TEXAS COURT OF APPEALS, THIRD DISRICT, AT AUSTIN
NO. 03-19-00881-CV
J. B., Jr. and Y. R., Appellants
v.
Texas Department of Family and Protective Services, Appellee
FROM THE 353RD DISTRICT COURT OF TRAVIS COUNTY
NO. D-1-FM-17-003746, THE HONORABLE LORA J. LIVINGSTON, JUDGE PRESIDING
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Following a bench trial, the trial court rendered judgment terminating Y.R.’s
and J.B., Jr.’s parental rights to their children, J.B. and J.A.B.1 The trial court found that Y.R.
(Mother) and J.B., Jr. (Father) each knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the children to
remain in conditions or surroundings that endangered their physical or emotional well-being and
that they each engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the children with persons who engaged
in conduct that endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code
§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E). The court also found that Father failed to comply with a court order
establishing actions necessary for him to obtain the return of the children, who had been in the
permanent or temporary managing conservatorship of the Department of Family and Protective
Services for not less than nine months as a result of their removal from their parents under
Chapter 262 for abuse or neglect. See id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). The court found that termination
1
We use aliases to refer to the minors and to their adult relatives to protect the minors’
confidentiality. See Tex. R. App. P. 9.8(a), (b).
of both Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in the children’s best interest. See id.
§ 161.001(b)(2). Mother and Father both appealed the trial court’s order terminating their
respective parental rights. Mother challenged the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence
supporting the finding that termination of her parental rights was in the children’s best interest.
Father challenged the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting the (D), (E), and (O) findings
and the factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting the finding that termination of his parental
rights was in the children’s best interest. We will affirm.
BACKGROUND
In October 2016, the Department received a report that Mother had been found
passed out in a car in a hotel parking lot leaving four-year-old J.B. and one-year-old J.A.B.
playing in the parking lot unsupervised. The Department received a second report the next day
that Mother had been passed out in the hotel elevator and that J.B. and J.A.B. had been left
alone. By the time the Department received the reports, Mother was incarcerated, and the
children were with Father and his mother, Tammy. When the Department contacted Father, he
was uncooperative and verbally aggressive and told the Department to communicate with
Tammy rather than with him. The Department contacted Tammy, who told them that Mother
had been released from jail and had, over her objection, taken the children. The Department
determined that Mother had taken the children to south Texas to stay with her mother for a brief
time and then returned to Austin. The Department advised Mother not to let the children be with
Tammy because of her history of neglectful supervision and her criminal history.
In November 2016, Father was arrested for delivery of a controlled substance.
Mother informed the Department that she and the children had been with her mother in south
Texas but had returned to Austin. In December 2016, Mother was arrested for theft at a
2
shopping mall in Austin. Mother informed the Department that she had been incarcerated for
three to four days but had been released on house arrest and that she was staying in Austin with a
female friend. In January 2017, Mother was arrested on a warrant for a charge of child
endangerment related to the October 2016 incidents of neglect at the hotel.2 A law enforcement
officer informed the Department that the children would be placed with Father. After she was
released later that month, Mother contacted the Department to find out what she needed to
do to complete the Department’s investigation. At the Department’s request, Mother agreed to
participate in Family Based Safety Services (FBSS), an out-of-court program through which the
Department attempts to provide in-home services to a family. The Department hoped the program
could address Mother’s drug use and unstable housing situation and Father’s drug use as well as
provide parenting and other services.
The FBSS program lasted from February to March 2017 during which time
Mother and the children were living with a friend and Father was living with Tammy. The
children were not to be around either their maternal or paternal grandmothers because of their
histories with the Department. The Department met with Mother and the children monthly.
During that time, J.B. made an outcry that his mother kicked him and hit him. Mother denied
that and stated that J.B. “was a liar.” Mother started a nurturing parenting program but was
discharged because of irregular attendance. In April, the Department learned that Father had
been arrested for possession of methamphetamine. When the Department attempted to visit
Mother and the children in May, it learned that Mother was incarcerated because she tested
positive for cocaine in a drug test administered as part of her pending criminal case. The children
2
Mother’s counsel suggested at trial that the warrant was for traffic violations rather
than for child endangerment, but it was undisputed that Mother was arrested and taken into
police custody.
3
were with their maternal grandmother and aunt in south Texas. Mother told the Department
that she did not send the children to stay with Father because he would not cooperate with
the Department and because he used marijuana. In June 2017, Father and Mother were both
incarcerated and the Department placed the children with their maternal aunt in south Texas.
Having determined that the FBSS program was proving unsuccessful, the
Department filed an original petition seeking temporary managing conservatorship of the
children and to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to J.B. and J.A.B. in the event
reunification efforts failed. J.B. and J.A.B. remained with their maternal aunt until August 2017
when she informed the Department that she could not care for them due to health issues. The
children were placed with a foster parent in Austin. That placement was unsuccessful because
of J.B.’s behavioral issues, and the children were moved to another foster home in Austin
in December 2017. By February 2018, Mother was engaging in recommended services. She
complied with some, but not all, requested drug testing. Father was incarcerated and had not
participated in recommended services. J.B. and J.A.B. both had psychological evaluations and
were diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). J.B. was behind in his reading skills,
but with his foster parents’ help and after school tutoring, he had caught up. The individual
therapy sessions focused on working through J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s trauma. The children both had
extensive dental needs and underwent a few surgeries and got fillings to correct problems with
their teeth.
During the spring of 2018, Mother was doing well in parenting class and had
participated in individual therapy. The Department agreed to extend the June 2018 deadline for
the case because of Mother’s progress. In May 2018, the parties entered into a Mediated
Settlement Agreement for further temporary orders. Mother was to continue to engage in the
4
family service plan and follow the recommendations of the psychological evaluation. She was
also required to take regular drug tests and was informed that skipping a test would result in a
presumed positive result. Father did not attend the mediation, but his attorney was present.
Father was to provide all certificates of completion or other proof of services completed while
incarcerated and was ordered to notify the Department and provide his contact information
within forty-eight hours of his release.
In July 2018, Mother was arrested, her probation was revoked, and she was
incarcerated until the following October. Father was incarcerated for most of the year. After
Mother was released, she lived with various people while working on the recommended services.
The case went to trial in December 2018, but the Department requested a recess because
Mother and Father had been released so recently from jail that the Department wanted to give
them a chance to engage in more services and reestablish their relationships with J.B. and J.A.B.
Mother and Father were to refrain from criminal activity and drug use. Father was to refrain
from buying or selling drugs or associating with individuals who promoted criminal behavior.
In December 2018, the Department placed J.B. and J.A.B. with the Davidsons,
who were Father’s relatives. Mother was having weekly supervised visits with the children.
When Father was released from jail, he also had supervised visits. The children continued to
have behavioral issues, particularly after visits with their parents, and were engaged in weekly
therapy. Father neither completed the recommended services nor refrained from criminal activity.
Father had a positive drug test in November 2018 and failed to undergo a drug and alcohol
evaluation. Mother, however, continued to make progress with the recommended services and
was working and doing well. Meanwhile, the Davidsons had informed the Department they
could no longer care for J.B. and J.A.B., so the Department placed them with the Smith family,
5
who were identified as J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s fictive kin. Mother was also living with the Smiths.
In May 2019, the parties entered into another Mediated Settlement Agreement in which the
Department agreed to a plan to return the children to Mother. Mother was to have supervised
visits progressing to unsupervised and overnight visits with the goal of the children returning to
live with Mother and the Smiths in July 2019. In June 2019, Mother tested positive for cocaine.
Because the Smiths were unwilling to move Mother from their home and because the children
could not stay in a home with a person who had a positive drug test, the Department placed the
children with a foster family in Lometa, Texas.
The case was tried to the bench in a three-day proceeding. The court heard
testimony regarding the circumstances surrounding the children’s removal from their parents and
the events driving the Department’s decision to seek termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights. The court also questioned the witnesses. At the conclusion of the trial, the court found
several predicate grounds for terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to their children
and that termination was in the children’s best interest. The court rendered judgment terminating
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to J.B. and J.A.B. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
Father’s Challenge to Predicate Grounds for Termination
The trial court found that Father knowingly placed or allowed J.B. and J.A.B.
to remain in conditions that endangered their physical and emotional well-being and engaged
in conduct or knowingly placed J.B. and J.A.B. with persons who engaged in conduct that
endangered their physical or emotional well-being. See Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E).
The trial court also found that Father failed to comply with a court order establishing actions
necessary for reunification. Id. § 161.001(b)(1)(O). On appeal, Father challenges the legal
6
sufficiency of the evidence supporting these findings as well as the factual sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the court’s finding that termination of his parental rights was in the
children’s best interest.
In an appeal from the termination of parental rights, legal and factual sufficiency
challenges require a heightened standard of review. In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex.
2002); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 25 (Tex. 2002). In reviewing the legal sufficiency, we view
all the evidence in the light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a trier of fact
could reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction about the truth of the Department’s
allegations. In re J.L., 163 S.W.3d 79, 84-85 (Tex. 2005); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 265-66.
We do not, however, disregard undisputed evidence that does not support the finding. In re J.F.C.,
96 S.W.3d at 266. In reviewing the factual sufficiency of the evidence, we must give due
consideration to evidence that the factfinder could reasonably have found to be clear and
convincing. Id. We must consider the disputed evidence and determine whether a reasonable
factfinder could have resolved that evidence in favor of the finding. Id. If the disputed evidence
is so significant that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction,
the evidence is factually insufficient. Id.
We first consider Father’s legal sufficiency challenge to the court’s endangerment
findings. In his brief, Father asserts only that because he was not able to complete the
recommended services due to his incarceration, he “could not have negated the (D) grounds that
brought the children into care, by doing services” and, likewise, “could not have negated the (E)
grounds, by doing services.” Father does not contend that there was no evidence at trial to support
a finding that he engaged in conduct that endangered the children but, rather, maintains that his
inability to participate in the recommended services prevented him from negating the trial court’s
7
endangerment findings. Father’s participation in services, however, is unrelated to whether he
engaged in conduct constituting child endangerment; i.e. conduct that exposed the children to
loss or injury or jeopardized their emotional or physical well-being. Assuming, however, that
Father has adequately challenged it, we will review the evidence presented at trial to determine
whether it was legally sufficient to support the trial court’s endangerment finding.
Both subsections (D) and (E) require proof of child endangerment, that is,
“exposing a child to loss or injury or jeopardizing a child’s emotional or physical well-being.”
A.C. v. Texas Dep’t of Family & Protective Servs., 577 S.W.3d 689, 699 (Tex. App.—Austin
2019, pet. denied) (citing Texas Dep’t of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex.
1987)). “Endangerment does not need to be established as an independent proposition but may
be inferred from parental misconduct.” Id. “Although ‘“endanger” means more than a threat of
metaphysical injury or the possible ill effects of a less-than-ideal family environment, it is
not necessary that the conduct be directed at the child or that the child actually suffers injury.’”
In re M.C., 917 S.W.2d 268, 269 (Tex. 1996) (per curiam) (quoting Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533).
Under subsection (E), the relevant inquiry is whether evidence exists that the endangerment of
the child’s physical or emotional well-being was the result of the parent’s conduct, including acts
and omissions or failures to act. A.C., 577 S.W.3d at 699. “Termination under this subsection
must be based on more than a single act or omission; instead, ‘what is required is a voluntary,
deliberate, and conscious course of conduct.’” In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d 744, 764 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2019, no pet.) (quoting Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 723 (Tex. App.—
Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied)).
“A parent’s conduct that subjects a child to a life of uncertainty and instability
endangers the child’s physical and emotional well-being.” Id. Thus, “evidence of criminal
8
conduct, convictions, or imprisonment is relevant to a review of whether a parent engaged in a
course of conduct that endangered the well-being of the child.” Id. at 360-61. “A factfinder may
also infer that a parent’s lack of contact with the child and absence from the child’s life
endangers the child’s emotional well-being.” In re M.D.M., 579 S.W.3d at 765 (citing In re
R.A.G., 545 S.W.3d 645, 652 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.)); see In re U.P., 105 S.W.3d 222,
236 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied) (concluding that parent’s criminal
conduct, which resulted in parent’s imprisonment and absence from child’s life, created
“emotional vacuum” in child’s life that endangered child’s well-being).
On this record, we conclude that the evidence is legally sufficient to support the
trial court’s finding under subsection (E) that Father engaged in conduct that endangered the
children. Evidence showed that Father was incarcerated for most of J.A.B.’s life and a
considerable part of J.B.’s life; that Father repeatedly engaged in illegal conduct including use,
possession, and delivery of controlled substances such as Promethazine and methamphetamine;
that Father’s serial incarcerations caused him to be absent for much of the children’s lives; that
even during the times Father was not incarcerated he was inconsistent in visiting J.B. and J.A.B.;
and that Father allowed J.B. and J.A.B. to stay with Tammy despite the Department’s order that
they not be with her because of her extensive criminal and Department history. The children’s
therapist Robin Beauregard testified that both J.B. and J.A.B. suffered from PTSD as a result of
trauma experienced in their lives related to the instability of their living conditions. The trial court
could reasonably have determined that Father’s repeated criminal activity and incarcerations
contributed to this trauma. Father himself testified that he understood that his involvement with
drugs endangers the children’s stability and security and that the loss of security and stability can
cause emotional or psychological harm.
9
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we
conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form “a firm belief or conviction” that Father
engaged in conduct that endangered J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s physical or emotional well-being. See
Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Furthermore, there was no significant disputed evidence
that would render such finding unreasonable. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266. Because we
have concluded that the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court’s finding under
subsection (E), we need not address Father’s challenges to the trial court’s other predicate
findings under subsection (D) or (O). See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235, 239 (Tex. 2019) (per
curiam) (requiring appellate courts reviewing termination findings that are based on subsection
(D) or (E) to ensure that evidence is sufficient to support at least one of those two grounds
because finding under either could be used in future proceedings to terminate parent’s rights to
other children); A.C., 577 S.W.3d at 698-99 & n.2 (noting that when appellant challenges both
subsection (D) and (E) findings, appellate court needs to ensure that evidence is sufficient to
support one of those grounds); see also Tex. Fam. Code § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (“The court may order
termination of the parent-child relationship if the court finds by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent has had his or her parent-child relationship terminated with respect to another
child based on a finding that the parent’s conduct was in violation of Paragraph (D) or (E).”).
Mother’s and Father’s Challenge to Best Interest Finding
Mother asserts that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support
the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the children’s best interest,
and Father asserts a factual sufficiency challenge to this finding. The best-interest prong of
the termination statute “is child-centered and focuses on the child’s well-being, safety, and
development.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018). When deciding the best-interest
10
issue, we consider the well-established Holley v. Adams factors, which include the child’s
wishes, the child’s emotional and physical needs now and in the future, emotional or physical
danger to the child now and in the future, the parenting abilities of the parties seeking custody,
programs available to help those parties, plans for the child by the parties seeking custody,
the stability of the proposed placement, the parent’s conduct indicating that the parent-child
relationship is improper, and any excuses for the parent’s conduct. See 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72
(Tex. 1976); see also In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 631; In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 807 (Tex.
2012); In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). The Department need not prove all the Holley
factors as a “condition precedent” to termination, and the absence of evidence of some factors
does not bar the factfinder from finding by clear and convincing evidence that termination of
parental rights is in a child’s best interest. In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 27; Spurck v. Texas Dep’t of
Family & Protective Servs., 396 S.W.3d 205, 222 (Tex. App.—Austin 2013, no pet.).
The children’s wishes
The children’s therapist, Robin Beauregard, testified that J.B. and J.A.B. both
love Mother and would choose to live with her. She stated that neither of the children mentions
Father very often at all. Beauregard testified that the children enjoy their visits with Mother if
they are supervised and are excited to describe what happened during the visits. Beauregard
testified that J.B. and J.A.B. have also expressed that they want to stay in their foster placement
and continue to visit with Mother on a regular basis. Beauregard stated that the children expressed
that if Mother made certain changes, they would “want to go back to live with her if they knew it
would be that certain way.” Beauregard stated that it is not unusual for children from abusive
situations to express a desire to be with a parent even if the parent was neglectful and abusive.
Danielle Hensen, the CASA volunteer assigned to the case, testified that the children love their
11
mother but “struggle with the bond.” Henson stated that J.B. tends to keep some distance from
Mother during visits.
The children’s current and future emotional and physical needs
The testimony regarding J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s physical and emotional needs
principally focused on the need for stability so they could continue to process the trauma they
had experienced and learn methods to cope with their behavioral issues. One of the reasons
several placements failed was that J.B. demonstrated aggressive behavior and severe “melt downs”
accompanied by screaming and hitting his mother and J.A.B. Department case supervisor
Melissa Fabian testified that both J.B. and J.A.B. suffer from PTSD and that when J.B. and
J.A.B. were able to remain in one placement with routine and clear expectations, they were
able to work through their trauma and behavioral problems. She expressed concern about the
possibility that future placements could fail and the toll that would take on J.B. and J.A.B.
Fabian testified that the children have been through a lot and that continuing to move from place
to place would be detrimental to their well-being. Fabian stated that the instability, abuse, and
neglect the children had experienced have compounded to the point where both children will
need long term support and therapy that she did not believe either Mother or Father could
provide. In her view, the stability that terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights would
provide would be in the children’s best interest.
Beauregard testified that J.B. wanted his therapy sessions with her to focus on
how to deal with unsettling memories of living with Mother and how to develop appropriate
coping skills. Beauregard stated that J.B. needed to learn that the mistakes Mother and Father
made were not his fault or his responsibility. Beauregard emphasized the importance of routine
and structure to children with PTSD, as well as the importance of redirection to address
12
aggression and outbursts. Beauregard testified that J.B. had assumed a caretaker role of J.A.B.
and needs to learn to let that go and understand that the foster parents will take care of J.A.B.
Beauregard also stated that J.B. and J.A.B. need to be allowed to “be kids” and to be involved in
sports. With regard to J.A.B., Beauregard testified that he needed stability to process memories
that bother him and to learn to play without being overly physical.
Hansen, the CASA caseworker, testified that J.B. and J.A.B. need parents who
understand that their behaviors are the result of trauma they have experienced and who know
how to address those behaviors in a way that makes the children feel safe and protected. Hansen
opined that it would be best for the children to be the only children in the home because they
need a lot of focus and attention paid to them. Hansen also stressed the need for the children to
be in a stable living environment. Mallory Ladny, a Department caseworker assigned to the case
in March 2019, also testified that J.B. and J.A.B. need a permanent home after having been
moved so many times.
Emotional and physical danger to the children now and in the future
No evidence was presented that J.B. and J.A.B. were currently in any physical
danger or that, if they were returned to their parents, they would be in the future. Ample and
consistent testimony was presented that Mother and Father act appropriately with the children
and that Mother in particular is very loving and caring during visits. Additionally, the children’s
therapist, caseworker, and CASA volunteer all testified that the children are safe and doing well
in their current foster placement. Beauregard testified that the current foster placement is stable
and has helped J.B. improve his behaviors. In that placement J.B. is healing and developing
better coping skills. Beauregard stated that J.A.B. feels safe where he is and has been working
on overcoming trouble sleeping and bed wetting. The structure and routine of the current foster
13
family has also helped J.A.B. succeed at school. Hansen testified that, after a transition period,
J.B. and J.A.B. are doing well in their current foster placement. She stated that the foster parents
are warm and clear and concrete about what is required of the children and that they joke and
play with them.
The main concern expressed by the Department’s witnesses at trial was the
potential for future emotional harm to the children if they continue to be exposed to unstable
home environments and do not have the structure and routine that is currently helping them to
process the trauma they have experienced. Fabian testified that Mother’s history of relapsing
into drug use creates the potential for more emotional harm to J.B. and J.A.B. in the future. She
also expressed concern that if the children were placed in a foster home without sufficient
resources the placement could be unsuccessful and the children would have to be moved again,
which would be more detrimental than having them remain in the current successful foster
placement in Lometa. Fabian testified that the risk of further disruptions in the children’s lives
would be harmful to their emotional health.
Placement proposed by parents
Neither Mother nor Father asked that the court return J.B. and J.A.B. to their care.
Both asked that their parental rights not be terminated and that J.B. and J.A.B. live with Sandra,
Father’s second cousin. Sandra was identified as a potential relative placement in the month or
so preceding trial. Sandra, who is twelve years older than Father, testified that she raised him as
a child and that she had contact with J.B. and J.A.B. when they were babies. Sandra testified that
she was not aware of the circumstances of the case and did not know Mother well at all, but that
she wanted to do whatever she could to help Father and ensure that J.B. and J.A.B. were placed
with a relative. Father testified that he understood that if J.B. and J.A.B. were placed with a
14
relative, the children would risk exposure to members of the family who would negatively
influence him and the children. Father stated that he would address this by spending time with
those family members “on his own” rather than at family gatherings. Father testified that he
wants J.B. and J.A.B. to be with his family and that he would “avoid the conflict.” Mother
testified that she does not know Sandra but would prefer that the children be with family rather
than non-family.
The Department completed a home study for Sandra and, although the placement
was conditionally approved, Department witnesses testified about concerns they had that would
need to be addressed before they could recommend that the children be placed in Sandra’s home.
Fabian testified that Sandra would need a lot of support to meet the children’s needs. Fabian
noted that Sandra has four children of her own living with her and would need financial
assistance to adequately care for J.B. and J.A.B. Fabian testified that adoption by Sandra would
be the only way that such financial assistance would be available. Hansen expressed concern
because Sandra had told her that her plan was to have her seventeen-year-old daughter take care
of her younger two children while she focused on J.B. and J.A.B. Hansen testified that she was
concerned about this arrangement. Sandra also told Hansen that her daughter planned to enter
the military within the next year. Hansen echoed the concern about Sandra’s financial ability to
care for six children as well as concern that one of Sandra’s older children was on probation for
criminal activity.
The Department’s witnesses testified that while they would continue to consider
Sandra as a placement if their concerns could be alleviated, they would still recommend
terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights so that Sandra could receive necessary
financial assistance and so that if the placement was unsuitable, the Department could act
15
quickly to find an alternative for J.B. and J.A.B. During her testimony Sandra acknowledged
that adopting the children would be the best alternative for her because of the availability of
financial assistance. Sandra also stated that she understood the Department’s position that
termination of parental rights made sense so that if placement with her did not work out, the
Department could act quickly to place the children elsewhere.
Ladny summarized the reasons the Department believed termination of Mother’s
and Father’s parental rights to be in the children’s best interest. She testified that the Department
had heard from other relatives that they would be willing to adopt the children if parental
rights were terminated but would not be a placement for the children otherwise. Thus, termination
of parental rights would open up more options for a relative placement. Ladny testified that
adoption also opens up possibilities for financial assistance for J.B. and J.A.B. that they would
not otherwise have. Ladny stated that not terminating Mother’s and Father’s parental rights
limits the Department’s options and ties its hands in terms of its ability to further explore
placements that would be best for J.B. and J.A.B. Hansen testified that, while not seeing Mother
and Father in the future would be harmful for them, J.B. and J.A.B. would suffer more trauma if
they continued to have a relationship with Mother. Hansen testified that this opinion was based
on the fact that Mother, despite having participated in all the recommended services, continues to
engage in the same choices that traumatized the children and brought them into the Department’s
care. Hansen testified that her recommendation was to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights, have the children remain in their current foster placement, and explore whether adoption
by a relative or by the foster parents was the better option.
The common theme to the Department’s witnesses was that three years of
working to reunify Mother with J.B. and J.A.B. had failed because each time reunification
16
was imminent, Mother relapsed into drug use. Mother’s therapist, Curtis Laurence, testified that
although Mother has periods of sobriety, she struggles with periods of relapse. Laurence
expressed concern about whether Mother can maintain the positive changes she has made and
whether she can maintain sobriety. Laurence expressed no concern about Mother’s parenting
abilities but testified that, although she had worked hard, it would be difficult for Mother to
change behaviors such as drug use and criminal activity that are harmful to her and to her
children. Fabian testified that she believed the Department’s efforts at reunification had ultimately
made the children’s situation worse because it had exposed them to a longer period of instability.
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court’s finding, we
conclude that a reasonable factfinder could form “a firm belief or conviction” that termination of
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights was in J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s best interest. After considering
the disputed evidence, we conclude that a reasonable factfinder could have resolved that
evidence in favor of the finding and that it is not so significant that a reasonable factfinder could
not have formed a firm conviction or belief that termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental
rights was in J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s best interest. After consideration of the Holley factors and the
evidence presented to the court, we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient
to support the court’s finding that the best interest of the children will be served by terminating
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated in this opinion, we overrule Mother’s issue challenging
the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s best
interest. We also overrule Father’s issues challenging the court’s finding that he engaged in
conduct that endangered J.B.’s and J.A.B.’s physical or emotional well-being and that termination
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of his parental rights is in the children’s best interest. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s
order of termination.
__________________________________________
Thomas J. Baker, Justice
Before Chief Justice Rose, Justices Baker and Triana
Affirmed
Filed: May 6, 2020
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