[Cite as State v. Sanchez, 2020-Ohio-1171.]
STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
)ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT
COUNTY OF LORAIN )
STATE OF OHIO C.A. No. 19CA011507
Appellee
v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT
ENTERED IN THE
MARK SANCHEZ COURT OF COMMON PLEAS
COUNTY OF LORAIN, OHIO
Appellant CASE No. 16CR094749
DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY
Dated: March 30, 2020
HENSAL, Judge.
{¶1} Mark Sanchez appeals his convictions in the Lorain County Court of Common
Pleas. For the following reasons, this Court affirms.
I.
{¶2} The Grand Jury indicted Mr. Sanchez for aggravated murder, murder, aggravated
robbery, aggravated burglary, felonious assault, and obstruction of justice. In exchange for the
dismissal of the aggravated murder and murder charges, Mr. Sanchez agreed to plead guilty to the
remaining counts and agreed to an aggregate sentence of 14 years. The trial court accepted Mr.
Sanchez’s guilty plea and sentenced him to a total of 14 years imprisonment. Mr. Sanchez has
appealed, assigning as error that his trial counsel was ineffective.
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II.
ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
MR. SANCHEZ’S GUILTY PLEA IS VOID AS HE RECEIVED INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL IN THE PLEA NEGOTIATION PROCESS.
{¶3} Mr. Sanchez argues that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel
at the plea hearing when he mistakenly told the court that the plea agreement Mr. Sanchez had
reached with the State precluded Mr. Sanchez from being eligible for judicial release. To prevail
on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Sanchez must establish (1) that his counsel’s
performance was deficient to the extent that “counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment” and (2) that “the deficient performance
prejudiced the defense.” Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). A deficient
performance is one that falls below an objective standard of reasonable representation. State v.
Bradley, 42 Ohio St.3d 136 (1989), paragraph two of the syllabus. A court, however, “must
indulge a strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, under the
circumstances, the challenged action ‘might be considered sound trial strategy.’” Strickland at
689, quoting Michel v. Louisiana, 350 U.S. 91, 101 (1955). To establish prejudice, Mr. Sanchez
must show that there existed a reasonable probability that, but for his counsel’s errors, the outcome
of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Sowell, 148 Ohio St.3d 554, 2016-Ohio-
8025, ¶ 138.
{¶4} We will begin with the prejudice prong because it is dispositive. State v. Loza, 71
Ohio St.3d 61, 83 (1994). According to Mr. Sanchez, he is subject to a longer sentence than he
ought to have been because his counsel did not clarify his eligibility for judicial release. Revised
Code Section 2929.20(C) provides that “[a]n ‘eligible offender’ may file a motion for judicial
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release with the sentencing court” at certain prescribed times depending on the length of the
offender’s nonmandatory sentence. Mr. Sanchez does not identify anything that his counsel said
that disqualifies him from being an “eligible offender” under Section 2929.20(A). Mr. Sanchez
notes that, although his counsel agreed with the trial court at the plea hearing that “judicial release
is not considered a part of this case[,]” the judge did not ask him directly whether he agreed with
that assessment at the time he changed his plea. We note that, when the Court asked the prosecutor
whether “this [is] an agreed sentence that has to be served completely,” the prosecutor replied only
that “[i]t’s an agreed sentence.” In addition, the written plea agreement that is in the record does
not mention judicial release or indicate that Mr. Sanchez will be ineligible for judicial release. The
agreement only provides that the parties have agreed to an “aggregate sentence of 14 years.” The
trial court’s sentencing entry also does not provide that Mr. Sanchez’s entire sentence is
mandatory.
{¶5} Upon review of the record, we conclude that Mr. Sanchez had not established that
he has or will be prejudiced by the statement that his counsel made before he entered his guilty
plea. Accordingly, we conclude that Mr. Sanchez has failed to establish ineffective assistance of
his trial counsel. Mr. Sanchez’s assignment of error is overruled.
III.
{¶6} Mr. Sanchez’s assignment of error is overruled. The judgment of the Lorain County
Court of Common Pleas is affirmed.
Judgment affirmed.
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There were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common
Pleas, County of Lorain, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of
this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27.
Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of
judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period
for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to
mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the
docket, pursuant to App.R. 30.
Costs taxed to Appellant.
JENNIFER HENSAL
FOR THE COURT
SCHAFER, J.
CONCURS.
CARR, P. J.
CONCURRING IN JUDGMENT ONLY.
{¶7} I concur in judgment only on the basis that this Court cannot consider
anything outside the appellate record on direct appeal. The issue raised by Sanchez is more
appropriate for post-conviction relief.
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APPEARANCES:
LEIGH S. PRUGH, Attorney at Law, for Appellant.
DENNIS P. WILL, Prosecuting Attorney, and BRIAN P. MURPHY, Assistant Prosecuting
Attorney, for Appellee.