NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS APR 10 2020
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CELIA REGINA FONTES CARVALHO, No. 19-70785
Petitioner, Agency No. A205-272-879
v.
MEMORANDUM*
WILLIAM P. BARR, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Submitted April 2, 2020**
Seattle, Washington
Before: McKEOWN, N.R. SMITH, and NGUYEN, Circuit Judges.
Celia Regina Fontes Carvalho, a native and citizen of Brazil, petitions for
review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) decision affirming the
Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). The parties are
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
familiar with the facts, so we do not repeat them here. We have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252, and we dismiss the petition in part and deny it in part.
We deny Carvalho’s challenge to the lack of time and date information in
her notice to appear because—regardless of the merits—the purported claim-
processing error was not timely raised. See United States v. Sadler, 480 F.3d 932,
940 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Absent a timely … invocation of … [a] claim-processing
rule, we are not obliged to enforce the rule.”). The “essential function” of a notice
to appear is to “[c]onvey … time-and-place information to a noncitizen” and
“facilitate appearance at [the] proceedings.” Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105,
2115 (2018). Here, the agency eventually provided the information in a notice of
hearing, and Carvalho fully participated in the proceedings by making an
appearance, offering evidence and testimony, and appealing to the BIA.
The agency did not err in finding no nexus between the harm and a protected
ground under either the “one central reason” standard for the asylum claim, or “a
reason” standard for the withholding-of-removal claim. See Barajas-Romero v.
Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 358–60 (9th Cir. 2017). Although it is possible that the
domestic partner’s generally violent nature was not the sole reason for abusing
Carvalho, Carvalho failed to show that she was targeted “on account of” belonging
to the social group, “members of the Fortes–Carvalho family.” Reyes v. Lynch,
842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016).
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The other social groups do not save Carvalho’s application. We lack
jurisdiction to address the proposed social group—“Brazilian women in a domestic
relationship who are viewed as property”—because it was not presented to the
BIA. See Barron v. Ashcroft, 358 F.3d 674, 677 (9th Cir. 2004). Nor do we
consider the social groups “women” and “women in Brazil,” which were not “the
grounds relied upon by [the] agency.” See Santiago-Rodriguez v. Holder, 657 F.3d
820, 829 (9th Cir. 2011) (citation omitted). Finally, substantial evidence supports
the agency’s conclusion that Carvalho did not belong to the social group,
“Brazilian women in a domestic relationship they are unable to leave.” See Reyes,
842 F.3d at 1132 n.3.
Substantial evidence also supports the agency’s denial of Carvalho’s CAT
claim because Carvalho failed to show that it is more likely than not that she would
be tortured by or with the consent or acquiescence of the Brazilian government.
See Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (that “the police
were aware of a particular crime, but failed to bring the perpetrators to justice” is
“not … sufficient to establish acquiescence in the crime”).
PETITION FOR REVIEW DISMISSED in part and DENIED in part.
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