NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 8 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, No. 18-50404
Plaintiff-Appellee, D.C. No.
2:05-cr-00578-JFW-37
v.
JOSE LUIS MEJIA, AKA Jose Al Mejia, MEMORANDUM*
AKA Checho, AKA Cheech, AKA Joe,
AKA Juan Martinez, AKA Check Mejia,
AKA Jose Mejia, AKA Jose L. Mejia, AKA
Jose Luiz Mejia, AKA Joe Morin, AKA Jose
Nernedes,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John F. Walter, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted April 3, 2020**
Pasadena, California
Before: BEA and BADE, Circuit Judges, and DRAIN,*** District Judge.
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
***
The Honorable Gershwin A. Drain, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of Michigan, sitting by designation.
Jose Luis Mejia was convicted of two drug-trafficking offenses alleged in a
multi-defendant First Superseding Indictment. He was sentenced to 324 months’
imprisonment. Mejia appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion for
a sentence reduction under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.
In 2007, Mejia appealed his conviction and sentence, which was
consolidated with eight of his co-defendants’ appeals. See United States v. Yepiz,
718 F. App’x 456 (9th Cir. 2017). The prior panel affirmed Mejia’s conviction and
denied his sentencing arguments without prejudice so that he could move in the
district court to modify his sentence pursuant to § 3582(c)(2). Id. at 473.
Following remand, the district court declined to exercise its discretion to grant
Mejia a sentence reduction and accordingly denied his motion.
Mejia argues that he is entitled to a sentence reduction based on the revised
drug-quantity thresholds in the amended Guidelines. We review the denial of a
sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2) for abuse of discretion. United States v.
Dunn, 728 F.3d 1151, 1155 (9th Cir. 2013). A district court abuses its discretion
when it applies the incorrect legal standard or if “the trial court’s application of the
correct legal standard was (1) illogical, (2) implausible, or (3) without support in
inferences that may be drawn from the facts in the record.” United States v.
Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1262 (9th Cir. 2009) (en banc) (internal quotation marks
2
omitted).
Contrary to Mejia’s contention, the district court properly followed the
procedure set forth in Dillon v. United States, 560 U.S. 817 (2010), for considering
a motion for sentence reduction under § 3582(c)(2). It determined that it was
“authorized to reduce” Mejia’s sentence under the first step of the Dillon inquiry.
Notably, the district court did not cite to any drug-quantity determination in this
section.
Next, the district court examined the drug quantity at issue in the second step
of the Dillon inquiry. The district court retains discretion in this second step to
decline to reduce a defendant’s sentence “based on the applicable [18 U.S.C.]
§ 3553(a) factors and the circumstances of the case.” United States v. Mercado-
Moreno, 869 F.3d 942, 962 n.12 (9th Cir. 2017). It should not be constrained in its
discretionary judgment at this stage of the inquiry. See United States v. Rodriguez,
921 F.3d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir. 2019) (“[T]he court must consider all applicable
18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors and determine whether, in its discretion, ‘the
authorized reduction is warranted, either in whole or in part.’”) (quoting Dillon,
560 U.S. at 826).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it cited to its prior
findings and references to the trial transcript, exhibits, and portions of the Pre-
Sentencing Report during its consideration of the § 3553(a) factors. At Mejia’s
3
sentencing, the district court determined that the government’s evidence was
“sufficient” to “sustain that all or [a] portion of that cocaine powder was converted
to cocaine base[.]” After referencing several alleged transactions, it ultimately
decided to “err on the side of caution” in its offense-level determination.
“Caution” here resulted in determination of lower drug quantities; thus, in Mejia’s
favor. The district court cited to these same findings in its order denying Mejia’s
motion to support its conclusion that there was “overwhelming evidence” of
Mejia’s drug trafficking which “strongly rebuts any argument” that Mejia deserved
a reduced sentence. Accordingly, the drug-quantity determinations are not
contradictory.
Mejia also argues that the denial of his motion was substantively
unreasonable. We review the substantive reasonableness of a district court’s
sentencing decision for abuse of discretion in light of the totality of the
circumstances. Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). The fact that this
court might reasonably have concluded that a different sentence was appropriate is
insufficient to justify reversal of the district court’s decision. Id.
Here, the district court determined that the original 324-month sentence
continues to be appropriate. It declined to grant any sentence reduction for three
reasons: (1) the overwhelming evidence of Mejia’s extensive drug trafficking and
the large quantities of cocaine base involved in his criminal conduct; (2) the need
4
for deterrence and to protect the public; and (3) the other factors previously
identified at sentencing, including Mejia’s failure to take responsibility, remained
“unchanged.” These reasons are properly grounded in § 3553(a).
Moreover, the district court specifically addressed the amended Guidelines’
policy considerations of the connection between the quantity of drugs involved in a
crime and its subsequent harmfulness and alleged danger to the community. After
providing a balanced analysis of positive and negative factors, the district court
determined that these policy considerations did not apply to Mejia’s case. The
district court’s explanation was sufficient, see Molina-Martinez v. United States, --
- U.S. ---, 136 S.Ct. 1338, 1348 (2016), and was not an abuse of discretion in light
of the totality of the circumstances, Gall, 552 U.S. at 51.
AFFIRMED.
5