NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5694-17T1
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
QUAWI TWIGGS,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted January 21, 2020 – Decided April 9, 2020
Before Judges Sumners and Geiger.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 11-04-1059.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Monique D. Moyse, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Jill S. Mayer, Acting Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Kevin Jay Hein, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
This post-conviction relief (PCR) matter arises from defendant Quawi
Twiggs' negotiated plea agreement resulting in his guilty plea on May 21, 2012,
to an amended count of first-degree aggravated manslaughter in consideration
for the State recommending a prison term between ten and twenty years. Almost
two years earlier, defendant and his father were involved in a dispute that
tragically ended when defendant shot and killed his father in front of other
family members.
The State agreed to dismiss the charges of first-degree murder, third-
degree hindering apprehension, and two related second-degree weapons
offenses. Had defendant gone to trial and been found guilty of first-degree
murder he could have been sentenced to a prison term of thirty years to life. See
N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(b)(1).
At defendant's July 20, 2012 sentencing, following the parties' argument
and consideration of the aggravating and mitigating factors, the trial judge
rejected trial counsel's request that defendant receive a ten-year prison term and
imposed the twenty-year prison term subject to the No Early Release Act,
N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2, sought by the State.
On direct appeal, defendant only appealed his sentence. On October 28,
2015, we heard defendant's challenge on our Excessive Sentence Oral Argument
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calendar pursuant to Rule 2:9-11 and rejected his claim the sentence was
excessive because it should have been a mid-range sentence of twenty years.
On July 13, 2017, defendant filed a timely petition for PCR alleging trial
counsel was ineffective because counsel told him he would receive a ten-year
prison term or a sentence at the low end of the plea agreement's range because
he had a viable claim of self-defense. He contends he would not have pled guilty
had counsel informed him he would receive a twenty-year sentence. He also
claimed counsel and the trial court failed to mention the defense of self-defense.
In support of his petition, defendant submitted his own certification together
with certifications by his mother and sister to support his position that he shot
his father in self-defense. They all asserted defendant was confronted and
threatened by his father, who pulled up his shirt to reveal his waistband. Only
the sister's certification stated there was a gun in the father's waistband.
After considering the parties' briefs and arguments, PCR Judge Kathleen
M. Delaney denied relief without an evidentiary hearing because defendant
failed to establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under
the two-prong test of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984), that
defense counsel's performance was deficient and that, but for the deficient
performance, the result would have been different. In her oral decision, the
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3
judge determined the plea record established "all parties were aware of the
judge's discretion and that the [ten]-year . . . sentence was the low end of the
[plea] agreement and was solely a possibility." Specifically, the judge cited
defendant's plea form and his thorough plea colloquy evidencing his plea was
knowing and voluntary.
As for the self-defense issue, Judge Delaney noted the plea form and plea
colloquy reflected defendant knowingly waived his right to trial and the ability
to confront witnesses against him, and to testify and present his own witnesses
to support his self-defense claim.
On appeal, defendant raises the following contention:
POINT ONE
MR. TWIGGS IS ENTITLED TO AN EVIDENTIARY
HEARING ON HIS CLAIM THAT HIS ATTORNEY
RENDERED INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL BY ASSURING HIM THAT HE WOULD
NOT RECEIVE A MAXIMUM TERM OF
IMPRISONMENT, BUT WOULD RECEIVE A TERM
OF IMPRISONMENT ON THE LOWER END OF
THE SENTENCING RANGE, IN EXCHANGE FOR
HIS GUILTY PLEA.
Having considered defendant's arguments in light of the record and
applicable legal standards, they lack sufficient merit to warrant extensive
discussion in a written opinion, R. 2:11-3(e)(2), and we affirm substantially for
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the reasons set forth by Judge Delaney in her cogent oral decision. We only add
that the plea record fully supports the judge's determination that defendant was
fully aware of the sentencing range and even though the twenty-year sentence
imposed was at the high end of the range set forth in the plea agreement, it was
within the range. Defendant's bald assertion that counsel told him he would
receive a ten-year sentence fails to present any competent evidence of
ineffectiveness of counsel. See State v. Cummings, 321 N.J. Super. 154, 170
(App. Div. 1999). Because defendant failed to establish a prima facie claim of
ineffectiveness, an evidentiary hearing was not warranted. State v. Preciose,
129 N.J. 451, 462 (1992).
Affirmed.
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