The summaries of the Colorado Court of Appeals published opinions
constitute no part of the opinion of the division but have been prepared by
the division for the convenience of the reader. The summaries may not be
cited or relied upon as they are not the official language of the division.
Any discrepancy between the language in the summary and in the opinion
should be resolved in favor of the language in the opinion.
April 2, 2020
2020COA56
No. 18CA0673, People v. Dax Ace Anderson — Constitutional
Law — Due Process; Criminal Law — Competency to Proceed
A division of the court of appeals considers whether a person
must be adjudged incompetent to proceed where the person has
made numerous statements and filings with the court that,
although appearing somewhat delusional on their face, are reflective
of a larger, yet atypical, anti-government system of beliefs shared by
others in the country.
The division concludes that an atypical system of beliefs
cannot alone be the basis upon which a defendant is incompetent
to stand trial.
The division also concludes that the trial court did not
misapprehend the competency standard, despite having made some
statements that the defendant was incompetent to waive his right to
counsel.
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS 2020COA56
Court of Appeals No. 18CA0673
Mesa County District Court No. 15CR487
Honorable Valerie J. Robison, Judge
The People of the State of Colorado,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Dax Ace Anderson,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED
Division I
Opinion by JUDGE DAILEY
Navarro and Gomez, JJ., concur
Announced April 2, 2020
Philip J. Weiser, Attorney General, Patrick A. Withers, Assistant Attorney
General, Denver, Colorado, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Danielle C. Jefferis, Alternate Defense Counsel, Denver, Colorado, for
Defendant-Appellant
¶1 Under the law, a person is incompetent to proceed in a
criminal case if he or she lacks (1) a rational and factual
understanding of the criminal proceedings or (2) sufficient ability to
consult with his or her lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding in order to assist in the defense. To be competent to
proceed, then, a person’s perceptions and understandings about
the criminal justice process and the charges must be rational and
grounded in reality.
¶2 In this case, we are called upon to determine whether a person
must be adjudged incompetent to proceed where the person has
made numerous statements that, although they may appear
somewhat delusional on their face, are reflective of a larger, yet
atypical, anti-government system of beliefs shared by others in the
country.
¶3 Because we conclude that such a person need not be adjudged
incompetent to proceed, we affirm the judgment of conviction of
defendant, Dax Ace Anderson, entered on jury verdicts finding him
guilty of (1) eleven counts related to sexual assaults on three
children and (2) various sentence enhancers.
1
I. Background
¶4 Anderson was charged in April of 2015 with the alleged
offenses in this case. He was eventually tried and convicted thirty-
one months later, in November 2017. Over the course of the case,
Anderson had nine attorneys appointed to represent him or to serve
as advisory counsel. The majority of these attorneys withdrew
because of Anderson’s refusal to work with them and lack of
communication.
¶5 Between the court’s multiple appointments of new counsel,
Anderson’s requests to proceed pro se, and Anderson’s generally
disruptive behavior during the proceedings, the preliminary hearing
was delayed almost two years until February of 2017. When
Anderson refused to appear at the preliminary hearing, the court
determined that he had waived his right to such a hearing, and the
case proceeded to trial.
¶6 Over the course of the case, there was continued consideration
given to Anderson’s competence to proceed. Three competency
evaluations were performed on Anderson by two different
psychologists at the Colorado Mental Health Institute at Pueblo.
(Anderson’s counsel had requested the first and third evaluations,
2
and the court had ordered the second one sua sponte based on the
nature of Anderson’s filings with the court.1) The result of each
evaluation was the same: Anderson did not have any mental
disability that would prevent him from interacting with counsel or
understanding the facts surrounding the charges against him.2
Based on these evaluations, along with its own questioning of
Anderson during the case, the court concluded that Anderson was
competent to proceed.
¶7 On the morning of trial, Anderson decided not to participate
because, he said, the court did not have jurisdiction over him.
When Anderson left the courtroom of his own accord, his appointed
counsel tried the case in his absence.3
1 For example, Anderson’s filings continuously referenced tax law,
the Uniform Commercial Code, and various inapplicable
constitutional provisions. The filings also stated often that “Dax
Anderson” was a fictitious entity subjected to the frauds of the
United States government.
2The second and third evaluations are contained in sealed portions
of the record on appeal, and the second evaluation quotes the first
evaluation.
3 Anderson decided not to participate in the remainder of the trial
too, leaving the courtroom each and every day of trial.
3
¶8 The defense presented at trial was that the three child victims’
testimony was not credible. After a seven-day trial, the jury found
Anderson guilty on all counts. Subsequently, the court sentenced
him to an indeterminate sentence of at least 240 years in the
custody of the Department of Corrections.
II. Anderson Was Properly Found Competent to Stand Trial
¶9 Anderson contends that the trial court erred in finding him
competent to stand trial, despite his incoherent filings, courtroom
statements, and inability to assist counsel. We disagree.
A. Preservation, Standard of Review, and General Law
¶ 10 Initially, we reject the People’s assertion that Anderson failed
to properly preserve this issue for appeal because neither he nor his
counsel ever objected to the court’s findings of competency.
¶ 11 To properly preserve an issue for appeal, a party’s objection or
request must be specific enough to (1) draw the court’s attention to
the asserted error, Martinez v. People, 2015 CO 16, ¶ 14; (2) provide
the court with a meaningful opportunity to focus on the issue,
People v. Coughlin, 304 P.3d 575, 582 (Colo. App. 2011); and (3)
prevent or correct the error, People v. Moore, 226 P.3d 1076, 1082
(Colo. App. 2009).
4
¶ 12 Here, the issue of Anderson’s competency to stand trial
saturated the proceedings: defense counsel twice asked for and was
granted competency evaluations, and the court was concerned
enough about Anderson’s competency to order yet another
evaluation sua sponte. Not only was the court given a chance to
rule on the issue, it did rule on the issue. Consequently, we
consider the issue properly preserved for appellate review.
¶ 13 Where the issue has been raised, we review a trial court’s
competency determination for an abuse of discretion. People v.
Price, 240 P.3d 557, 561-62 (Colo. App. 2010). A court abuses its
discretion if its decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or
unfair, id. at 561, or if it applies an incorrect legal standard, People
v. Mondragon, 217 P.3d 936, 939 (Colo. App. 2009).
¶ 14 Due process prohibits the trial of an incompetent defendant.
People v. Wingfield, 2014 COA 173, ¶ 32. “In Colorado, a
defendant’s due process rights in regard to competency are
protected by statute.” Price, 240 P.3d at 561. Under the statute, a
defendant is incompetent to proceed if “as a result of a mental
disability or developmental disability,” he lacks “sufficient present
ability to consult with [his] lawyer with a reasonable degree of
5
rational understanding in order to assist in the defense,” or “a
rational and factual understanding of the criminal proceedings.”
§ 16-8.5-101(12), C.R.S. 2019; cf. Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S.
402, 402 (1960) (per curiam) (Under the Due Process Clause, the
competence to stand trial inquiry focuses on whether the defendant
“has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer with a
reasonable degree of rational understanding — and whether he has
a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.”).
B. The Trial Court’s Determination is Supported by the Record
¶ 15 The trial court, without any objection from the parties,
determined that Anderson was competent to proceed. Its
determination is supported by the competency evaluations. In the
competency evaluations, the psychologists concluded that Anderson
was competent to proceed because he did not have a mental
disability or developmental disability and he had sufficient ability to
consult with a lawyer with a rational and factual understanding of
the criminal proceedings he faced.
¶ 16 The first two competency evaluations, as well as other parts of
the record, reflected the following:
6
Anderson sustained a traumatic brain injury in
approximately October of 2008, leaving Anderson with
some reported memory problems;
although Anderson was evaluated for malingering early in
the case because he claimed he could not recognize his
counsel, he later recognized counsel and recalled
previous conversations when he and counsel had met
with the psychologist;
the psychologist noted, during the conversations, that
Anderson logically connected his ideas;
Anderson’s initial, incomplete understanding of the legal
process had improved over the course of his case because
he had “bought many law books” and was studying
because he had decided to represent himself;
Anderson was generally familiar with terminology, the
trial process, plea options, and the relationship between
attorney and client;
Anderson was aware he had been charged with multiple
counts of sexual abuse on children and understood the
general facts regarding the charges: where he was, who
7
the alleged victims were, and the possibility of spending
life in prison if convicted;
the psychologist was not concerned with Anderson’s
understanding of general legal principles and the facts
surrounding the charges;
the psychologist (1) noted the lengthy list of appointed
defense counsel that had withdrawn from the case and
(2) was concerned with Anderson’s inability either to
work with an attorney to plan a defense or to represent
himself; and
the psychologist noted that “[m]aking what seems to be
an ill-informed choice as to whom he wants to help him
proceed pro se does not preclude him from having a
rational and factual understanding of the criminal
charges he faces.”
¶ 17 As to the third competency evaluation:
it was very brief;
8
Anderson largely refused to participate in the evaluation,
as well as other programs within the jail, citing
“Sovereign Citizenship” beliefs;4
Anderson was described as being behaviorally stable and
“his thought processes were coherent, logical, and goal-
directed,” and “although he endorsed beliefs related to
the Sovereign Citizen movement, his thought content was
not disturbed by a delusional belief system”;
4 Those who affiliate with “Sovereign Citizenship” believe in a
particular interpretation of the common law and believe they are
not subject to governmental statutes, proceedings, or jurisdictions.
They believe the individual, a “flesh and blood” man (denoted in
lowercase letters) is separate from a legally fictitious commercial
entity imposed upon them by issuance of a birth certificate and
other official documents (as governmental documents usually
denote names in all capital letters). Through this fictitious entity,
they believe, the United States government perpetrates fraud,
making the individual a “creditor” of the fictitious entity. Caesar
Kalinowski IV, A Legal Response to the Sovereign Citizen Movement,
80 Mont. L. Rev. 153, 158, 163, 166, 175 (2019) (discussing the
finer details of the Sovereign Citizenship movement); see, e.g.,
Kilgore-Bey v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, Civ. A. No. RDB-17-1751,
2017 WL 3500398, at *2 (D. Md. Aug 14, 2017) (“Sovereign citizens
are a loosely affiliated group who believe that the state and federal
governments lack constitutional legitimacy and therefore have no
authority to regulate their behavior.”) (citation omitted).
9
Anderson was able to describe the evidence in the case,
his awareness of the role of the district attorney, and the
roles of witnesses; and
Anderson was also aware of the appointed advisory
counsel but was still set on representing himself,
suggesting that Anderson had the ability to make
decisions about his case.
¶ 18 Given the contents of the evaluations, the lack of any objection
by Anderson or his counsel to the conclusions stated therein, and
the court’s ability to observe Anderson,5 we perceive no abuse of the
court’s discretion in determining him competent to stand trial.
C. Anderson’s Arguments Otherwise Are Unpersuasive
¶ 19 In so concluding, we necessarily reject Anderson’s assertions
that the court’s determination was in error because, according to
him, the record reflects that (1) he was delusional (i.e., his
perceptions and understandings were not rational and grounded in
5 See People v. Morino, 743 P.2d 49, 52 (Colo. App. 1987) (“The trial
judge who . . . has had the opportunity of observing the defendant,
his actions and general demeanor, has substantial discretion in
determining whether an issue respecting his competency has been
raised.”).
10
reality); and (2) the court misapprehended the governing law, as
demonstrated by its determination that Anderson was competent to
proceed but not competent to waive his right to a lawyer and
represent himself.
1. Anderson’s Beliefs
¶ 20 In legal support of his first assertion, Anderson relies on the
following pronouncement from another division of this court:
[A] defendant’s factual understanding of the
proceedings, proper orientation as to time,
place, and person, and his ability to furnish
accurately information as to his past history
and the events at issue are not alone sufficient
to establish the defendant’s competence.
Rather, the defendant’s perceptions and
understandings must also be rational and
grounded in reality.
Mondragon, 217 P.3d at 940 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
¶ 21 As pertinent here, Anderson points to various statements he
made in documents or in court. The following are examples of
those statements:
In a motion for writ of habeas corpus, Anderson wrote,
I Anderson: Dax Ace: the Natural Living-born
man of God, to implore, motion, and direct this
court, to take the following actions without any
further sale, denial, delay, or obstruction.
11
....
Be it further noted that on & for the private &
and public records of this case, that,
Anderson: Dax Ace is the Authorized Agent for
the corporate artifice & fiction known as “DAX
ACE ANDERSON, ET AL,” and that Natural,
Living-born man CANNOT under any measure,
or means, be used as “collateral” for the
alleged “Debt Obligation,” and under the
Colorado Constitution’s Bill of Rights, Sections
#12 and 20, “no person shall be imprisoned for
debt,” and that, “No excessive bail, or cruel &
unusual punishment shall be imposed, or
inflicted.”
Anderson filed a “Notification of reservation of rights UCC 1-
308/1-207.”
Anderson mailed documents to the court and district attorney
titled “Notice of Acceptance of dishonor and default,” “Notice of
dishonor,” and “Non-Negotiable Notice of Acceptance,” for
payments Anderson felt were owed to him under Uniform
Commercial Code rules.
In a document seeking a “Right of Master,” Anderson wrote:
I, dax-ace: anderson, a living and breathing
man of the land. Do hereby give right of
master to all who work with The Bear’s law
and Forensics Team located at [a Florida
address]. If my rights are violated and/or I am
incapacitated due to an unlawful arrest or
abduction caused by any officer or official
12
working outside the color of law and/or not
following their oath of office. The Bear’s Law
and Forensics Team is granted full rights by
me to fight my case to the fullest extent of the
true law.
In another document, Anderson wrote, “From the beginning as
god is my witness, I dax, a true man of God acknowledge all
blessings given by God; repent all transgressions against God;
and waive all claims without God[.]”
In another document, Anderson wrote, “I Do Not ‘Consent’ to
any Force or Physical Abuse . . . this is not a Criminal Issue.
This is a Tax Issue. . . I Do Not ‘Consent’ and Do Not
‘Contract.’”
Anderson filed documents titled “Hell has No fury Like a
Woman Scorned” and “LEGAL NOTICE AND DEMAND, FIAT
JUSTITIA, RUAT COELUM, Let right be done, though the
heavens should fall.”
In court Anderson made statements such as (1) “Okay,
another thing in here, it says without my consent you cannot
proceed, federal Rules Title 28, Civil Procedures, Section 636,
cannot proceed without my consent here”; (2) “Like I said
before judge, I’m not that person. I’m an authorized
13
representative for that person. I do not argue facts. I want
full disclosure in settling his account, period”; (3) “I am doing
a forgiveness of indebtedness and I’m instructing you to file a
1099-C within 72 hours. If you do not do this, I am filing a
criminal complaint with the Comptroller of the currency that
you and everyone involved are guilty of tax evasion because
you are qualified heir to receive property from defendant’s
estate and you haven’t paid the tax on property . . . .”; and (4)
“I’m the secured party creditor and I demand you provide of
jurisdiction over me, the secured party creditor.”
¶ 22 On the surface, these statements might appear, as Anderson
argues, to depict a person who is not in touch with reality. Digging
deeper, however, these statements do not undermine the trial
court’s competency determination.
¶ 23 Anderson’s statements indicate that he shares some common
beliefs with people who identify with the “Sovereign Citizenship”
movement.6
6The record reflects that at times Anderson denied that he was a
“Sovereign Citizen,” and at other times, he acknowledged that he
was one. Whether or not Anderson was a “Sovereign Citizen” is of
14
¶ 24 In one of the competency evaluations, a psychologist noted
that beliefs akin to those held by “Sovereign Citizens” are not alone
sufficient for a DSM-5 diagnosis of a mental disorder and not
relevant to the competency issue.
¶ 25 We agree that such beliefs are not, in and of themselves,
indicative of a mental disorder. Nor are they dispositive of a
competency determination. In addressing a similar situation, the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals said:
It is not disputed that Neal made numerous
comments and filed a variety of documents
disputing jurisdiction and other “nonsensical”
issues (e.g., [the] United States is a
corporation. . . . as a corporation it cannot
interact with human beings; “the sale of bonds
based on Petitioners [sic] conviction by the
court creates a financial conflict of interest”.).
However, Neal also professed a “sovereign
citizen” belief system. His comments and
conduct were indicative of that belief, not a lack
of competence. Neal cannot now use those
beliefs as an expression of incompetency. “In
the absence of any mental illness or
uncontrollable behavior, [Neal] had the right to
present [his] unorthodox defenses and argue
[his] theories to the bitter end.”
no consequence to us. What is of consequence is that Anderson
shares many beliefs with people who espouse that cause and who,
as indicated below, have been found competent to proceed.
15
United States v. Neal, 776 F.3d 645, 657 (9th Cir. 2015) (emphasis
added) (footnote omitted) (quoting United States v. Johnson, 610
F.3d 1138, 1147 (9th Cir. 2010)). Other courts have reached a
similar conclusion. See, e.g., United States v. Coleman, 871 F.3d
470, 478 (6th Cir. 2017) (“[S]imply espousing sovereign citizen and
other fringe views does not necessarily demonstrate lack of
competence . . . .”); United States v. Gooch, 595 F. App’x 524, 527-
28 (6th Cir. 2014) (“[M]erely believing in fringe views does not mean
someone cannot cooperate with his lawyer or understand the
judicial proceedings around him. . . . [T]he question is not whether
a defendant has tax-protester or other fringe beliefs but whether
possessing those beliefs establishes, without more, a deeper
breakdown in communicative ability (i.e., ability to communicate
with one’s lawyers) or cognitive ability (i.e., ability to understand the
ongoing legal proceedings). We answer that question as several of
our sister circuits have: with a resounding ‘no.’”); United States v.
James, 328 F.3d 953, 955-56 (7th Cir. 2003) (“Many litigants
articulate beliefs that have no legal support . . . . Sometimes these
beliefs are sincerely held, sometimes they are advanced only to
annoy the other side, but in neither event do they imply mental
16
instability or concrete intellect so deficient that trial is impossible. .
. . One person with a fantastic view may be suspected of delusions;
two people with the identical view are just oddballs.”) (citation
omitted); State v. Tucker, 62 N.E.3d 893, 898 (Ohio Ct. App. 2016)
(“Other courts, when faced with similar circumstances, have
consistently concluded that while such behavior may reflect
unusual beliefs and may go so far as to obstruct trial court
proceedings, they are not indicia of incompetency . . . .”).
¶ 26 In line with these authorities, courts have uniformly rejected
the notion that people are incompetent to proceed simply because
they espouse or evidence a belief system similar to Anderson’s. See,
e.g., Gooch, 595 F. App’x at 526-27 (that a person was governed
only “by God’s law,” presented tax arguments to combat criminal
charges, and refused to speak to defense counsel “does not mean
[he] cannot . . . understand the judicial proceedings around him”);
United States v. Landers, 564 F.3d 1217, 1219 n.1 (10th Cir. 2009)
(holding a criminal defendant, who believed in an alternative
version of commercial law and planned to file liens and Uniform
Commercial Code documents against prison wardens to recoup
payment owed for unauthorized use of the defendant’s name, was
17
not incompetent to stand trial); United States v. Oehler, 116 F. App’x
43, 44 (8th Cir. 2004) (per curiam) (holding that “performing
incantations of the tax protest movement” and making legally
frivolous arguments were not evidence of mental incompetence);
James, 328 F.3d at 954-55 (holding the defendant’s exclamations
that he was a “secured party” in a criminal case was insufficient to
undermine a finding of competency).
¶ 27 Because Anderson’s unconventional beliefs do not necessarily
reflect that he is delusional or out of touch with reality, they are not
sufficient, in and of themselves, to undermine the court’s
competency determination.
2. Misapprehending the Competency Standard
¶ 28 Anderson asserts that he was not competent to stand trial
because the trial court concluded that he was not competent to
waive his right to counsel and proceed pro se. Because the
standard for determining competency to proceed is the same as that
for determining competency to waive counsel,7 Anderson argues
7 See People v. Davis, 2015 CO 36M, ¶ 16 (“A defendant is
competent to waive the right to counsel if he meets the threshold
standard for competence to stand trial articulated by the United
18
that the court should have recognized that he was as incompetent
to proceed as he was to waive counsel.
¶ 29 True, on occasion, the court did say that Anderson was not
“competent” to represent himself. But read in context, the court’s
“competence” concern was not that Anderson lacked sufficient
acumen or touch with reality to be capable of deciding whether to
proceed (with or without counsel). Rather, the court’s concerns were
that (1) Anderson was ill-equipped or sorely lacking in the legal
skills to represent himself and (2) Anderson was being obstinate
toward the progression of the case. Indeed, just over a year and a
half before trial, the court allowed Anderson to waive counsel and
proceed pro se with the help of advisory counsel, which
demonstrates that the court did not misunderstand or misapply the
applicable “competency” standard.8
States Supreme Court in Dusky v. United States, 362 U.S. 402
(1960) (per curiam).”).
8 The court subsequently determined that Anderson “waived the
right to represent [himself] based on [his] behavior, . . . [his]
disruptions, . . . [his] delaying tactics, . . . [his] inability to proceed
with this case in a just and appropriate manner,” and his hindrance
of “the administration of justice over and over and over again.” It
was not, the court noted, that Anderson did not understand the
19
III. Disposition
¶ 30 The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
JUDGE NAVARRO and JUDGE GOMEZ concur.
proceedings, it was that he “refuse[d] to adhere to the rules of this
courtroom.” See People v. Mogul, 812 P.2d 705, 708 (Colo. App.
1991) (The right of self-representation “may not be used to impede
the efficient administration of justice.”).
20
v. Dax Ace Anderson
Combined Opinion