J-S07008-20
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
FAQUAN HILL :
:
Appellant : No. 2940 EDA 2018
Appeal from the Judgment of Sentence Entered September 21, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0010471-2017
BEFORE: NICHOLS, J., KING, J., and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY KING, J.: FILED APRIL 22, 2020
Appellant, Faquan Hill, appeals from the judgment of sentence entered
in the Philadelphia County Court of Common Pleas, following his bench trial
convictions for aggravated assault, simple assault, recklessly endangering
another person, and possessing instruments of crime.1 We affirm.
In its opinion, the trial court accurately set forth the relevant facts and
procedural history of this case. Therefore, we have no reason to restate
them.2
____________________________________________
* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
1 18 Pa.C.S.A. §§ 2702; 2701; 2705; 907, respectively.
2 We clarify that the written sentencing order confirms the trial court imposed
the probationary sentences concurrent to each other but consecutive to the
terms of incarceration, not concurrent to the terms of incarceration as stated
on the first page of the court’s opinion.
J-S07008-20
Appellant raises two issues for our review:
DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR AND/OR ABUSE ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT PERMITTED THE COMMONWEALTH
TO PRESENT HEARSAY EXCITED UTTERANCE TESTIMONY
FROM A POLICE OFFICER WHICH CONTAINED OUT OF
COURT STATEMENTS FROM THE COMPLAINANT THAT
ACCUSED APPELLANT OF ASSAULTING THE COMPLAINANT
WHERE THE COMPLAINANT/DECLARANT DID NOT TESTIFY
AT TRIAL?
IS THE SENTENCE IMPOSED UNDULY HARSH AND
EXCESSIVE UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE
AND AS APPLIED TO DEFENDANT/APPELLANT?
(Appellant’s Brief at 5).
After a thorough review of the record, the briefs of the parties, the
applicable law, and the well-reasoned opinion of the Honorable Daniel D.
McCaffery, we conclude Appellant’s issues merit no relief. The trial court
opinion comprehensively discusses and properly disposes of the questions
presented. (See Trial Court Opinion, filed April 15, 2019, at 5-11) (finding:
(1) evidence showed Victim was distraught at time she told police Appellant
was person who caused her injuries; Medic O’Donnell and Officer Hancock both
testified Victim was distressed and upset when they arrived on scene and
spoke to her; evidence showed Victim was still overwhelmed by what had
occurred at time she related that Appellant had assaulted her; thus, Victim’s
statement qualified as excited utterance exception to rule against hearsay;3
____________________________________________
3Appellant’s alternative Confrontation Clause argument is waived, as he did
not specify this claim at trial, in his written post-sentence motion, or in his
-2-
J-S07008-20
(2)4 sentence imposed was not excessive under circumstances; court
considered Appellant’s rehabilitative needs; court listened to defense counsel’s
proffered mitigating factors; court also reviewed pre-sentence investigation
report, which detailed Appellant’s history of domestic abuse; justice
demanded severe sentence where Appellant attacked Victim in her apartment
using hammer while their child was present; aggregate sentence on all crimes
was lenient given underlying facts and importance of protecting public from
violence). Accordingly, we affirm on the basis of the trial court’s opinion.
Judgment of sentence affirmed.
Judge Nichols joins this memorandum.
Judge Strassburger concurs in the result.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/22/2020
____________________________________________
Rule 1925(b) statement. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (explaining issues not raised
before trial court are waived on appeal).
4 Initially, we observe that Appellant has satisfied the four-part test required
to invoke our jurisdiction over his discretionary aspects of sentencing
challenge. See Commonwealth v. Evans, 901 A.2d 528, 533 (Pa.Super.
2006), appeal denied, 589 Pa. 727, 909 A.2d 303 (2006).
-3-
0023_Opinion
Circulated 03/26/2020 04:35 PM
IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS PHILADELPHIA
FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
TRIAL DIVISION-CRIMINAL SECTION
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : PHILADELPHIA COURT
: OF COMMON PLEAS
: CRIMINAL TRIAL DIVISION
v. CP-51-CR-0010471-2017
FAQUAN HILL FILED
APR t 5 2019
Office of Judicial Records
Appeals/Post Trial
OPINION
MCCAFFERY, J
Faquan Hill (hereinafter Appellant) appeals from the judgment of sentence imposed on
September 21, 2018. For the reasons set forth below, it is suggested that the judgments of
sentence be affirmed.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Appellant was found guilty by this Court following a waiver trial on June 21, 2018, of
Aggravated Assault, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2702, graded as a felony of the second degree, Simple Assault,
18 Pa.C.S. § 2701, Recklessly Endangering Another Person, 18 Pa.C.S. § 2705, and Possessing
Instruments of Crime, Generally, 18 Pa.C.S. § 907. On September 21, 2018, following the denial
of a Motion for Extraordinary relief, Appellant received concurrent sentences of incarceration of
five to ten years and two and one-half to five years on the Aggravated Assault and Possessing
Instruments of Crime charges, respectively. Sentences of two years' probation were imposed on
the remaining charges which were ordered to run concurrently with the sentences of
incarceration. Appellant thereafter filed post-sentence motions and when they were denied,
Appellant filed a notice of appeal and a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P 1925(b) Statement.
FACTUAL HISTORY
On November 26, 2017, at 1 :48 a.m., Mr. Mark O'Donnell, a paramedic employed by
the City of Philadelphia, responded to a call at 2819 North Broad Street in Philadelphia. (N.T.
6/21 /18, 13-15). Upon arrival, he heard someone screaming inside the residence. Accompanied
by a police officer, he went to the third floor of the residence and, as he entered, heard screams
as he proceeded up the stairs. (N.T. 6/21/18, 17-18). In the hallway outside an apartment, Mr.
O'Donnell saw a bloody hammer and blood on the walls. (N.T. 6/21/18, 18, 25-26).
Mr. O'Donnell went into the apartment and encountered K.L., the complainant herein,
holding a baby while leaning against a wall. (N.T. 6/21/18, 18).1 K.L, who was quite upset, had
a wound to her Jen temple cause by blunt force trauma that was still bleeding. (N .T. 6/21 /18, 19-
21 ). When Mr. 0' Donnell took the baby from her, K.L. related that she had been kicked and
punched and hit in her head with a hammer. (N.T. 6/21/18, 23-24). Mr. O'Donnell treated the
wound to her head and transported her by ambulance to Temple University Hospital. (N.T.
6/21/18, 26-27).
Philadelphia Police Officer Shawn Winton was on duty the night of the incident and was
also directed to 2819 North Broad Street. When the officer arrived, other police officers and
medics were already on the scene. (N.T. 6/21 /18, 37). One of the officers present was watching
Appellant, who was sitting on the steps. (N.T. 6/21 /18, 38).
Officer Winton recovered the hammer and assisted in the arrest of Appellant for domestic
abuse. Appellant asked the officer why he was being arrested. (N.T. 6/21/18, 38-40). Appellant
then told the officer multiple stories including that that he had been pushed down the steps and
I
K.L. did not appear for trial despite being subpoenaed to do so.
2
had been struck in the chest with a hammer by K..L. (N.T. 6/21/18, 39-41, 43-44, 48). Officer
Winton examined Appellant for injuries but did not observe any. (N.T. 6/21/18, 41). Winton
observed some blood on Appellant's shirt, which Appellant claimed resulted from his having
been struck with a hammer. (N.T. 6/21/18, 41).
Philadelphia Police Officer Courtney Hancock was the first police officer to arrive at the
scene. (N.T. 6/21/18, 41). She proceeded there after receiving a radio call, at about 1:45 a.m.,
directing her to go to the location to investigate a report of a person with a weapon. (N.T.
6/21 /18, 41 ). Upon arrival, the officer heard a man and a woman arguing inside the building, so
she entered the residence to investigate. (N.T. 6/21/18, 54-56). Once inside, she encountered the
complainant on a staircase located between the second and third floors of the building. (N.T.
6/21/18, 56, 60). The complainant was holding her head, which had a gash on it that was still
bleeding, and scratches on her arms. (N.T. 6/21/18, 57, 60). The complainant's shirt was ripped,
she was distraught, and looked disheveled. (N .T. 6/21/18, 57).
Officer Hancock asked the complainant what happened. Complainant stated that
Appellant, her boyfriend, struck her with a hammer and punched her, hit her, choked her and
scratched her. (N.T. 6/21/18, 59-60). The complainant then pointed out Appellant to the officer
as Appellant was walking down the steps from the third floor. (N.T. 6/21118, 60).
After medics treated the complainant, Officer Hancock accompanied the complainant to
her third-floor apartment where, in a hallway, the officer saw a hammer and blood on a closet
door. (N.T. 6/21/18, 61-62). Officer Winton placed Appellant under arrest. (N.T. 6/21/18, 63).
Appellant appeared calm with no visible injuries. Appellant denied striking the complainant.
(N.T. 6/21/18, 55, 67, 68, 69).2
The Commonwealth also presented, by way of stipulation, the partial contents of 911
2
Appellant and the complainant were the parents of the baby. (N.T. 6/21/18, 77).
3
calls made early that morning by Appellant and a neighbor, along with the complainant's
hospital records. (N. T. 6/21/18, 70- 71 ). The hospital records indicated that complainant suffered
a two-centimeter laceration over her scalp that was closed with four staples, pre-orbital swelling,
and redness sore to the touch. (N.T. 6/21/18, 70, 73).
Appellant testified in his own defense. He testified that he and the complainant lived
apart and shared care of their child. (N.T. 6/21/18, 77-78). On the day of the incident, he arrived
at the complainant's residence after l :00 a.m., intending to take the baby because he was
planning to go see his family during the upcoming weekend. (N.T. 6/21/18, 78-79). When the
complainant answered the door to her apartment, Appellant said she was intoxicated. He told her
that he did not like that she was intoxicated while watching the baby. (N.T. 6/2 l/l 8, 79-80).
Appellant stated that the complainant told him to stay and after telling her that he could not, he
began gathering baby items to take with him, but remained to have something to eat. (N.T.
6/21/18, 80-81). While he was eating, the complainant continued to try to convince him to stay
as she continued to drink alcoholic beverages. (N. T. 6/21 /18, 80).
At some point, Appellant went to gather some belongings. When he did so, the
complainant pulled out a hammer and warned Appellant that he was not going anywhere because
they were a family as she swung the hammer at him. (N.T. 6/21/18, 81). According to
Appellant, the complainant hit him in the chest with the claw end of the hammer causing him to
start bleeding. (N.T. 6/21/18, 81-82). When Appellant told her to "chill out", she lunged at him
and slipped and fell while doing so. (N.T. 6/21/18, 83). When she fell she hit her head on a step.
(N.T. 6/21 /18, 83-84).
After the complainant fell, Appellant retrieved the hammer and told the complainant that
is what happens when she drinks. (N. T. 6/21 /18, 84 ). He then tried to tend to her injury.
4
However, she went into the baby's room, grabbed the baby and again told Appellant that he was
not leaving. (N.T. 6/21 /18, 85). The couple began arguing over possession of the baby and, as
they were doing so, a neighbor's boyfriend kicked in the door, entered the apartment and waived
a gun. (N.T. 6/21/18, 85-86). The man said that he had a gun because he thought someone had
broken into her apartment. The neighbor then walked the complainant and the baby downstairs
and Appellant called the police. (N .T. 6/21 /1 8, 88-901 ). When the police arrived, he told them
about what had occurred. (N.T. 6/21/18, 94-95).
Appellant added that when the police asked the complainant if she wanted to press
charges, she responded that, although Appellant had hit her, she did not want to have Appellant
charged. (N.T. 6/21/18, 97). She thereafter changed her mind and said that she wanted to press
charges against Appellant only after Officer Hancock told her that if she declined to do so, her
baby would be taken by the Department of Human Services. (N.T. 6/21/18, 97). Appellant
denied hitting the complainant and accused the police of abusing him and not taking a statement
from him. (N.T. 6/21/18, 103-106).
DISCUSSION
In his l 925(b) statement, Appellant raised two claims in his first issue. First, he asserts
that this Court committed an abuse of discretion by permitting Officer Hancock to testify that the
complainant said Appellant was the person responsible for her injuries. He also complains that
without the disputed evidence underlying his first claim, the evidence was insufficient to sustain
the convictions herein because the evidence "merely establishes that appellant was merely
present at the scene where a person was found to be suffering from injuries allegedly incurred by
means of an assault by a person who was not identified." Appellant's I 925(b) Statement, Issue
5
1. It is respectfully submitted that neither claim has merit, and both should be rejected on
appeal.
With regard to the admission of Officer Hancock's testimony, a trial court's ruling on the
admissibility of evidence is governed by an abuse of discretion standard. Commonwealth v.
O'Brien, 836 A.2d 966, 968 (Pa. Super. 2003). An abuse of discretion is "not merely an error of
judgment; rather, discretion is abused when the law is overridden or misapplied, or the judgment
exercised is manifestly unreasonable or the result of partiality, prejudice, bias or ill-will, as
shown by the evidence of record." Commonwealth v. Busanet, 817 A.2d I 060, l 076 (Pa. 2002)
( citation omitted). Instantly, this Court did not abuse its discretion because the testimony in
question, albeit hearsay, was clearly admissible under the excited utterance exception to the
hearsay rule.
Hearsay is "a statement other than one made by the declarant while testifying at the trial
or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Pa.R.E. 801 ( c).
Hearsay is per se inadmissible unless permitted by the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence, rules
promulgated by our Supreme Court or by legislative enactment. Commonwealth v. Dent, 837
A.2d 571 (Pa. Super. 2003).
There can be no doubt that the testimony at issue was admissible as an excited utterance.
In Commonwealth v. Luster, 71 A.3d 1029 (Pa. Super. 2013), this Court recently wrote:
Pennsylvania Rule of Evidence 803(2) defines an excited
utterance as "[ a] statement relating to a startling event or condition
made while the declarant was under the stress of excitement caused
by the event or condition." The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has
explained that "it must be shown first, that [the declarant] had
witnessed an event sufficiently startling and so close in point of
time as to render her reflective thought processes inoperable and,
second, that her declarations were a spontaneous reaction to that
startling event." Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 603 Pa. 92, 982
A.2d 483, 496. (Pa.2009), cert denied, 559 U.S. 1111, 130 S.Ct.
6
2415, 176 L.Ed.2d 932 (U.S.2010) (internal citation omitted).
Luster, 71 A.3d at I 042.
In addition, the law provides that the speaker must be found to be in hysterical state of
mind after "percciv[ing] the happening" and statements must be made before the spontaneity is
negated. Commonwealth v. Pronkoskie, 383 A.2d 858, 863 (Pa. 1978). There is no clear cut
expiration on spontaneity. Id. In Commonwealth v. Wholaver, 989 A.2d 883 (Pa. 2010), our
Supreme Court stated:
There is no clearly defined time limit within which the
statement must be made after the startling event; the determination
is factually driven, made on a case-by-case basis. Id.; see also
Commonwealth v. Boczkowski, 577 Pa. 421, 846 A.2d 75, 95-96
(2004 ). "The crucial question, regardless of the time lapse, is
whether, at the time the statement is made, the nervous excitement
continues to dominate while the reflective processes remain in
abeyance." Pa.R.E. 803(2), cmt. (quoting Commonwealth v. Gore,
262 Pa.Super. 540, 396 A.2d 1302, 1305 (1978)).
Wholaver, 989 A.2d at 906-907. Further, "an excited utterance (1) need not describe ... the
startling event ... ; it need only relate to it, and (2) need not be made contemporaneously with, or
immediately after, the startling event." Rule 803(2) cmnt. Se� also Commonwealth v. Carmody,
799 A.2d 143 (Pa. Super. 2002).
In this case, the evidence clearly showed that the complainant was distraught at the time
she told the police that Appellant was the person who caused her injuries. Medic O'Donnell and
Officer Hancock both testified that the complainant was distraught and upset when they arrived
and spoke to her. 6/21/18, 21, 57). This was sufficient to allow the admission of the evidence
because it is clear that she was still overwhelmed by what occurred to her at the time she related
that Appellant caused her injuries. Sec Commonwealth v. Washington, 692 A.2d 1018, 1022
(Pa. 1997) (holding that it was proper to admit police officer's testimony that a named declarant
7
who witnessed a shooting where the declarant had been "in a very excited state");
Commonwealth v. Barnyak, 639 A.2d 40, 44 (Pa. Super. 1994) (holding that excited utterances
by shooting victim and son were admissible even though made more than a half an hour after the
shooting and in response to police questioning, where both victim and son were still visibly
experiencing the overpowering emotion of the event), @peal denied, 652 A.2d 1319 (pa. 1994),
cert. denied, 515 U.S. 1130 (1995). Accordingly, for the reasons stated, it is suggested that this
claim be deemed lacking in merit.
The second part of Appellant's claim should also be rejected because Appellant can only
obtain relief by excluding the testimony given by Officer Hancock that the complainant
identified Appellant as the person who caused her injuries. The law does not permit a reviewing
court to strike evidence admitted at trial when conducting a sufficiency review, even when that
evidence has been improperly admitted, which is not the case herein as the above discussion
demonstrates.
The applicable standard when evaluating the sufficiency of the evidence is whether the
evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, is sufficient to enable a
reasonable jury to find every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Commonwealth v.
Watkins, 843 A.2d 1203, 1211 (Pa. 2003). The entire trial record should be evaluated, and all
evidence received considered, whether or not the trial court's rulings thereon were correct.
Commonwealth v. Laird, 988 A.2d 618, 622 (Pa. 20 I 0). The trier of fact, while passing upon the
credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence, is free to believe all, part, or none of the
evidence. Id.
In view of the foregoing, it is clear that Appellant's sufficiency claim fails because a
review of all of the evidence, including the complainant's excited utterance, duly presented
8
during the trial established that Appellant was not just merely present, as he contends, and that he
was the cause of the complainant's injuries. Accordingly, it is respectfully suggested that
Appellant's sufficiency claim be denied for the reasons stated.
In his final claim, Appellant contends that this Court committed an abuse of discretion
when it imposed a sentence on Appellant because the sentence imposed was well above the
aggravated range suggested by the Sentencing Guidelines. In addition, Appellant asserts that the
sentence "was unduly harsh and excessive under the circumstances in light of the fact that
[Appellant] suffers from mental illness, has obtained lawful employment, and furthered his
education while on parole .... " Appellant's 1925(b) Statement, Issue 2.
A trial court's sentencing decision will not be disturbed absent a manifest abuse of
discretion. Commonwealth v. Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996) (citations omitted). "The
sentencer has broad discretion to choose a penalty from sentencing alternatives and the range of
permissible confinements, provided the choices arc consistent with the protection of the public,
the gravity of the offense, and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant." Commonwealth v.
Devers, 546 A.2d 12, 13 (Pa. 1988); sec also 42 Pa.C.S. § 972l(b). An appellate court is required
to accord the sentencing court great weight as it is in the best position to view the defendant's
character, displays of remorse, defiance or indifference, and the overall effect and nature of the
crime. Commonwealth v. Clever, 576 A.2d l l 08, 11 IO (Pa. Super. 1990). If a sentence is within
the statutory limits, the reviewing court will only find an abuse of discretion where a sentence is
so manifestly excessive that if inflicts too severe a punishment. Commonwealth v. Kahley, 539
A.2d 389, 390 (Pa. Super. 1988).
With regard to Appellant's remaining attacks on the discretionary aspects of his sentence,
"[tjhe proper standard of review when considering whether to affirm a court's sentencing
9
determination is an abuse of discretion. An abuse of discretion is more than a mere error in
judgment; thus a sentencing court will not have abused its discretion unless the record discloses
that the judgment exercised was manifestly unreasonable, or the result of partiality, prejudice,
bias or ill-will. Commonwealth v. Walls, 926 A.2d 957, 961 (Pa. 2007), citing Commonwealth v.
Smith, 673 A.2d 893, 895 (Pa. 1996). In imposing a sentence, the court must consider the
protection of the public, the gravity of the offense as it relates to the impact on the life of the
victim and on the community and the rehabilitative needs of the defendant as well as the
sentencing guidelines. 42 Pa. C.S. § 972l(b), Walls, 926 A.2d at 963.
Applying the foregoing to Appellant's issue, it is clear that this Court did not commit an
abuse of discretion because the sentence was not excessive under the circumstances and the
Court did consider Appellant's circumstances and rehabilitative needs. During the sentencing
hearing, this Court carefully listened as Appellant's counsel set forth mitigating circumstances
calling for a reduced sentence. The Court also reviewed the pre-sentence reports, which outlined
Appellant's horrendous history of domestic abuse. This Court's consideration of Appellant's
mitigating evidence is reflected in the record where this Court noted that it had considered that
evidence and, but for it, justice demanded a more severe sentence. (N.T. 9/21/18, 39-40).
Regarding the claim alleging that this Court did not consider Appellant's rehabilitative
needs, this Court did consider them in fashioning the sentence imposed on Appellant. This Court
carefully reviewed all of the reports and despite the seriousness of the underlying crimes, it
decided against imposing a more serious sentence, one which would have reflected the
seriousness of the of-lenses committed by Appellant and which would have protected the public
from Appellant for a far longer period of time. Although this Court did not recite every word in
42 Pa.C.S. § 9721(b), the certified record reveals it thoroughly considered appropriate factors
IO
prior to imposing sentence. Commonwealth v. Anderson, 830 A.2d 1013, 1018- 19 (Pa.
Super.2003) (the record as a whole must reflect the court's reasons and its meaningful
consideration of the facts of the crime and the character of the offender).
Finally, Appellant's sentence was not excessive in light of the senousness of the
underlying matters and the fact that Appellant attacked the complainant with a hammer in her
own apartment in the middle of the night with their child present. In fact, in this Court's view,
the aggregate sentence manifested leniency given the underlying facts and the importance of
protecting the public from criminal violence. In a case where the maximum imposable sentence
was far greater, it could be said that the sentence was too low. In any event, this Court
considered all relevant factors in deciding upon a sentence. This Court followed the
requirements under the Jaw and, thus, it is suggested that the Honorable Court deem this issue to
be lacking in merit.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, it is respectfully suggested that the judgments of sentence
entered in this matter against Appellants be affirmed.
BY THE COURT,
Date: April 15, 2019 /� Daniel D. McCaffery, J.
11
CERTIFICATION OF SERVICE
I, James Molinari, Esquire, Law clerk to the Honorable Daniel D. McCaffery hereby
certifies that on the 151h day of April, 2019, by first class mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct
copy of the attached opinion was served upon the following:
James R. Lloyd., Esquire
1315 Walnut Street-Suite 1605
Philadelphia, Pa. 19107
Lawrence J. Goode, Esquire
Chief-Appeals Unit
Office of the Philadelphia
District Attorney
Three South Penn Square
Phi lade I phi a, PA 19107
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12