ALD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 19-2016
___________
PHENG KUANG NA,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A088-646-122)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Steven A. Morley
____________________________________
Submitted on Respondent’s Motion for Summary Disposition Pursuant to
Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 19, 2019
Before: MCKEE, SHWARTZ, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: April 13, 2020)
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OPINION*
___________
PER CURIAM
*
This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
Petitioner Pheng Kuang Na petitions for review of an order of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) denying his motion to reopen. The Government has filed a
motion for summary disposition arguing that no substantial question is presented on
appeal. For the following reasons, we will grant the Government’s motion and
summarily deny the petition for review. 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Na, an ethnic Chinese Christian native and citizen of Indonesia who entered the
United States in 2005 on a valid non-immigrant visa, was charged with removability
pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(1)(B), for remaining in the United States for a time longer
than permitted. An Immigration Judge (IJ) sustained the charge of removability. In
2010, Na filed an application for asylum and for withholding of removal. He claimed
that he had suffered past persecution as a Chinese Christian and feared that he would
suffer persecution on account of his ethnicity and religion in the future. The IJ denied the
asylum application as untimely because it was not filed within a year of Na’s arrival, and
there were no extraordinary circumstances related to the delay. See 8 U.S.C.
§§ 1158(a)(2)(B), (a)(2)(D). The IJ further determined that Na had failed to meet his
burden of proof for withholding of removal. The BIA dismissed his appeal, and Na filed
a petition for review in which he argued that the Board made an impermissible factual
finding in determining that his asylum application was not filed within a reasonable time.
We granted the Government’s motion to remand.
In March 2016, the Board again affirmed, agreeing with the IJ that Na had not met
his burden to prove “extraordinary circumstances directly related to his failure to timely
file his asylum application.” It also affirmed the IJ’s determination that the harm Na
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suffered in Indonesia did not rise to the level of persecution, and that he failed to
establish a clear probability he would suffer persecution if he returns to Indonesia. Na
once again petitioned for review. We dismissed the petition to the extent Na challenged
the Board’s disposition of his asylum application as untimely and otherwise denied the
petition, finding that the agency’s denial of the withholding claim was supported by
substantial evidence. See Na v. Att’y Gen., 665 F. App’x 178 (3d Cir. 2016). In
particular, we found that substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that Na
would not likely suffer future persecution. Id. at 181. In so holding, we noted that, while
the record showed “widespread discrimination” against Chinese Christians, it did not
support a finding of “pervasive or systemic persecution.” Id. (citation omitted).
On December 27, 2016, two weeks after this Court’s decision, Na filed a motion
to reopen his immigration proceedings based on “changed country conditions,” which the
Board denied as untimely. The Board noted that the motion did not meet any of the
exceptions which would allow Na to file an untimely motion to reopen, and, alternatively,
that he failed to satisfy his burden of showing prima facie eligibility for relief. Na
petitioned for review, and we granted the Government’s motion to summarily deny the
petition, noting that the Board did not err in concluding that the evidence did not
demonstrate a pattern or practice of discrimination against ethnic Chinese Christians. See
C.A. No. 17-2202 (Order entered February 13, 2018).
Five months later, on July 2, 2018, Na filed another counseled motion to reopen
with the BIA, arguing that changed country conditions warranted relief. The BIA denied
the motion, and this petition for review ensued.
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We have jurisdiction over the petition for review pursuant to 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(a)(1). We review the denial of a motion to reopen for an abuse of discretion, Filja
v. Gonzales, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006), reversing only if the BIA’s decision is
“arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law.” Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 F.3d 166, 174 (3d
Cir. 2002).
An alien has the statutory right to file one motion to reopen removal proceedings
within 90 days of the entry of an order of removal. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i); 8
C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). There is no dispute that Na’s motion was his second motion to
reopen and that it was filed more than 90 days after the BIA’s final decision. However,
he argues that he falls within the exception to these limitations on the grounds that the
basis of his motion is changed country conditions, and the evidence supporting the
motion could not have been discovered or presented at the previous proceeding. See 8
U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii). Na challenges the
Board’s conclusion that he did not meet this exception because he had failed to
demonstrate materially changed country conditions.
In support of his motion to reopen, Na presented the 2018 Human Rights Watch
World Report and three articles – two reporting on bombings at three Christian churches
in Indonesia in 2018, and one reporting that Jakarta’s former Governor, a Christian, was
sentenced to two years’ imprisonment for blasphemy. Na argued in his motion that the
evidence “document[s] the pervasive, systemic and organized effort by radical Muslims
and the Indonesian authorities to prevent the free expression of Christianity” and that “the
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police and government authority have been either tolerant of violence or ineffectual in
curbing anti-Christian violence.” A.R. at 23.
The BIA acknowledged the recency of Na’s evidence but determined that it
reflects “a continuance of the on-going and sometimes volatile circumstances for Chinese
Christians in Indonesia” that gave rise to Na’s initial claim. BIA Op. at 2. With the
exception of the articles on the church bombings, the evidence is not qualitatively
different than that which Na provided in support of his first motion to reopen. Na had
previously presented evidence of increased enforcement of the blasphemy law, including
an article reporting that the Jakarta Christian Governor was named by the Indonesian
National Police as a suspect in a blasphemy investigation. And the 2018 Human Rights
Watch report noted that “[r]eligious minorities continue to face harassment, intimidation
from government authorities, and threats of violence from militant Islamists.” A.R. at 37
(emphasis added). The articles on the bombings report that they were coordinated suicide
attacks at three different Christian churches by Muslim extremists on behalf of the
Islamic State. A.R. at 27-25. The BIA did not address the articles, one of which noted a
“resurgence of Islamist attacks in recent years,” or Na’s claim that the bombings created
changed country conditions for Indonesian Christians. Id. at 35. In any event, there is
support for the Board’s alternative basis for denying the motion to reopen – that Na had
failed to establish prima facie eligibility for relief from removal. See INS v. Abudu, 485
U.S. 94, 104 (1988) (recognizing that the BIA may deny a motion to reopen if a “movant
has not established a prima facie case for the underlying substantive relief sought”); Lin
v. Att’y Gen., 700 F.3d 683, 686 (3d Cir. 2012).
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An asylum applicant must make a showing of a particularized threat of
persecution. See Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 316 (3d Cir. 2007). Na did not
proffer evidence that he would be individually singled out for persecution; rather, he
argued that there is a “pattern or practice” of discrimination against ethnic Chinese
Christians like himself. See Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 637 (3d Cir. 2006).
To constitute a pattern or practice, the persecution of the group must be “systemic,
pervasive, or organized.” See Lie v. Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 537 (3d Cir. 2005)
(quotation marks and citation omitted) (superseded by statute on other grounds).
Moreover, the acts of persecution must be committed by the government, or forces the
government is either unable or unwilling to control. Id.
The Board’s conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
“systemic, pervasive, or organized” persecution of Chinese Christians is not “arbitrary,
irrational or contrary to law.” Sevoian, 290 F.3d at 174. The exhibits, which detail
religious intolerance in Indonesia, highlight a few specific examples of enforcement of
the blasphemy laws against individuals of various minority faiths and isolated incidents
of religious violence by non-government actors. Na did not raise a single allegation of
legal or factual error committed by the Board in denying the motion to reopen, and we
perceive no abuse of discretion. We therefore grant the Government’s motion for
summary disposition, and we will deny the petition for review.
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