MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be
May 01 2020, 9:23 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
APPELLANT PRO SE ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Michael D. Greer Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
New Castle, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Justin F. Roebel
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Michael D. Greer, May 1, 2020
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-3143
v. Appeal from the Shelby Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Trent Meltzer,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
73C01-0908-FB-15
Sharpnack, Senior Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 1 of 10
Statement of the Case
[1] Michael D. Greer appeals the trial court’s denial of his Motion to Remove
Probation Stipulation. We affirm.
Issue
[2] Greer raises one issue, which we restate as: whether the trial court erred in
denying his motion.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In August 2009, the State charged Greer with numerous offenses, including
criminal deviate conduct, a Class B felony. The State also filed a repeat sexual
offender sentencing enhancement. On April 11, 2011, the parties filed with the
trial court a Joint Motion to Enter Plea of Guilty (Joint Motion). In the Joint
Motion, Greer agreed to plead guilty to criminal deviate conduct and to being a
repeat sexual offender. In exchange, the State agreed to dismiss the remaining
charges.
[4] The parties also agreed in the Joint Motion that, if the trial court accepted the
plea agreement, Greer would be sentenced to twenty years for criminal deviate
conduct, plus ten years for the repeat sexual offender sentencing enhancement,
for a total of thirty years, with five years suspended to probation. Among other
conditions of probation, Greer acknowledged that he would have to comply
with a sex offender management program and with sex offender registry
requirements.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 2 of 10
[5] Also on April 11, the trial court held a hearing, at which the parties presented
1
the Joint Motion. The trial court took Greer’s guilty plea under advisement.
[6] On May 17, 2011, the trial court held a sentencing hearing. The court accepted
the parties’ plea agreement and imposed the sentence set forth in the Joint
Motion. In a sentencing order dated May 20, 2011, the court identified the
conditions of Greer’s probation, including requirements that he “comply with
the sex offender management program as well as the special sex offender
conditions of probation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 27. The Court further
informed Greer that while he was on probation, he would have to “comply with
the sex offender registry requirements.” Id.
[7] During the May 17 hearing, Greer signed a document captioned “Standard
Conditions of Probation.” Id. at 28. In the document, Greer again
acknowledged he would have to comply with a sex offender management
program and comply with sex offender registry requirements.
[8] At the same hearing, Greer reviewed and signed a document captioned
“Indiana Recommended Special Probation Conditions for Adult Sex
Offenders.” Id. at 29. In addition, the trial court read the document to Greer,
and Greer stated that he had read and understood the document.
1
A transcript of this hearing has not been included in the record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 3 of 10
[9] The document contained a list of conditions. Each condition was preceded by
spaces for a defendant’s initials and a checkmark. The document explained,
“[t]he special conditions checked below apply to you as a result of your sex
offense conviction and should be initialed by you after you have read these
conditions or after these conditions have been read to you.” Id. Greer placed
his initials next to the following relevant conditions:
2. You shall not reside within one thousand (1,000) feet of
school property (as defined in IC 35-41-1-24.7 . . . for the period
of probation . . . .
*****
3. [You] shall not reside within one thousand (1,000) feet of
school property, or a youth program center or a public park.
*****
15. You shall not travel alone after 10 p.m. (including but not
limited to: driving, walking, bicycling, etc.) unless given
permission by your probation officer.
16. You shall notify your probation officer of your establishment
of an intimate and/or sexual relationship. You shall notify any
person with whom you are engaged in an intimate or sexual
relationship of your sex-related conviction(s). You shall not
engage in an intimate or sexual relationship with any person who
has children under the age of 18 years.
*****
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 4 of 10
19. You must never be alone with or have contact with any
person under the age of 18. Contact includes face-to-face,
telephonic, written, electronic or any indirect contact via third
parties.
20. You shall not be present at schools, playgrounds, or day care
centers unless given permission by the court.
21. You shall not participate in any activity which involves
children under 18 years of age, such as, but not limited to, youth
groups . . . or youth sports teams, unless given permission by the
Court.
*****
27. You are prohibited from accessing or using certain web sites,
chat rooms, or instant messaging programs frequented by
children.
Id. at 29-31.
[10] On June 20, 2018, while he was still serving the executed portion of his
sentence, Greer filed a “Motion to Remove Probation Stipulation.” Id. at 32.
Greer supplemented the motion by addendum on August 17, 2018. In
summary, Greer asked the trial court to revise the conditions of his probation to
remove any restrictions on contacts with minors. He also asked the court to
remove the condition barring him from traveling alone after 10:00 p.m. He
claimed that those conditions would hinder his “re-entry into society” by
restricting his contact with his younger relatives. Id. at 32. Greer further
argued the restrictions would unfairly limit where he could live.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 5 of 10
2
[11] On October 18, 2018, the trial court held a hearing on Greer’s motion. On
November 27, 2018, the trial court issued an order. The court declined to
remove any of the conditions Greer challenged, but the court modified several
conditions restricting Greer’s contact with minors so that Greer could seek the
court’s permission to relax those conditions on a case by case basis “as specific
circumstances arise.” Id. at 43. This appeal followed.
Discussion and Decision
[12] Before we address the merits of Greer’s argument, the State claims Greer
cannot now challenge the conditions of his probation because he pleaded guilty
and accepted those conditions as part of his plea agreement. We agree.
[13] A plea agreement is a contract, and once the trial court accepts it, the terms of
the plea agreement are binding upon the trial court, the State, and the
defendant. Archer v. State, 81 N.E.3d 212, 215-16 (Ind. 2017). In general, a
person who pleads guilty may later challenge the merits of the trial court’s
sentencing decision only if “the trial court has exercised sentencing discretion,
i.e., where the sentence is not fixed by the plea agreement.” Collins v. State, 817
N.E.2d 230, 231 (Ind. 2004).
[14] In Greer’s case, the parties agreed in the April 11, 2011 Joint Motion that he
would serve an executed sentence of twenty-five years, plus five years of
2
A transcript of this hearing has not been included in the record.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 6 of 10
probation. The parties further agreed that Greer would be subject to conditions
of probation, including “comply[ing] with Sex Offender Mgmt Program/Terms
of Probation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. 2, p. 23. The precise elements of the sex
offender management program were not set forth in the agreement, but Greer
was aware that, by pleading guilty, he would be subject to those additional
requirements. At the sentencing hearing, the trial court reviewed the
requirements of the program with Greer, and he signed the document
acknowledging he understood these additional conditions of probation.
[15] We conclude that compliance with a sex offender management program, with
terms to be detailed later, was part of the bargain to which Greer agreed. He
may not now challenge the terms of his probation, just as he may not challenge
his executed sentence. See Freije v. State, 709 N.E.2d 323, 325 (Ind. 1999)
(explaining that “some ‘special’’ or ‘additional’ conditions that do not
materially add to the punitive obligation” are a binding part of the plea
3
agreement even if set forth in a separate form).
[16] Waiver notwithstanding, we turn to the merits of Greer’s appeal. He argues
that the trial court erred in refusing to eliminate the conditions of probation
barring him from interacting with children. Greer reasons that he was
convicted of a sex crime against an adult, and as a result, limitations on his
3
In the alternative, the State argues that Greer also waived his challenge to the conditions of probation by
failing to object to them at the sentencing hearing. We need not address this issue.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 7 of 10
contacts with children are not reasonably related to his rehabilitation or the
safety of the public.
[17] A trial court may impose upon a defendant conditions of probation that are
“reasonably related to the person’s rehabilitation.” Ind. Code § 35-38-2-2.3
(2009). As a result, trial courts have “broad discretion” in establishing a
defendant’s conditions of probation, and we will not disturb a trial court’s
probation ruling absent an abuse of that discretion. Weida v. State, 94 N.E.3d
682, 687 (Ind. 2018). A key inquiry is whether challenged conditions of
probation are “reasonably related to rehabilitating the defendant and protecting
the public.” Id.
[18] Greer does not dispute that he is a sex offender. Indiana Code section 35-38-2-
2.4 (2006) provides that as a condition of probation, the trial court may require
a sex offender to avoid contact with any person under the age of sixteen without
prior court approval. The statute does not distinguish between sex offenses
involving adult victims or child victims. Further, the record indicates that
Greer has committed crimes against children. A victim at his sentencing
4
hearing testified that Greer is “escalating from what he first did to now adults.”
Tr. Vol. 2, p. 7. Requiring Greer to refrain from contact with children is
relevant to protecting public safety and his rehabilitation. See Jackson v. State,
4
In addition, the State directs our attention to Greer’s prior appeals, which discuss his past convictions of
child molestation. See Greer v. Buss, 918 N.E.2d 607 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009). The State argues that Greer’s
repeat sex offender sentencing enhancement was based on his child molestation convictions, but the record
does not identify which prior convictions were the basis for his sentencing enhancement.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 8 of 10
816 N.E.2d 868, 871 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming conditions of probation
barring Jackson from being in contact with persons under the age of eighteen;
conditions were related to Jackson’s rehabilitation, even though his sex offense
involved an adult victim; evidence indicated he committed the offense in the
presence of a child).
[19] Greer cites Bleeke v. State, 6 N.E.3d 907 (Ind. 2014), in which the Indiana
Supreme Court determined that conditions of Bleeke’s parole barring him from
contact with children were invalid. Bleeke, like Greer, had been convicted of a
sex crime against an adult victim. We conclude Bleeke is distinguishable from
this case for two reasons. First, parole and probation are two different
circumstances. In fact, the Bleeke Court discussed Jackson and noted that
probation conditions are within a trial court’s discretion, as opposed to parole,
which is a function of the executive branch. Second, there was no evidence that
Bleeke posed a threat to children. In Greer’s case, the record from his
sentencing hearing, combined with his criminal record, demonstrate that he
poses a risk to children.
[20] We are also aware of a closer, but still distinguishable case, Waters v. State, 65
N.E.3d 613 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). Waters was convicted of criminal deviate
conduct and other offenses against an adult victim. He pleaded guilty. Before
he was released from incarceration, the trial court imposed conditions of
probation barring him from contact with minors. Waters appealed, claiming
that barring him from contacting minors was without evidentiary support. A
panel of this Court concluded the conditions of probation were inappropriate
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 9 of 10
because there was no evidence that Waters was a threat to children. By
contrast, in Greer’s case there is evidence that he poses a risk to children. As a
result, Greer has failed to demonstrate that the trial court abused its discretion
by declining to eliminate the sex offender conditions of probation that bar him
from contact with children without prior court permission.
Conclusion
[21] For the reasons stated above, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
[22] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Bailey, J., concur.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-3143 | May 1, 2020 Page 10 of 10