MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing Mar 30 2020, 10:01 am
the defense of res judicata, collateral CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
estoppel, or the law of the case. Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Philip R. Skodinski Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
South Bend, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Myriam Serrano
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Juan C. Rojas, March 30, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
19A-CR-2348
v. Appeal from the St. Joseph
Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Elizabeth C.
Appellee-Plaintiff. Hurley, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
71D08-1902-F1-9
Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 19A-CR-2348 | March 30, 2020 Page 1 of 8
Case Summary
[1] Juan Rojas appeals his conviction for attempted murder, a Level 1 felony. We
affirm.
Issue
[2] Rojas raises one issue for our review, which we restate as whether the evidence
is sufficient to support Rojas’ conviction.
Facts
[3] On February 22, 2019, Jennifer Alvizo, Rojas’ mother, and Jimmy Gamez,
Alvizo’s fiancée, lived together at Gamez’s home in South Bend. On February
22, seventeen-year-old Rojas and his girlfriend, sixteen-year-old A.V., were at
Gamez’s home. Rojas asked Alvizo and Gamez whether Rojas and A.V. could
stay at the home; however, Alvizo and Gamez declined to allow A.V. to stay
because she had run away from home.
[4] While Alvizo and Gamez were discussing the living arrangement, Rojas
overheard the conversation from an adjacent room and confronted Gamez.
Rojas was upset, angry, and aggressive when he confronted Gamez and told
Gamez that Gamez should discuss his concerns with Rojas instead of Alvizo.
Gamez and Rojas “buffed up” 1 to one another, and Gamez told Rojas that
1
Alvizo testified that “buffed up” means Gamez and Rojas stood up to one another as if they were about to
fight. Tr. Vol. II p. 21.
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Rojas was “not about that,” meaning Rojas was not ready to fight with Gamez
because Rojas was a minor and Gamez was an adult. Tr. Vol. II p. 21.
[5] After the encounter, an angry Rojas left the room where Alvizo and Gamez
were sitting. A.V. phoned Rojas’ sister, Cassandra Alvizo (“Cassandra”), and
requested a ride from the home. Rojas and A.V. packed clothes and, once
Cassandra arrived, Rojas and A.V. went outside to Cassandra’s vehicle. Rojas
told Alvizo that, after placing his belongings in the vehicle, he would return to
say goodbye to her. Rojas and A.V. put their belongings in Cassandra’s
vehicle, and A.V. and Cassandra left, leaving Rojas behind.
[6] Rojas returned to the front porch, stood at the door, and said: “Who ain’t about
that?” before shooting Gamez twice. Id. at 23. This comment Rojas made to
Gamez was in reference to the earlier argument between the two where Gamez
told Rojas that Rojas was too young to fight with Gamez. Gamez was sitting
on the couch when Rojas approached the door. The distance between Gamez
and Rojas was approximately ten to fifteen feet. The shots hit Gamez in his
abdomen and in his leg. Alvizo called law enforcement.
[7] Rojas left the home and walked toward a different street, where A.V. and
Cassandra, who left moments before, saw Rojas walking toward the vehicle.
When Rojas got inside Cassandra’s vehicle, Cassandra asked Rojas what was
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going on, to which Rojas responded: “Don’t trip.” 2 Id. at 58. Rojas was acting
“[n]ormal” when he got inside the vehicle. Id. at 75. Cassandra then dropped
off A.V. and Rojas at the home of their friend, Charles Douglas.
[8] A few days later, on February 25, 2019, A.V. used her father’s credit card to
purchase pizza, and police were able to locate A.V. and Rojas at Douglas’
home. Officers obtained a search warrant for Douglas’ home and found a gun
hidden behind a false wall in a closet.
[9] On February 25, 2019, the State charged Rojas with Count I, attempted
murder, a Level 1 felony; and Count II, battery by means of a deadly weapon, a
Level 5 felony. Rojas’ jury trial was held on June 4 and 5, 2019. Witnesses
testified to the foregoing facts.
[10] Detective Joshua Brooks, with the South Bend Police Department, testified that
Gamez identified Rojas as the shooter. Officer Ronald Wilson, with the South
Bend Police Department, testified that the weapon, located in Douglas’ home,
was a semi-automatic weapon and in order to fire two shots, Rojas was
required to pull the trigger twice.
[11] At the trial, Rojas admitted that he fired the gun two times. Rojas testified,
however, that his “intention wasn’t to kill” Gamez. Id. at 152. Rojas said he
“wasn’t thinking” when he fired the shots. Id. at 158. Rojas did admit that he
2
At trial, Cassandra testified that Rojas was telling Cassandra she should not “worry about it.” Tr. Vol. II p.
58.
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said: “Who ain’t about that life?,” id. at 176, before shooting at Gamez 3 and
that the gun shown to the jury at the trial was the gun he used to shoot Gamez.
In response to a juror question, Rojas stated that his intention was merely to
scare Gamez.
[12] The jury found Rojas guilty of both counts. The trial court entered judgment
on Count I only due to double jeopardy concerns and sentenced Rojas to the
Department of Correction for thirty years with five years suspended to
probation. Rojas now appeals his conviction.
Analysis
[13] Rojas argues insufficient evidence was presented regarding Rojas’ intent to kill
to support his conviction for attempted murder. When there is a challenge to
the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither reweigh evidence nor judge
witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204, 210 (Ind. 2016) (citing
Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert. denied), cert. denied. Instead,
“we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to the judgment together with
all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id. (quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d
at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is supported by ‘substantial evidence
of probative value even if there is some conflict in that evidence.’” Id. (quoting
Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84); see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558 (Ind.
2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was “beside
3
As discussed above, this comment was made in reference to an earlier fight between Rojas and Gamez.
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the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as a
reviewing court”). “We will affirm the conviction unless no reasonable fact-
finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a reasonable doubt.”
Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v. State, 867 N.E.2d
144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[14] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 35-42-1-1(1), for a defendant to be convicted
of murder, the State must prove that the defendant “knowingly or intentionally
kill[ed] another human being.” A defendant commits attempted murder if he or
she engages in conduct “that constitutes a substantial step toward” murder.
Ind. Code § 35-41-5-1(a).
Attempt crimes generally require the same mens rea as completed
crimes, but attempted murder is different in that it requires the
State to prove “the defendant’s specific intent to kill.” Rosales v.
State, 23 N.E.3d 8, 12 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis added). This
requirement “stems from ‘the stringent penalties for attempted
murder and the ambiguity often involved in its proof.’” Id.
(quoting Hopkins v. State, 759 N.E.2d 633, 637 (Ind. 2001)).
Miller v. State, 77 N.E.3d 1196, 1197 n.1 (Ind. 2017).
[15] “An intent to kill sufficient to sustain a murder conviction can be established in
several ways.” Burns v. State, 59 N.E.3d 323, 328 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016), trans.
denied. Specifically, intent to kill may be inferred from “the use of a deadly
weapon,” “the nature of the attack and the circumstances surrounding the
crime,” “[t]he duration and brutality of the attack[,] the relative strengths of the
defendant and victim,” and “where blows of magnitude are repeated, a jury
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could conclude that the defendant had an intent to kill.” Id. See also Leon v.
State, 525 N.E.2d 331, 332 (Ind. 1988) (“Discharging a weapon in the direction
of a victim is substantial evidence from which the jury could infer intent to
kill.”) (citations omitted).
[16] Here, jury had several facts from which it could infer Rojas’ specific intent to
kill Gamez. The State presented evidence that: (1) Gamez and Rojas got into
an argument; (2) an angry Rojas began to leave the home with Cassandra and
A.V., but remained behind after Cassandra and A.V. drove away and returned
to the house to confront Gamez with a loaded weapon; (3) Rojas shouted:
“Who ain’t about that?” prior to shooting Gamez, which was a remark in
response to Gamez’s earlier argument with Rojas, demonstrating Rojas’
continued anger with Gamez, tr. vol. II p. 23; (4) Rojas pulled the trigger twice,
firing two shots at Gamez; (5) Rojas then returned to the vehicle with
Cassandra and A.V. and was acting “normal,” id. at 75; (6) Rojas went to
Douglas’ house immediately after the shooting; and (7) the weapon was hidden
and police recovered the weapon behind a false wall in Douglas’ home. From
these facts, the jury could infer that Rojas firing the weapon two times toward
Gamez, along with the surrounding circumstances, demonstrated Rojas’
specific intent to kill Gamez.
[17] While Rojas testified that he did not have the intent to kill Gamez, the jury was
free to disbelieve Rojas. Rojas’ arguments are merely requests for us to reweigh
the evidence, which we cannot do. See Gibson, 51 N.E.3d at 210. The evidence
was sufficient for the jury to conclude that Rojas attempted to murder Gamez.
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Conclusion
[18] The evidence is sufficient to sustain Rojas’ conviction for attempted murder, a
Level 1 felony. We affirm.
[19] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Mathias, J., concur.
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