support her offset claims. After more than two months,
she failed to provide any documentation.
In March 2019, the trial court issued its written ruling. It found there was no
agreed reduction of the debt and, without clearly explaining why, it refused to apply
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In re Marriage of Blackburn
equitable estoppel or laches. The trial court noted that RCW 4.16.020 provides for a 10-
year statute of limitations for past due child support obligations that accrue under an
administrative order. Citing RCW 74.20A.020(6), which defines “administrative order,”
it concluded that the debt was a child support obligation that accrued under an
administrative order. The trial court, therefore, entered judgment in Shawn’s favor in the
amount of $43,300.
Shennen timely appealed to this court. Shennen has since passed away and her
estate has substituted in this and the lower court as the party in interest.
ANALYSIS
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS
The parties disagree which statute of limitations controls. Determinations of
which statute of limitations applies to a specific cause of action is a question of statutory
construction this court reviews de novo. City of Pasco v. Pub. Emp’t Relations Comm’n,
119 Wn.2d 504, 507, 833 P.2d 381 (1992).
Statutes are construed by applying well settled principles. Cortez-Kloehn v.
Morrison, 162 Wn. App. 166, 170, 252 P.3d 909 (2011). The purpose of statutory
construction is to give effect to the legislature’s meaning and intent. Roberts v. Johnson,
137 Wn.2d 84, 91, 969 P.2d 446 (1999). “Statutes must be interpreted and construed so
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that all the language used is given effect, with no portion rendered meaningless or
superfluous.” Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham, 128 Wn.2d 537, 546, 909 P.2d
1303 (1996).
If a statute is clear and unambiguous, it does not need interpretation. State v. J.P.,
149 Wn.2d 444, 450, 69 P.3d 318 (2003). Thus, we always begin with the statute’s
“‘plain language and ordinary meaning.’” Id. (quoting Nat’l Elec. Contractors Ass’n v.
Riveland, 138 Wn.2d 9, 19, 978 P.2d 481 (1999)). When interpreting a statute with
undefined terms, this court will give those terms their plain and ordinary meaning, unless
there is contrary legislative intent. State v. Connors, 9 Wn. App. 2d 93, 95-96, 442 P.3d
20, review denied, 193 Wn.2d 1041, 449 P.3d 656 (2019). If a statute is ambiguous and
the intent of the legislature is unclear, the court may rely on legislative history, including
bill reports, to help decipher the statute’s meaning. Biggs v. Vail, 119 Wn.2d 129, 134,
830 P.2d 350 (1992).
RCW 4.16.130 provides: “An action for relief not hereinbefore provided for, shall
be commenced within two years after the cause of action shall have accrued.” Therefore,
unless Shawn can point to a specific statute of limitations, this two-year statute controls.
Shawn cites both RCW 4.16.020(2) and RCW 4.16.020(3). He argues both control
his cause of action.
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RCW 4.16.020(2) provides in relevant part: “The period prescribed for the
commencement of actions shall be . . . ten years . . . [f]or an action upon a judgment or
decree of any court of the United States . . . .”
Shawn argues his action is one to enforce the original child support order, which is
part of the divorce decree. In support of his argument, he cites a provision of the support
order that states: “The obligor may be able to seek reimbursement for day care or special
child rearing expenses not actually incurred. RCW 26.19.080.”2 CP at 11. This
provision uses the word “may” and directs the parties to RCW 26.19.080, which sets forth
limitations and procedures for seeking reimbursements for overpaid day care or special
child rearing expenses. We construe the provision as notifying the parties of a statutory
2
RCW 26.19.080(3) provides in relevant part:
If an obligor pays court or administratively ordered day care or special child
rearing expenses that are not actually incurred, the obligee must reimburse
the obligor for the overpayment if the overpayment amounts to at least
twenty percent of the obligor’s annual day care or special child rearing
expenses. The obligor may institute an action in the superior court or file an
application for an adjudicative hearing with the department of social and
health services for reimbursement of day care and special child rearing
expense overpayments that amount to twenty percent or more of the
obligor’s annual day care and special child rearing expenses. . . . If the
obligor does not have child support arrearages, the reimbursement may be
in the form of a direct reimbursement by the obligee or a credit against the
obligor’s future support payments. If the reimbursement is in the form of a
credit against the obligor’s future child support payments, the credit shall be
spread equally over a twelve-month period. . . .
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right, not as creating a right in the decree for reimbursement. Shawn’s argument would
be stronger if the provision stated, “The obligor shall be liable for reimbursement of day
care or special child rearing expenses not actually incurred.” Because it does not say this,
we conclude that Shawn’s request for reimbursement of child care overpayments is not an
action to enforce the child support order.
RCW 4.16.020(3) provides in relevant part: “The period prescribed for the
commencement of actions shall be . . . ten years . . . [after] the eighteenth birthday of the
youngest child named in the order for whom support is ordered for an action to collect
past due child support . . . .”
Here, Shawn seeks reimbursement for overpaid child care expenses. He does not
seek to recover past due child support. Overpaid child care expenses are not past due
child support. We conclude RCW 4.16.020(3) does not apply.
The Estate argues the applicable statute of limitations is 12 months. It cites one
sentence in RCW 26.19.080(3). We earlier set forth most of this subsection in our
footnote 2. The one sentence relied on by the Estate provides: “If the reimbursement is in
the form of a credit against the obligor’s future child support payments, the credit shall be
spread equally over a twelve-month period.”
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In re Marriage of Blackburn
We reject the Estate’s argument that RCW 26.19.080(3) provides a 12-month cap
for overpaid child care expenses. That section provides a 12-month cap if the obligor
parent seeks reimbursement by offsetting future child support payments. Here, Shawn
does not seek reimbursement by offsetting future child support payments. Rather, he
seeks a judgment to offset Shennen’s one-half net equity in the former family home.
Because neither RCW 4.16.020(2) nor RCW 4.16.020(3) apply, we conclude the
two-year catchall statute of limitations applies.3 We remand for the trial court to enter an
amended judgment based on a two-year statute of limitations.
Reversed and remanded.
A majority of the panel having determined that only the foregoing portion of this
opinion will be printed in the Washington Appellate Reports and that the remainder,
having no precedential value, shall be filed for public record pursuant to RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
3
Shawn does not argue that Shennen’s four payments constitute an
acknowledgment of the debt for purposes of recommencing the statute of limitations. We
doubt the argument would have succeeded. Shennen never acknowledged the debt.
Rather, she disputed it. Her four payments, coupled with the “Repayment settlement total
[$]11,050” notation on the first check, reflect her willingness to pay a lesser amount.
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No. 36670-7-III
In re Marriage of Blackburn
DENIAL OF EQUITABLE RELIEF
The Estate contends the trial court erred by not applying equitable estoppel or
laches. We disagree.
The trial court did not explicitly explain why it denied Shennen’s request for
equitable relief. But based on the parties’ briefing below and on appeal, we can discern
the trial court’s reasons.
The trial court determined that Shawn was not equitably estopped from requesting
full reimbursement because he had not agreed to a lesser amount. We see no error. Even
if Shennen had established that Shawn had agreed to receive a lesser reimbursement, she
did not perform the agreement. Under the law of accord and satisfaction, when a debtor
fails to pay the lesser negotiated amount, the creditor may bring an action on the original
disputed amount. Douglas Nw., Inc. v. Bill O’Brien & Sons Constr., Inc., 64 Wn. App.
661, 685-87, 828 P.2d 565 (1992). Here, Shennen did not pay the purported negotiated
amount of $11,050.
Nevertheless, the trial court found that Shawn had not agreed to a lesser negotiated
amount. Equitable estoppel requires a party’s claim to be inconsistent with a prior act or
statement. Club Envy of Spokane, LLC v. Ridpath Tower Condo. Ass’n, 184 Wn. App.
593, 601, 337 P.3d 1131 (2014). Shawn’s request to recover the disputed amount,
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No. 36670-7-III
In re Marriage of Blackburn
therefore, was not inconsistent with any prior act or agreement. We conclude the trial
court did not err by refusing to apply equitable estoppel to this dispute.
The doctrine of laches is an implied equitable waiver arising when the plaintiff has
knowledge of existing conditions and acquiesces to them. Buell v. City of Bremerton, 80
Wn.2d 518, 522, 495 P.2d 1358 (1972). A defendant wishing to raise a laches defense
must prove three elements, “‘(1) knowledge or reasonable opportunity to discover on the
part of a potential plaintiff that he has a cause of action against a defendant; (2) an
unreasonable delay by the plaintiff in commencing that cause of action; and (3) damage to
the defendant resulting from the unreasonable delay.’” King County v. Taxpayers of King
County, 133 Wn.2d 584, 642, 949 P.2d 1260 (1997) (quoting 15 LEWIS H. ORLAND &
KARL B. TEGLAND, WASH. PRACTICE § 651, at 478 (5th ed. 1996)).
Here, the Estate argues Shawn unreasonably delayed to bring this action until he
wished to purchase the family home. We do not discern any unreasonable delay. Shawn
had good reason to not earlier seek reimbursement. Reimbursement would have come
directly from Shennen and, thus, taken away from their son’s care. Waiting until Shawn
could offset the family home purchase was not an unreasonable delay. We conclude the
trial court did not err by refusing to apply laches to this dispute.
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No. 36670-7-III
In re Marriage of Blackburn
The parties have not discussed whether Shennen's payment of $3,500 to Shawn
should be credited to the reduced judgment. We suggest, but do not hold, that the law of
accord and satisfaction might be applied to resolve that issue.
Reversed and remanded.
Lawrence, Berrey, J.
j
WE CONCUR:
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Pennell, C.J.
Siddoway, J.
11