United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT July 24, 2006
Charles R. Fulbruge III
Clerk
No. 05-51458
Summary Calendar
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ROBERTO GARCIA-BAEZA,
Defendant-Appellant.
--------------------
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Texas
No. 7:05-CR-91-ALL
--------------------
Before SMITH, WIENER, and OWEN, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Roberto Garcia-Baeza was convicted by a jury of attempting to
transport more than $10,000 outside the United States with the in-
tent to evade the currency reporting requirements of 31 U.S.C.
§ 5316, in violation of 31 U.S.C. § 5332. The district court
sentenced Garcia-Baeza to a 27-month term of imprisonment and a
*
Pursuant to 5TH CIR. R. 47.5, the court has determined that this opinion
should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circum-
stances set forth in 5TH CIR. R. 47.5.4.
No. 05-51458
- 2 -
three-year period of supervised release. Garcia-Baeza contends
that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We review
the district court’s fact findings for clear error and its legal
conclusions de novo. United States v. Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d 420,
430 (5th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1449 (2006).
Garcia-Baeza contends the court should have suppressed state-
ments made by him before he was given warnings pursuant to Miranda
v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). Garcia-Baeza was arrested after
bulk currency was discovered on his person and in his vehicle dur-
ing a traffic stop. Routine traffic stops are analyzed under Ter-
ry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). Lopez-Moreno, 420 F.3d at 430. A
reasonable person in Garcia’s situation would not have understood
that he was under formal arrest. See United States v. Bengivenga,
845 F.2d 593, 596–98 (5th Cir. 1988) (en banc). The restraint on
his freedom of movement was not of a degree that the law associates
with formal arrest. See id. The court did not err in refusing to
suppress the pre-arrest statements.
Garcia-Baeza argues that the court should have suppressed the
statements he made during an interview, two days after his arrest,
with a Special Agent of the Department of Homeland Security, Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement because he was not taken before a
magistrate judge in accordance with FED. R. CRIM. P. 5(a). He does
not dispute that he was legally detained pursuant to the immigra-
tion laws or that he was advised of his right to remain silent
before the interview. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(2). Because he has
No. 05-51458
- 3 -
been tried and convicted, he must show that he was prejudiced by
the delay in taking him before a magistrate judge. See United
States v. Causey, 835 F.2d 1527, 1529 (5th Cir. 1988). He can do
so by demonstrating that the delay affected the voluntariness of
his custodial statement. See United States v. Bustamante-Saenz,
894 F.2d 114, 120 (5th Cir. 1990). His conclusional argument does
not demonstrate that the delay in taking him before the magistrate
judge was “for the purpose of interrogation or for any other male-
volent reason” or “that the delay tainted the voluntariness of his
confession or that there was a causal connection between the delay
and his confession.” See Bustamante-Saenz, 894 F.2d at 120; see
also United States v. Martin, 431 F.3d 846, 849–50 (5th Cir. 2005),
cert. denied, 126 S. Ct. 1664 (2006); United States v. Perez-
Bustamante, 963 F.2d 48, 51–54 (5th Cir. 1992). The court did not
err in denying the motion to suppress.
Garcia-Baeza contends in a FED. R. APP. P. 28(j) letter that
his sentence was increased beyond the statutory maximum in light of
Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296 (2004). This question is not
properly before this court and has not been considered. See FED.
R. APP. P. 28(j); 5TH CIR. R. 28.4.
AFFIRMED.