[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
SEPT 25, 2006
No. 06-12039 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 97-00462-CR-FAM
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
GUILLERMO QUINONES,
Defendant-Appellant.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(September 25, 2006)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
In 1998 Guillermo Quinones was convicted of conspiracy to possess with
intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. His motion for new
trial was denied, and he was sentenced to 240 months imprisonment. In 2001
Quinones, represented by counsel, filed a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion seeking to
vacate his sentence. The motion was denied and we affirmed that denial. Earlier
this year Quinones, proceeding pro se, filed a Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b) motion seeking a
new trial of the same criminal charges for which he is serving the sentence.
In his Rule 60(b) motion Quinones asserted the claim that his counsel was
being investigated at the time of the trial for receiving the proceeds of drug sales,
which meant that he had a conflict of interest, and that conflict adversely affected
counsel’s performance. Because the government withheld the information about
his counsel’s conflict of interest, Quinones argues that the district court had abused
its discretion by denying his motion for a new trial and he is entitled to that relief
now. The district court denied Quinones motion, and he has appealed.
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion only for an abuse of discretion,
see Davis v. Florida Power & Light Co., 205 F.3d 1301, 1304 n.4 (11th Cir. 2000),
and we address jurisdictional questions de novo, Evans v. Walter Industries, Inc.,
449 F.3d 1159, 1162 (11th Cir. 2006). The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
“govern the procedure in the United States district courts in all suits of a civil
nature . . . .” Fed.R.Civ.P. 1. Rule 60(b) does not provide for relief from judgment
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in a criminal case. United States v. Mosavi, 138 F.3d 1365, 1366 (11th Cir. 1998);
United States v. Fair, 326 F.3d 1317, 1318 (11th Cir. 2003). It can in some
limited circumstances provide relief from an earlier denial of a § 2255 petition. See
Gonzalez v. Crosby, 125 S.Ct. 2641, 2648–50 (2005).
In other circumstances, a Rule 60(b) motion is treated as a second or
successive habeas corpus petition, and is therefore subject to the procedural
requirements of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996
(“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-32, 110 Stat. 1214 (1996). See Felker v. Turpin, 101
F.3d 657, 661 (11th Cir.1996) ( 28 U.S.C. § 2254 context). If a Rule 60(b) motion
puts forward a new claim for relief or a reason for granting a claim denied in the
earlier petition, it is “in substance a successive habeas petition and should be
treated accordingly.” Gonzalez, 125 S.Ct. at 2647. Before a prisoner may file a
second or successive § 2255 motion, we must authorize it by granting certification.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2255. Without that authorization, the district court has no
jurisdiction to consider a successive § 2255 motion. See 28 U.S.C. §
2244(b)(3)(A).
Because Quinones’ Rule 60(b) motion puts forward a new claim for relief or
a reason for granting a previously denied claim, it is subject to the restrictions on
second and successive motions for § 2255 relief. We have not certified the motion
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as one that may be brought, and could not do so because it does not fit within the
strictures of § 2255 ¶ 8. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to grant
the motion. It was properly denied.
AFFIRMED.
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